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Indian Philosophical quarterly

Vol. 27 2000 No. 1-4

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ISSN 0376-415X

61

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Indian Philosophical Quarterly

VOL. XXVII NO 1&2 JANUARY - APRIL 2000.

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Articles in the Journal are indexed in the *Philosopher's Index, U.S.A., Reportoire Biblographique de Philosophie, Belgium* and *Indian Documentation Service,Gurgaon (Haryana).*

Subscription to be sent in the name of :
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EDITORIAL

We are not very happy to inform our Readers and Subscribers that we are greatly constrained to announce revision in the Subscription Rates of the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* which will take effect immediately. Announcement regarding revised rates of Subscription appears separately in this Issue. This decision was forced on us due to phenomenal increase in the Paper-cost, Printing charges and Postage-cost. We have tried our best to keep the rise within reasonable limits in the hope that our subscribers will not find the revised rates prohibitively high and that they will continue to patronize our enterprise to serve them better and better in the years to come. Our Life-Member subscribers, both individual and institutional, have been our main stay and support. We would therefore very much welcome and appreciate our new members' enrollment in future as Life-Member subscribers. We look forward to a positive response in this direction.

We have a word of advice for those who would like to contribute their papers or articles for publication. It has been our observation that contributors do not read and follow carefully all the instructions while preparing their manuscripts. The Instructions laying down the Format and Style requirements are printed by us on Cover Page No.3 of very issue of the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*. We would like to appeal to the Contributors to follow them carefully enough so as to avoid unnecessary correspondence in this regard. We feel confident that our contributors will extend every possible co-operation and minimize our difficulties we face in editing and printing our Journal.

We take this opportunity to extend our best wishes to our Readers, Subscribers and Contributors.

Chief Editor

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LANGUAGE AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK : A NOTE ON STRAWSON.

KANTI LAL DAS

Introduction :

Analysis of language is a twentieth century phenomenon. It has been gradually realised by many important philosphers of this century that language is relevant to Philosophy. It is relevant for more than one reason. For some, language is relevant; because it is the chief tool by which we can know reality. But it is true that language often misleads us and consequently it must be revised in favour of an ideal language. So what is relevant to philosophy is not the language in ordinary use, but an ideal (artificial) language which philosophers construct. Ideal language is very much careful about logical syntax, which they believe would give correct picture of reality.

The proposal that there should be an ideal language has been assailed from different directions It has been objected that the ideal language philosophers make an approach which is basically circular, because here they propose that they shall know the structure of reality on knowing the structure of language. But it is equally true that we cannot know that a language is ideal unless first we know the structure of reality. Thus the ideality of language requires a prior knowledge of ontology.[1] The ideal language philosophers, therefore, cannot claim ontological neutrality which makes their approach completely biased. It is, therefore, doubtful if an ideal language can be acknowledged as philosophically relevant.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 1&2
January - April 2000

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Some philosophers, mostly belonging to Oxford, consequently reject the claim that philosophy can proceed in its task with an ideal language. Some of them believe that our ordinary language is all right so far it goes. Wittgenstein of *Investigations* is of the opinion that it is useless to take a monolithic conception of language. It is wrong to say that language has the single function of recording facts. Why should the world be conceived of as a totality of facts and not in any other way? He discovered that whatever is conveyed by language is not dictated by logic but by convention of use. He, therefore, focussed his attention on natural history of language rather than logic. So what the *Investigations* shows is that if language is relevant to philosophy, it is not an ideal language, but the ordinary one.

This idea is echoed by some other philosophers like Austin and Strawson. Austin is of the opinion that ordinary language has survived the test of time and this shows that it must be adequate for the purpose for which language is invented. He says that " Our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing and the connections they have found worth making, in the life times of many generations."[2] Like ideal language philosophers, Austin believes that we can know a lot of things if we care to look at words and sentences. But "when we examine what we say when, what words we should use in what situation, we are looking again not *merely* at words....but also at the realities we use the words to talk about."[3] This is what we call *linguistic Phenomenology.*

Strawson opposes ideal language for two reasons. The first is that everything that is contained in ordinary language does not permit formalisation. Secondly, ordinary language and the actual use of words may be shown to a sure way to philosophy. We shall consider in this paper the position of Strawson in connection with his claim that language, i.e., ordinary language is relevant to philosophy not because it discloses the structure of reality, but because "it lays bare the conceptual framework of human mind."

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Descriptive Metaphysics And Language

Strawson believes that the study of ordinary language will make intelligible the conceptual apparatus which lie submerged in it. To use an expression of Urmson we can say that ordinary language makes intelligible our conceptual apparatus " in a way an architect's blue-print can clarify an impressionistic sketch."[4]

The philosophy of Strawson has been built up on the background of his significant distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics. The concept of 'descriptive metaphysics' emerges in Strawson's *Individuals* in contrast with what he calls revisionary methaphysics. The distinction between the two types of metaphysics has been explained by Strawson in the following sentence: " Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure."[5] Thus Strawson takes metaphysics to be a deliberation on the structure of human thought. In traditional speculative philosophy we find that attempts were consistently made to present a philosophically glorified scheme of things, an onotology which virtually amounted to a revision of our conceptual scheme.

Although Strawson characterises desctriptive metaphysics, but actually speaking, it is a survey of our cognitive apparatus. Examination of the way in which we use ordinary words, will show how the fundamental categories of our thought hang together and how they relate, in truth, to those formal notions which range through all categories.

The method which Strawson advocates for the discovery of the conceptual scheme has been called the method of descriptive analysis. Descriptive analysis is nothing but " a close examination of the actual use of words". Strawson believes that this kind of analysis will be philosophically productive. He writes....."the claim to clarify will seem empty, unless the results achieved have some bearing on the typical philosophical problems and difficulties which arise concerning the concepts to be

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clarified. Now these problems and difficulties have their roots in ordinary, uncoustructed concepts, in the elusive, deceptive moods of functioning of unformatised liguistic expressions."[6]

Consequently, one has to describe the logical behaviour of the linguistic expressions of natural languages. This alone would solve the problems and difficulties rooted in ordinary language. Descriptive analysis is the attempt to bring out the natural foundation of our conceptual apparatus. Strawson conceives that the descriptive philosophers, i.e., the philosophers who intend to describe our conceptual scheme may have to do more than making literal description, but it is nonetheless true that "the actual use of linguistic expressions remains his sole and essential point of contact with the reality which he wishes to understand; conceptual reality."[7]

The use of words in ordinary language does not only unveil our conceptual scheme, it also determines our ontology. Jack Kaminsky says, "P.F. Strawson has been one of few to elaborate our ontology which involves a serious ontological commitment."[8] Again he observes that Strawson begins by assuming that individuals do engage in discussion and then he raises the question concerning the extra-linguistic conditions which must be present if we are to be assured that communication be actually occuring. The first and perhaps the most important condition is that there are particulars to which the words employed can refer. Particulars compose ontology for Strawson. This theory has been established by Strawson by his theory of reference and communication, and also by his concept of identification. If we go through Strawson's argument contained in the first chapter of *Individuals* we will find that he believes in a very close connection between language and reality, of course, not in the sense in which the ideal language philosophers would conceive it. Strawson does not concede the idea that there is a structural affinity between language and reality. His idea is rather that the inclusion of a particular within our ontology is determined by linguistic phenomena, viz., whether the particular in question is such that it cannot be known by us which is in

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its turn, is to be testified by the fact if it can be referred to by and that again successfully. Success, in this context, is determined by fruitful communication. Communication in Strawson's opinion is fruitful only when the hearer can identify the particular which is referred to by the speaker. If the hearer fails to identify the particular referred to by the speaker then communication fails and the speaker also fails to identify. Strawson's theory is that when the hearer is successful to identify a particular referred to by the speaker, the speaker earns the right to include the particular in his ontology.

If we follow Strawson through the different steps of his account, we find the following :

(a) Language is a means of communication. We can identify particular if we can comunicate successfully. Since the world is taken to contain particulars, we use some proper names, pronouns, and descriptive phrases to refer to particulars.

(b) The hearer can identify if on the basis of the referring expression used by the speaker, he can pick out by sight or hearing or touch the particular referred to, knowing that it is that particular.

(c) All particulars referred to by the speaker can not be sensibly discriminated. So when a particular referred to by the speaker is beyond the range of the hearer's senses, it is difficult to ascertain whether the particular identified by the hearer is the same as the particular referred to by the speaker.

What is the guarantee that identification in such a situation is successful? It is theoretically conceivable that there is a multitude of particulars answering to the same referring expressions. Strawson solves this difficulty by suggesting that the particular which is not sensibly present and hence cannot be demonstratively identified, may be identified by a description which relates it uniquely to another particular which can be demonstratively identified. The sector occupied by the particular should be uniquely related to the sector which the speaker and the hearer

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themselves occupy.

The process of identification requires that there is a single system of relation in which every thing or event has a place. According to Strawson there is a system of spatial and temporal relation in which every particular is uniquely related to every other. But the conceptual scheme does not simply operate with a spatio-temporal framework. It is not only case that the expreience of a particular must be arranged in space and time, as Kant would endorse. Nevertheless, in the Kantian system there is a question of arrangement of the data received through the faculty of sensibility. The disorganised, discrete or isolated data collected through sensibility would not produce knowledge unless they are categorised or arranged by the rather active faculty of understanding. The conceptual apparatus in the Kantian system is partially passive and partially active. In Strawson's system one may notice a similar idea when the spatio-temporal framework is discovered as a passive scheme through which we receive our experience of particulars. But this collection has to be arranged in a certain way. This arrangement does not express itself in the pattern of judgements mentioned by Kant. Strawson's point is that knowledge in the true sense requires identification. From this basic of view, he discovers that there is a relation of dependence between the identification of one class of particulars and another. It may be that we do not identify a class of particulars without a prior identification of another class of particulars. This would mean for him that from the point of identification, a class of particulars may be more basic than the class of another particulars. This amounts to an epistemic arrangement done by our cognitive apparatus. The active imposition of the category of understanding which we find in Kant is here conceived as a process of arrangement according to identifiability dependence in Strawson's philosophy.

Strawson's philosophy contains a method determining basicness which he describes as independent identifiability. Apart from that he offers certain other criterion of basicness. Material bodies and persons, according to Strawson, are considered basic not only because they can be independently identified but also because they answer perfectly to the

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character of the unified spatiotemporal framework. When Strawson speaks of the spatio-temporal framework, he does not take it to be a system where all particulars find a place. The framework, in his opinion, is not something extraneous to the object in reality of which we speak. There is atleast one class of particulars which answers to the description of the framework. As a matter of fact such particulars, by virtue of their fundamental characteristics, may be said to confer their characteristics upon the framework. The framework is admittedly spatio-temporal, and material objects are three dimensional, and endure through time. Thus material bodies which meet the key conditions of three dimensionality constitute the framework. Hence Strawson concludes that given a certain general feature of the conceptual scheme we possess and given the character of the available major categories, things which are or possess material bodies must be the basic particulars.

Concluding remarks :

It is clear from the above that Strawson's examination of the actual use of words, his emphasis on the phenomenon of referring expressions and the significance of identification bring home some truth about the constitution of our cognitive mechanism. But still several problems raise their heads there. The most serious problem is the supposed necessity of communication. If one can know without publicly referring to that, then ordinary language cannot expose our conceptual scheme. Because the discovery of the conceptual scheme really hangs upon the necessity of communication through referring expressions which in fact has been questioned by some philosophers. Prof. B. A. Brody, for example, when admitting the importance of reference, has expressed his doubt regarding the need for communication and consequently for identification. In this is really questionable, then Strawson's method of unfolding our conceptual scheme will be totally frustrated.[9]

But I think Prof. Brody's remark is not cogent. It is really a contingent matter whether somebody will decide to talk to others about a particular which he knows. But such knowledge must be necessarily communicable. We cannot acknowledge the existence of particulats unless

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we believe that such acknowledgement is communicated to others. It would be highly absurd if we say that a man acknowledges the existence of a particular and at the same time denies its communication possibility. It also explains partly why such a particular must be identified. That is why Strawson aptly remarks : " That it should be possible to identify particulars of a given type seems a necessary condition of the inclusion of that type in our ontology." [10]

Strawson claims that the success of descriptive analysis of ordinary language would depend to a large extent on the claim which Strawson makes in favour of the conceptual scheme. He tells us that "there is a massive care of human thinking which has no history."[11] What he means to say is that the analysis of language would reveal a universal and invariant conceptual apparatus. But it may be suspected that the conceptual scheme which ordinary man operates is relative to his cognitive content and the cultural climate of his age. This question gets a very sharp edge in the contention of Iseminger. He asks, "Was there a time in history or is there a culture in which men employed or employ a conceptual scheme in which there is no provision for the identification of basic particulars?"[12] One can also refer to the misgivings of E. A. Burtt who comments in his article "Descriptive Metaphysics" :

> .....it seems to me quite clear that his (Strawson) belief in a changeless categorical core of human thinking rests on an illusion - a very natural illusion, arising from the fact that at any given point in history some concepts appear to us to be central and basic that we cannot imagine how anyone can dispense with them. To engage in any responsible inquiry seems to require their use. But when we adopt the broadest historical perspective that it is possible to adpot, do we not find that any candidate for a place in this massive core-causality, substance, space, time, individual, universal- has in fact undergone changes that are most drastic than those of linguistic idiom and personal style, and do we not naturally expect that such changes will continue, however, slowly and threfore imperceptibly to most of these who employ these concepts?

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Burtt further continues that "the implication of such a survey is that Strawson is mistaken in believing that there is a changeless core of metaphysical categories, and also in believing that a metaphysical system can be purely descriptive, avoiding any revisionary taint."[13]

Strawson opines that conceptual scheme pervades all languages that we presently use. But following Devidson it is claimed that Strawson's committment becomes true only when different languages are translated into each other.[14] Burtt observes that Strawson is mistaken in making this presupposition. A good number of recent linguistic philosophers maintain that the so called conceptual scheme is reflected in the structure of different language differently. So the claim that there is a "massive central core of human thinking" is not tenable, since there is no such core. Burtt says, "My point in this critical reflections is simply to bring out vividly the fact that the conceptual system with which "we" are operating may be much more changing, relative and culturally limited than Strawson assumes to be....."[15].

But I think Strawson is right in his standpoint in claiming that the conceptual scheme is constant and changeless. Of course, there may be different methods of unfolding it which vary depending on the intellectual and perhaps cultural climate of age in which the investigation is carried on. But basically there is a constant and invariant conceptual scheme.

Now, Strawson being aware of the above phenomenon observed that "certainly concepts do change, and not only, though mainly, on the specialist periphery; and even specialist changes react on ordinary thinking."[16] Nevertheless he believes that "there are categories and concepts which, in their most fundamental character, change not at all."[17]

Strawson's contention seems to be that the categories and concepts which constitute the massive central core of human thinking change not at all in their most fundamental character. It is true that the concept of causality, as Prof. Burtt suggests, has undergone change in the course of the progress of metaphysical investigation. But the concept itself, we must not forget, was always there. The change is not fundamental in the sense

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that it is effected on the endorsement of the concept in human cognitive structure. It shows that any change that is not effected on the existing framework of concepts does not do away with the ordinary and common place view of the world. Such change does not call for alternative use of linguistic expressions fitted to describe an alternative ontology.

The all important conclusion is that the ordinary man's ontology being constant a process of linguistic analysis would reveal a conceptual scheme the central core of which is invariant and changeless. Despite our cultural advancement such central core remains constant. What is important is that there is a universal ontology of ordinary people which comprise of particulars that must be objects of reference. It is this phenomenon which would reveal the invariant conceptual scheme of man which has been discovered by Strawson with the method of descriptive analysis.

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ANNOUNCEMENT

WORLD PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE

(PLATINUM JUBILEE SESSION OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS : 2000)

We are happy to announce that the 75 th Annual Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress which was founded by eminent Philosophers like Dr. Rabindranath Tagore and Dr. Radhakrishnan - The Platinum Jubilee Session of the Congress - will be celebrated in the form of World Philosophy Conference from 28 th December 2000 to 1st January 2001 at Delhi, the metropolis of India. The Celebrations are being sponsored by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research and the Hon'ble President of the Republic of India has kindly consented to be the Chief Patron. The Jawaharlal Nehru University of New Delhi will be the Chief Host of the Conference.

Prof. S. R. Bhatt of the University of Delhi is the Co-ordinator and Organizing Secretaty.

The general theme of the Conference is ***Spirituality, Science and Technology.*** Some of the sub-themes are as under :

i) Recovering and Interpreting Indian Spiritual Heritage ii) Consciousness : Estrangement and Enlargement iii) Yoga and Spiritual Praxia iv) Value-oriented Science and Eco-friendly Technology v) Spirituality, Science and Technology for World Peace and Prosperity vi) United Human Family vii) Civilizational Crisis and Beyond viii) Education as Learning and Cultivation of Values ix) Rethinking Foundations of Science x) Roots and Horizons of Science xi) Orientations and Limits of Technology.

The medium of deliberations will be English.

All are cordially invited to participate in the Conference and present papers which shall be not more than double spaced eight typed-pages length, along with half page abstract. Only selected papers of quality research will be published and permited to be presented in the Conference. The last date for submission of Papers is 16 August, 2000

Registration Fee for the Indian deligates is Rs. 1000/- inclusive of boarding and lodging if they register before September 16,2000. Thereafter it shall be Rs. 1500/- For student delegates, there will be a concession of Rs. 500/- in these rates.For Foreign Delegates the registration fee is US $700/- (before Sept. 16, 2000) and US $ 800/- (after Sept. 16, 2000)

The Registration Fee should be remitted A/C Payee Bank Draft drawn in favour of **"Indian Philosophical Congress, Platinum Jubilee Celebration Committee".**

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A CRITIQUE OF FOUCAULT'S POWER AND KNOWLEDGE

S.PANNEERSELVAM

In this paper an attempt is made to evaluate the role and importance of power and knowledge in the Foucaultian thought. One salient aspect of his approach to the problem is that he uses historical analysis as a key to understand this. Historical view, according to him, is an essential preliminary for an examination of his account of power. His thought is rooted in a highly individual historical vision, which centers on the transition from traditional to modern, industrial societies, and is specifically concerned with the forms of knowledge and modes of social organization characteristic of capitalist modernity. Hence this paper approaches the notion of power with the understanding of historical view and moves further to analyse the notion. The paper is a critique of the notion of power and knowledge taking into consideration his approach to the problem and it analyses whether Foucaultian approach is acceptable one in the post-modern society.

I

Foucault's contribution to post-modern thinking is highly important, though he will not associate himself with post-modernism completely. He cannot be placed in one category or group, as he is a complex thinker. He was a critique of reason and Western thought, like Nietzsche and Bataille. The impact of Nietzsche and Bataille on Foucault is noteworthy. It was Nietzsche who started the post-metaphysical and post-humanist approach in philosophy, and from him, Foucault learnt what is known as "genealogical history". Also from Nietzsche, he understood that the will to truth and knowledge is indissociable from the will to power. Nietzsche's following claims are very important in shaping Foucault's

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 1&2
January - April 2000

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mind. (i) Systematizing methods produce reductive social and historical analysis and (ii) knowledge is perspectival in nature, requiring multiple viewpoints to interpret a heterogeneous reality. Foucault as a critic of modernity and humanism, approached the problems like society, knowledge, and power, and made a considerable influence on the post-modern thinking. Foucault draws upon an anti-Enlightenment tradition that rejects the equation of reason, emancipation and progress. He asserts that an interface between modern forms of power and knowledge has served to create new forms of domination.

A close study of historic-philosophical study, for which Foucault is famous, attempts to explain the above point from different perspectives, like psychology, medicine, punishment and criminilogy. His purpose is to write a critique of our historical era, which problematizes modern forms of knowledge, rationality, social institutions, and subjectivity that seem given and natural, but in fact are contingent socio-historical constructs of power and domination. Apart from Nietzsche, the second influence came from Bataille, who also was a critic of Enlightenment reason and the reality principle of Western culture. Like Nietzsche, Bataille also supported the realm of heterogeneity and attacked the sovereign philosophical subject and argued in favour of transgressive experiences. Foucault focused on the social and discursive practices that play a role in the formation of the human subject. Throughout his philosophical writings he examined the means by which social and personal identity are generated and objectified. One of the most important of these strategies consists of dividing practices which categorize, label, isolate and exclude the subject from what is considered "normal" social intercourse. In *Madness and Civilization* he deals with how these dividing practices operated in the case of "insane" and pointed out that the manipulative procedures used to implement dividing practices change over time. In *The Birth of Clinic* and *Discipline and Punish,* Foucault continued this genealogical investigation of the rules and norms generating dividing practices. In *The Order of Things* and *The Archaeology of Knowledge,* he dealt with the autonomous structures of knowledge. He always relates knowledge with domi-

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nation. Knowledge, according to him, is always part of a cultural matrix of power relations. His critique of modernity and humanism, and development of new perspectives on society, knowledge, discourse and power, thus made him the important thinker of post-modern thought.

II

Foucault combined pre-modern, modern and post-modern perspectives. He makes a distinction between the classical era (1660-1800) and the modern era (1800-1950) in the post-renaissance period and says that in the classical era, we can see how human beings were dominated by power. He rejects the idea that human progress from combat to combat; humanity installs each of its violence in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination. Modern rationality is a coercive force, according to him. He talks about the individuals who have been dominated through social institutions, discourses and practices. The task of the Enlightenment was to multiply " reasons for political power" and to disseminate it through the social field, eventually saturating the spaces of everyday life. In his writings of 1970s, Foucault stigmatizes modern rationality, institutions, and forms of subjectivity as sources or constructs of domination. Analysis of knowledge and truth became the main task for him. While modern theories tend to see knowldege and truth as neutral, objective, universal or vehicles of progress and emancipation, Foucault analyses them as integral components of power and domination. He valorizes the amazing efficacy of discontinuous, particular and local criticism as compared to the inhibiting effect of global, totalitarian theories. For this reason, he is often considered a champion of post-modernism where incommensurablity, difference and fragmentation play an important role, though Foucault cannot be labeled as a post-modern thinker alone. Because in his writings one can see the culmination of pre-modernism, modernism and post-modernism.

All the time, he has been supporting the need for plurality forms of knowledge and micrioanalysis. His aim is to detotalize history and society as unified wholes governed by a centre, essence or telos, and to decentre

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the subject. His approach to history as a non-evolutionary, fragmented field of disconnect knowledge, and society as a dispersed regularity of unevenly developing levels of discourse are important. In short, he is one of the supporters of "difference". "Respect...difference" has been his slogan. Nietzsche's conception that the world has no single meaning but rather countless meanings and that there is no limit to the ways in which the world can be interpreted, has paved the way for Foucault to reject the notion of approaching reality from a particular standpoint or from one particular way of philosophical thinking. He has understood that discourse is a complex reality that we not only can but also should approach it at different levels with different methods. This means for Foucault, no single theory of method of interpretation can be acceptable. It is because there is always plurality of discourses, institutions and modes of power, which contribute to the modern society.

Foucault uses the terms like "archaeology" and "genealogy" to denote the new historiographical approach while discussing the critique of modernity. He says that his objective is to create a history of the different modes, which, in our culture human beings are made subjects. In his earlier writings, Foucault had been using the term "ontology of knowledge". His usage of the term "ontology" is different from that of hermeneutics. "Archaeology", *i.e.*, historical approach, is also different from hermeneutics. It is also different from idealism and humanist mode of continuous evolution of thought. For example, in hermeneutics, there is a need for seeking a deep truth underlying discourse also. In idealist and humanist mode of writing, there is a search for "continuous" evolution of thought in terms of tradition. Archaeology rejects both. It tries to identify the condition of possibility of knowledge, the determining rules of formation of discursive rationality that operates beneath the level of intention or the thematic content. In his writings, the term "genealogy" plays an important role. He defines the word as follows:

> Let us give the term *genealogy* to the union of erudite knowledge and local memories, which allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of theis knowledge

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> tactically today....What it really does is to entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledge against the claims of unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchies, and order them in the name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects.[1]

Genealogy, for Foucault, depends on the voices of the disqualified in order to disrupt the serenity of what is. Though some argue that in his later period, he rejected the notion of testimony of the other, he maintained the view that genealogy reveals contingency as opposed to necessity and it is contingencies that allow the possibility of freedom. A close study of Foucault's works like, *Madness and Civilization* and *The History of Sexuality* prove that he believes humanism and reason have functioned in the West as definitive, exclusionary terms and the identity of the society is formed on what it forcefully excludes. Foucault questions the possibility of a pure other. In *Discipline and Punish,* he argues that the excluded are never outside. "The carceral network does not cast the unassimilable into a confused hell; there is no outside. It takes back with one hand what it seems to exclude with the other. It saves everything, including what it punishes."[2]

In his interesting essay," What Is Enlightenment?" Foucault articulates how his critical practices differ from that of Kantian critique, where necessary condition plays a role. He says:

> This criticism is not transendental, and its goal is not that of making metaphysics possible : it is genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method...This critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form to what we are, what it is impossible for us to do and to know, but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think.[3]

The above passage clearly shows that Genealogy exists as an alternative to transcendental thinking of Kant. It also teaches that history could have been other than what it has been. History is the product of

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successive power struggles, which are discontinuous. Foucault who emerged two centuries after Kant observes the continuity of his post-Nietzschean genealogy with the classical critique of reason. He says:

> I think that the central issue of philosophy and critical thought since the eighteenth century has been, still is, and will, I hope, remain the question: What is this reason that we use? What are its historical effects? What are its limits, and what are its dangers?[4]

But Foucault emphasized the discontinuity also. He says:

> If the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits knowledge has to renounce transgressing, it seems to me that the critical question today (is)... In what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligating, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitary constraints?[5]

The questions of Foucault prove that he is for practical critique of reason. In the above essay, Foucault attempts to transcribe the Kantian critique as an attitude that is addressed permanently to the discourses through which subject is constituted.[6] Foucault's view about the relationship between knowledge, autonomy and political action does not presume the trascendental implications of pure reason as in the case of Kant. Each person is viewed as the subject of knowledge and the self is always situated within the control of social, economic and political institutions. The possibility of Enlightenment, according to Foucault, is not something connected with a priori necessity inscribed in and practical reason, but that which enters into medicine, psychiatry, criminology, sexual hygienic, etc., as strategies of domination. In *Madness and Civilization, Discipline and Punish,* and *The History of Sexuality* one can see his genealogies of sanity and madness, sickness and health, sexuality and perversion.

In the well-known essay, "Traditional and Critical Theory"? Horkheimer supports the notion of critical theory. The standard conception of theory, otherwise known as traditional theory, is the collected knowledge, which is useful for describing facts, and from Descartes to

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Kant and Husserl, we find such type of knowledge. Horkheimer makes a distinction between traditional and critical theory. One of the important tasks of criticial theory is to challenge the privileged "non-position" of social-scientific knowledge by analyzing the modes of its production, the roles it played in society, the interests it served, and the historical processes through which it came to power. It is concerned with the historical and social genesis of the facts it examines and with the social contexts in which it results will have their effects. Later, the book *Dialectic of Enlightenment*[8] appeared in support of critical theory. It also was in favour of the critical historiography. Nietzsche analyses modernity's preoccupation with history as a sign of its loss of a sense, of its own role in history. Modernity tries to break with its past, but to know that its achievements are creative and novel, it must look back to see whether the past had anticipated it. Thinking historically, is thus a peculiar paradigmatic feature of modernity. In other words, thinking historically means, more than thinking about the methods of historiography or the events of history, for even thinking about other topics like knowledge, culture, morality, religion etc., can involve increased and perhaps, even exclusive concern with their historical nature. One can see the elements of critical history developed by Horkheimer in Foucault, who talks about three ways of thinking historically. (1) Antiquarian historiography tries to recreate the past as it really was, ignoring the present as if the present dose not condition how the past is achieved and understood. (2) Monumental historiography, looks at the past for models of how to act in the present, ignoring the novelty of the present and diminishing the significance of present agents by comparison with the triumphs of past heroes. (3) Criticial historiography takes into consideration of both the present and future. Foucault is in favour of such historiography, which is visible in his approach to knowledge and power. Horkheimer and Adorno helped Foucault a great deal to develop his theory of power. One can see the influence of this in *Discipline and Punish.* The passage from *Dialectic of Enlightenment* explains how Foucault developed his theory of power :

> Where the evolution of the machine has already turned into that

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> of the machinery of domination ...untruth is not represented merely by the outdistanced. As against that, adaptation to the power of progress involves the progress of power, and each time anew brings about those degenerations which show not unsuccessful but successful progress to be its contrary.[9]

Foucault echoes the above point in *Discipline and Punish,* which shall be shown in the following discussion.

Marcuse in "Philosophy and Critical Theory"[10] argues that reason is the fundamental category of philosophical thought, the category by which it has bound itself to human destiny. He says that in classical philosophy, it represents the highest human potential and in the modern period, it comes to be represented as self-conscious self-determination.[11] He further states that what remains outstanding to the realization of reason is not a philosophical task.[12] This means that the philosophical concept of free rational action was seriously inadequate. Critical theory is always concerned with the life of reason, not with mere reason, but with critical reason, which has helped Foucault to develop the theory of critical historiography.

Foucault attempts to rethink the nature of modern power in a non-totalizing, non-presentational and anti-humanist scheme. He says that to this day we have yet to fully comprehend the nature of power. He rejects the notion of modern power to be anchored in macrostructures for ruling classes. He gives a post-modern approach to power and sees power as dispersed indeterminate, heterogeneous, subjects and productive, constituting individuals' bodies and identities. He argues how the two models of power, namely the economical and the judicial are defective. For example, the economic model suggested by the Marxists has to be regarded as a reductionistic subordination of power to class domination. On the other hand, the judicial model approached power in terms of law, legal and moral right and political sovereignty. In *The History of Sexuality,* Foucault talks of a new mode of power known as "bio-power". It is bio-power which according to Foucault, lies at the root of the Nazi Holocaust.

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He argues that with the constitution of bio-power as the central concern of the modern state, sex became the focus of an explosion of discourses concerning the health of the body. Thus discourses like, organic physiology, gynecology, neurology, psychology etc., which established life as the focus of power where the primary concern was the body and descent of the classes that ruled.[13]

Foucault believes that every production of knowledge serves the interest of power. Thus knowledge produced in economics, medicine, psychiatry and other human sciences is nothing but a part of the power of the social institutions that have grown around these disciplines. Foucult talks of three characteristics of power. First, power is productive. Secondly, it is only exercised by individuals but never possessed by them and thirdly, power is involved in every social relation. His contention is that the individual does not stand apart from power prior to it. Since individual is constituted by power, individual existence and identity are among power effects. The individual exercises power at certain times and in certain places as a functionary of power's intentions, but not his own. He further says:

> There is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives. But this does not mean that it results from the choice or decision of an individual subject...the rationality of power is characterized by tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted level where thy are inscribed tactics which, becoming connected to one another.[14]

Thus for Foucault, the individual is not the agent who puts power into play; on the other hand, individual is the element of power's articulation.

Stressing the role of power, Foucault further argues that a society without power relations can only be an abstraction and in every social field, there are relations of power throughout. He wants us to reject the notion that knowledge can exist only where power relations are suspended.

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He is of the view that it is power which produces knowledge. Power and knowledge directly imply one another. There is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge. Similarly, there is no knowledge, which does not presuppose power relations. Thus he denies the independent knowledge. In *Discipline and punish,* and other writings one can see the relation between power and knowledge which is scattered in different forms. In *Madness and Civilization* he argues that man is historically constituted as the other of reason. In *The Birth of the Clinic,* he talks about the movement from a premodern speculatively based medicine to a modern empirically based medicine rooted in the rationality of the scientific gaze. Again in *The Order of Things,* he discusses the emergence of the human sciences and the importance of such a study where the rules, assumptions focusing on the shifts in the sciences of life, labour and knowledge of human societies are important.

In *The Archaeology of Knowledge,* he corrects some of his past mistakes. This was due to the influence of French historians like Bachlard and Canguithem. In this work, Foucault maintins that discontinuity is a positive working concept. It is no longer seen as blight on the historical nature and stigmatized in principle. Foucault tries to break up the unity approach of Hegel and Marx with regard to evolutionary history and tries to see the possibility of having number of groups. This detotalizing move is the contribution of Foucault, which allows multiplicity of discourses in knowledge. With this concept, he attacks the traditional interpretation of history. But for this reason we cannot define him as philosopher of discontinuity. In the philosophy of discontinuity of Foucault, the break is not so radical; it does not simply negate everything that had preceded it. Very rightly, he says: "Rupture is possible only on the basis of rules that are already in operation"[15] Discontinuity does not mean complete change but a redistribution, a reconfiguration, a redefining. Thus in Foucault one can see the synthesis of continuity and discontinuity.

In *The Archaeology of Knowledge,* he undertook two responsibilities. Decentering the subject and critical analysis of reason are these two

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important responsibilities. The work attempts to show that the subject is a fictitious construct. For him, archaeology would be the appropriate methdology of the analysis of local discourses. It criticized the human sciences as being grounded in humanist assumptions. It also theorized the birth of the human sciences in the context of the modern episteme. In 1970, the transition from archaeology to genealogy took place. Genealogy is a new mode of historical writing, according to him. It seeks to foreground the material context of subject construction. A significant aspect of it is that it links theories to the operation of power and tries to put historical knowledge to operate in local struggles. It highlights the power and effects relations they produced. Foucault is interested in writing the histories of unknown, forgotten, rejected, uncared, marginal discourses. He firmly believed that the discourses of madness, medicine, punishment and sexuality to have independent histories and institutional identity, which are neither reducible nor enlargeable institutions like that of the modern state.

It was during the 1970s, he developed the theroy of power and his historical vision of problems like madness, poverty and unemployment, has helped him a great deal to develop his theory of power. He says that to this day, we have yet to fully comprehend the nature of power. He tries to approach the notion of power from a non-totalising, non-reprsentational, and anti- humanist approach. Foucault's approach to the theory of power is rooted in a highly individual historical vision, which centers on the transition from tradition to modern industrial societies. He was mainly concerned with the forms of knowledge and models of social organization. His concept of power could be understood only in the context of the historical foundation of the modern west. He made a bold approach to conceive problems like madness, poverty, unemployment, the inability to work etc., as social problems and it is the responsibility of the state to take care of these. His approach to historical analysis can be seen in *Madness and Civilization* and *The Birth of the Clinic.* His concern here was with the emergence of modern form of administration of the social world. In both the works, he makes it clear that his concern was with the physical

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rather than the moral disorder. The intervention in the social domain by agencies of welfare and control is more fundamental feature of modern societies than an economy released from directly political relations of domination. In the two books that followed namely, *The Order of Things* and *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, his attention was towards the internal structure of scientific discourse especially the discourse of human sciences. Again in *Discipline and Punish,* the historical analysis becomes prominent. Here, Foucault explains the notion of power as follows: "We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 'excludes', it 'represses', it 'censors', it 'abstracts', it 'makes', it 'conceals'. In fact power produces; it produces realities; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth"[16] He rejects the repressive and negative aspects of power and apprehends it as primarily positive and productive. Power constitutes the individuals on whom and through whom it subsequently operates. He says:

> The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against which it happens to strike and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact, it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals.[17]

He explains the importance of power in *The History of Sexuality* as omnipresence. Power is produced at every moment, at every point, or rather in every relation between points. "Power is everywhere; not because it englobes everything, but because it comes from everywhere"[18] says Foucault.

In the writings of 1970 one can see the relation between forms of power and forms of knowledge. In fact there is a fusion between the two. While discussing the relation between the two, he says that power is a pre-condition of knowledge rather than knowledge as a pre-condition of power. He talks about the transformation of the fundamental structures of

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experience through which human beings become able to think of themselves as the subjects of a purely procedural rationality of inquiry and to consider other irrational human beings as the possible objects of such an inquiry. He explains how the relation between power and knowledge concerns the repressive institutions, which make the formation of certain kinds of knowledge possible. He contends:

> "If it has been possible to constitute a knowledge of the body, this has been possible to constitute a knowledge of the body, this has been by way of an ensemble of military and educational disciplines. It was on the basis of power over the body that a physiological, origins knowledge of it became possible."[19]

His conviction is that the power and knowledge cannot even analytically be separated. "...it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge."[20] He stresses the point that power and knowledge directly imply one another and there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time relations of power. For Foucault, structuralism is the captive to classical form of knowledge, and for this reason he rejects it.

III

Habermas was more sympathetic towards Foucault. The transition from archaeology to genealogy in Foucault and his preoccupation with the theory of power is very much appreciated by Habermas. In his work, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity,* Habermas asks the following question:

> What, then, are the grounds that determine Foucault to shift the meaning of this specific will to knowledge and to truth that is constitutive for the modern form of knowledge in general, and for the

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> human sciences in particular, by generalizing this will to knowing self-mastery into a will to power *per se* and to postulate that *all* discourses can be shown to have the character of hidden power and derive from the practices of power?[21]

Habermas himself tries to answer the above question by saying that if one takes the question of episteme, one can never master it. He says that this is precisely the reason for Foucault to go without the concept of episteme altogether. Habermas says: "When he (Foucault) gives up the autonomy of the forms of knowledge in favour of their foundation within power technologies and *subordinates* the archeology of knowledge to the genealogy that explains the emergence of knowledge from the practices of power."[22] Thus Habermas very well supports Foucault with regard to the theory of power and genealogy. Does this mean that Habermas has nothing to disagree with Foucault? Habermas says that the concealed derivation of the concept of power from the concept of the will to knowledge in Foucault is systematically ambiguous. He says that the trace of the philosophy of subject is not completely absent in Foucault. "Genealogical historiography is supposed to be... the functionalist social science and at the same time historical research into constitutive social science."[23] Habermas further says: "Foucault did not think through the aporias of his own approach well enough to see how his theory of power was overtaken by a fate similar to that of the human sciences rooted in the philosophy of the subject."[24] Though Habermas supports Foucault's critiques of subjectivity and the institutions of modernity, at the same time Habermas argues that Foucault has no standpoint from which to criticize modern institutions and has no basis for ethics and politics. Both Foucault and Habermas relate knowledge to power but Foucault links reason with power and domination, but Habermas distinguishes different types of reason. Habermas also criticizes Foucault for rejecting modernity and Enlightenment.

All of Foucault's writings from *Madness and Civilization* to the *History of Sexuality* presuppose a close proximity of power and knowledge. But according to the critics, the concept of power has a drawback

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because of this intrinsic relation between knowledge and power. It is also argued that his critique of modernity is one-sided in its focus on repressive forms of rationalization and fails to acknowledge the merits of modernity. His criticism that modernity has brought only domination cannot be accepted because modernity has brought advances in medicine, democracy, liberty, law or equality which are not acknowledged by Foucault. For him, power breeds resistance but the nature of this resistance is not explained by him. In other words, he has not properly developed the notion of genealogy of resistance. Also, his understanding that power is mostly understood as an impersonal and anonymous force, which is exercised apart from the actions and intentions cannot be correct. He has not taken into account how the agents in positions of economic and political power administrate power. Though he talks about the microlevel of resistance, in power struggle, he does not discuss the modalities of local struggles. No doubt, the importance of local struggles cannot be neglected, but the multiplicity of the local struggle must be properly united or linked in order to avoid fragmentation. Otherwise the local struggle lose their significance. All microstruggles must be related to marcostruggles to oppose the domination of power. Foucault has neglected this aspect. But it is an indisputable fact that Foucault could approach the theory of power from a post-modern perspective, though it has certain deficiencies.

NOTES

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THE CONFUCIAN AND TAOIST APPROACHES TO TRUTH AND THEIR CONTEMPORARY IMPLICATIONS.

ALOK TANDON

This paper aims at understanding the Confucian and Taoist approaches to truth and their contemporary implications. Since our purpose is not to engage in any detailed treatment of truth or to have any particular methodological framework or theory of truth in mind, we shall avoid, as far as possible, any controversial views about various concepts of truth. Our emphasis will be on cultural differences regarding truth and their implications. However, we need to consider Hans George Gadamer's contention seriously in this regard. In his introduction to *Truth and Method,* he argues that the phenomenon of understanding is not concerned primarily with the method of amassing knowledge and truth. He further says:

"The phenomenon of understanding not only pervades all human relations to the world. It also has an independent validity within science and resists any attempt to change it into a method of science. The following investigation starts with the resistence within modern science against the universal claim of scientific method. It is concerned to seek that experience of truth that transcends the sphere of the control of scientific method whereever it is to be found, and to inquire into its legitimacy. Hence the human sciences are joined with modes of experience which lie outside science, with experience of philosophy, of art and of history itself. These are all modes of experience in which a truth is communicated that can not be verified by the methodological means proper to science."[1]

The point is that the truth could also be communicated through

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 1&2
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other modes of experiences which cannot be verified by science. It could also be the state or quality of being in accrod with fact or reality. Thus, to put it in more humanistic tone, truth could signify the state or quality of being in accordance with a norm or principle aspired after by cultural heroes in a particular historical context. Confucius, Lao Tzu can be taken as such cultural heroes like Plato and Jesus Christ. We are taking truth in this sense and thus not engaging in various theories of truth in modern epistemology.

What then is the truth communicated through the Confucian and Taoist modes of experience? But before we discuss the same, we must keep in mind the dramatic contrast between Chinese and Western modes of philosophic thinking grounded in contrasting assumptions of their calssical cultures. As the well known Chinese philosopher Lin Yutang notes,"China's peculiar contribution to philosophy is therefore the distrust of systematic philosophy, which is the hallmark of Western philosophy."[2] Western mode of philosophysing seeks out being of things, the essential unity behind appearances, whereas primary concern of Chinese philosophy is establishment of and cultivation of harmonious relationships within the social structure. Compared to Anglo-Europian philosophic traditions, the thinking of the Chinese is far more concrete. This worldly and above all practical Western civilization gives priority to logical reasoning, whereas Chinese civilization is largely indifferent to abstract analysis. The Chinese tradition is, unlike the Western, less interested in dispassionate speculation for acquisition, organisation and transmission of knowledge about the nature of things. In the West, mathematical order has been thought the purest. In China by contrast, such an abstract order is of decreasing relevance. Rational order depends upon a single ordered cosmos that presumes determining principles as transcendental sources of order. In China, the cosmos is simply ten thousand things. They believe that things of nature may be ordered in any number of ways. In contrast to rational or logical thinking grounded in analytical, dialectical and analogical argumentation that stresses explanatory powers of physical causation, Chinese way of thinking may be called correlative thinking grounded in

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informal and ad-hoc analogical procedures presupposing both association and differentiation. For example, Yin and Yang are not to be understood as cosmic principles of ontological contrasts rooted in the very nature of things. Rather, they are heuristics helpful in reading and characterizing the world as concretely expreienced in variety of ways. Correlative descriptions are, in fact, prescriptions which orient human beings in a very practical manner to their external surroundings. Thus, Chinese categorical definitions are not framed in terms of essential features and formal class membership; instead, they tend to be metaphorical, and invariably entail the human subject and human values. This difference between Western and Chinese way of thinking may not be absolute, but a difference in the degree of emphasis leading to different approaches to truth, as Lin Yutang puts it, "there is a definite difference in approach between Chinese and Western philosophy, the approach of values and approach of facts."[3]

Since we are suffering not from lack of facts, but rather from too many and from lack of judgement, it is worthwhile to understand two main Chinese approaches to truth: Confucian and Taoist.

The Confucian Approach to Truth

According to correspondence theory of truth, knowing involves true correspondence between thought and an objective reality and knowledge then, is presentation of state of affairs as it really is. But for Confucius, reality is immanent, relative and contingent. It is something achieved rather than recognized. Thus, reality is not independent of realizer. Therefore, truth can not be result of simple correspondence. Rather, as Deutsch argues, truth is to be seen as qualitative achievement which involves something like "appropriateness" or "genuineness".[4] Such a paradigm of truth is, unlike the dominent Western model, personal in nature in two senses.[5] Outwardly, it is a kind of sincerity in which one brackets one's own private preferences in favour of optimizing the feelings of all interested persons. Inwardly, it aliens one to the self one ought to be. These two referents of the notion are tightly fused. It is primarily by indentifying with the feelings of others (developing Zen) that one be-

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comes a chuntzu (the self one should be). Hustan Smith has described such a notion of truth as " a kind of performative".[6] An act or utterance is true to the extent that it resolves the ingradients of a situation in a way that furthers a desired outcome- in case of Confucius, social hormony. It can be defined even in stronger terms.: "Truth is speech and deed that effects an intended consequence".[7] In any case, truth is not given; it is to be realized.

The Confucian concept of truth is expressed in terms of Tao (the way). In the *Analects,* the prevalence or non-prevalence of the Tao is frequently mentioned.[8] By the Tao, Confucius refers to the way of human being to achieve a normative socio-political order which was not practised during his time but could be recovered with efforts from the past. The prevalence of the way presupposes a kind of universal kingship. When the way is established, the Emperor is the source of music, rites and punitive measures and the commoners do not express critical views about politics. Thus, it appears that democracy is not favoured for practice of the way. But this can be due to political norm at his time. The more important thing is that Confucian way is a socio-political order that at one time existed in this human world and not in a transcedent world. This refers not only to the proper familial and socio-political roles, statuses and ranks but also to the objective prescriptions of proper behaviour-ritual, ceremonial and ethical - that governs the relationship among these roles. Thus the Confucian way can not be separated from the ideal performance of human roles in their proper socio-political contexts.

Compared to the Christian approach to truth, the Confucain way is relatively this-worldy in its orientation. In the Bible, the way is related to the eternal truth and most often refers to the individual moral life; normally it is not considered to be associated with this world and its socio-political order. But, for Confucius, the ideal order had appeared in the past and hopefully could emerge again in future. As a result, the Confucian tends to be more optimistic about this secular world.

Though Tao is the normative socio-political order from the past, yet

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it is not the state of nature but the fruit of cultural endeavours. This is in sharp contrast to the Bibilical Garden of Eden, in which Adam and Eve are not only physically naked but devoid of any social roles, status and all the machinery of a complex society.[9] Thus, culture seems to play a far more important and constructive role in Confucuanism than in Christianity. In the words of Confucius : "It is man who is capable of broadening the way. It is not the way that is capable of broadening Man."[10] It means human effort is what makes the way possible.

For a Confucian, not to go astray and to walk properly, the role of culture, education and moral efforts is of paramount importance. His concern is not to choose between different alternatives but to follow the path mapped out for him by the ancient sages. Herbert Fingarette aptly characterizes the Confucian way as " a way without a crossroad.[11] Thus, in Confucian approach to truth, the ultimate value of human experience lies in becoming a quality person through education and cultivation.

The Taoist Approach To Truth

The Taoist approach to truth uses the term Tao in an entirely different meaning compared with that in Confucianism. The Taoist way does not refer to the ideal socio-political order of the golden age to be recovered by the Confucain sage in the present. It still refers to some sort of pattern, prevalent in nature, but its meaning is somewhat elusive and could not be described in language. This is because of the very fundamental characteristic of Taoism which is a district of language and argumentation as a means of attaining reliable knowledge or approaching truth. For them, a language is a set of limitations imposed upon the individual by the social and cultural environment in which he grows up. Even if an universal language were possible, it would still be restricted by the finite viewpoint, for after all it is a human language. What is true of the human world may not be true of other worlds, the worlds of monkeys, deer, fish and like. In short, for the Taoists human knowledge is the limited knowledge and the human viewpoint is only a finite viewpoint. Human culture is but a crystallization of human bias, finitude and partiality.

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Since absolute knowledge is the knowledge of Tao,' the Tao that can be spoken of is not the absolute Tao', Lao Tzu says. Though Tao as a metaphysical concept stands for the ultimate reality of the universe, it does not imply any notion of material substance like water, air or fire. But it is also not entirely abstract like Platonic forms. Due to its immaterial nature, Tao can not be qualified by words which usually characterize material objects. Lao Tzu did try to use hints, suggestions and metaphers to charecterize Tao :

> "Tao, being a hollow vessel is never exhaustible in use;
> Fathomless Perhaps the fountainhead of all existence."[12]

Does it suggest that Tao is emptiness, nothingness or non-being? But many passages (Ta0 Te Chinng, 21) clearly suggest that though, Tao is not a sharply demarcated corporal substance of determinate being, it is 'something rather than pure nothingness'. Then, the question is; what are the charecteristics of this something? Lao, Tzu gives us an answer:

The above passage suggests that Tao created the universe and gave birth to all existence. This had let many scholars to compare Tao with God in the Judiac-Christian tradition. While doing so, we should keep in mind that Chinese culture is far less religious as compared to Western or Hindu cultures and our interpretation of Tao in terms of God, or a Divine being may undermine the humanistic spirit of Chinese culture and the naturalistic flavour of Taoism. The most significant difference between the concept of Tao and the concept of God in Judiac-Christian tradition is that latter is a Deity of tremendous actions, while the former is an embodiment of the principle of non-action. Lao Tzu emphatically declared that "the principle of Tao is sportaneity."[14] The Second difference is that God in the Judiac-Christian tradition is a personal Deity while Tao is impersonal and naturalisitic. Tao has never exercised authority to assert its power like the God in the Old Testament. Another difference is that God is an object of worship, while Tao has never been one. Tao is neither religiously available, nor is it even religiously relevant. It appears that Tao is a metaphysical principle rather than a deity and can be compared

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with the concept of God as interpreted by some philosophers like Spinoza or Whitehead. Since Tao is a metaphysical principle which requires rare philosophical talent to understand its meaning, the principle of Tao can hardly be popularized. The common people are more receptive to Confucian values. When the absolute is unattainable, we have to be content with the relative.

Although, Tao could be taken in different ways, in its dynamic sense it is basically universally binding principle. It is said to stand alone and does not change.[15] But if it is constant, why there is reference to the decline of Tao?[16] The answer is that the principle of Tao is supposed to be binding in the non-human realm, man, due to his free will, has the option of following or not following the Tao. And this following and not following is also part of the nature of Tao. Without this possibility of man's deviation from the way, there would be no need to heed Taoist advice.

It is interesting to note that Lao Tzu is completely at odds with the Confucian project of morality. For him, Confucian morality represents 'cleverness' and great 'artificiality' which merely express symptoms of ills of civilization and not the solutions to the social problems. Dishormonious family relationships and chaotic state of affairs result in the need of Confucian to promote the virtues of filial piety and loyality to the ruler.

Despite his aversion to morality and civilization, Lao Tzu presents a rather high-profile political philosophy. His statements such as "Governing a large state is like boiling a small fish"[17] and " It is because he does not contend that none in the empire is in a position to contend with him"[18] do suggest the minimalistic government philosophy. However, the general message throughout is that the political order can not remedy the human plight which is rooted in the individual mind itself.[19]

Our foregoing discussion leads to the conclusion that the two approaches to truth, the Confuican and the Taoist are diametrically distinct from each other. Confucians deal with human relationships in an ideal social order, while Taoists are more concerned with spiritual yearnings

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and imaginative flights of which the human soul is capable. Confucians worship culture and reason, Taoists reject them in favour of nature and intuition. Confucius can be termed as a positivist, Lao Tzu a mystic.[20] After a man has been good son, dutiful father and provider of the family, there remains the beauty and mystry of universe, the meaning of life and death, the pursuit of which is more exciting. That is why the two approaches are seldom mutually exclusive and often complement to each other in Chinese culture. A chinese may be more of a Confucian or a Taoist, but is always under the influence of both.

Contemporary Implications Of The Two Approaches To Truth

In view of the Huntington's thesis on cultural clashes, it is important to look into the contemporay implications of the Confucian and Taoist approaches to truth.

Confucian approach to truth is basically moral. It should be commonly shared and freely accessed by all. The difference between assessing or not accessing the truth depends on personal efforts in learning how to follow the way and not in illuminating light of God or devine Grace. In Confucian classics, there are relatively few details of moral prescriptions. For example, in the Analects, the teaching of fillial piety does not elaborate upon its practice in specific situations. This leaves much scope for flexibility in applying the teachings to various circumstances. For a Confucian, truth is not something for us to contemplate or worship at a distance, but for us to apply, get involved in and embrace in actual human situations. Due to these characteristics, East Asians have been proficient at utilizing and improving upon the technological discoveries originating in the west and turning them into commercial products at competitive prices. The situational nature of Confucian ethics, in the economic sphere, poses less hindrance and requires minimum adjustment to the kind of life stipulated in a modern commercial society. On the other hand, the notion of copy and patent rights is probably somewhat alien to Confucian culture and westerners have often accused Confucian East Asians of infringing upon their intellectual properties.

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A Taoist, as a close observer of nature has the natural tendency to develop interest in arts and literature. On the philosophical level, the Taoist is an individualist who often rebels against the oppressive forces of the uniform values and cultural lifestyles of Confucian societies. A Taoist may unwillingly contribute to the peace and freedom of life and promote man's harmony with nature, but it is not his concern to promote economic growth or to fit into a society.

Prof. Kenneth K. Inada has forecefully and persuasively argued for Eastern approach to truth as "becoming rather than being" in his highly stimulating essay "The Challenge of Buddho-Taoist Metaphysics of Experience"[21] In his opinion, westerners have been unduly influenced by Plato's cogent argument 'for the absolute nature of things, i.e. the nature of being over becoming'. For Asiatics, becoming is the most basic and primitive nature of experience. Experiences take place as a becoming process. So with becoming as the experiencial basis, being and non-being become two rubrics of the function of becoming. Where the West expanded and envisioned becoming in terms of the nature of being, the East took becoming to be essentially in the nature of non-being, which is the locus of any discourse of being.

Looking at the contemporary implications of the two different approaches to truth, we find that the Easterners tend to be more holistic in their approaches of business, politics and other social aspects of life. While they may appear to be not analytical and precise enough, they are also less liable to be limited and narrow in their orientations. For example, business relations are more than just contractual relations but embrace all aspects of interactions. The metaphysical attention to becoming rather than being has made Easternens more flexible in many areas. For them. truth as a process of becoming should be dynamic and applicable to various situations, and not taken in absolute and static sense. The situated nature of Confucian ethics is one good example. But the Confucian flexibility and adaptability have their merits and demerits. The abillity to fit in and adjust easily is useful on many occasions but may also

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tend to bend principles to suit individual situations whenever the principles become inconvenient. This may be regarded as unduly compromising and, from a Western viewpoint, as utterly dishonest.

Our effort above to treat both, the Confucian and the Taoist approaches to truth as part of a general Eastern approach and to compare the same with the Western approach to truth should not be viewed that these cultural distinctions are in any way absolute and the clashes are inevitable, though some aspect of international scene may appear to have confirmed Samual Huntington's celebrated thesis. Our hopes lie in creation of multi-cultural setting in the world. We can refer to Singapore's harmonious multicultural society and revival of Christianity in a somewhat Confucian South Korea. The two examples are sufficient to point towards promising direction where the Confucian and the Taoist approaches to truth have meaningful contribution to make. There is no reason to envision the East-West dichotomy in terms of an exclusive 'either/or'. It is more conducive to the development of mankind to consider the contrast between East and West to be 'both/and'. The world today is shrinking both physically and mentally, due to advanceness in tele communications and transportation. What we need is an attempt not only to understand the two different thought tendencies as analogous but to preserve the differences. As in the metaphor of the Yin and the Yang, East and West require each other for their own existence, and future development depends not on one system of thought replacing the other, but on an integrated growth which maintains and expands both tendencies.

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HEIDEGGER AND THE ENIGMA OF DEFINING HUMAN ESSENCE

MUHAMMAD KAMAL

The philosophy of Martin Heidegger has a significant appliction for the range of crucial issues in contemporary European thought. One of these issues which has become a central theme in post-modernism for understanding human existence is Heidegger's unique analysis of "Dasein" based on hermeneutic-phenomenology. What is distinctive about Dasein is its consciousness projeting itself and the things in the world and at the same time is subjected to the world by the very nature of existence in the world. Dasein finds itself in the world which is its own world insofar as its consciousness projects it. In this account, it is not the thinking-substance as a completely self-dependent and autonomous master of its own know- ledge and standing aloof from the contingent events in history, but it is a unitary whole capable of experiencing the world as a living being.

Heidegger's primary concern in his major philosophical work *Being and Time* (1926) is an inquiry into the meaning of Being in general, or the establishment of 'fundamental ontology'. His quest for understanding the meaning of Being began in 1907 under the influence of Franz Brentano's work, *On the Manifold Sense of Being According to Aristotle* (1862). Since then he fostered this idea as the major philosophical enterprise in his life time. According to Heidegger, Being, as the ontological ground, has been neglected by post-Aristotelian thinkers as they began to engage themselves in studying finite manifestations of Being rather than Being itself. Since then, Being, which is considered by Heidegger to be a genuine philosophical truth, was alienated from philosophical thought. However,

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVI INo 1&2
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the problem of the possible oblivion of Being is not our target here as we try to explain how Heidegger's analysis of human existence, or Dasein, opens a new horizon for understanding human reality and how this analysis becomes a total rejection of a Cartesian theory of self-substance. In approaching this problem we find Heidegger's relationship with Descartes to be of a primary rather than a secondary concern. Heidegger's criticism of Cartesianism began in the winter semester of 1923 at Marburg, three years before publishing his major work *Being and Time*, while lecturing on 'Modern Philosophy.

It is evident that Descartes' philosophical inquiry is concerned with the problem of 'certainty' and aims at the stratification of true knowledge; and so from its inception, Cartesian philosophy is engaged chiefly with epistemology. In the *Meditations*, "Doubt" is utilized for examining the reliability of knowledge. All beliefs, prejudices and knowledge of the objects and events in the world even the existence of the world as well as of our own bodies were swept away by means of doubt. All judgments were suspended until a certain foundation was found on which true knowledge could be established. (1)

As we know the scope of methodic doubt narrows down gradually and becomes less universal after discovering the certainty of one's own existence in the Second Meditation, where Descartes concludes that by his famous statement or the *Cogito* " I think therefore, I exist". The *Cogito* signifies that one can doubt knowing everything other than his/her own esistence as a thinking-being and verifies itself as the only self-evident truth which does not require any proof and emerges as the most certain fact whose negation is self-defeating and at the same time it has become the point of departure in Descartes' philosophical inquiry. [2]

The attribute of thinking in the *Cogito* covers all kinds of mental activities from contemplation to doubt and imagination, and makes an individual aware of the objects of the world. Thinking as an activity is intentional and can never happen without standing out from itself before its object. It is always posited and directed towards something which is

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thought about. But does the awareness of an object or intenationality of thinking includes self-awareness? Can thinking relate itself to itself in the same intentional manner of being aware of an object in the world? The second part of the *Cogito* suggests that when I think, I become aware of my existence. But how can I think of myself ? Does that mean, to become self-conscious, I must stand at a distance from myself and split the I into a subject and an object? Obviously, the dichotomy of subject-object relationship makes it difficult to encompass the split of the "I" subject from the "I" object. Whenever we are self-conscious, the human self suffers a shizodic mode and then every self will be carrying two selves within itself; the observed and the observing selves. But since the observed self has become an object and it is not a subject like the observing self, then it should be different from the latter and cannot be defined as a thinking-subject anymore. In this case, the self will not become aware of itself as an active subject because the observed self is reduced to an object, and in order to become self-conscious, the observing self has to split still further; this process to continue infinitly. Jean-Paul Sartre suggests a solution for this problem, arguing that the self is always aware of being aware of the objects in the world and this kind of awareness is 'pre-reflective *Cogit*'[3] an implicit knowing of the self which is presupposed by positional awareness.

In Cartesian philosophy, thinking has become a necessary condition for existence and human essence is defined as an entity that can exist by itself without relying on the body. Consciousness is closed in on itself, dwelling totally within the inner space of its own ideas and experiences and only subsequently in contact with external reality. In other words, Descartes has tried to prove that human existence is a mixture of worldly and transcendent entities which are not necessarily connected. The thinking substance does not rely on the extended-substance to exist. The self and the body interact without depending on each other for their existence.

After making this distinction between the self and the body and apprehending the differences between them, Descartes arrived at the

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conclusion that the self must be complete because it is unchangeable, otherwise it would not be distinct from the body. As a 'subject' it should resist all kinds of change, and it should be the self-same bearer of all sorts of cognition and different experiences. This notion of self-sameness of the subject is again a derivative of metaphysical understanding of human existence as a thinking-substance.

There are two serious problems with a Cartesian analysis of the self; first, the primary relationship between the self and the world is epistemological and self stands in this relationship to the world as a sepectator and remains separated from its object. Second, although Descartes believes that the self may be known better than the body because it is unchangeable, but knowing one's own self does not guarantee an access to knowing the other's self. The other, or another thinking-substance recedes from our knowledge and stays undiscovered or unknown. It is possible to know myself by intuition but how can I know the other ? The self-substance theroy has not been abale to recognize these two problems and fails to deal with the complexity of the application of its account of human existence when the question of interpersonal relationship arises.

Generally speaking, the Cartesian analysis of human existence can be summarized in five points :

* The belief in the existence of the self distinct from the body.
* The self is known to be unchangeable.
* The distinction between the self and mental activities.
* The emphasis on the priority of an epistemological relationship between the self and the world.
* The self is non-corporeal and cannot be known by perception.

Against these points we find philosophers Hume, Kant, and many contemporary thinkers, including Heidegger who have developed new theories by refuting Cartesian philosophy. Heidegger's throught is a new

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challenge which aims at constructing a foundation for understanding human existence on the refutation of Cartesianism. The main arguments and the focus of his critique of Descartes in *Being and Time* can be set out as following :

* The rejection of the theory of self-substance.
* The rejection of the primacy of the epistemological relationship between the self and the world.
* The rejection of mind-body dualism.

Heidegger rejects Descartes' analysis of human existence as a thinking-substance and describes human being as *'Dasein'* (Being-There) becuse *res cogitans* presupposes its own ontological ground, there will be no thinking without being. Dasein is an entity which intends itself and understnds its own being. This attitude of Dasein is at the same time the realization of the possibilities and its existence is always towards these possibilities. For that, and in order to make a clear distinction between Dasein and other entities, Heidegger designates 'existence' (*Existenz*) to it rather than *'existentia'* which describes the being of other entities.[4] *Existenz* and not *'Existentia'* captures the unique meaning of human existence because it is incomplete and dynamic and it is a being towards possibilities. On the contrary, *'Existentia'* signifies a static existence which is used by medieval metaphysicians to describe something actual and that is an inadequate term for describing a kind of being such as Dasein. With regard to Dasein, its being is at issue; it has to decide about its own being and then comport itself towards that. In opposition to *res cogitans,* Dasein's authentic existence is possibility and not actuality.

Now after discussing Heidegger's refutation of the self-substance theory, we talk about the adoption of Husserl's phenomenology in studying Dasein by Heidegger which is another departure from Cartesian tradition. The terms 'Phenomenon' and 'Phenomenology' have been used by thinkers such as Kant and Hegel before Husserl. Kant, in his *Critique of Pure Reason* has made a distinction between two aspects of reality;

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phenomenon and noumenon. The former was kept in the light of human knowledge while the latter remained inaccessible and hidden. Hegel used phenomenology as a descriptive method to explain dialectic stages through which consciousness develops itself with the help of inherent contradictions to the higher stages of progress. For Husserl and Heidegger the term 'Phenomenon' signifies something that exhibits itself or presents itself to experience.[5] It is derived from a verb which means ' to show itself'[6] and a phenomenon can be understood as something that shows itself to be seen from itself in the way in which it shows itself [7] Heidegger has gone further by making a distinction between phenomenon and apearance. Phenomenon is something which shows itself, ' *das was sich zeigt, das Sichzeigende das Offenbar'* and this coming to the light of day can take multiple forms.[8] This difference may be understood as the relationship between a disease and its symptoms. The symptoms are not the disease but are an indication of it and that simply means the disease as a phenomenon needs to manifest itself through the symptoms. Fever, for example, is a symptom of flu, but the flu is not fever. Appearance is not a phenomenon but the announcing of a phenomenon. It is something that depends on an appearance to announce itself. Appearance of a phenomenon is quite similar to the 'shining-forth' of 'Essence' in Hegel's logic, and it is possible, as Chrisopher Macann remarks that Heidegger has Hegel's logic in mind in his distinction between phenomenon and appearance. [9] In 'The Doctrine of Logic', Hegel has distinguished two movements of 'Essence'; 'shining-in-itself' and 'shining-forth'. When 'Essence' is hidden and not revealed to consciousness, it is shining-in-itself and when it manifests itself, shines-forth and becomes appearance. In Hegel's logic appearance is not self-dependent, because it relies on 'Essence' to exist and such a dependence is interchangeable.[10] In making this distinction between phenomenon and appearance, Heidegger does not intend to believe in transcendentiality of something beyond the realm of appearance in the Kantian sense. But when we think about a phenomenon as being distinct from its appearance it will remain transcendent and so it becomes accessible only through its manifestation as a disease is known through the

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symptoms.

Heidegger employed Husserl's phenomenology in his investigation into the meaning of Being and Dasein, but before we deal with Heidegger's phenomenology it is important to say a few words about Husserl and his philosophical inquiry. Edmund Gustav Albercht Husserl (1859-1938) was originally a mathematician. His passion for philosophy was developed under the influence of Franz Brentano, a philosopher and a psychologist at the University of Vienna. The main philosophical issue for him was a new foundation for cognition. To accomplish this, he believed, one should begin with the analysis of consciousness phenomenologically. This type of analysis is not concerned with psychic states of the mind but with intentionality of consciousness and the objects intended by it. Phenomenoeogy as a method is then a turn to the phenomena intended by consciousness or to the things-in-themselves *'Zu den Sachen Selbest.'* This turn does not conceive of the phenomena as a reality of the second grade but objects that can be grasped intuitively prior to any presuppositions and prejudgements. Consequently, phenomenology can be defined as a method which describes the phenomena the way they show themselves to consciousness.

Intentionality stands against two kinds of beliefs; first, the denial of reality other than consciousness or solipsism and second, viewing consciousness as a monad closed in upon itself. In this regard, the intentional structure of consciousness becomes a foundation for ontological proof of the world. Since consciousness is consciousness of something then that something becomes the constitutive structure of consciousness and there can be no consciousness without object, as Sartre remarks "Consciousness is born supported by a being which is not itself." [11] Another way to describe the structure of consciousness is its transcendental character. In phenomenological method, consciousness is 'transcendental'. It is a necessary a priori condition for every experience. Consciousness is the only object that escapes the bracketing process in the phenomenological method and becomes the only presupposed foundation for knowledge.

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It should be mentioned that Husserl was not interested in empirical facts. He wanted to develop phenomenology as an 'eidetic' science. For this purpose he made a distinction between two kinds of intuition, empirical and categorial. In the Sixth Logical Investigation, two titles have been used to describe these two kinds of intuition, 'Sensibility and Understanding' and then 'Sensuous and Categorial Intuitions'. The first title corresponds to the two faculties of human mind recognised by Kant but it is wrong to think that Husserl used these terms in the Kantian sense. For Kant, Understanding is bound to sensibility and cannot go beyond the empirical facts provided by sense experience. The categories in Kant's philosophy are subjective and deduced from the Aristotelian table of judgments, and are given by intuition. We can say that empiricl intuition, resembles sensibility, because it is the source of empirical knowledge and discovers the facts which are accidental and conditioned by space and time. [12] Categorial intuition is non-empirical and is an immediate insight into the genus, species of each entity. It reveals the stable essences of the phenomena. This unchangeable structure of the phenomena is called "*Eidos*" or idea, and is defined as the 'universal' of which the particular is an instance. [13] The goal of phenomenology is then the transition from the factual to these essential forms.

In order to reveal the "*Eidos*" of a phenomenon in our intution it is necessary to go through two major stages known as the 'natural standpoint' and 'phenomenological standpoint'. Natural standpoint is also clled 'Bracketing' the 'Epoche' and the second stage is phenomenological reduction. Natural standpoint is the most basic attitude of cognitive relationship to the objects, and it is different from scientific standpoint, becuse it is free from all presuppositions *(Voraussetzungslos)*.[14] Although taking a stand from presuppostionless might seem to be similar to Cartesian doubt in the First Meditation, Husserl does not begin with doubt. Scepticism is not an issue for him, and bracketing the world is in no way limited to doubt. It is a mere suspension of all kinds of pre-knowledge and judgments regardless of their being true or false. Natural standpoint is the first outlook upon the world from view point of a common human being

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similar to sense-certainty in Hegel's phenomenology or knowledge by 'Acquaintance' in Russell's philosophy and as such is a simple way of looking at the world without presuppositions, before analyzing it into universal categories. Phenomenological standpoint or reduction can be termed as a moving away from empirical facts towards the unchangeable aspects of the transcendent. More clearly this reduction detects the persistent part of a phenomenon that can exist independently of the empirical facts. It is the discovery of a 'ground' on which empirical facts stand and present themselves to consciousness.[15] In eidetic reduction every experience of a particular phenomenon is transformed into categorial intuition or discovering the universal determinations.

The main philosophical enterprise undertaken by Heidegger is entirely distinct from Husserl's. For Heidegger the problem is not methodology since Husserl has already produced one, but an inquiry into the meaning of Being with the help of that method, and he places emphasis on the "hermeneutic" characteristic of Dasein's understanding of its own existence.[16] Philosophical hermeneutics was developed by Friedrich Schleiermacher as a theory of interpretation of text and he proposed that interpretation should be based on full understanding of the circumstances in which a text came into existence. According to this theory, the meaning of a text can be apprehended after understanding the meanings of its parts and understanding of the parts require a prior understanding of the whole text. Heidegger was first introduced to hermenutics as a student at the Roman Catholic Theological Faculty of the University of Freiburg. He employed the term in his philosophy seeking to distinguish his phenomenology from that of Husserl. For Heidegger, then, hermeneutics was the interpraetation of existentiality of human reality. His hermeneutic circle does not deal with the interpretation of the text but consists of a movement from the meaning of Dasein to the meaning of Being and then from Being to Dasein . It denotes an ontological inquiry by exploring the existence of Dasein as the only being capable of understanding itself and comporting itself towards the whole reality. The philosophical understanding of the being of Dasein rests upon such a disclosing future

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project. Understanding the meaning of Being becomes intelligible when the question of the meaning of Dasein is answered. In Division 1, chapter 5 of *Being and Time,* Heidegger explains the relationship between Understanding and Interpretation and on his account, Understanding is not considered as a faculty in the human mind, but an existential which constitutes the ontological structure of Dasein.[17] This approach towards understanding of "Understanding' is unique and is one of Heidegger's radical steps in developing his philosophy of existence and modifying all theories of knowledge that consider understanding to be just a faculty to shed some light on the objects outside human mind. The hermeneutic circle of Understanding and Interpretation is applicable to the interpretation af all kinds of phenomena attempted to be understood. Interpretation is possible when a phenomenon (whether Dasein, a text or an equipment) is understood and its meaning is assigned to it.

The major function of interpretation is the revelation of meaning and meaning is not imposed on a phenomenon by consciousness because what is understood is actually the phenomenon in its web of relations with other phenomena and then after that we infer the meaning of what we experience. A phenomenon becomes intelligible only when it is understood by consciousness in the web of relations and meanings and since Understanding is an existential of Dasein, Dasein is the only entity to experience the phenomena in their web of relations and meanings and Dasein is the only one to assert the meaningfulness of the world. In this context in interpreting human existence, history and language function as a special type of precondition in the hermeneutic circle, because the being of Dasein does not rely on self-substance as the master of its own cognitive activity. The actual historical circumstances and language provide a set of preunderstandings which help Dasein to make understanding possible. This entails that understanding depends, in part, on social and historical standards and Dasein's interpretation of reality is not completely presuppostionless. Coming back to phenomenological method, Husserl's understanding of essence is not distinct from the traditional

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interpretation of the term explained mainly by Aristotle and then later by the medieval and modern thinkers. Essence has been traditionally defined as the primary element of a thing without which that thing cannot exist the way it is.[18] A phenomenon changes its empirical qualities without ceasing to exist, but it cannot continue to exist when its 'essence' is altered. If the essence of water is being liquid, a condition in which its particles move freely over each other, then by losing that property, water ceases to exist. But then changing empirical qualities, such as whether water is cold or hot, does not affect its being as water. In this case being liquid as a universal determination becomes the essence of water.

Husserl's view of 'essence' resembles that of Aristotle with the exception that Husserl does not claim explicitly that essence is cause of being of a phenomenon. But when we analyse the significance and task of universal determinations in his philosophy, one can reach the conclusion that Husserl accepts that all phenomena rely on universal determinations to exist in one way or another.[19] According to Aristotle, essence which constitutes the being of each speices is what it is said to be *propter se*.[20] The essence of water is not being cold or hot, but being liquid, because these empirical qualities are accidents, not necessary properties. The essence of water as being liquid is unchangeable and when it is lost, water would also cease to exist. This distinction between 'necessary qualities' and 'accidents' is based on the question "What is it?". This interpretation suggests that all qualities predicated to a subject in a proposition do not constitute the essence of that subject. And when we deal with the answer of the question we simply try to define the term by discovering its essence. Each statement expressed to answer "What is it?" is said to be a definition and an indication of its essence. The ideas of 'substance', 'essence', 'properties', and 'accident' have been discussed by many thinkers after Aristotle; including the rationalists and some of empiricist thinkers and these thinkers agreed with Aristotle that 'essence' consists of the primary elements of an object. John Locke, for example, as one of the empiricist thinkers of the modern age has made this point clear by drawing further distinction between two kinds of essence; the real and

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nominal.[21] The real essence, on his view is the internal constitution of things on which all perceived qualities depend. Locke also believed that the real essence is unknown or like the things-in-themselves are inaccessible to human mind. The nominal essence by contrast is the connotation of the term, a cluster of qualities which are applied to when we describe an object.[22] The nominal essence of 'water', for example, is that complex idea the term 'water' stands for, like; being liquid, having certain weight and it quenches thirst. The real essence, which is transcendent, is the internal constitution of water on which the nominal essence depends. Locke remarks that real essence is God-made but their being ranked under such and such names or species depend on human understanding. On Locke's view we know nothing about real essences of the objects in the world, but only about the nominal essences which are qualities ascribed to each species the way the categories in Aristotelian logic are applied to the entities in the realm of human experiences. What I intend to explain here is that Husserl in his analysis of the meaning of 'essence' belongs to the traditional interpretation represented by Aristotle which defines 'essence' as a necessary constitution of being of the entities in the world. But since there is a fundamental distinction between the being of 'Dasein' and the being of the other entities, we need to make a clear distinction between two kinds of essence, and the traditional interpretation of essence is applicable only to the being of the entities other than Dasein. The essence of Dasein, then, should be defined differently and requires a new interpretation. This analysis, however, does not reduce from the paramount of traditional, Aristotelian interpretation but rejects its adequacy for understanding the essence of Dasein simply because Dasein is not a property of a substance whose essence is what it is, and no property can be counted as a 'cause' for its being. The unique characteristic of consciousness, as dynamic and incomplete, will not allow us to accept the traditional interpretation for it otherwise, it will be reduced to thinghood and its nature becomes universal, shared by all individual conscious beings. Heidegger's understanding of the being of Dasein is a revolt against the traditional way of thinking about human essence and his understanding of

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essence is intimately connected with his departure from tradition, particularly, Cartesianism.

The first step to understand Heidegger's viewpoint is that the essence of Dasein is not a property of a substance whose essence 'it is'. This point relies on the analysis of Dasein's existential structure as a being with its own distinctiveness described in *Being and Time,* " The 'essence' *["Wesen"]* of this entity lies in its "to be" *[Zu-sein].* Its Being-what-it-is *[was-sein]* (*essentia*) must, so far as we can speak of it at all, be conceived in terms of its Being (*existentia*). But here our ontological task is to show that when we choose to designate the Being of this entity as "existence" [*Existenz],* this term does not and cannot have the ontological signification of the traditional term "*existentia";* ontologically, *existentia* is tantamount to Being-present-at-hand, a kind of Being which is essentially inappropriate to entities of Dasein's character. To avoid getting bewildered, we shall always use the interpretative expression "*present-at-hand"* for the term "*existentia",* which the term "*existence",* as a designation of Being, will be allotted solely to Dasein."[23]

The distinction between Dasein's Being and the Being of the entities of present-at-hand has been clearly emphasized by Heidegger and that distinction is based on the ontological structure of each of these entities. If the traditional interpretation of essence is accepted for definging the essence of an entity such as Dasein, then human essence will be defined as some properties which have already been there or born with Dasein. In this case, Dasein cannot choose its own essence because it is born with it like a trade mark or properties of the entities present-at-hand and ready-to-hand. But the rejection of the Cartesian theory of self-substance is the denial of inborn properties or the denial of human nature for Dasein;

> " The essence of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly, those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' present-at-hand of some entity which 'looks' so and so and is itself present-at-hand; they are in each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than that."[24]

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What we are looking for is the way Dasein can be understood, becuse now the problem of defining Dasein's essence is more complicated than before. If dasein does not possess properties like the entities of present-at-hand, then what does constitute its essence? In the light of Heidegger's previous statements, we are able to discover a number of themes. The 'essence' of Dasein is not a property of a substance in the Aristotelian sense, simply because Dasein's existence precedes its essence. Although Heidegger does not mention this explicitly but he believes that Dasein comes into existence and then only after that it obtains its own essence. Its essence, in this regard, is nothing more than "the possible ways for it to be". The appropriate answer to "What is it?" of Dasein is the interpretation of its existence in terms of realized possibilities which at the same time distinguish one Dasein from another. When we say, Salvador Dali is an artist, being an artist as one of the realized possibilities in the life of this artist becomes a component of his essence. But then this is not an inborn universal property to constitute the essence of Dali.

The uniqueness of this entity (Dasein) and its distinction from the other entities has also motivated Heidegger to avoid using traditional terms and categories in describing it. He has listed some general ontological determinations (the Existentials) for studying the Being of Dasein only.[25] The question which arises here is that, do these existentials constitute dasein's essence ? The essence of Dasein which lies in its existence is quite distinct from the existentials described in *Being and Time*. Heidegger has not considered them to be component parts of Dasein's essence, because Dasein's essence is defined in terms of realized possibilities and these possibilities which are at variance from one individual to another are not universal determinations. If the existentials are taken to be components of Dasein's essence then the essence of this kind of being, like the essences of the objects of ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, becomes a composite of universal determinations shared by all individuals. In this case, there will be a single universal essence for all of them and Dasein's individuality will vanish.

The existentials are ontological conditions for the existence of

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Dasein and not the components of its essence. We may say that breeding, for example, is a necessary condition for the life of an embryo to begin, but this contact is not the essence of an embryo. Similarly, if there is Dasein, it should exist in the world. Being-in-the-world is an ontological condition for the being of Dadein but this condition does not constitute its essence. If we wish to reject the traditional interpretation of 'essence' and consider Dasein to be essentially distinct from the other entities, this Heideggerian approach will be the only alternative. Accordingly, if Husserl's phenomenological reduction aims at detecting the essences of the phenomena and these essences are composed of universal determinations revealed in categorial intuition, then the phenomenological reduction will not be in a position to uncover the essence of Dasein, because Dasein's essence is not composed of universal determinations. Perhaps, phenomenological reduction can be utilized to reveal the 'existentials' rather than the essence of Dasein.

The 'existentials', like the categories of Understanding in Kant's "Tracscendental Analytic', are necessary and *a priori,* but at the same time different. They are different from the categories because the categories which are transcendentally deduced from the forms of judgments are conceived to be subjective-epistemological conditions for the possibility of knowledge.(26) The existentials by contrast, are ontological, and stand as objective principles outside the human mind as pre-conditions for human existence. However, one may understand the nature and characteristics of these existentials as *a priori* conditions for human existence in two ways; The existentials are presupposed by the existence of Dasein. If there is Dasein, then, it should be in the world, or space is always presented to it.

In "natural standpoint" Dasein shows itself the way it appears as something there on the platform of everyday life. In this situation 'others' prevail over the Being of Dasein and Dasein becomes 'somebody' other than its own possible self. This state of false selfhood is an inauthentic mode of existence and fallenness, *Vefallenheit,* where Dasein's self identification is at stake. In everydayness Dasein manifests itself to

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consciousness as the "They" or as someone just like the others. The others, which are characterised by "They" are not this or that person, they are indefinite people without specific identifications. Since the "They" are not any definite others, are interchangeble and anyone can stand in for everybody else. Due to this character of the "They", the who of everydayness is *(Das Man)* without a face.[27] Inauthenticity, in this connection, seems to have ontological primacy to authenticity for Heidegger, becaue the Being of Dasein is grasped in "natural standpoint" as fallenness and Dasein is always in the-world-with-others or into which it has been thrown. These are, as we said, ontological conditions and necessary components of human existence. Fallenness is this becoming an inevitable character of Dasein's involvement in the world. Fallenness can also be understood positively in the sense that inauthentic mode of existence helps Dasein to be aware of losing itself and then to strive to obtain authenticity. Authenticity is achieved by projecting one's own self resolutely and this stand is not withdrawal from the others. It does not cut off Dasein from social responsibilities but brings the self right into the current concerned with being by possessing itself, by being the master of itself. Everydayness constitutes a network of practical ends and operational relations in which individuality and uniqueness of Dasein are not recognized. It is a system of activities and duties required by others to be fulfilled by Dasein and the essence of Dasein is defined by what one does in conformity with the system of these public requirements. Every Dasein has a proper professional label, for example, a teacher, a teller, a tram-conductor etc., and Dasein is identified with one of these professions. The "they" has its own way of existence maintaining distantiality and facticity.[28] An inauthentic mode of existence reduces Dasein's ability of understanding itself and its world by placing Dasein at a superficial level of life, relying mostly on ready-made knowledge and values provided by the "They". Inauthenticity as the denial of one's own possibilities is the state of alienation of Dasein from its own real essence. It is noteworthy that public life which is a primordial phenomenon revealed in "natural standpoint", has become an existential for Heidegger, and is Dasein's positive constitution and, "It

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itself has, in turn, various possibilities of becoming concrete as something characteristic of Dasein *[seiner daseinsmassigen Konkretion]."*[29]

In everydayness Dasein comes under the assailant of moods. The moods alter from one kind to another, for example, from happiness to sadness but they do not vanish and Dasein cannot escape them. This analysis of Dasein's ontological structure in everydayness is another departure form Cartesian tradition. The existential of Mood has become a primordial condition at this stage in the life of Dasein. This primacy of Mood to Understanding is based on two points; first, Mood is the dominant state of mind in everdayness and everdayness precedes Dasein's authentic mode of existence. Second, the existential of Mood is more general than the existential of Understanding. Dasein may not have an understanding of itself and a situation in which it is but it is always under the attack of moods," The fact that moods can deteriorate (*Verdorben werden*) and change over means simply that in every case Dasein always has some mood *(gestimmt ist)*[30] Mood discloses the facticity of Dasein as an entity that it has been thrown to the world. The notion of thrownness *(geworfenheit)* which has no connection with the religious myth of the Fall, determines the being of Dasein, by making it actual. Actuality reveals the "that-it-is" of Dasein exhibiting how one 'is' and how one finds oneself as an actual being. Actuality which is in the light of Being becomes the source of various kinds of moods assailing Dasein in everyday life. Dasein finds itself in a mood only when an event has become actual. No one can place him/herself in a specific mood for some thing or for an event which has not yet happened. Being in mood is a passivity, because it is an ability to be affected and attuned by the events in relity. It reveals the truth that Dasein is in the world living among the others. This aspect of the role of 'Mood' can also be understood better when 'Mood' is related to the existential of 'Care'. Dasein is assailed by mood in its relationships to the world and to others because it cares for them. This primordial relationship of Dasein to the world is emotional and unlike 'Perception' it does not require the presence of its object before consciousness. Even when objects of concern are not perceived, Dasein still cares

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for them. The presence of objects are not fundamental for mood to assail and Dasein is attuned even by their non-existence, "....ontologicaly mood is primordial kind of Being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and volition, and beyond their range of their disclosure. And furthermore, when we master a mood, we do so by way of a counter mood: we are never free of mood,"[31] Another significant role of 'Mood', as it is explained by Heidegger, is that, it gives birth to the revelation of 'Nothingness'. However, this explanation does not mean that 'Mood' becomes thinking because all of us know that "Mood" has a silent character, is speechless and no language is required for Dasein to be attuned by moods. But then how does mood become a ground for the revelation of 'Nothingness'?

For the answer to this question we need to refer to two further works of Heidegger; *On the Essence of Truth,* where he argues that the totality of Being is revealed in 'Mood'. And in *What is metaphysics* ? where he explains how thought is incapable of providing the source and the principle of all negations, namely, Nothingness, and how Nothingness is revealed in Dread *(Graun)* which is a kind of mood.[32] By revealing 'Nothingness in Dread, Dasein will be able to transcend the given reality. But 'Nothingness', in Heidegger's ontology, has no attribute, it is also difficult to say that it is equivalent to pure 'isness' of Hegel's Dialectic Logic, because it is the negation of the totality of Being.

In inauthentic mode of existence, when Dasein feels at home with the "They", is primarily in the domain of 'Mood' and characterised by actuality. The "They" requires unexamined and uncritical style of existence and the possibilities of Dasein are abandoned to the disposal of the others. This mode of existence is alienation of Dasein from its own real essence, but we cannot say it is a state in which Dasein has no essence at all. Even when Dasein lives under the domain of the "They", its essence is defined in terms of the possibilities manipulated by others and as such are at the disposal of others.

Authentic mode of existence, unlike inauthenticity, is characterised

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by 'Possibility' and 'Understanding'. Understanding, in *Being and Time* is not treated as a faculty of human mind but it is one of the existentials and an ontological condition for the Being of Dasein. It is Dasein's ability to apprehend its own existence and the world. In this context, Understanding does not consist of making propositions about the facts, it is the way of disclosedness which determines the whole life of the authentic mode of Dasein without which knowledge would not be possible. To be aware of one's own existence in the world and having possibilities depends upon Understanding. Possibilities, for Heidegger, do not have logical meaning and should not be mistaken for the concept of potentiality in Aristotle's metaphysics. Dasein is not determined by possibilities because Dasein is the creator and executor of the possibilities. This role of Understanding, in revealing Dasein's own possibilities, is called "Projection" *(Entwurf).* Dasein's authentic mode of existence is nothing more than self-projection towards future possibilities.

It is important to mention that Heidegger's interpretation of the existentials of Actuality and Possibility is the rejection of the traditional interpretation of actuality which considers actuality to be more significant and real than possibility. We have already discussed the significance of 'Possibility' for the authentic mode of existence and Dasein's essence is defined in terms of these possibilities. And then, 'Possibility' is connected with the revelation of truth. Inauthentic mode of existence, which is the state of false-consciousness and hiddenness is characterised by untruth, because truth is unhiddenness *(Aletheia)* but then hiddenness and the state of untruth in everydayness is unescapable. Dasein is incapable to emancipate itself immediately and reveal its own true essence by cultivating its own possibilities. Authenticity and truthfulness is achieved in resoluteness and conflict to eliminatie all imposed condition by the 'they-self' in everyday life. In the conclusion, Dasein's being is such that it always has an understanding of its own being. To be Dasein is to have an understanding of itself and to intend itself as an end to be realized. It is only in light of such a projection that Dasein's essence can be understood at all. Our philosophical investigation must rest upon such disclosing projection of

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Dasein rather than on traditional interpretation of essence, otherwise we fail to apprehend the true meaning of human reality.

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ANNOUNCEMENT

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EMOTION, CHOICE AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY: REFLECTIONS ON THE RATIONALE OF PROVOCATION DEFENCE

GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS

Introduction :

In England and other common law jurisdictions provocation operates as an independent partial defence to murder aimed at the reduction of that offence to voluntary manslaughter.[1] Moreover, provocation is usually taken into account as a factor in mitigation of sentence with respect to offences other than murder. For the partial defence to succeed the jury must be satisfied that the accused was deprived of his or her self-control at the time of the killing (the subjective test) and that this was the result of wrongful conduct serious enough to provoke an ordinary person (the objective test). Determining the threshold of legal provocation presupposes a moral judgement about what sort of offensive conduct is capable of arousing in a person such a degree of justified anger or indignation that might defeat his or her capacity for self-control. Although legal wrongdoings of a significant nature should for the most part provide a sufficient basis for the defence, non-legal, moral wrongdoings may also be considered serious enough to pass the threshold of provocation in law. Over this threshold, provocations may vary from the less serious ones (e.g. verbal provocations) to those involving very serious wrongdoings (e.g. provocation involving physical violence). Provocations involving different forms and degress of wrongdoing may equally support a partial defence to murder, provided that the requirement of loss of self-control is also satisfied.

The defence is understood to hinge upon two interrelated elements,

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 1&2
January - April 2000

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namely, the wrongful act of provocation and impaired volition or loss of self-control. The first element is taken to be justificatory in character, for it focuses upon a condition that, on the face of it, is capable of affecting the wrongfulness of the actor's conduct quite independently of his or her state of mind. The second element, by placing the emphasis on the actor's state of mind and his inability to exercise control over his actions, is clearly excusative in nature. Because the provocation rests upon both excusative and justificatory considerations, the rationale of the legal defence has been difficult to locate.[2] As Alldridge has remarked.

> The defence [of provocation] must be either a partial excuse (in which case the centre of the inquiry will be whether or not the defendant lost his/her self-control) or a partial justification (in which case the centre of the inquiry will be what was actually done by the deceased to the defendant--to what extent the deceased 'asked for it')...It is interesting to note that both these conditions obtained at common law.[3]

Although the justificatory element in provocation may have played a part in the shaping of the legal doctrine of provocation, its role in modern law is greatly diminished. The idea that an act of revenge may be partially justified conflicts with fundamental presuppositions of the criminal law system as a system whose very point is shifting the authority and moral basis of actions from the domain of subjective attitudes to general and impersonal norms of conduct.[4] Although for the defence of provocation to succeed it must be established that the accused was sufficiently wronged by his or her victim, the rationale of the defence in law is more satisfactorily explained in terms of the excuse theory. The real basis of the provocation defence, traditionally regarded as a concession to human frailty, lies in the actor's loss of self-control in circumstances in which any ordinary person might also have lost control.[5] In this respect, the wrongful act of provocation is seen as providing a morally acceptable explanation for the accused's loss of self-control and killing rather than a reason for directly reducing the wrongfulness of his or her actions. This paper examines how provocation can be conceptualised as a partial excuse and

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discusses problems relating to the traditional understanding of the provocation defence as a concession to human frailty.

Provocation as a Partial Excuse: Some Introductory Remarks

The description of provocation as a concession to human frailty reflects the conception of the defence as an excuse.[6] This approach to the defence hinges on the notion of impaired volition or loss of self-control. Its governing assumption is that provocative conduct, when it is sufficiently serious, is capable of inflaming anger to such a degree as to be likely to lead the provoked person to lose his or her self-control and retaliate in violence. When the provoked person loses self-control he is unable to weigh up the consequences of his action according to reason. It is not that the provoked person lacks the *capacity* to reason. His judgment that there has been a wrongdoing is a reasoned judgement, but the reasoning then breaks down so that his actions that stem from that judgment are no longer the product of reason. As Horder explains :

> Actions stemming from a loss of self-control...are the product of a judgment (of a certain degree of wrongdoing..) and a desire following in the wake of the judgment that controls the will without, for the moment, the restraining or guiding influence of reason.[7]

Although losing self-control and killing as a response to provocation is not totally excusable, the actor's degree of culpability falls short of that required to convict him of murder. From the point of view of the excuse theory, the gravity of the provocation is relevant to assessing the accused's claim that he was provoked to lose his self-control. There is no question here of whether the wrongful and culpable character of the provocative conduct should render the killing objectively less wrongful or partially justified. It is, rather, the accused's loss of self-control, *as a result of provocation,* that accounts for and justifies the reduction of culpability and, consequently, the reduction of the offence from murder to manslaughter. To gain some insight into the excusative element in provocation it is necessary to consider what human frailty means and how it relates to the loss of control requirement which, from the viewpoint of

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the excuse theory, constitutes the true basis of the provocation defence.

Loss of Self-Control as a Basis for Excusing : A Closer Look

In provocation it is not required that the actor loses his self-control to the extent that he does not know what he is doing, or what his action is aimed at; but self-control must be lost to such an extent that for the moment his action is being guided by passion rather than by reason. Indeed, it is an important prerequisite for pleading provocation as a partial defence to murder that the accused has acted with the requisite *mens rea* for murder, i.e. an intention to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm. If the provoked agent loses his self-control to such an extent as to be unaware of the nature or quality of his act, or unable to exercise control over his bodily movements, then he may be entitled to full acquittal on the basis of a lack of *actus reus* or *mens rea* defence. Other things being equal, if the provoked agent suffers a total loss of self-control, automatism may provide the appropriate basis for a complete defence to the charge of murder.[8] Nevertheless, in those cases of provocation where the actor is totally deprived of his ability to control his conduct, the victim's provocation might perhaps be regarded as a triggering factor of the excusing condition - i.e. automatism providing the basis of his defence to murder. Thus, although another excuse takes the priority over provocation here, the latter might be granted a role peripheral to or supportive of the defence relied upon.[9]

The role of loss of control in the theroy of excuses is understood in the light of the important distinction between involuntariness and moral or normative involuntariness. The term involuntariness is used to denote one's total inability to direct one's conduct or to exercise control over one's bodily movements. One might say that, in such cases, the agent acts only in appearance because the conduct is no longer subject to conscious determination by the agent.[10] Normative or moral involuntariness, on the other hand, pertains to those cases where the agent, although he is able to direct his external conduct (to "act", in a strict sense), is unable to act as he chooses-or would have chosen due to external or internal constraints

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on his freedom to choose (cases of "overpowered will"). According to Fletcher :

> Excuses arise in cases in which the actor's freedom of choice is constricted. His conduct is not strictly involuntary as if he suffered a seizure or if someone pushed his Knife-holding hand down on the victim's throat. In these cases there is no act at all, no wrongdoing and therefore no need for an excuse. The notion of involuntariness at play is what we should call moral or normative involuntariness. Were it not for the external pressure, the actor would not have performed the deed. In Aristotle's words, he 'would not choose any such act in itself'.[11]

The distinction between involuntariness and moral or normative involuntariness is allied to that between complusion and coercion. A person acting under compulsion is unable to exercise physical control over his or her bodily movements, in other words, is not free to act. A coerced person, by contrast although he is free to act in a strict sense, is not free to choose the direction of his action.[12] Compulsion provides the basis for claims of exculpation contesting authorship-responsibility and hence, indirectly, moral responsibility. Claims of exculpation (or mitigation) stemming from coercion challenge directly the actor's being morally responsible for a wrongful act. From the point of view of the excuse theory, the classification of the various exculpatory claims in law turns on the source and nature of the relevant external or internal impediments precluding the agent's acting in compliance with the law.[13]

Freedom of choice in action, as a requirement of moral and legal responsibility, presupposes, among other things, that the actor is "master of his mind", or that he is acting in a "normal" frame of mind. Heat of passion and loss of self-control imply that the contribution of reason in the psychological process towards the formation of the will is precluded or substantially diminished.[14] There are two ways in which passion may affect a person's ability to choose freely. In some impetuous acts the urge does not circumvent the conscious self but, in a sense, passes through it.

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Because of its intensity, however, the urge overrides the actor's ability to exercise rational judgment, it defeats his moral resistance.[15] One might also consider as relevant here the so called *short-circuited reactions.* These pertain to cases where an intense psychological urge is activated so abruptly that, in a way, circumvents the conscious self and affects directly the agent's motivational system. In such cases the agent's moral inhibitions are bypassed rather than overcome. Depending upon the degree to which self-control is lost, the provoked agent's response may be described as an impetuous act of the first type or as a "short-circuited reaction". In the latter case loss of self-control tends to involve a spontaneous, immediate reaction to the provocation received. The desire to inflict punishment on the provoker which is triggered by the judgment of wrongdoing is translated into action immediately,i.e. without going through any process of deliberation. In this case the agent reacts almost without thinking, like the person who, when another raises his hand to hit him, instinctively ducks his head or raises his hands to protect himself. In the former case, by contrast, the provoked agent appears to be making a choice in anger to inflict a certain kind of punishment on the provoker. The exercise of choice here, however, does not necessarily require us to draw the inference that the provoked agent is in control of his actions, for the choice he makes, distorted by emotion, involves a misjudgment as to what form and degree of retaliation is appropriate. Depending upon the perceived gravity of the provocation, this misjudgment is to some extent excusable because people are fallible and often leap before they look, especially when they are conquered by passion. Both impetuous acts involving deliberation and short-circuited reactions should be distinguished from what is referred to as "reflex actions". The latter lack a concrete psychological basis and therefore relate to the conditions of involuntariness rather than to those of moral or normative involuntariness. The "impetuous acts" and, arguably, the "short-circuited reactions" are not irrelevant to the attribution of moral and, possibly, legal responsibility for both may be taken to manifest undesirable character traits or dispositions.

What do we mean, then, when we say that the provoked agent who

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acts "in the heat of the moment" is not entirely free to choose? To answer this question one would need to look more closely at the interrelation between free agency and self-control. It has been asserted that freedom of choice presupposes that what motivates the agent to act in a certain way accords with his or her all-things-considered evaluations. G. Watson draws a distinction between the agent's "valuational" and "motivational" systems. He defines an agent's valuational system as :

> that set of considerations which, when combined with his factual beliefs, yields judgements of the form: the thing for me to do in these circumstances, all things considered, is a. To ascribe free agency to a being presupposes it to be a being that makes judgements of this sort. To be this sort of being, one must assign values to alternative states of affairs, that is, rank them in terms of worth.[16]

Moreover, Watson defines the motivational system of an agent as that set of considerations which moves the agent to action. From this point of view, an action is held not to be free if the agent's motivational system is not aligned with, or correspond to, his evaluational system. In Watson's words :

> The possibility of unfree action consists in the fact that the agent's valuational and motivational system may not completely coincide. Those systems harmonize to the extent that what determines the agent's all-things-considered judgements also determines his actions....The free agent has the capacity to translate his values into action; his actions flow from his evaluational system.[17]

Freedom of action as a requirement of responsibility presupposes not only that what motivates a person to act concurs with his or her evaluations; it presupposes, in addition, that the person's evaluations that move him to action take place in a "normal" frame of mind. As A. Mele has noted :

> A self-controlled person is disposed to bring his motivations into line with his evaluations and to maintain that alignment. But there

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> is more to being self-controlled than this, for one's evaluations themselves can be warped in various ways by one's wants and motivations. Hence, a self-controlled person must also be disposed to promote and maintain a structure of evaluations or values which is not unduly influenced by his motivations.[18]

As has been pointed out before, provocation may provide the grounds for a partial excuse only if the victim's conduct is considered to be suficiently wrongful, i.e., capable if raising legitimate anger or indignation.[19] It is precisely his or her disapproval of the victim's conduct that motivates the agent to respond. In provocation the provoked agent does not merely judge that there has been a wrongdoing, but also, to some extent, deliberates on what retaliatory action is required. But, where there is an overreaction, the agent judges that more retaliation is appropriate than it is in fact justified by the seriousness of the provocation. Although the agent's judgment of wrongdoing motivates his choice to take punitive action, the ensuing urge to retaliate in a sense overrides the agent's own evaluational system, or his ability to assess correctly both the provoker's misdeed as well as his own response to the provocation. Thus, we might say that the provoked agent is not fully free to choose because his capacity for evaluation is undermined by the overwhelming emotional pressure which he is experiencing.[20] In this respect, the provoked agent who overreacts in an outbreak of anger is similar to the victim of coercion who acts morally involuntarily.

Unlike other defences based upon the idea of moral or normative involuntariness, loss of self-control as a result of provocation falls short of totally excluding moral and legal culpability. Giving way to anger-justified though such anger may be or allowing one's reasoning ability (and hence his freedom to choose) to be overcome by passion furnishes suficient grounds for holding the provoked agent partially responsible for his wrongdoing. The provoked agent who kills is still to blame for violating the general norm requiring that people should always hold their anger in check, even when faced with the most severe provocation. The

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agent remains morally and legally responsible for the lesser crime of manslaughter because, as a "normal" person, he is assumed capable of resisting his impulse to kill the provoker. The provoked agent's inability to defeat his urge to kill shows that he lacks the power of reason to view his response to provocation in the context of a system of values and an assessed set of circumstances. Because that power of reason is lacking the provoked agent finds it impossible to control his impulse, since the stifling of the impulse cannot be made the objective of a voluntary choice. As long as the provoked person is regarded as a "normal" person, giving way to anger can only be due to a defect of character, manifested by his inability to view the impulsive action in the light of a given system of norms that proscribes the taking of human life. This is precisely what justifies the provoked killer's being held, to some extent, morally and legally responsible for his actions.

In provocation the attribution of responsibility for the lesser offence can be explained on the basis of the theory of responsibility which focusses on the relationship between external conduct and human character. This theory postulates that moral praise or blame pertains not directly to acts but, rather to the character traits. By character trait is understood any socially desirable or undesirable disposition or attitude that an act may be taken to reflect.[21] Although not all acts manifest character traits in a way that is morally or legally relevant, an actor cannot be held blameworthy or legally culpable unless his harmful conduct reflects a socially undesirable attitude. If it does, the degree of blame and punishment which the actor deserves is to be determined by reference to the extent to which his or her attitude is deemed undesirable; if it does not, blame and punishment would be inappropriate, although certain non-punitive measures preventive of similar conduct in the future might be taken. Notwithstanding that attitudes may be volatile or unstable, the general assumption of this theory is that, other things being equal, wrongful and unlawful act does manifest an undesirable character trait or attitude. From the point of view of the character theory of responsibility, the role of excuses is to block the normal inference from a wrongful act to an undesirable trait of

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characer. Determing whether a wrongful act reflects a defect in the actor's character requires consideration of the actor's state of mind at the time of his act and of his ability to exercise control over his conduct. In this respect, the admission of loss of self-control in provocation is taken to block the normal inference from the act of killing to the character fault associated with the crime of murder. Nevertheless, the excusing condition here cannot preclude the actor's conviction for the lesser crime of man-slaughter, for losing control and killing is still taken to reflect a defect in the actor's character.

Under the character theory of responsibility one could also explain why losing control and killong in the face of a trivial provocation, or when no provocation has been offered, should not entitle the actor to a partial excuse. One might say that, if the provocation is not regarded as serious enough to raise justified anger to such a degree as to cause an ordinary person to lose his self-control and kill, the actor's response, on the spur of the moment though it may have been, manifests the same degree of character fault as that normally ascribed to a premediated killing. The same may be said about those cases in which the actor is deemed responsible for creating a situation wherein a provocative event is highly likely to occur.[22] As Dressler has pointed out :

> under excuse theory, we do not (fully) blame a person who (partially) loses self-control if, *but only if,* he is not to blame for his anger and for his homicidal actions which result from it....A person who becomes sufficiently enraged to kill because the decedent acted in a nonwrongful manner arguably does not deserve to be excused. At the least the nonwrongfulness of the decedent's actions is highly pertinent in determining whether the actor's loss of self-control was excusable. Thus the individual who becomes angry and responds violently when another *justifiably* strikes him in self-defence and the person who unjustifiably creates the situation in which the provocation gives birth are blameworthy and should not be excused.[23]

If sufficient provocation cannot be shown or where the actor is

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deemed responsible for creating the conditions of provocation, the fact that the actor killed after he lost his self-control cannot on its own entitle him to an excuse on the grounds of the provocation defence. One might argue, however, that if a general loss of control defence was recognised, establishing provocation would not be necessary in order to reduce the actor's culpability for homicide. Nevertheless, where the actor's loss of self-control cannot be attributed to provocation, such a general loss of control defence may hold good only in so far as another acceptable reason for losing control can be brought forward.

Let us now consider a little further the idea that an accused might perhaps be able to rely on a general loss of control defence in some cases where the test of provocation cannot be met. As was noted before, in such cases the accused's plea for extenuation should not be accepted unless the accused offers a good reason for his losing his self-control in the circumstances. We might say that for an excuse to be allowed the accused's claim of impaired volition must be supported by evidence of a particular condition which is put forward as its triggering factor or "cause". Although a number of such conditions have been singled out as providing the grounds for formulating general defence categories, a claim of impaired volition might perhaps be brought forward which may be difficult to subsume or treat under one of the existing categories. In this respect, a general loss of control or impaired volition defence would serve to accommodate claims of excuse based on conditions lying outside the scope of the existing excuse-based legal defences. An excuse-based defence of this kind would be open-ended, in the sense that, although it would rest upon the requirement of impaired volition, no specific condition or triggering factor would be laid down as the cause of the actor's impairment. It would rest upon the accused to bring forward evidence of an acceptable condition, or set of conditions, accounting for his (partial or total) lack of control over his conduct. Such a general impaired volition defence may be introduced either to complement or even to replace (i.e. as encompassing) an existing defence category. For example, the American Model Penal Code provides the reduction of homicide from murder to

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manslaughter in those cases where the accused acted "under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse". It is added that "The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be".[24] Under this provision there are no special limitations as to what sort of circumstances that may give rise to such an excuse-based defence. It is upon the jury to decide whether the accused in fact acted under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and it is upon them to determine whether the disturbance was one for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. An excuse-based defence similar to the MPC's extreme emotional disturbance' defence may be relied upon to deal, for example, with some cases of cumulative provocation lying on the borderline between provocation and diminished responsibility where neither provocation nor diminished responsibility seem capable of providing the basis of the accused's plea for a partial excuse. In these cases, the lapse of time between the last provocative incident and the accused's response, or the admission of forethought and deliberation, would appear to militate against the "hot anger" requirement of provocation. On the other hand, the assumption that the accused is a "normal" person, or the relatively uncertain or temporary nature of his psychologicl impediment, may render the defence of diminished responsibility difficult to accept. Here, the accused might nevertheless be able to rely on a defence of impaired volition, on the grounds of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, by drawing attention to the psychological effect that continued abuse or violence has had on him or her and the ensuing difficulties in checking, through rational judgment, the disruptive force of the ensuing emotions.

Concluding Note

The excusative element in the provocation defence pertains to the assumption that the provoked agent who loses his self-control acts morally or normatively involuntarily. In so far as the actor's anger at the author of the provocation is morally justified, an intentional killing committed in the "heat of passion" does not reflect the moral disposition or trait of

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character which is normally associated with murder. Impaired volition does not mean that the provoked agent must have lost his self-control in an absolute sense, for loss of self-control is a matter of degree and, as such, it does not always preclude deliberation. What must be precluded or, at any rate, seriously affected, however, if provocation is to provide a partial excuse, is the actor's capacity of assessing the moral significance of his actions or of bringing his actions into line with his all-things-considered moral choices.

NOTES

1. Sec, e.g., s.3 of the English Homicide Act 1957; s. 169 of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961; s. 232 of the Canadian Criminal Code; s.23 of the New South Wales Crimes Act 1900; s.304 of the Queensland Criminal Code; ss. 281 and 245 of the Criminal Code of Western Australia.

2. As. J.L. Austin has noted, "It is arguable that we do not use the terms justification and excuse as we might; a miscellany of even less clear terms, such as 'extenuation', 'palliation', 'mitigation', hovers uneasily between partial justification and partial excuse; and when we plead, say, provocation, there is genuine uncertainty or ambiguity as to what we mean - is he partly responsible, because he roused a violent passion in me, so that it wasn't truly me acting 'of my own accord' (excuse)? Or is it rather that, he having done me such injury, I was entitled to retaliate (justification)?", "A Plea for Excuses", in *The Philosophy of Action,* A. White (ed.), (1968) 19,p.20.

3. "The Coherence of Defences", *Criminal Law Review* (1983) 665,p.669. And according to Dressler, "careful analysis of the language and of the results of common law heat of passion cases demonstrates that there is an uncertainty whether the defence is a sub-species of justification or of excuse", "Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defence in Search of a Rationale", 73 *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminilogy* (1982) 421, p. 428. See also Dressler, "Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?", *Modern Law Review* 51 (1988) 467.

As. A.Von Hirsch and N, Jareborg have pointed out, "Although the [provoker] might deserve punishment, the actor lacks authority to inflict it. Penalizing,

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malefactors is not a legitimate role for an individual; it is a state function, to be undertaken with appropriate due process safeguards", "Provocation and Culpability", in *Responsibility, Character and the Emotions,* F. Schoeman (ed), p. 242.

5. As Devlin J. pointed out in Duffy [1949] 1 All ER 932, "circumstances which include a desire for revenge are inconsistent with provocation, since the conscious formulation of a desire for revenge means that a person has had time to think, to reflect, and that would negative a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, which is of the essence of provocation" (at 932).

6. See, e.g., *Holmes v DPP* [1946] AC 588: "the law has to reconcile respect for the sanctity of human life with recognition of the effect of provocation on human frailty" (at 601 per Lord Simon). According to O'Regan, "The doctrine of provocation is a concession to human frailty, a recognition that a lower standard of criminal responsibility should apply to one who kills when he is 'for the moment not master of his mind", "Indirect Provocation and Misdirected Retaliation", *Criminal Law Review* [1968] 319,p.320. And see R. Perkins, *Criminal Law* (1957), p. 42.

7. *Provocation and Responsibility,* Oxford: Clarendon Press (1992), p. 164.

8. As T. Archibald has remarked, "it may be possible to argue in extremely exceptional cases where there is some evidence pointing towards the inference that the accused suffered a total loss of control, that his conduct was involuntary and unconscious; therefore, the *actus reus* of the crime might be negatived and the accused could be acquitted on the basis that the automatic conduct gives rise to the defence of automatism", "The Interrelationship Between Provocation and Mens Rea: A Defence of Loss of Self-Control", *Criminal Law Quarterly* 28 (1985-86) 454, pp. 454-455.

9. As Colvin puts it, "extreme rage may produce a state of dissociation under which conduct is no longer being directed by a reasoning mind and there is threrfore no voluntary *actus reus.* Similarly, provocation may induce a state of impaired cognition which negatives *mens rea*", *Principles of Criminal Law* (1991), p. 253.

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10. As Jerome Hall has noted, with regard to conduct whose cause is "entirely outside the person, where his 'self' does not participate in the slightest degree, the legal rules represent the traditional judgement that the defendant has not acted at all, i.e. 'act' implies volition", *General Principles of Criminal Law,* 2nd ed. (1960), p. 422. See also, S.C.Coval & J.S.Smith, *Law and its presuppositions: Actions, Agents and Rules,* (1986), esp. chapters 1 and 2.

11. *Rethinking Criminal Law* (1978),p. 803. And see Holland, *Jurisprudence* 13th ed. (Oxford 1924), p. 103.

12. See D. Hoekema, *Rights and Wrongs,* (1986), p. 75. For an analysis of the distinction between compulsion and coercion see J. Edwards, "Compulsion, Corecion, and Criminal Responsibility", *Modern Law Review* 14 (1951) 297; H.G.Frankfurt, "Coercion and Moral Responsibility", in *Essays on Freedom of Action,* T. Honderich (ed), (1973) 63.

13. See H. Gross, *A Theory of Criminal Justice* (1979), p. 69.

14. According to Kant, in those cases where reason succumbs to passion, the will is determined by something external to it - a relation which Kant terms the *'heteronomy of the will'.* In such cases the person's reasons for acting in a certain way pertain only to what he or she desires, independently of his moral beliefs. On the other hand, when the person's will is determined by reason, the will is said to be 'self-ruled', for reason is viewed as something 'internal' to the will. A will which is determined by reason is at one with itself. According to Kant, such a will can override passion and desire.

15. See N.R.F. Maier, "Frustration Theory: Restatement and Extension", *Psychological Review* 63 (1956) 370, p. 382. The author suggests that there are intermediate states between being totally emotional and totally rational, wherein emotion and reason may conflict with each other.

16. "Free Agency", in *Free Will* (1982),p. 105.

17. *Ibid* at p. 106.

18. " Self-control, Action, and Belief", *American Philosophical Quarterly* 22, 2, (April 1985) 171.

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19. In provocation the assumption that only justified anger may render the provoked agent partially excusable on the basis of his loss of self-control implies that not only the provoked agent's response to the provocation but also his assessment of the victim's conduct is subject to judgment, As C. Taylor has remarked, "Naturally we think of the agent as responsible, in part, for what he does; and since he is an evaluator, we think of him as responsible in part for the degree to which he acts in line with his evaluations. But we are also inclined to think of him as responsible in some sense for these evaluations themselves", 'Responsibility for Self", in *Free Will* (1982), p. 118.

20. As R. Brandt has remarked, "Strong emotional disturbance is known to primitivize thinking (much as does alcohol). A state of anger notoriously enhances one's aggressive tendencies, and reduces one's empathetic or sympathetic concern about injuring its target", "A Motivational Theory of Excuses in the Criminal Law", *Criminal Justice Nomos* XXVII (1985) 165 at pp. 183-184; reprinted in *Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law,* M.L. Corrado (ed.), (1994) 95, p. 114.

21. As W. Lyons has remarked, "we are blamed for character traits and their expression only in so far as it is considered that a character trait has given rise to actions which have had an undesirable upshot. If character traits did not ever do anything, they could never do harm", *Emotion* (1980), p. 194.

22. One should note that this does not represent the current position in English law. Provocation may be accepted as a defence even through it was self-induced, provided that the objective and subjective requirements of the defence are met. That the provocation was self-induced, however, may be relevant as an aggravating factor in determining the appropriate sentences imposed for the lesser offence.

23. "Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?", 51 *Modern Law Review* (1988), p. 475.

24. Model Penal Code, para 210.3 (1) (b) (1980).

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RULE AND RULE-FOLLOWING SKEPTICISM

GOPAL SAHU

I

Rule is a set of directions arbitrarily designed to guide, explain and justify our varied day-to-day activities. Rule, once accepted, becomes universal and acts as a norm over its unlimited and infinite applications. Rule as a norm has to satisfy two conditions: On the one hand, it guides us to select the appropriate action among the available options, on the other hand, it provides the justification for such selection. This is apparently an impossible job on the part of follower to determine the infinite applications of the rule considering his cognitive limitations. There is a contrived tension in bridging the gap between the rule and its applications. It is argued that any rule can be extrapolated in an infinite ways and equivalently, any set of behaviours can be held to fit a single rule. The indeterminacy of the applications of rule can give rise to a paradox: the same rule being interpreted in contradictory ways or the follower may not be following the rule, which he was following previously to account for the same act. This is the problem of the rule-following skepticism.[1] The rule-following skepticism puts grave question mark to the rule-based explanations of human actions and behaviours having broad implications for all areas of philosophy.

I argue, following Wittgenstein, that the rule-following skepticism arises because of the misunderstanding of the concept "rule" and "rule-following" and a conceptual analysis of these expressions will resolve the misunderstanding. The conceptual analysis is a grammatical investigation, in which philosophical problems are resolved and confusions are eliminated by describing the use of the words, clarifying the grammar of the

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 1 & 2
January - April 2000

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expressions and tabulating the rules for the use of words. This is an investigation into the posibility and actuality of conditions of rule following. The conceptual analysis is undertaken in the frame-work of philosophical grammar provided by Wittgenstein.

II

It is an obvious fact and apparently unproblematic to state that our day-to-day activities are rule-governed. We teach ourselves by reference to rules; we guide and explain activities by citing the rules that govern them. Rules can appear in the form of plain orders, commands, theories and mathematical formulas and are associated with human activities in the form of meaningful criticism, encouragement and correction etc. Conspicuous cases of such rules are rules of games, legal rules, the traffic codes, rules of etiquette etc. These rules regulate our movement on the road, explain the possibility of meaningful interpersonal communication, teach us how to do a mathematical calculation, provide reason to why we did what we did, govern the meaningful movements of chess pieces in the game of chess, so on and so forth. The behaviors and actions that are explained on the basis of some rules are the applications of the rules. So my stopping at the red signal is an application of the traffic rule "do not cross the road when there is red signal". The applications of a given rule are the extensions of the rule and can be called as an action-type.[2] The action-type is an open-ended class having infinite members. For example, the applications of the rule "+2", such as 1002, 1004, 1006 etc. are unlimited and unbounded.

Rule acts as a constraint over an indefinite number of cases, therefore, it is relevant for an indefinitely large number of action-types. The employment of the rule presupposes the independent identifiction of its infinite applications or laying down the conditions of its application in advance. This characterization of rule makes it a normative issue. The normativity of rule puts certain constraints on usage over an indefinite variety of cases and determines the meaning independently of any particular use. Hence, rule is a "normative- regularity" or "normative-con-

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straint"[3], which regulates our actions and behjaviors by providing *the necessary* and *sufficient* condition to fit a particular action as the extension of the given rule. Rule, like the ethical norm, is normative in nature for rule is *prescriptive and prohibitive* in nature; prescribes to act positively in accordance with the given rule and prohibits the unwarranted extension of the given rule. The normativity of rule puts evaluation constraints on having unjustified applications and thereby regulates our behaviors. Other features of a normative rule are that it discourages deviant behaviors (e.g. do not kick the football in specific position and place, otherwise your party will be penalized), encourages the desired interpretation of rule (e.g. follow the rule of syntax to produce the meaningful sentences) and it helps us to decide our actions in the case of confusions (e.g. in the case of confusion regarding the meaning of a word, we check the dictionary/rule to decide the meaning), helps us to control and predict the event(e.g. if there is black cloud, (it means rain) keep an umbrella with you) or in resolving conflict (e.g. the rule "plus" decides when there is indecision in addition of two numbers). Thus, Baker and Hacker[4] have rightly pointed out five characteristics of normative rules, such as, the definitory aspect, the explanatory aspect, the justificatory aspect, the evaluative aspect and the instructional aspect.

Rule as a normative regularity to govern and explain our actions has to satisfy two conditions: First, rule should help us to pick up the appropriate and correct action among the available set of behaviors. This condition can be called the *correctness* condition of rule. The explanation of certain action-type by subsuming it under a rule is dependent on the successful identification of the action-type. The correct identification naturally helps us to eliminate the incorrect and inappropriate applications of a rule. Thus for example, the rule "plus" instructs the users not only to select the action-type "2 plus 2 equals to 4", but also it eliminates the action-type "2+2 equals to 5". The correctness condition of rules also signifies that the rules are universal in character having open-ended applications. If one follows a given rule, then one always does the same thing when the appropriate occasion arises. However, the correct and

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successful identification or determination of the applications of rule is not enough. This itself does not provide the reason that whatever is correct is also reasonable or warranted. This is the reason the appropriate and correct chess-move made by the computer cannot provide the adequate explanation as to why it moves the chess piece as it made.

Secondly, rule should provide justification for the action-type so selected. This condition can be called the *adequate*[5] condition of the rule. The adequate criterion of rule not only helps us to choose the correct action-type, but also it provides the reason as to why a particular action-type is the correct one or is the only one in accordance with the given rule. The adequate condition predetermines in some unique way the application of a rule. Rule does not help us to simply identify objects fall under its scope, but it also compels us to adhere to the norms set by it for our future use. The algebraic formula "plus" should "determine my answer for indefinably many new sums that I have never previously considered...my past intention use determines a unique answer for indefinably many new cases on the future"[6]. The adequate condition helps one to justify and defend oneself at the time of conflict and criticism and helps one to remove confusion and inconsistency. This condition also explains the necessary change and meaningul deviation of rule whenever required.

At this point, it is very pertinent to discuss the distinction between following a rule and conforming a rule. The distinction is very crucial for the presentation and understanding of the rule-following skepticism. Following a rule is more general than conforming a rule. Though all cases of following a rule are also cases of conforming the specified rule, it is not other way. One may conform a rule without following it. For example, an idiot and a monkey may conform the rule of chess and can make correct and appropriate movement of chess pieces, but it cannot be said to follow the rule of the game of chess. The conformation of a rule is different from the conscious and deliberate action of following a rule. It may so happen that we are acting in accordance with a rule perfectly under the influence of some drug or under the compulsion of some external force. So, we are conforming a rule without being aware of its

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conditions. This is certainly different from following a rule, where one can explain and defend oneself against the possible criticism.

The difference between conforming a rule and following a rule can be compared to the epistemic distinction between "true belief" and "true justified belief". Though all justified beliefs are also true beliefs, it may not be the case that all true beliefs are also justified beliefs. One may have a belief and the belief may be true incidental to the luck of the knower, however the belief will not be considered as an instance of knowledge, unless the reason for its truthfulness is provided. The belief to be considered as knowledge must be justified and the agent must be able to explain how it can be justified.

The normativity of rule is more related to the issue of following rather than conformation of a rule. For the issues of prohibition and prescription make sense only when it specifies when and how a rule can be followed and when the conditions of the rule are deliberately laid down. The issue of following a rule is invariably related to the issues of intention, capacity and willingness of the follower and the conditions under which the rule can be followed. To follow a rule is to obey the conditions of the rule intentionally and with a purpose to achieve an end. If the agent is following a rule he is aware that he is conforming the rule. Thus, rule-following is a self-conscious and an intentional act.

III

Some philosophers have raised serious doubt whether a follower can really follow the rule considering the requirement of its following. They challenge that the follower cannot identify a rule that can satisfy the normative constraint with his limited cognitive capabilities. The object of infinite requirement does not affect our senses as a physicl object and we are not causally related to its infinite applications in the ordinary way.[7] In following a rule we always go beyond the given. The past experiences, though successful and correct, are always finite and do not provide the license to go beyond. We are not omniscient to identify the unlimited applications which are yet to take place. If our accumulated practice of

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the rule-following is not enough to keep track of the future applications of the rule, and if we do not have control over the future operation of the rule, it is quite possible that we may not be following the same rule which we used to follow in earlier cases to justify the same action. This possibility will give rise to the problem of multiple interpretations of the rule. On the one hand, there may be more than one contradictory action-types fitting to a given rule and on the other hand, the same action-type can be accounted for by two contradictory rules. Rule-following then seems to be an irrational act.

To understand the problem, let us discuss the thought-experiment designed by Kripke. He asks us to imagine a person who has applied the plus-rule successfully and correctly involving numbers up to 57. Now we can say that, since the person has fulfilled the correctness criterion, he has grasped the plus-rule and can employ it in infinite cases. Thus, for example, if he is asked to operate the plus-rule between the numbers 57 and 68, he will come with the number 125, though he has never applied the plus-rule to the number 68 before. At this juncture, Kripke introduces the concept of "quus-rule" which, according to him, is identical to plus-rule if the numbers involved are less than 57, otherwise it is 5.[8] That means, the function "68+57=125" is correct according to plus-rule and at the same time the function "68+57=5" is also correct as per quus-rule. The skeptic is asking "how do we know that 68 plus 57 as we meant "plus" in the past should denote 125 and not "5"? We cannot know whether the person is following plus-rule or quus-rule since both the rules will hold valid, though, we know that the person who used to following the plus-rule in the past, the answer he indents of 68+57, should be 125 rather than 5.

Kripke argues that the person cannot provide the reason to choose between plus-rule and quus-rule. Kripke argues that the quus rule is incorrect and we do not misinterpret plus-rule with quus-rule, but it does not seem to be *a priori* impossible. This is possible because his calculation by hypothesis does not go beyond the numbers involving 57 and thus by

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the same hypothesis he does not explicitly instruct that 125 is that result. The hypothesis is true, for the infinitely large number of the cases of plus rule are not in the follower's mind. The applications so far made are always limited. Thus, Kripke argues that there is no way one can say whether plus or quus rule is being followed. It is possible that by plus I always mean quus, I should misinterpret all my past uses of the plus rule. The skeptic argues that there are equally compelling reasons for both plus and quus functions having been applied in this case.

What is skeptical about here is that, as Kripke says, "we follow the rules as we do without reason or justification."[9]. "Plus" as we understand it forces us to say that "68+57" equals to "125", but the rule of plus function has nothing in it to identify the plus-rule as distinct from quus-rule. Skepticism doubts two things: First that, there is any "fact about past history-nothing that was ever in my mind, or in my external behavior-establishes what I mean by a word."[10] Second, even if we have meaning, we are not justified in having it. There is no logical justification that a particular word would necessarily mean this and not any thing else, for, "there is no justification for one response rather than others."[11]

The rule-following skepticism seems to pose a dilemma questioning the possibility of meaning, understanding, prediction, projection etc. If this is the level of skepticism, then it is obvious that we cannot with surety speak of the rule-governed behavior of other person. Thus, social building of knowledge system is impossible, and not only that the day-to-day working knowledge of the language and other transactions are made impossible. There would not be any reason to choose one set of options as justified against the available set of options. It is not possible to choose the right and correct theory among competing theories. Contrary to the fact that rule makes communication and clarification possible, it plunges us into such a situation that we are not able to justify our behaviors and actions. Worst still, if rule-following skepticism is allowed to have its sway, even the individual who framed the rule cannot know when he follows the rule whether he has followed the same rule which he had formulated in the past.

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No wonder the problem posed by Kripke has been felt by many contemporary philosophers and the problem has surfaced in various forms. Two such contemporary problems which can be shown to be similar to the problem of rule-following are the problem of *new riddle of induction* and the problem of *underdeterminacy of theories* proposed by Goodman and Quine respectively. The new riddle of induction is a problem related to the inductive rule and its applications in the form of projection of the predicates and the adaptation of the hypotheses. The problem in projection from the given or going beyond the evidence can be interpreted to be a problem similar to the problem of rule and the identification of its examples in advance. Similarly, theory in science can be compared to the characteristics of rule. A theory in science is also a set of guide-lines and acts as a normative constraint in predicting, explaining and controlling the nature. A theory is built from the given data, but it always transcends the data. Therefore, as Quine will argue, the theory is always underdeterminate from the given data. There would not be much problem to argue that underdeterminacy of theory is nothing but the problem of rule-following skepticism, albeit in different context.[12] Even the Gettier's paradox[13] can be interpreted to be a form of rule-following skepticism.

Kripke argues that there is no possibility of attempting, what he calls a "straight solution" to skeptical paradox. We cannot offer a definite solution to skepticism by producing a mental fact or a disposition the description of which would answer skepticism once and for all. However, he has offered a solution to the skeptical paradox which he calls "the skeptical solution to skepticism". The skeptical solution begins by "conceding that the skeptic's negative assertation are unanswerable. Nevertheless our ordinary practice or belief is justified because...it need not require the justification the skeptic has shown to be untenable."[14] The solution offered is called a skeptical one because, it is not an answer to the problem *per se,* rather it is an attempt to explain away the problem. Kripke has offered an Humean solution to the problem in admiting that we do not require to offer a solution to the problem and following Hume he says that human instinct is enough to get rid of the problem.

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The skeptical-problem as well as skeptical solutions is the result of the mistaken assumption that rule is different from its applications and we require some intermediary to fix the applications under the most appropriate rule. On this assumption, rule is treated as a mysterious explanatory mechanism, transecending all its applications, yet is involved in the explanation. The hidden nature of rule supposes that the user has a tacit and implicit knowledge of the rule while following. Following Wittgenstein, I argue that the problem arises out of misunderstanding of what he would call the grammar of rule. Wittgenstein seems to argue that the puzzle in the following a rule arises due to the mystification of rule. The grammar of rule helps us to demystify uses of rule and provides the necessity to the act of rule-following.

IV

Let us discuss the notion of "philosophical grammar" which is very basic in the philosophy of Wittgenstein. According to Wittgenstein, philosophical grammar is a linguistic tool to demarcate the meaningful expression from nonsense expression in a system of language by describing its structure and conceptual scheme. Grammar aims at explanation, clarification and correction of different linguistic expressions, thus grammar is a set of rules used for the construction of significant utterances whose violation yields nonsense.. The meaningfulness of an expression is decided within the language game in which it is embedded and not by verifying its truthfulness or falsity. The clarification is done not by describing the nature of the reality or the structure of the mind or the "laws of thought", but by use of analogy, comparison, illumination, example, model etc. Thus, philosophical grammar is an investigation in which philosophical problems are resolved and misunderstandings are eliminated by describing our use of words, clarifying the grammar of expressions and tabulating rules.

Philosophical grammar is a free floating set of rules for meaningful use of the language. The grammar is an internal relation and it consists of autonomous rules to establish the relationship among constituents in the

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language. There is no such thing as correct use of grammar and there is no such thing as justifying the grammar by reference to reality, grammar is antecedent to truth. Thus Wittgenstein claims that the meaning of an expression is not an object in the reality but the totality of the rules which determines its uses within the language.[15] The philosophical grammar produces no conclusion or thesis in philosophy and it does not assert or deny any fact about the world. The denial of the grammar does not result in denying some fact about the world. It is not concerned with the truth-value of the expression. Thus rules are not answerable to the reality in the currency of truth, rather it is answerable to the usage prevalent among the users of the rules. Wittgenstein considers that grammar consists of only two things: rules and symbols. Thus, philosophical grammar as a tool of clarification is concerned with language only, our explanation and understanding are confined within the limit of language without any factual or theoretical commitment.

In this sense, the philosophical grammar is no different from that of the ordinary grammar. The traditional grammar concerns itself with the grammatically correct use of the part of speech (such as nouns, verbs, adjectives etc.), teaches the use of tenses and so on. Thus, like the philosophical grammar, it also teaches not to violate grammatical rule to commit grammatically nonsense expressions. It tells us which combination of words is permissible and which is not. One may say that a sentence is meaningful if the sentence follows the existing rules of syntax and semantic. The grammatically sound or unsound sentences are also the sentences which are meaningful or meaningless. An ungrammatical sentence in the philosophical sense is a sentence quite similar to the ordinary wrong sentence. An ungrammatical sentence in both ordinary and philosophical sense results from the same cause; i.e., not following the proper rules of grammar. For like the rule of syntax, the philosophical grammar also determines the bound of sense, the difference from sense from nonsense but not truth from falsity. Neither kind of rule furnishes empirical knowledge about the world. Thus, they do not presuppose the

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metaphysical entity unlike the depth rules of logical syntax. Ordinary grammar books and disctionaries also provide the explanation, clarifications, and corrections of different linguistic expressions.

However, the domain of philosophical grammar is wider than the rules of logical syntax. The philosophical grammar includes all forms of meaning, not merely epistemological definitions, but ostensive definitions, explanation by examples, paraphrases, gestures etc. The philosophical grammar is a heterogeneous rule for the use of symbol that we take to inform the activity of speaking the language. Thus, the use of analogy, similes, comparison and many other tools which are not generally part of the traditional grammar is a part of philosophical grammar. It includes all kinds of speeches as a part of the web of human life interwoven with multitude of acts, activities, reactions and responses. Where the grammarian classifies parts of speech into nouns, adjectives, adverbs etc. the philosophers do conceptual classification, e.g. the sensation words into words for feeling, emotion, attitude etc. The perceptual word can be classified into memory, introspection, tactual etc., which are generally not dealt with in the ordinary grammar. The second difference is that the ordinary grammar is concerned with the rules involving a particular language at a particular time, characteristic of a particular form of representation. But philosophical grammar consists of the rules for the use of the symbol, of all languages both natural and artifical. However this characteristic of the philosophical grammar should not give the impression that it is a form of the universal grammar seeking the universal and unquestionable element or structure common to all languages: the deep structure grammar. Moreover, all philosophical nonsenses are not necessarily grammatical nonsenses. For example, "green idea sleeps furiously" is philosophically a nonsense sentence, but grammatically it is a meaningful sentence.

Beside, the philosophical grammar is purposive in the sense that it is concerned with solving the problems arising out of the misusing the grammar of the language. The philosophical grammar uses the grammar

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to resolve the philosophical problems involving grammar. That is why it is called the philosophical grammar. Wittgenstein equates the conceptual relations with "grammatical notes" and argues that logical questions are really "grammatical" in nature.[16] Philosophical grammar is the analysis of the necessity, possibility. conceivability of a given expression in a given context.

V

Wittgenstein believes that the investigation into what is expressed by a rule and following it is an investigation into the grammar of the word "rule" and mastering the technique of how to follow a rule. The grammar of rule is an investigation to clarify the grammar of the expressions or rule, i.e. what is it to act in accord with a rule? how is it possible for a rule to have an open range of applications? What is it to understand a rule, and how does such understanding manifest itself? This is to say what expressions of rule make sense and those which do not. Wittgenstein has used a number of analogies and examples as a part of philosophical grammar to make clear the use of the expression of rule and what it is to call an action as a consequence of the rule. He compares the act of following a rule with playing a game in accordance with a definite rule and fulfillment of an expectation and having an expectation.

The philosophical analysis of rule points two things: first, it does not make sense to presuppose any metaphysical intermediary between rule and its applications, for the grammar of the rule is not grounded in the reality. The relationship between rule and its applications is immanent and internal, yet transparent, for we have to acknowledge the use of the rule for using it and we should be willing to cleave to it, other wise rule cannot act as reason for what one is doing. If a chasm between the rule and its application is created, there is little chance to close the gap by the help of something which operates between the rule and its applications, but is neither. The question of bridging the gap is unwaranted for the gap is an artificial one and is the result of the misconception of following a rule. Thus Wittgenstein comments: "in our failure to understand the use

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of a word we take it as the expression of a queer process. (as we think of time as a queer medium, of the mind as queer kind of being.)"[17] The whole process of answering the skeptic is centered around finding out some immutable characteristic in the rule or unquestionable mental process. As we do not encounter such characteristic in a given rule which guides us beyond, we tend to think that rules are metaphysical entities found in the world of forms. Wittgenstein comments, "we do not command a clear view of the use of our words,...hence the importance of finding and investigating intermediate cases".[18] As a result of which there are attempts to determine the scope of rule by positing different mythological explanations, i.e. causal determination, the mental and logical determination of rules.

Second, rule is very much contained in its rule. On this account, there is no place of hidden rule; nothing would be counted as a rule independently of being used as a rule. There is nothing as our following a rule without our being able to explain or justify our actions by reference to them, for the calculus of rule is nothing but the uses of the rule. Wittgenstein comments, "every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life?- in use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there? - Or is the use its life."[19] Furhter he says,"one cannot guess how a word functions, one has to look at its use and learn from that."[20] For example, "the signpost is an order- if, under normal circumstances, it fulfills its purpose"[21] The grammar of the expression involving rule will render a rule senseless which we cannot use or in principle it is impossible to violate, for "what is hidden to us is of no interest to us."[22] Thus Wittgenstein says, "obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one is obeying a rule would be the same as obeying it."[23]

The practice and custom are essential for the understanding of a rule and how to follow it. Wittgenstein validly argues that "a person goes by the sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-post, a custom"[24] The mastering of the technique is possible because we have a

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common language and some uniform practices. The other frameworks within which the successful following of the rule is dependent are that, the world is substantially an unchanging and uniform in nature, there is harmony between language and reality and human beings have their own limitations. This commonality or frame-work is what Wittgenstein says the "forms of life". However, the forms of life don't define or constitute rule-following, it provides the minimum requirement to conduct our rule-governed activity smoothly. The forms of life provide the frame-work through which we operate our grammar and achieve the necessary agreement. However, this is "not an agreement in opinions but in the forms of life."[25]

How does the rule which is so much depended on the form of life can provide the necessity to its following, since form of life is conventional and relativistic in nature. A rule heavily dependent on the conventional practice of the members of the community is whimsical, subjective and is subject to change at will, therefore, it is natural to wonder how such relativistic framework can provide the ground for the justification for meaning and communication. However, rules formulated within this framework provide the necessity for two reasons:

First, rules are stipulated for certain purposes, approved and followed in the community by its members after deliberation. Therefore rules are very much objective and collective in nature and there should be no problem of inter-subjective communication. Though the community view of justification is arbitrary and fallible, it does not force us to embrace relativism, a very common charge leveled against any theory based on convention. This is because, once we invoke a rule, we are committed to follow it; are supposed to be faithful to it. Thus, Wittgenstein would say though rules are arbitrary, their applications are not.[26] The application of a rule becomes a social necessity. The community view of rule, and faith to honor it acts as a *normative constraint*. Systematic and consistent use of rule along with commitment to rule gives us the required parameters to judge the epistemic behavior of other members in the community. Rule, thus is predictable, it tells us in advance which

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behavior would fit which rule. In this sense, a rule determines its extension. On the strength of the knowledge of the rule used in the communities, one member understands the behavior of the others in the society. The commitment to rule is essential part of our very institution of language and is best exemplified by the fact that one has no freedom to question the truth of a statement expressing a definition. Having defined a week consisting of seven days, I cannot further ask the question why should a week consist of seven days. This is the implication of Wittgensteinian thesis that rules canot be justified further though we justify our actions and judgments in terms of rules.[27]

However, we do not deny the possibility that there can be a rule for instance a time-table, totally designed and followed by an individual isolated from the society. But this fact does not make such a rule mysterious. What we object, following Wittgenstein, is that we cannot follow a rule privately. This is because rule is not a mental fact and it is not the case that an individual who possesses this mental state alone is privileged to follow it. The agent can disobey a rule or even can stipulate contradictory rule for there is no right or wrong rule, only convenient or inconvenient to follow, but it makes sense only when it is followed publicly or at least the conditions of the rule should be clear enough for somebody who is willing to follow. Therefore, though rule is merely conventional, that does not license the user to change the agreement unless and ohterwise there is a case for either giving up the convention or introduce a new convention which is in some way opposed to the present one, otherwise we do not change the existing conventions as they are already part of our way of life. There is force of a promise attached to every rule because we have committed to the rule and, thus if we are violating it, which we can very much do, it amounts to cheating the society in a subtle manner by not keeping our promise; and the result would be a conceptual confusion.

Secondly, why rule is not whimsical and private is that it is meant to be followed by cognitively finite and fallible human beings. There is no point in prescribing rule which the agent cannot follow and is not

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within the cognitive reach of the finite human beings like us. For example, rules are to be formulated keeping fact in the mind that followers have limited information processing ability, finite memory storage capacity, are vulnerable to error in sense and reasoning.[28] Therefore, though we can very much stipulate a very arbitrary traffic rule like "jump over the road when there is a red light", we do not formulate such an impractical rule, because we know that this is not possible on the part of the human beings to follow. For an ideal rule violates the principle of "ought" implies "can". It must be possible to follow and violate the rule. Rule which cannot in principle be followed or violated is a pseudo-rule. For example, the rule "you should remember all the results or applications of the algebraic rule '+2' " is such a rule which cannot be followed nor can be violated in principle. The requirement that rule ought to be followable makes the rules determinable in advance. It should be determinable or identifiable by a finite follower independently of any particular application-condition under which a particular rule is first used. The condition to conform the rule also incorporates fallible nature of rule. Rule is not absolute, so the possibility of committing a mistake is unavoidable no matter what and how much precaution we take in advance, for rule is "directly readable and falliably readable."[29]

How it is possible that we grasp the whole application of a rule in flash, in an instance which requires laying hold of something which must somehow contain the entire use of the expression in advance of our applying it. The unlimited applications of rule are buried in the use of the rules. Thus the question of the grasping all applications of the rule appears not to be impossible, though we simply cannot see or experience all the applications of the rule before using it. When you master the technique as how to use a rule, you have known all the steps in advance because you know the condition of the application of the rule is predecided. Rules are hypothetical-imperatives: follow a rule this way, its consequences will be like this. Thus, if somebody understands the rule "+2", there should be no problem for him to go the next step, e.g. 1002 after the numeral 1000. It is not the special education or training or some

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mathematical acumen which guides us to go to the next step in the process of adding 2. The rule and how to use it contains all steps in the rule of adding 2. Thus all the steps are predecided even though the chain of the calculation is indefinite and each step is a new step in the chain. There occurs mistake and miscalculation in the process of following the rule of "add2", but that does not mean that the rule is not followable or we cannot keep track of all its applications well in advances. Thus when you master the technique of rules, your mind flew ahead and took all steps before you physically arrived this or that one.[30] When "you know what the word stands for, you understood it, you know its whole truth", comments Wittgenstein.[31] How do we determine what would constitute the violation of the rule? There is nothing above and over the application to describe the violation of a rule. Somebody understands a rule means he is aware of the conditions under which the rule can be followed and under what condition it can possibly be violated. For "the understanding itself is a state which is the source of the correct use".[32]

But the mastering the technique of how to use the rule is not merely be able to apply the rule by examples. Understanding a rule by citing its examples is always a limited affair and it does not carry any logical guarantee about the future uses. We cannot say that because I have calculated the series correctly and follow the series of odd number till a point, I have understood the rule and can go further. Rule-following involves mastering the technique or a know-how to use it which does not demand repetition. The technique is a capacity and ability to do certain things under certain conditions. When I know how to ride a bicycle, it means I am capable of riding it or probably in a position to teach the method of riding to somebody. Thus, We cannot define rule and order in terms of meaning of "regular", "uniform", "same" etc. or in terms of example and practice. For the application always goes beyond all examples, and education and training to understand the algebraic formulas are always limited up to a particular time.[33] The mastering of the technique of the use of the rule does not involve the mastering of some logical acumen to logically see all the inferences or applications of the rule at once. This

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is not possible, for we are not omniscient.

Following a rule is like obeying an order to react or to choosing in a particular way and unique way. Rule, like an order, loses its grammar and meaning if one person reacts the order in one way and the second person in a different way.[34] The "quus" rule designed by Kripke to show how the arithmetical rule of "plus" can be manipulated is a case of violating the rule of the expression "plus". Even though, we have not performed the function of "plus" beyond the number involving 57, the addition of two numbers beyond 57 will not be 5, as Kripke's skeptic holds, so long as we are following the "plus" rule. We do not have to look into our habit of addition to give certainty to the rule of plus, rather it is the definition of the rule "plus" and the .commitment to follow it, that determines the meaning of the expression "plus". Therefore, there is no scope for any confusion in the multiple interpretations of rules and its following.

NOTES

1. Kripke (Kripke, S.A., *Wittgenstein: On Rule and Private Language* (henceforth *WRPL*), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982) is the first philosopher to have propounded the rule-following skepticism though he attributes skepticism to Wittgenstein. This is a debatable issue. I do not want to enter into the debate nor want to discuss Kripekean variety of rule-following skepticism. Here my concern is to discuss the skeptical problem *per se*, though I will be referring to both Kripke and Wittgcnstein regularly in the coursc of the discussion. However, readers who want to go into the debatc, they can benefit from: Bakcr, G.P. and Hacker, P.M.S., *Skepticism, Rule and Language,* Basil Blackwell, 1984,pp. 1-50. McGinn, Maric, "Kripke on Wittgenstein's Skeptical Problem", *Ratio,* 1984, pp. 19-32 and Malcolm, Norman, *Wittgenstein: Nothing Is Hidden,* Basil Blackwell, 1986,pp. 154-181 and Byrne, Alex, "On Misunderstanding Kripke's Wittgenstein", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* 1996, pp. 339-343.

2. See Pettit, p., "*The Reality of Rule-Following*", *Mind* Vol. 99, 1990,p.2.

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3. See Pettit, p., *op cit.*, p.4.
4. See Baker, G.P. and Hacker,P.M.S., *Wittgenstein :Rules, Grammar and Necessity*, Vol.2, Basil Blackwcll, London, 1985,pp.45-49.
5. See Boghossian, P.A., "The Rule-Following Consideration", *Mind*, Vol. 98, 1989, p. 508ff.
6. *WRPL*, p. 11.
7. See Prttit, p., *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.
8. See *WRPL*,p.9.
9. *WRPL*.,p.viii.
10. *WRPL*., p.13.
11. *WRPL*,p.21.
12. For a comparative study of these problems see, Sahu, Gopal, *Rule-Following Skepticism:Kripe, Goodman, Quine and Wittgenstein*, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, submitted to Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, 1997.
13. See Gettier,E.: "Is Justified True Belief Knoweldge?", *Analysis*, Vol.23, 1963,pp.121-123.
14. *WRPI*,p.66.
15. Wittgenstein, L., *Philosophical Grammar* (ed.), R. Rhees, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1974. See sections 59,63,87.
16. Wittgenstein,L., *Zettle* (ed.), G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxfprd, 1974 590.
17. Wittgenstein, L., *Philosophical Investigations* (henceforth PI) (ed.), G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1963, Sec. 196.
18. *PI*, 122.
19. *PI*, 432.
20. *PI*, 340.

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21. *PI*, 87.

22. *PI*, 126.

23. *PI*, 202.

24. *PI*, 198.

25. *PI*, 241.

26. See *PI*, 241.

27. See *PI*, 219.

28. See, Goldman, A.I.: "Epistemic : The Regulative Theory of Cognition" in Kornblith, H. (ed.): *Naturalizing Epistemology*, 1985, pp. 217-230.

29. See Pettit, P., *op.cit.*, p 4.

30. See *PI*, 188.

31. *PI*, 264.

32. *PI*, 164.

33. See *PI*, 189.

34. See *PI*, 206.

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SYMBOL - EXPERIENCE, METAPHORICAL EXPRESSION AND CULTURAL REVELATION

L. ANTHONY SAVARI RAJ

(A) *Symbol-Experience*

We shall first attempt to discover how every reality becomes meaningful when mediated through a symbol-experience. But we need to clarify what exactly is a symbol, Perhaps this can be better understood if we make a fundamental distinction between symbol and sign.

A symbol is distinguished from a sign in that while the latter is simply a pointer to reality, chosen conventionally, (in a one-to-one relationship), the former is a representative of a relity, (that is, it makes it somehow 'present'), somehow partakes of its nature, in a one-to-many relationship with a great intellectual, evaluative and emotional power.[1]

Just an example or two to clarify the distinction we are trying to make: A traffic sign while it serves to point out the road or direction, it does not become the very road or direction it points to; whereas, when the president of a country is on an official visit somewhere, he does not merely point to his country, but he is somehow his country, he is therefore a symbol of his country. He carries the country, as it were. In other words, the symbol carries within itself its own revelation. A symbol is symbol precisely because it symbolises that which is symbolized. And reality is not somewhere else-not beyond or behind or hidden somewhere-so that the symbol could become a mere sign.[2]

Let us pursue this further with the example of human body as symbol. The body reveals, manifests, discloses and evokes its soul, its personhood. A body can be seen either as an object or it can be seen as a

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 1 & 2
January - April 2000

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symbol. In the first case, it is merely a "corpse" without a soul as it were. One may treat a person then at the object-level, and so overlook the person-dimension. But instead a symbol-experience is present when the symbol reveals its 'soul'. When this happens the externals function as pointers to the soul. In fact, there is no such thing as body and soul. We have one reality which has a body-aspect and a soul-aspect. When we experience this total reality holistically, as it really is, then the soul-aspect is revealed through the body-aspect. The body points to the soul, and more so it becomes so trasparent that it manifests its soul. In a word, a symbol-experience is an experience of the body-aspect as pointing to the soul aspect.[3]

But it can happen that symbols do not function as symbols; this is because they could be reduced to mere objects, objects of information, utility and profit, objects of pleasure. This is the level of possession and possessiveness. In such a case, they do not evoke. The symbol-aspect becomes dormant, apparently dead. This reduction of symbols to object is "reification of symbols". This reification has tremendous negative consequences in our times. The whole ecological predicament of our present times can very well be traced to this reification, where the Earth has been fully objectified, totally reduced to a mere lifeless object which can be manipulated for our own utility, profit and pleasure, discarding thus its symbolic, evocative and mystery dimension. A note must be added here. Symbols really do not die; it is we who become blind to the symbolic aspect of reality. Symbols, like light, always evoke; but no amount of light can make a thing visible to a blind person. Or again, the experience of evocation is not to be identified with an emotional experience, though emotion may (and usually does) accompany it. In evocation the depth of our being comes in contact with the depth of another being. Since there are degrees of depth, the degree of evocation depends on the depth that has been touched. The deeper one has been touched and transformed the more intensive and extensive the evocation. Such an experience profoundly affects our attitudes and values, our perspectives and prejudices.

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(B) *Metaphorical Expression*

A depth-experience like this expresses itself in language. This is metaphor. A metaphor is in fact a linguistic concretization of an evocative experience.[4] Signs may be explained, verbalized or fully objectified through concepts. These concepts are an outcome of processes based primarily on the *Ratio* where evidence and proof are important ingredients. That is, an ordinary concept, for example, may be associated with many things, and this association can ultimately be de - *term*-ined', for, terms have a fixed and constant meaning. But this is simply not the case with symbolic expressions (that is, metaphors). These are evocative of a deeper realm and these evocations can never be fully explained or verbalized. But in any case, symbols cannot really do away with concepts. At the basis of symbolic or metaphorical expressions, there are concepts and it is in and through concepts that evocation takes place. The concept looks at the 'body', as it were, of that which is understood but symbolic expression has to do with its 'soul'. Consequently we can say that function of metaphorical expressions is to *reveal the soul-aspect through the body-aspect.* This means that metaphorical expressions presuppose concepts but they cannot be fully reduced to concepts since they express not just the body-aspect but the soul-aspect as well.[5]

In this sense the metaphorical expressions aim not to describe a state of affairs but to transform the person by evoking in him a *depth-experience.* Transformation is concerned not with the meaning of a thing but with its significance (i.e. meaningfulness). Meaningfulness is the experience of the depth-dimension of a thing or person.

The meaning of a thing can be expressed or articulated in such a manner that it can either be verified or falsified. But its meaningfulness can be understood in an indefinitely number of ways. It can be ascertained only through its effects. Has the promised transformation taken place? If yes, then the transformation function of a metaphor has been realized. If no, then it has not succeeded. This is so because significance is not a new meaning, but it refers to the depth-dimension. Significance comes about

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when one develops a depth-relationship with an object or a person. Such a relationship is not reducible to nor is it exhausted by any number of meanings. In a word, metaphorical expressions arise out of a specific experience and if alive, they can take us back to such a similar experience.

(C) Cultural Revelation :

Metaphors belong to a family of metaphors; they are not unrelated and individualistic. All genuine metaphors belong to a family and so have a family semblance. The home of a family of metaphors is the "**Mythos**", the background of all our understanding. All understanding takes place with the help of a background which by definition remains in the background and hence is not known or seen. The difficulty is that unless we become familiar with (i.e. belong to the family of) the background we shall fail to understand what is being said.[6] That is why to understand tradition we have to 'stand under' it. The metaphor of *Purusa* for example, or *Karma* is at home in the Hindu *Mythos* and is intelligible there alone; it will not make much sense in the Christian world-view and vice-versa.

By a world-view we understand the totality of attitudes, values and meanings that make up the living tradition of a people. When we discourse we do not make up our own meanings; we employ words that we have learnt from tradition. These are simply 'given'. In these given meanings are contained a specific way of looking at reality and a definite complex of attitudes and values.

A religious tradition brings forth its beliefs in a specific world-view; the beliefs manifest this world-view. It is through these beliefs that we find access to the tradition. So too the myths (i.e.stories about the origin and end of the world, about gods and cosmic powers functioning at the cosmic level) manifest the *Mythos* of a culture. Metaphors and myths, therefore, reveal the *Mythos* of their origin. It is through them that we can come in contact with the *Mythos*. The dominant metaphors of a culture, (***Yajña, puruṣa karma, punarjanma,*** in Indian tradition, for example), manifest their *Mythos*. Hence a genuine hermeneutic should

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involve a committed study of the dominant metaphors of different traditions keeping in mind their background. Or again, like symbols, metaphors too can cease to evoke. When that happens, then only a new experience can re-interpret it and bring its evocativeness back to us. Interpretations should make clear not what a metaphor is but what it means and how it can become "meaningful" to our times.

Are not according to this understanding all interpretations results of mere subjective experience? Does this not lead to subjectivism? All interpretations belong to the realm of the knowing subject, hence they are subjective but this does not imply that they are *subjectivistic.* Subjectivistic means fanciful and arbitrary. Because interpretations are subjective, that is, they belong to the ream of the knowing subject, they can be understood relevantly and thus made know relevantly. Indeed the knowing subject is a person, not a mere individual and a person is constituted by his relationship to other knowing subjects as such. In this sense subjective is a positive, not a pejorative quality.[7]

Yet, admittedly our theoretical distinction does not solve the problem of arbitrariness of interpretations. Subjective interpretations are characterized by their lack of openness in a dual way; one, they tend to exclude other interpretations by absolutizing their own and two, they build their interests on narrow interests of cliques, clans, castes and religion. But there can also be interpretations that are ahead of their times and so have to be discovered as relevant only much later. Generally speaking, however, interpretations are "children of their age" and so tend to be evocative in the period of their birth.

NOTES

1. Cf. Salvino Azzopardi, *Epistemology* (Pune: Jnana Deepa Vidyapeeth, 1983), p.53.

2. Cf. R. Panikkar, "Symbols and Reality", *Monchanin,* Vol. VIII nos 3-5, Cahier 50, p.18.

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3. Cf. Francis X. D'sa, *Survey of Indian Religions and Philosophy* (Pune: Jnana Deepa Vidyapeeth, 1986),p.2.

4. Cf. *Ibid.*, p.3

5. Cf. Francis X. D'sa *The Right to be Human and the Duty to be Cosmic* (Pune: Jnana Deepa Vidyapeeth, n.d.),p.2.

6. Cf.R.Panikkar, *Myth. Faith and Hermeneutics* (Bangalore: Asian Trading Corporation), 1983), pp 8-9.

7. Cf. Francis X.D'sa, *Survey of Indian Religions and Philosophy, op. cit.*, p.4.

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DILEMMA OF DHARMA

JAGAT PAL

The word *'dharma'* is a generic word which is used to denote different kinds of the code of conduct both individual as well as social in the classical Indian tradition of thought. We can divide all of them into two basic categories: general and specific. The category of the general code of conduct comprises norms and duties of *sādhāraṇa dharm* which are said to be binding or obligatory on every individual of the society irrespective of the caste, creed, sex, place and time etc. It is said that we are all required, according to the theory of *sādhāraṇa dharma,* to cultivate certain general virtues such as truthfulness, mercifulness, compassion , modesty, forgiveness, wrathlessness, generosity, benevolence, hospitality, endurance, chastity, charity, kindness, friendliness, sacrifice, non-violence, honesty, brotherhood, purity, and non-enmity etc. just by virtue of being a member of the class of human species. Since norms and duties of *sādhāraṇa dharma* are said to be binding on every individual who belongs to the class of human species, *sādhāraṇa dharma* is also called as *sāmānya dharma.* The category of the specific codes of conduct comprises norms and duties of *varṇa dharma, āśrma dharma, śreṇi dharma, rāja dharma, kula dharma, deśa dharma* and *kāla* or *yuga dharma* etc. which are said to be not binding or obligatory on every individual who belongs to the class of human species because of the sepcificities. Since norms and duties of the specific code of conduct differ from *varṇa* to *varṇa, āśrma* to āśrma, śreṇi to śreṇi, rāja to *rāja, kula to kula,* deśa to *desh and kāla* to *kāla,* they are said to be not one for all the members of human class in all the circumstances like *sādhārana dharma.* They are said to be valid only for those individuals who fall under the scope of their jurisdiction and not outside them. Since norms and duties of the specific code of conduct are

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 1 & 2
January - April 2000

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not one for all, we can sensibly talk about them in terms of the categories of *svadharma* and *paradharma* without any logical difficulty which we cannot do in the case of *sādhārana dharmas* because *sādhārana dharmas* are common to all. According to the Indian traditional theory of *dharma* there are, thus, two different sets of duties, general and specific, which every individual of the society is supposed to do through out his or her whole life. When there is no conflict between the two different *dharmas*, the individual does not face any moral dilemma in doing of them. He or she can act according to them very well through out his or her life. But when the conflict between the two different *dharmas* occur in a particular situation, the individual faces a moral dilemma in choosing one of them. He or she does not know what to do. Under such a situation the question naturally arises before the individual: Which *dharma* between the two ought to be chosen and which *dharma* ought not to be chosen? The Indian traditional theory of *dharma* is supposed to provide an answer to this question. The question cannot be brushed aside simply by saying that it is a meaningless question because the question is a meaningful question and the genuineness of moral dilemma is a concrete reality of human life which can not be denied. Moral dilemma we all do experience in our day to day life. The Indian classical philosophy is full of such instances. Arjuna himself did face the problem of moral dilemma of *dharma* in the battle of *kurukṣetra*. So the genuineness of the relity of moral dilemma cannot be doubted. It rather requires a solution which the Indian classical theory of *dharma* is supposed to provide for to be a sound theory of action. But unfortunately the Indian classical theory of *dharma* does not provide any solution to this problem although it does admit that one *dharma* can supersede and be superseded by another *dharma* on certain occasions. The objective of this paper is to provide a solution to the problem of moral dilemma of *dharma*. But before doing it let us first try to understand the moral dilemma of *dharma*.

Take, for example, the cases of *sādhāraṇa dharma* and *varṇa dharma*. If it is true that *sādhāraṇa dharma* and *varṇa dharma* represent

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two different autonomus moralities; *sādhāraṇa dharma* represents general morality and *varṇa dharma* represents professional morality and none of the *dharma* between the two overrides the other, then doing of action in accordance with any one of the *dharmas* would be morally right no matter which *dharma* we choose to do. If this be so, then Arjuna cannot be condemned morally when he was giving up the profession of a soldier and was choosing the path of a nonviolence which was his *sādhāraṇa dharma.* But if it is true that *sādhāraṇa dharma* and *varṇa dharma* do not represent two different autonomous moralities, then doing of action on the basis of either of *dharma* may not always be morally right. It could be said to be morally right only when what we do, we do in accordence with that *dharma* which morally overrides the other conflicting *dharma* and not otherwise. But if it is true that *sādhāraṇa dharma* always morally overrides *varṇa dharma* whenever *varṇa dharma* conflicts with it, then acting against *sādhāraṇa dharma* surely would not be morally right. Because morality consists in the fact of the following of that *dharma* which has relatively more weightage, in terms of the goodness of all the persons concerned, than any other conflicting *dharma.* But if it is true that *varṇa dharma* always morally overrides *sādhāraṇa dharma* whenever *sādhāraṇa dharma* conflicts with it, Arjuna definitely cannot be said to be morally right when he was giving up the profession of a solider and was choosing the path of a non-violence. Because in a such situation morality always consists in the fact of following the dictum of the *dharma* which outweighs any other conflicting *dharma* on the balance of reasons. But if it is true that on certain occasions *varṇa dharma* overrides *sādhāraṇa dharma* and *sādhāraṇa dharma* overrides *varṇa dharma* then the whole matter becomes undecidable. We cannot determine anything in advance on the basis of *a priori* ground. Because any dharma which *dharma* would override the other because the overridingness of a *dharma* logically depends upon the nature of situation and its relative strength which are themselves undetermined. When human situations and the relative strength of *dharma* are themselves indeterminate, nothing can be said which *dharma* would override the other *dharma* on the basis of *a priori*

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ground. Because any dharma which can override in one particular situation may or may not override the same *dharma* in another particular situation. All this is perfectly quite possible because the overriding is a relative characteristic. We can determine the feature of overridingness of any *dharma* apart from and independent of human situations only when we logically subsume it i.e. one set of *dharmas* falls under the another set of *dharmas* and not otherwise. In other words, we can say that *varna dharma* always overrides *sadharaṇa dharma* or *sādhāraṇa dharma* overrides *varna dharma* independently of the situations only when we logically assume it that between these two sets of *dharmas* one set of *dharmas* is a subset of another set of *dharmas* and not otherwise. What to say of general situation, even in a particular situation we cannot determine which *dharma* overrides the other *dharma* unless we have a clear-cut principle to weigh their relative strength. If we have no clear-cut principle to measure their relative strength in terms of the goodness of all the people concerned, we cannot morally judge nor can we decide which *dharma* between the two in fact overrides the other *dharma* in the specific situation. Because the acts of judging and decidability always require an evaluation and evaluation is not logically possible unless we have some touchstone to evaluate them. And this the Indian classical theory of *dharma* unfortunately does not supply any where to the best of my knowledge. Even if it is admitted for the sake of argument that the Indian classical theory of *dharma* does have a touchstone for measuring the relative strength of the different *dharmas*, we can not legitimately say that the system of *varna dharma* is a system of morality unless we conceptually allot the place of morality to it. The reason is that because the question of its being a system of morality does arise only when we logically assume it that the word '*dharma*' occuring in it is a moral word and not otherwise. Because there is nothing in the notion of *dharma* as such on the basis of which we can legitimately say about it that it is a system of morality. If this is so, then we have to first ascertain what exactly is the moral status of *varṇa dharma* within the general system of the Indian classical theory of *dharma* before providing any solution to the

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problem of the moral dilemma of *dharma.*

When we go through the different writings of both the Indian as well as the Western scholars, we find that there is a disagreement among them on the issue of the moral status of *varṇa dharma.* Two extreme positions are held. Some scholars have held the view that the code of *varṇa dharma* does not represent any kind of a moral code of conduct. It only represents a professional code of conduct and profesional code of conduct is conceptually different from a moral code of conduct. Others say that the code of *varṇa dharma* does represent a social moral code of conduct. Two extreme positions are held within this group. Some say that the code of *varṇa dharma* represents an autonomous moral code of conduct. But others do not agree with this view. They say that the code of *varna dharma* does not represent any kind of autonomous moral code of conduct apart from and independent of the general moral code of conduct of the *sādharaṇa dharma.* Views are again divided within this group. Those who believe that morality is one say that *sādharaṇa dharma* and *varṇa dharma* do not represent two different kinds of morality. They represent only one kind of morality, that is, doing of *dharma* for the sake of *dharma.* Some of them even go to the extent of saying that universal morality of *sādharaṇa dharma* constitutes the foundation of *varṇa dharma.* According to them, the morality of *verṇa dharma* is a concretization of the universal morality of *sādharaṇa dharma* in the social context. But those who do not subscribe to this view say that both *sādharaṇa dharma* and *varna dharma* represent two different kinds of morality. For them *sādharaṇa dharma* represents absolute morality and *vārṇa dharma* represents relative morality but within the same general framework of the theory of *dharma,* that is, doing of *dharma* for the sake of *dharma.* According to them, the notion of *dharma* includes in its meaning not only the absolutistic features but also the relativistic features of morality. It represents absolute morality in the sense that the agent who is to perform it is bound by it. But it also represents reltive moraliy in the sense that it is not one and the same for all in all the situations. On their view, there is no incompatibility in these two different senses of the notion of *dharma.*

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The notion of *dharma*, they say, can have both senses because the relativistic feature of *dharma* does not affect its absoluteness. But those who do not subscribe to the view that *sādharaṇa dharma* and *varṇa dharma* form two different parts of one and the same unitary system of *dharma* say that both the sets of *dharmas* represent two different autonomous moralities; *sādharaṇa dharma* represents general morality and *varṇa dharma* represents professional morality and professional morality is conceptually different from that of general morality because both the moralities rest on entirely two different logical grounds. The ground of one morality is not the ground of another morality. This is quite evident, they say, from the fact of the assertion of the theory of *dharma* itself. Because the theory of *dharma* does assert that *varṇa dharma* on certain occasions can supersede *sādharaṇa dharma* and *sadharaṇa dharma* can supersede *varṇa dharma* and this can be said to be possible only when we logically assume that both the *dharmas* do represent two different autonomous conceptions of morality and not otherwise. Nonetheless, whatever the view we might subscribe to on the issue of the moral status of *varṇa dharma*, the question always persists: which *dharma* morally ought to be performed and which *dharma* morally ought not to be performed when there is a conflict between the two *different dharmas* in the specific situation. And this problem does arise not only in the cases of *sadharaṇa dharma* and *varṇa dharma* but also in the cases of the other *dharmas*.

The problem of the moral dilemma of *dharma* we cannot solve just by referring to the character of *Mahajanas* (good men) because the character of *Mahajanas* does not, and cannot, constitute as an authentic criterion of moral rightness by use of which we can resolve the issue of the moral conflicts of *dharmas*. The moral character of a person itself logically depends upon the concept of moral rightness. Moral character a man acquires only by doing the actions according to the principles of moral rightnes. The problem of the moral dilemma of *dharma* can be resolved only by adopting the following rules:

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Rule 1

A *varṇa dharma* is morally permissible when and only when it does not violate any *sādharana dharma.*

Rule 2

A *varṇa dharma* is morally permissible when and only when it does not violate any *sadharaṇa dharma* which overrides it.

Rule 3

A *varṇa dharma* is morally permissible when and only when it does not violate any other *dharma* which overrides it.

Rule 4

A *varṇa dharma* is morally permissible when and only when it has equal weight with any other *dharma* which violates it.

Out of these four rules the rule 1 in the context of the system of *dharma* could be said to be valid only when we logically assume that the code of *sādharaṇa dharma* is the supreme moral code of conduct within the system of the theory of *dharma.* Because when we assume the supremacy of *sādharaṇa dharma, sādharaṇa dharma* automatically not only overrides all other *dharmas* but also logically restricts their moral permissibility when they conflict. Under such a condition no *varṇa dharma* can be said to be morally permissible if it conflicts with any one of the *sādharaṇa dharma.* We can easily decide under such a condition which *dharma* ought to be performed and which *dharma* ought not to be performed just by looking at them without any deliberation. In fact in such a condition no thinking is required at all on the part of the doer. The doer can decide it blindly without any problem. But the rule 1 cannot validly be held within the framework of the theory of *dharma.* Because the assumption on which its validity rests goes directly against the dictum of the theory of *dharma* because the theory of *dharma* does permit that on

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certain occasions a *varṇa dharma* can supersede a *sādharaṇa dharma* and a *sādharaṇa dharma* can supersede a *varṇa dharma* and this can be said to be possible only when the rule is discarded. If this be so, then the rule 1 definitely cannot validly be used to resolve the problem of the moral dilemma of *dharma* at any cost. The difficulty which arises in the case of the rule 1 does not, of course, arise in the case of the rules 2 and 3 because the validity of these rules does not logically rest on the notion of the supremacy of *sādharaṇa dharma* on which the validity of the rule 1 logically rests. The validity of the rules 2 and 3 in fact logically rests on the notion of overriding and the notion of overriding does not logically rest either on the notion of supremacy or on the notion of *dharma* or on the notion of *sādharaṇa dharma* or on the notion of *varṇa* dharma. That is the reason why these rules can be held validly without any logical difficulty. This also is quite evident from the rules 2 and 3 that moral permissibility of both the *dharmas* is logically restricted. The overriding characteristic of *varṇa dharma* logically restricts moral permissibility of *sādharaṇa dharma* and the overriding characteristic of *sādharaṇa dharma* logically restricts moral permissibility of *varṇa dharma.* The validity of the rule 4 logically rests on the notion of the equality of weight which is conceptually different from that of the notions of supremacy and overriding. The rule 4 does not logically restrict the moral permissiblity of any one of the *dharmas.* It only asserts that if the two *dharmas* do have the equal weight, then any one of the *dharmas* could be chosen and our choice would always be morally right. Out of these four rules the last two rules could be said to be the fundamental rules of action because they subsume under them the first two rules. However all these rules can validly be held as action guiding rules in choosing of one *dharma* against the another no matter whether the conflict between the two occurs within the same class or different classes of the *dharmas.* They all provide us guide lines as regard to which *dharma* ought to be chosen and which *dharma* ought not to be chosen when the conflict between the two different *dharmas* occur.

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The critics here might argue that all the rules mentioned above can provide us a guide line in choosing of one *dharma* against the another only when it is logically assumed that the system of the theory of *dharma* does not debar us from the violation of any *dharma.* And this cannot be assumed because assuming this would amount to going against the dictum of the system of *dharma.* Because the system of *dharma* asserts that all the *dharmas* are universally obligatory. They are absolute, unconditional and infallible; and these notions rule out the logical posibility of the violability of any *dharma* in any condition on which the validity of the above mentioned rules logically rests. But this line of argument to my mind does not seem to hold much water because it rests on the wrong identification of the notions of obligation, absolute, unconditionality and infallibility with the notion of inviolability. The notions of obligation, absolute, unconditionality, infallibility and inviolability are not synonymous. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that the notion of *dharma* does essentially involve in its meaning the notion of obligation in the sense of universal binding, it does not invalidate any one of the rules mentioned above. Their validity still remains intact. In fact, when the *dharmas* are said to be universal, obligatory, absolute, unconditional and infallible, they are said only in those cases where they do not conflict with any *dharma.* Because if it were not the case, a statement like 'I ought not to fight even though I am under obligation to do so' should be inconsistent because it is self-contradictory. But this is not so. Because in the context of action statements like this are perfectly quite consistent. This also gets estblished from the fact of the assertion of the theory of *dharma* itself. Because the theory of *dharma* does assert that one *dharma* can be performed by violating another *dharma* when there is a conflict between the two different *dharmas* and the performance of one *dharma* is not just possible without violating the another *dharma.* Consider, for example, the following sets of statements where a and b represent two different *dharmas* and the performance of one *dharma* (i.e. fighting in war) is not just possible without violating another *dharma* (i.e. nonviolence).

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(i)

I ought to do a.

I ought to do b.

I ought to do both a and b.

(ii)

I ought to do a.

I ought to do b.

I cannot both do a and do b.

The set (i) can be said to be consistent only when we logically assume that the principle of 'ought implies can' and the principle of conjuction of the propositional logic are valid principles of the practical reasoning. And this can be assumed only when we further logically assume that the system of the theory of *dharma* is formally a coherent and unitary system of values, a system in which no two different *dharmas* conflict. Because when we assume that the system of *dharma* is formally a coherent and unitary system of values in which no two *dharmas* conflict it is always logically possible to act in accordance with them in any specific situation without any violation. But to say this is not to say that what is logically possible is also practically possible to do. But this is not so because what is logically possible may or may not be practically possible. Any *dharma* is practically possible only when the agent is in a position to do so physically and psychologically. But since we all know it that the system of *dharma* is not a formal system of values and the *dharmas* do conflict on certain occasions, the set (i) surely cannot be said to be formally a consistent set. It is in fact formally an inconsistent set. Only the set (ii) can be said to be a consistent set. The problem arises only when we assume it that the principle of 'ought implies can' and the principle of conjuction of the propositional logic are valid principles of practical reasoning. They hold good in all the posible situations of human actions which they do not. They can be held to be valid only when we

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logically assume that the agent is capable of doing the actions physically and psychologically in accordance with the prescriptions of the theory of *dharma* under all possible circumstances no matter what they are and acting upon one *dharma* does not require him to violate any other *dharma* of the system. But in a situation where it is not just logically possible for him to perform any one of the *dharmas* between a and b without violating the other, he cannot validly hold the principle of 'ought implies can' and the principle of conjunction. They become invalid. This problem we cannot solve just by discarding the genuineness of the moral conflict of the two different *dharmas* because to deny the genuineness of the moral conflict of the two different *dharmas* would amount to denying the concrete reality of life which the theory of *dharma* cannot afford to deny because it is morally a relevant factor. We all do face moral crisis on certain occasions where it is not just possible to perform one *dharma* without violating the another *dharma* as it was the case with Arjuna. Those who deny the reality or the genuineness of the moral conflict of *dharma* do it by making the mistake of treating the terms *dharma*, duty, obligation and inviolablity as synonymous where as the fact is that they are not synonymous terms at all. If they were, the statements of the set (ii) would have been inconsistent. But this is not so. If there is some grain of truth in what I have just said, then from this it is quite clear that the last three rules can be held to be valid without discarding the system of *dharma* even if we do not assume the supremacy of *sādhāraṇa dharma* over any other *dharma*. In fact, any *dharma* becomes a duty or obligation only when the person concerned can perform it and not otherwise. In any situation where a person cannot perform one *dharma* without violating the another, *dharma* because of the complexity of situation, both the *dharmas* cannot be said to be the duties or obligatory. The logic of such situation is that we can say only that *dharma* is a duty or obligatory which overrides any other conflicting *dharma*. The overridden *dharma* cannot be said to be a moral duty of the person concerned. If it is true that the overridden *dharma* cannot constitute as a moral duty, then no person can be said to be morally obligated to do it. If this be the case,

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then we cannot legitimately say that the overridden *dharma* is morally permisible. If the overridden *dharma* cannot be said to be moraly permissible, then it is not correct to say that all the *dharmas* are universally obligatory in all the ciucumstances irrespective of their nature as it is said quite often. We cannot logically say that they are the duties under all the conditions. Because the rightness of a *dharma* also is determined by the nature of situation and its relative strength when it conflicts with another *dharma.* If one *dharma* can override another *dharma* on certain occasions, then both the overriding and the overridden *dharmas* cannot be said to be the moral duties of a person. Because the overriding characterisic of one *dharma* logically restricts the moral permissiblity of another *dharma.* If the principle of overridingness of *dharma* is a valid principle of morality which I think it is, then the nation of the obligatioriness of dharma. cannot be said to be incompatible with the notions of impermissibility and violability as it is generally understood. No *dharma* can be said to be always morally permissible. The moral permissibility of any *dharma* does not logically follow from its being a *dharma.* Any *dharma* becomes morally permissible only when it does not violate the condition of overriding of morality and not otherwise.

If the moral permissibility of *dharma* is determined by the nature of situation and relative strength, then determining whether or not a *varṇa dharma* which conflicts with a *sādhāraṇa dharma* is morally permissible requires weighing of both the *dharmas* and weighing of the *dharmas* can be made to be possible only when we have a clearcut principle of measurement and not otherwise. Because the overridingness is a relative characteristic. And being a relative characteristic it is always derived from the respective weights of the conflicting *dharmas* no matter whether the conflict occurs in between the two different *dharmas* of the same individual or of different individuals. In both the cases the nature of conflict always remains the same. It does not change. The conflict differs in both the cases only in regard to their terms of relation. However the situation in which a is said to be a *dharma,* and the situation in which b is

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said to be a *dharma* is not identical with that situation in which both a and b conflict. In the former case moral permissibility of any one of the *dharmas* is not logically restricted. So both a and b can be said to be the duties and it is always logically possible to act according to them. While in the latter case both a and b cannot be said to be the duties because the overridingess of one *dharma* logically restricts moral permissibility of the another *dharma.* Any *dharma* which is not morally permissible cannot be said to be the duty or obligatory. The overriding characteristic of the different *dharmas* is measured in terms of their respective positive and negative contents which they possess. Any *dharma* which possesses comparatively a heavier content overrides the another conflicting *dharma.* The personal content definitely cannot be said to be a moral content in terms of which we can measure the strength of two conflicting *dharmas.* The reason why personal content cannot be said to be a moral content is that the notion of morality is conceptually linked with the notion of the goodness of all the people concerned. Moral content is not a matter of personal life. It is a matter of interpersonal life. Since the goal of *mokṣa* is a personalistic goal, it cannot constitute as a moral goal of human life even if it is true that the performance of *dharmas* leads to the attainment of it. Since the moral goal of human life is interpersonalistic in character the only interpersonalistic content can be said to be the content of a moral life. By the term 'moral content ' here I mean well-being and goodness of all the people concerned who matter in the moral consideration of the *dharmas* under reference. But this is such a kind of requirement which is most difficult to achieve in practice by the agent. Because its fulfilment presupposes an epistemic ideality which can be satisfied only by those people who are omniscient like God and have knowledge of the goodness of all the people concerned. Not only this, they also know which act would bring about the maximum good of all the people concerned and which one will not before performing the act. Since moral contents are interpersonalistic in nature and they do differ from one context to another because of the variations found in human nature and situation, the overriding characteristic of a *dharma* cannot be said to be static and

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immutable at all. It is bound to differ from one context to another. As result of which any *dharma* which overrides in one particular set of circumstances may or may not override the same *dharma* in another particular set of circumstances. All this is perfectly quite possible because of the relative characteristic of the overriding feature of *dharma* itself. Since it is always logicaly possible that one *dharma* can override and be overridden by another *dharma* no matter what it is, depending upon the nature of situation and its relative strength, no set of any *dharmas* or a *dharma* can be said to be the supreme and fundamental. If this be so, then no one can logically say that *sādhāraṇa dharma* is foundational to *varṇa dharma* as some of the thinkers do say. Because to say that one *dharma* overrides another *dharma* is not to say that overridden *dharmas* logicaly follows from the overriding *dharma* which is logically required for any overriding *dharma* to be called as supreme and fundamental. When we say that one *dharma* overrides another *dharma*. we only mean to say that the overriding *dharma* possesses relativily more weightage in terms of the goodness of all the people concerned than any overridden *dharma*. And to say this is not equivalent to saying that the overriding *dharma* subsumes under it the overridden *dharma*. To think so is to commit a logical mistake. Acting on the principle of overridingness of *dharma* means acting on better reasons and acting on better reasons means acting on that which is more suitable and reasonable in the given situation. And the balance of reason lies on that which the agent impartially thinks that his chosen *dharma* would necessarily bring about if action is done in accordance with it. But the agent's mere impartial choosing of one *dharma* against another does not, and cannot, by itself guarantee that his chosen *dharma* is weightier in terms of the content than the unchosen one. The weightage of *dharma* always ultimately depends upon the nature of the content of *dharma* and not upon the thinking of the agent. The overridingness of *dharma* does not logically rest on the individual's arbitrary decision. It always rests on morally good reasons.

The arguments put forward may be rejected just by saying that

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they do not hold good because they rest on the notion of content on which the notion of *dharma* does not logically rest at all. But this line of argument to my mind does not have any logical strength. Because the notion of *dharma* does logically rest on the notion of human goodness. This fact is quite evident from the objective of the theory of *dharma* itself. Because the theory of *dharma* was designed to play an important role in the maintenance of social stability and harmony which is very much required for the promotion of moral goodness not only in the case of society but also in the case of individual as well. The theory of *dharma* provides a set of rules and duties the observance of which is considered to be a necessary condition for the welfare of human beings. If this be so, then it is not correct to say that the notion of dharma does not logically rest on the notion of content. It does logically rest on the notion of human content. What would happen, suppose for the sake of argument, we admit that the theory of *dharma* does not logically rest on the notion of human content ? The result I think is quite obvious. It goes not only against the basic objective of the theory of *dharma* but also goes against the philosophy of overridingness of *dharma* which the theory of *dharma* itself prescribes. A *dharma* can override another *dharma* only when we logically assume that *dharmas* do differ in terms of the contents, depending upon the nature of situation. We cannot logically explain the overriding feature of the *dharmas* just by referring to their formal characteristic without making any reference to their content. *sādhāraṇa dharma* no doubt is formally a wider *dharma* than any other *dharmas*. But just on the basis of this we cannot solve the problem of overridingenss of *dharmas*. Because *sādhāraṇa dharma* too are overridden on certain accasions according to the Indian tradition not only outside the class but also within the same class. And this fact cannot be explained without admitting it that the *dharmas* do differ in terms of the contents. If the *dharmas* were contentless, there would have been no possibility of overridingness of one *sadharaṇa dharma* over another *sadharaṇa dharma* as the theory of *dharma* asserts. All *sadharaṇa dharmas* would have the equal weightage being universal *dharmas*. But this is not so. The

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overridingness of one *sadharaṇa dharma* over another *sadharaṇa dharma* can, therefore, be justified only by referring to their content If this be so, then the *dharmas* cannot be said to be contentless. They do logically rest on the notion of human goodness.

If whatever I have said so far is correct, then from this it is quite clear that all the rules stated above are valid rules of practical reasoning by following of which we can decide which *dharma* ought to be chosen and which *dharma* ought not to be chosen from the moral point of view when the conflict between the two different *dharmas* occur either within the class or outside the class. So a *varṇa dharma* can be said to be morally permissible against a *sadharaṇa dharma* only when it does satisfy the criterion of moral overriding and not otherwise. And to say this is not to allot the place of morality to it in any way. Because allotting the place of morality to it would amount to treating it as an autonomous system of morality which it is not. The system of *verṇa dharma* is a system of professional norms and duties; and the professional norms and duties are conceptually different from moral norms and duties. And to say this is not equivalent to saying that we cannot logically apply the notion of moral permissibility to it. We can logically apply the notion of moral permissibility to it. Because when we do it, we always do it not on the professional ground but on the moral ground and what is professionally prescribed may be the case that it is also morally permissible. This is perfectly quite possible because both the notions are mutually quite consistent notions.

Thus, in short, we can say that the problem of moral dilemma, which arises from the conflict of two different *dharmas*, cannot be solved by appelaing to the of notion of any *dharma* no matter what it is. It can be solved only by appealing to the principle of overridingness of morality and the principle of overridingness of morlity is conceptually different from that of the theory of *dharma*.

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SUBJECTIVISM IN THE COPERNICAN PROJECT OF KANT

R. SUGATHAN

Reason in its rationalist-empiricist polemic was what Kant had to face. He designated himself as a serious mediator. So, his mission was to reconcile the two opposing trends-one viewing reason as a priori, innate, and the other taking reason as a posteriori, empirical. Rationalists took self-evident principles, internal to mind as truths of analytic certainty. Empiricists considered experience as the sole content of knowledge. For empiricists, there is nothing called self-evident truth.

As it was Hume who awakened him from his dogmatic slumber, Kant rightly took experience as an element of truth. He accepted this element for giving universality to knowledge so that it can be free from subjectivism. This was his device against rationalism. At the same time, Kant thought, an element of certainty (*a priori* certainty for Kant) also has to be provided to plug the empiricist loophole. Thus Kant advanced a reconciliation, a solution to both what Kant calls the rationalist dogmatism and empiricist skepticism.

The possible knowledge, for Kant, is only a phenomenology realized through the unity of concepts and percepts. There are other elements of mediation and also conditions that make possible this knowledge. The whole incredible edifice he builds up to substantiate the reconciliation that he himself has advanced forms only an element of fictional magneticism with which he attracted a philosophy audience. Kant was very successful in realizing this aim, and we also have no other way but to go through these bricks and plaster where and when we need.

Kant called this reconcilement, this third form of philosophy, critical philosophy. He called it also as transcendental idealism or sometimes

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 1 & 2
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as critical idealism. We would see in the course of this treatment whether Kant could really reconcile the trends. However, we shall first see what he means by transcendental.

Kant uses 'transcendental' not in the usual sense of 'not immanent'. He accords to it a unique meaning. This, in essence, means 'related to objects, but not yet empirical' or 'relating to objects in an *a priori* way'. This is the meaning in which transcendental philosophy or transcendental idealism is used.

Kant says:

> I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode is to be possible a priori.[1]

Again,

> ....What can alone be entitled transcendental is the knowledge that....representations are not of empirical origin, and the possibility that they can yet relate *a priori* to objects of experience.[2]

Or again,

> The term 'transcendental'...signifies such knowledge as concerns the *a priori* possibility of knowledge, or its *a priori* employment.[3]

It is a strange meaning; but this is the sense in which Kant tries to explain his reconciliation. When Kant unites the *a priori* and a *posteriori* elements of knowledge, what he wants is not a *contingent* synthetic *combination* of intuitions.[4] The synthesis is done at a conceptual level, not in an empirical level.[5] That means, the synthesis is done *a priori*. This unity or synthesis is transcendental.

How is it possible to add something new to the *a priori* analytic knowledge without taking something from the empirical realm? True, the addition is taking place. But it is because of the active extension from the side of the a priori. This is because of the ampliative principles involved in synthesis.[6] The difference between analytic and synthetic essentially lies

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in the fact that while the identity of subject and predicate in the analytic is immediate, this is mediate in the latter. And this mediation involved in the synthesis is just an espousal of what is already conceived *a priori.*

It is to give necessity and certainty to the knowledge that Kant avoided empirical synthesis. The experimentation, here, has no other way but to agree with the *a priori* conceptions. In the system of concepts/ categories and percepts/sensible intuitions also, the former are the active participants. Thus, one thing is clear that Kant's emphasis is on the subjective; all experimentations and all the processes attached to the a posteriori/empirical elements are supposed only to vindicate the subject; predicate is just the subject. But, such a mediation allowed by Kant amounts to no mediation. Here, we find his subjectivism; the Copernican turn, the claim of Kant's revolution in philosophy is also the same.

Kant himself has declared that the concern of his transcendental idealism is not on the relation of knowledge to its object.

> The distinction between the transcendental and the empirical belongs therefore only to the critique of knowledge ; it does not concern the relation of that knowledge it its object.[7]

Again,

> By *transcendental idealism* I mean the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, representations only, not things in themselves, and that time and space are therefore only sensible forms of our intuition, not determinations given as existing by themselves, nor conditions of objects viewed as things in themselves.[8]

The two quotes above together speak that neither the philosophy is concerned with the knowledge of reality, nor are we in a position to know the objects viewed as things in themselves. Let us ponder on the question why Kant has taken such a negative attitude. Kant's main concern in the mission of the historic reconciliation turned out to be "a science of the mere examination of pure reason, of its sources and limits."[9] Kant preferred to call this a critique, not a doctrine:

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> ...it should be called a critique, not a doctrine, of pure reason. Its utility, in speculation, ought properly to be *only negative*, not to extend, but only to clarify our reason, and keep it free from errors - which is already a very great gain.[10]

Kant's whole project is negative because he is satisfied in 'better not extend knowledge than speculate errors'. Such an attitude could keep Kant only in a fix and that way make him commit negative errors. And Hegel's criticisms of Kant clearly established this truth.

Kant's choice to remain a philosopher of negative reason makes Hegel call him 'philosopher of the understanding' distinct from that of speculative and positive reason. The sides understanding (abstract) and negative reason (dialectical) are only two 'moments' or premises which take us to the 'truth' or conclusion, in Hegelian logical traid. Hegel regards the speculative side (positive reason) as rich in content, and as something worthy of philosophical endeavour. It is through a critique of Kant that Hegel comes to the position of a speculative philosopher expounding positive reason. When we criticise Kant, one should not forget that we also uphold the trends of positive reason and speculation instrumental to the idea of a dialectical totality hidden in Kant despite his refusal of them. Now we shall go through the facts of subjectivism and the inherent empiricism in Kant's transcendental/critical idealism, of the subjectivism in the Copernican revolution and Kant's inability in overcoming this in a sublated objectivism, of Kant's separation of method from content, i.e., separating the process of examination of instruments of knowledge from knowledge itself, and of the onesidedness in his defense of formal logic. In all through this treatment we should see that reason in Kant is subjectivistic.

To begin with, Kant's project was similar to Hume's. Nicholas Capaldi points out the similarities in Hume's introduction to his *Treatise* and Kant's preface to his first *Critique*. In both Hume and Kant we can see (i) a need to put metaphysics in the right track, (ii) an attempt to make human reason as the centre of study and (iii) an appeal to experience to

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reject transcendental explanations as unscientific.[11] This similarity of project could retain Kant a Humean to a certain extent, despite the strong differences between them. Hume's fatal attacks on causality influenced to a great extent Kant. And Kant gives credit to Hume for wakening him from the 'dogmatic slumber' lulled by the Leibnizian and Wolffian rationalism. At the same time, Kant took much care not to fall a victim to Hume's empiricist, skeptical nihilism. As a precaution, Kant transferred causality from empirical realm to an *a priori* area making it a category of relation; he kept necessity also *a priori* category. In this attempt of subjectivisation, Kant could not escape internalising a bit of empiricism from Hume. Hegel also sometimes terms Kant an 'empiricist'.

Kant's system was against both rationalism and empiricism. Also what Findlay talks of Logico-mathematicism and Radical Empiricism amounts to the same. According to Findlay, Kant erected a system against these two related errors.[12] Findlay is right in holding Kant for committing the same mistakes which he tries to refute.

> ...The wonderment with which he regards what he calls the synthetic *A Priori*, his own discovery...is a wonderment derived in part from a superstitious reverence for a supposedly complete Formal Logic and in part from what one may call a deep seated crypto-empiricism. It is the latter which leads Kant to resort to the most fantastic hypotheses, themselves cryptically empiricistic and psychologistic,.....[13]

Kant's empiricism lies in his refusal to accept anything behind the representations, appearances and phenomena. The initial unity of the discrete appearances are not cognized from the real objects or the things in themselves, but supplied externally to it through the *a priori* categories of the subject, the knower. The objects for Kant are only what is *given* to us. This division of appearances and reality took Kant to resort to various hypotheses of introducing limiting concepts like noumena or of unsuccessfully attempting to bridge the gap between these two realms. In fact, subjectivism and empiricism are strongly linked in Kant, and we would see this again and again on the way of our appreciation for Kant.

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Again, we can see the subjectivism in the very conception and execution of Kant's Copernican project. In the pre-Copernican astronomy, earth is generally taken passive. Copernicus took earth an active participant in the solar system. The factor of the movement of spectator on earth or, for that matter, the movement of earth itself was taken into account in observations and conclusions regarding astronomy. This is the Copernican revolution in astronomy. Taking human faculty as an active element in the knowledge formation is Kant's Copernican revolution in philosophy. True, he took *a priori* concepts as the active component and treated intuitions (sensible intuitions, percepts) as passive component of appearance. Already, we saw that the synthetic a priori judgements are just ampliative principles resulting from *a priori* extension to objects (not things in themselves). One should note that this extension is from the side of the *a priori*, and it is only an *a priori* checking of the data (still, strangely, not empirical) where the intuitions are only to agree with the *a priori* concepts. Intuitions just 'apply' to concepts, while concepts 'apprehend' a priori the intuitions, not empirically.

So, it is clear that the whole Copernican perspective in Kant is a subjectivist one, and the over-enthusiasm shown in the suppression of intuitions to passivity is something that could have been avoided. In essence, the external, objective element of knowledge, i.e., the intuitions are just unwanted ornamental appendices in Kant's epistemology. Analysing the metaphysics and subjectivism involved in this, Hegel says that the subject-object identity in Kant is only formal. We also saw that the mediation involved in the subject-predicate identity in the synthetic apriori statements is no mediation.

Hegel is right in observing that the subject and things exist each for itself in Kant. We are separate, epistemologicaly separate from things, and the things are separate from us. We only assume or posit that things are. As we are not knowing them (things in themselves of Kant), we only posit them. That means, the objectivity of the external world is just subjective, not made subjective, not made known; things are objective in the sense that

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the knowledge of them is denied to us. To use another language of Hegel, there is only a subjective subject-object identity.[14] That is, the *finite* categories of understanding in Kant are not able to clasp the original identity in totality to the point of absolute grasp of it. This is because of the finite and subjective nature of Kant's categories. Here, Hegel terms the idealism of Kant psychological also. Because, in a strict sense, Kant is not able to come out of the Cartesian 'I think'. No sublation of Kant's subjectivism takes place.

Moreover, the natural objectivisation attempts of the subjective reason in Kant are never allowed by Kant as logicaly and epistemologically legitimate. Again this is a subjective limitation of a conscious Kant. Kant thinks that it is an inherent mistake on the part of human reason to enter into the unauthorised realms of objects and things-in-themselves. In the ascending series, reason which is able to know each and every condition in the series aims, illegitimately in Kant's parlance, to know the totality of conditions and even the Unconditioned. This objectivisation trend of reason is the hidden other in Kant's subjective reason that Hegel later on posits objectively. One can see that this unity of reason in Hegel is inclusive of the illicit reason in Kant. When Jonathan Bennet calls the objective trend of Kant's reason as ascending reason[15] (derived from the ascending series) neither he visualizes any bud of objective reason in it nor he is for it. Bennet sees the ascending reason as only the part of the subjective reason that, for him, is really and shall be legitimately subjective.

Limiting this reason only as subjective and as a method is the manifest attitude of formal logic. While talking about the ascension / objectivisation / transcendentalisation of reason, Kant points out as a misdeed of this reason that this wants to make a systematic unity "necessary, not only subjectively and logically, as a method, but objectively also."[16] I quote this to state that in common philosophy, subjectivity, logic (read formal logic) and method go together. Logic is subjective, formal and a method. When Hegel argued for a content to this, the whole concept

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of logic has changed. Hegel opposed the separation of method from content.

Hegel opposed the very idea of first analysing our faculty of knowledge before we gain any knowledge. The very separation of knowledge from the faculty of knowledge, that of content from method, is paradoxical. The paradox is that knowledge is a must to draw limits to knowledge. The idea that instrument of knowledge should be inspected before and without using it is an impossibility. Kant's subjectivism and empiricism can again be sensed here. Kant follows Locke in taking the examination of powers of reason and understanding as prior to the very attempt of making any beginning in knowledge. Empiricists as a whole including Kant, and rationalists as well, not to exclude Kant again, have only part of reason, finite reason at hand; the unity of reason, the infinite reason where the identity of infinite and finite is explicit, which is capable of grasping the totality, the whole, the things in themselves is lacking in these philosophers. That is why Hegel called Kant a philosopher of the understanding with finite reason, the empiricist, the abstract thinker lacking in means to grasp the concrete that is rich in sides.

The so-called testing in abstraction is more or less nothing. This misguided process can reveal an abstract side. But only actions can reveal the concrete full truth. In Lesser Logic (*Logic in* Ency-clopaedia), Hegel ridicules Kant's kind of endeavours by resorting to a metaphor. Kant's attempt is like refusing to enter water until one has learned to swim, says Hegel. Hegel positively asserts, and he is right in doing so, that the act of knowing an object and the being of the object are not separable; these cannot be two separate enterprises as Kant has thought. Kant's metaphysical separation of form from content is one and the same folly of his formalism, subjectivism and empiricism.

When Capaldi says that

> contrary to what critics such as Strawson say, the Copernican model is coherent when properly understood, and where difficulties

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> arise they are the result of Kant's Aristolelianism and of his not being Copernican enough.[17]

it is Capaldi who does not understand that the Copernican model of Kant (subjectivism) and the Aristoteloanism (formal logic) in him are one and the same thing. In one way, Capaldi is correct in reading Strawson. Critics like P.F.Strawson[18] are involved in further cutting down Kant who himself has self-edited to the point of unexcisable subjectivism and empiricism. Despite the bulkiness of Kant, thanks to the construction of his big fiction of 'as ifs' regulative ideas, limiting concepts, so on and so forth, the essential Kant, especially in epistemology and logic, is a largely self-edited subjectivist. When we have already established that Kant remained defensive and negative with the self-defeatist aim of 'better not take risk and advance than to commit errors', the preamble of his transcendentalism, that the execution of his whole Copernican project amounted to partial, finite, one-sided abstract, formal, subjectivist and empiricist results, and that we indirectly suggest that Kant could have gone further in sublating himself into a position of positive reason, enabling thus to have a grasp of the total, the concrete, the whole, the empiricist attempts like that of Strawson in further excising an already excised Kant would amount to be meaningless.

Findlay terms Strawson's attempt of reconstructing (or destructing) Kant as what is called Transcendental Excision.[19] He means by this cutting short a thinker, cutting out the inconsistent, incoherent parts. In Kant's case, Findlay also argues for a transcendental excision, though he differs with Strawson in what to cut and what not to cut.[20] I argue not for an excision, but instead a sublation of the subjectivism. The implicit attempts of such a sublation can be seen in Kant in the form of hidden unrecognised middles, as flexible conceptions, in mediations and triplicities or even in bridging ventures through the later critiques. Here, we would limit ourselves to conclude that the valid reason in Kant is basically subjective; his categories are subjective; space and time, the forms of intuitions, are subjective; synthetic knowledge is also an *a priori* attempt. The essence of the Copernican revolution is the subjectivisation of reason. And in the

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mission of reconciliation, he is a failure to a great extent; his metaphysical separation of subject and object of knowledge allowed all the dichotomies their onesided abstractions; his bridging attempts could not save him from being a dualist.

NOTES

1. N.K.Smith (Tr.), *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Macmillan, London 1958.
2. *Ibid.* p. 96.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.* p. 50.
5. *Ibid.*p. 51. "It cannot be experience, because the suggested principle has connected the second representation with the first, not only with greater universality, but also with character of necessity, and therefore completely *a priori* and on the basis of mere concepts."
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.* p. 96.
8. *Ibid.* p. 345.
9. *Ibid.* p.59.
10. *Ibid.* (emphasis added)
11. Nicholas Capaldi, 'The Copernican Revolution in Hume and Kant' in Lewis White Beck (ed.), *Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress*, D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht (Holland), 1970. pp. 234-40.
12. J.N.Findlay, 'Kant and Anglo-Saxon Criticism', in L.W. Beck (ed.), op.cit, pp. 128-48.
13. *Ibid.*

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14. Jere Paul Surber (Tr.). *The Difference between the Fichtean and Schellingean Systems of Philosophy*. Ridgeview Publishing Co., California, 1978.

15. Jonathan Bennet. *Kant's Dialectic*. Cambridge University Press, 1974, pp. 260-64.

16. N.K.Smith (Tr.). *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Note. 1, P. 536.

17. Nicholas Capaldi, op. cit, p. 239.

18. P.F.Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*, Methuen & Co., London, 1973.

19. J.N.Findlay, op cit, pp. 130-31.

20. *Ibid.* P. 147. ".....I would wish the last trace of constructive subjectivism to be excised from Kant...."

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ADVAITIC CRITIQUE OF EXPERIENCE

D. N. TIWARI

I have confined my observation in the present discussion, to the principal 'Upaniṣads and Śaṅkara Vedānta. The text, for the present observation is an argument about the limitation of experience to describe the witness-self. I observe that it has never been the aim of the text to analyse the concept of Sākṣi in terms of experience but it is quite obvious that, philosophically, the whole text is an analytic device based on experiences to help the mind to reach conceptually the concept of indivisible witness-self. Before coming to the discussion on the issue proper, I think, it is useful to clarify the meaning of the use of the terms 'experience and Sākṣi'. By the term 'experience' we mean knowledge acquired and the epistemic justifications and empirical evidences given for proving its certainty. More specifically by the term 'experience' I particularly, mean empirical knowledge acquired through the knowing process. It needs no mention that a critique of experience as used in the sense of our cognition acquired by senses and reasoning i.e. relative and conditioned knowledge, finds that the very base or cognitive ground in such conceptualisations is ignored or is declared as unknown. The term Sākṣi' is generally used in usual communication in the sense of impartial or disinterestendness of knowledge, the knowledge acquired indenpendently of our mental and cultural allegiances to physioslogical, psychological, axiological and other entities. In acquiring such a knowledge as Sākṣi-Jñāna our consciousness (I-ness) enjoys freedom from allegiances to things and to our private thoughts.[1] Secondly, the term 'Sākṣi' as used in 'Sākṣi-caitanya' (witness-consciousness), is usually taken by *Advaita Vedantins* as an ontological apposition of knowledge and is concerned with our inquiry into the very nature of consciousness. Philosophically, as

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 1 & 2
January - April 2000

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the concept is inevitably related with our experiences, in the context of which we talk about it, it requires a cognitive inquiry into the very basis of our experiences viz. objects of cognition, the self-cognition and the cognition itself and, for the present discussion in this paper, it is concept of perpetual and indivisible awareness itself. It is direct knowledge and is beyond the knowledge by sources, epistemic-proofs, etc., valued much as a significant subject matter of epistemology in general. The term 'beyond' is not used in the sense of transcendental, or trans-experience but that of very cognitive foundation of all experiences: empiricl and trans-empirical. However, we do not deny that the beyond as taken in our view is transcendental and trans-experience also.

In the present discussion I am not concerned with the witness consciousness as ontological concept with which *Vedānta* as a religion is concerned but with providing a critique of experience as found in the text and its utility in indicating the witness-consciousness.[2]

The text talks generally about two categories of different sorts of experiences 1-empirical experiences (*Aparā-Vidyā*) and 2-Trans-empirical experiences (*Parā-Vidyā*). The experiences acquired by our sensory perception, inference and other forms of reasoning which are often valued as epistemological justifications and empirical-evidences for providing certainty to them are all included in the former category. These experiences are mediate or indirect as they are relative to knowing faculties and, are knowledge conditioned. They are relational to the triad of experiencer, experiences and the object-experienced. This category of experiences to the best of the value given by the text to them helps the acquisition of *preyas* (mundane-prosperity) the acquisition and enjoyment of which completely traps the individual (*jīva*) and keeps him away form his spirit[3]. However I am not going to explore the issues concerning trapping as I have referred to it only to show that in the realm of these experiences our whole mentality and dispositions are committed to the sphere of subject, object and their relationship and that our mind is fit only to grasp the objective mode of experiences. Our whole psyche is

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operated by interests and suffers from enjoying pleasure and pain as per satisfaction and dissatisfaction of the interest. We will discuss the arguments given by the text for refuting empirical experiences in knowing the witness consciousness aftera few steps but before that, think it useful to clarify that there is apparent duality in between the empirical and transempirical experiences and that philosophical reflections are confined only to the former and the latter is the object of religious realisation and, thus, for those who are confined to the former the latter is beyond and these who are doing philosophy the latter kind of it does not stand significantly as an object proper of philosophy. Even there is mention of trans- experience being i.e. *Brahman* or *sāksī-Caitanya* at the level of which both of the experiences-empirical and trans-empirical are not possible.[4] However, these experiences are not meaningless first because only in the context of these experiences the trans-experience becomes a legitimate issue for discussion and second that without the gradual transcendence from the empiricl and trans-empirical one can not reach that state and, hence, useful for a spiritual seeker. *What is not transcended in the process is transcendence itself which is luminous by nature. It is self-illumined and illuminating principle ubiquitously given as the very soul of all beings. It is the self-illumined on which different kinds of consciousness are ascribed differently as per the process involved in the cognitive activities in relation to which (as witnessed) it is called witness-self. This trans experience as self luminous is the basis of all experience and yet beyond them is witness-consciousness.* The same reality *Brahman* is called by the term *sāksī-Caitanya* by the virtue of it as perpetually illuminating principle of everything and thought presented before it as conditioned and transient in nature.

The text on the basis of certain popular arguments rejects experiences by perception as a means to know the beyond. Perceptual experiences are relational to the senses which perceive and to the objects perceived and can not operate for that which is not an object at all. If it is said that subjective entities are also perceived even then, its performance is of no use in regard with that which is neither an object nor a subject in

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both of the senses of mental dispositions and of the mind as a knower. Perceptual experiences are changing instants and are sublated by the next of it. Not only that but it varies from person to person according to their difference in perceiving capacity, distance in time and space, defects in sensing, in senses and other factors. It contradicts itself as it suffers from the defects of senses, external facts and changing nature of the object they perceive. Perception is concerned only with the outwardly superficial aspects and the senses can not perceive thing in its entirety.[5] *The most significant matter of fact about the sensory perception is that the senses are fixed naturally in their own concerned objects in a way that the object of a particular sense is beyond for the other senses, for example, the object, say verbal noises, in which auditory sense is fixed is almost beyond for the other sense that is visual sense which is fixed only in form and colour (rūpa) and likewise rūpa(form) and colour are beyond for the auditory sense and similar is the case with objects of other senses.* We can grasp only the objects having qualities but the things having no such qualities cannot be grasped by experience. Like Vedāntic text modern sciences and cognitive philosophies also accept that the senses do not grasp the thing-in-itself but the image of thing as confronted with them or sense-data which is the object of experience and not the experience itself. We drink water but water is not experience. We experience sweet or severe but sweetness or otherwise inhered in external objects are not the experience. Experience is the idea of sweet or severe having no physiological quality like extension, form, etc. and hence a cognitive unit and, hence, internal while the senses are natually fixed only in the external object. How can that which has no form, colour, other qualities and properties be known by perception?

Inference is given primary importance among sources of knowledge and that most of our rational operations are based on different kinds of inferential experience. According to critiques of inference as the source of knowing beyond, it is conjectural and the certinty of it is based on *anvayavyatireka* (agreement-disagreement) and, thus, it is relative not only

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to perception the futility of which has already been discussed in earlier paragraph but to the other factors like evidences, the means and the end or the conclusion to be derived. Inferential experiences are not self-established and require consciousness as its base. One can infer self-consciousness as the base of such experiences but witness-consciousness can not be inferred by the same logic[6]; it is known directly as the base of all experiences including inference. Even if it is taken as inferred, that will be no more than an experience and the experience cannot infer itself and, hence, is not established by itself.

The operation of self consciousness is encircled by egoity and subtle body to *susupti* (sleeping-consciousness) from waking consciousness and vice-versa. We find that there is discontinuity or even complete absence as in faint or in deep sleep. The changing consciousness cannot know itself as changing and cannot know its own changes as well. Different sorts of consciousness according to *Vedānta* are ascriptions to the witness-self which is the perpetual base of all conscious stages ascribed to it and is transcendental not only to experiences but to these subject and object ascribed also. Nothing will be founded if this foundational illumination (witness-self) persisting uniformly and breaklessly as the illuminating principle of all of them is denied. It is witness (Sākṣī) because it is non attached, unaffected, changeless, perpetually persisting and ubiquitously given principle of illumination by nature. *Vedāntins* will not disagree to the idea that there is no other appropriate definition of *sākṣī- Caitanya* than the self-illumined and illuminating principle before which every thing is presented with the limitation that this definition is merely an other designation to *Sākṣī-Caitanya.*

The seers are the realizers of spirit transcendental in nature and their trans-empirical experiences are given in the form of statements of the *Vedas and* Upaniṣads. In fact it is on the basis of these statements that we are acquainted with the idea that there is something which is trans-empirically existent and which at the same time is the base of all experiences (*avijñātam vijñātṛ).* As they cannot be put in a way to make

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the truth visualised on the ordinary plane of experiences the statement concerning them are only a device through which they try to express their experiences of the beyond and as such their realisation as-it-is cannot be taken as the object proper of our ordinary experiences. However, they are of vital imporatnce for philosophical purposes as they provide incentive and direction to our investigation into the very possibility and nature of the truth beyond.

The beyond may be implicated as the basis or ontological apposition of cognition and of experiences of objects of cognition but it is false in cases if the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. Again, even if it is true, there is every possibility that its antecednet and consequent both may be presumptuous and, hence, it may logically be true but cognitively false. Imposition of something of unknown character does not help to know the beyond. Imposition is based on similarity and, thus, it may provide analogous knowledge, but the similarity of unknown beyond with known empirical experiences is not legitimately possible and, hence, unfounded. We shall discuss analogy in the next paragraph. We want to say in very brief that even intuitive experiences are also not free from psychologism and from logical and pragmatic errors and it is very difficult to make those experiences experiential to ordinary state.

There is no possibility of sensory experience of the senses themselves and, thus, senses are beyond the sensory experience they sense. Senses are known by the intellect. As for the particular function they perform the respective senses are known by inference or by implication as the substratum of the function they perform and like wise the intellect cannot know itself though it is known by inference or implication made on the basis of experiences as their ontological apposition. The intellect is endowed with the capacity to infer any conclusion regarding those beyond its grasp on the basis of some presumed premises but then the premises are accepted either as self-proved or self-established or presumptuous. Nothing is gained if they are presumptuous but if they are taken as self-proved the conclusion derived on their basis is taken as true but it adds nothing to the position of a self-proved witness-self which needs no proof.

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During this discussion we come to the fact that the senses are beyond from the sensory perception, that intellect is beyond from its own activities and as the intellect is not self-illumined; it is illuminated by the consciousness which is beyond, not only from sensory and intellectual experiences but from the senses and the intellect as well also; they can not help knowing their luminous-principle which is beyond them. *If it will be known as an object it will cease to be the knower and if the knower is taken as intellect it will not be illumined by itself.* Intellect is *antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna*-consciousness and, hence, it is not self-illumined while *Vedānta* accept *Sākṣi -Caitanya as self illumined. It is idea of the self illumined nature of sākṣi chaitanya propounded in the text which leads us to a conclusion that it is non-different from Brahman because Brahman in Vedānta is the non-dual Reality and is only Self-illumined-(reality) by nature or that the Brahman* and *Sākṣī- Caitanya* are non-different. It is perhaps with the view of self-illumined and illuminiating principle of subject and object that the conscious principle is designated as saksi-chaitanya. and that with the view of ultimate as the principle of existence, illumination and bliss it is called *Brahman.* So far as the idea of the nature of witness-self as pure consciousness and self illumined principle is concerned the two are non-different.

The most significant matter of fact to be observed as the *Upaniṣadic* method of saying is that the seers have tried to make their trans-experience and trans-empirical experiences understandable to ordinary minds with the help of allegories myths and analogies which indicate the beyond in a metaphorical way.[7] We confine our observation only to alalogies and particularly to the analogy of different states of waking, dreaming and sleeping which is given high importance in the text [8] to describe metaphorically the character of *Sākṣī-Caitanya* in different kinds of experiences of those states. Here, it is significant to say that this analogy is distinguished from that of others given in the text for example the anology pot-space, rope-snake based on experiences of external world in which there is duality of percipient and adjuncts of which both are ultimately false and, thus, they describe the non-duality of the Reality

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only metaphorically which ultimately is unfit for removing the sense of duality at conceptual level and logical difficulties of the experience of non-duality as well.

Unlike others, in the analogy based on experiences of different states of waking, dreaming and sleeping there is no room for prior existence of any external thing like rope or pot distinct from percipient because the objects experienced in waking state are internal to that state as those experienced in dreams are internal to that state and just as we wake up from dream state the dream objects disappear likewise, when we wake up from waking state the experiences of waking objects will be no more existents. Although there is no experience of waking and dreaming objects in sleeping (*sarvavyvahāra śūnya*), this state is also accompanied by traces of objects. The objects of this or that kind has always been the objects of experience in waking and dreaming consciousness. The major difference in between these two states is that the waking objects are transcended in the dreaming and vice versa. Different from these two states both of the objects of waking and dreaming are transcended is sleeping. In other words neither the external world of waking nor the internal world (*Vāsanā*) of dreaming are experienced in sleeping but as there is *Vāsanā* itself without its dispositions, as the object of experience, we have the experience like 'I slept without any object to disturb (*aham sukham svāpsam*)[9] This *Vāsanā* without disturbance is transcended in *Turīyā* which transcends all the limitations of experiences, objects of experiences and the experiencer themselves. *Turiya* consciousness is witness-consciousness. A passage from *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* make it more clear according to which just as a hawk having sharp wings flies every where without being attached to anywhere at last comes to its *nest* when tired, the witness-self is unaffected without getting any attachment to any or all of the waking, dreaming and sleeping experiences of the I-consciousness.[10] The witness-self is self-illumined and ubiquitously given principle perpetually lying as the base of all- the experiencer (I-consciousness), the experiences and the object of experience and that is why when ego or I-consciousness gets back from sleep or dream to

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waking state it finds itself as losing nothing of its ability naturally assigned to it in spite of passing through the different stages. Even though it does not get back (if one dies) the witness-self as the witness of the deeds done in past life is prepetually there with self (*jīvātma*) as its illuminating force by the virtue of which the *Jīvātma* presents it-self in life after death and in rebirth according to the fruits of its Karmas (past-deeds). According to the text there is redemption from the chains of life and death only when *Jīvātma* gets rid of its witnessed-character or that it gets redemption form 1-ness and realises its pure conscious, self-illumined nature. At the level when witness-self is itself realised there is no question of *Ṣākṣī* which is called so only in relation to those of which it is witness, at this level, it gets rid of all subject-object sphere; it is *Brahman.*

Advita-Vedānta observes the principle of *Sākṣī-Caitanya* as the principle of objectivity. R. R. Pandey writes "The concept of *Saksin* is a typical notion of *Advaita* which may be called the principle of objectivity. By the principle of objectivity is meant that the principle reveals an object or a state as it is in a non-personal way."[11] Prof. Pandey seems right in observing the *Sākṣī* as a principle of objectivity because the text illustrates it as a perpetually given illuminating force of a self-illumined character and as it is ubiquitously given principle of illumination, luminosity is not personal to any or private being but given as all pervasive luminosity like that of *Bhartrhari's śabda- Brahman.*[12] It is the cultural, psychological and other allegiance of our intellect (*Buddhi*) on account of which *SākṣīCaitanya* is taken differently to different persons, changing and relative to the experiences of the experiencer (*Buddhi*) but it can not be denied as the objective principle of all that is experienced and the experiencer as well which cease to be so in absence of this illumination and in that case there will be no possibility of any kind of knowledge also. The knower (Buddhi) itself is illuminated by this non-dual principle of objectivity and there is no other definition of *Sākṣī-Caitanya* except ubiquitously given perpetual luminosity revealing everything in a non-personal way. As it is the basic principle non-attached to any experience or object of experience it illuminates and as it illuminates them all

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objectively without any interest, this illumination is illumination in non-personal way. This also suggests a unique idea according to which this illumination is the cognitive base of awareness of the intellect, object and the experiences themselves which it illuminates.

It may be asked if it is being of awareness, it will be known by perception, inferece, verbal statements, implication and other experiences and then it will be an object and, hence, relative but it is not so. It is a foundational principle of illumination. From the discussion in the lines mentioned above it will be confusive to take that identical or sameness of the cognition of the experiencer and the experiences is possible only by the principle of *Sākṣī-Caitanya*. If it is so then *Sākṣī-Caitanya* has to be accepted as universal in character, but this is not proper. Witness self is not universal in any of the following two senses. 1- It is not an abstraction: experience or concept: from different individual objects of experience or from the experiencer themselves and 2- It is not the object of cognition or illumination and not the cause of the identical cognition of the objects in their different occurrences and instances of which universal is the cause. *Advaita Vedantin* like *Bhartrhari* [13] makes a difference between cognition and the cognition of the objects in order to elucidate the indivisibility of cognition and to differentiate cognition from the objects of cognition which may either be individual in some cases or universal in other cases. The cognition is not another or an object in a cognition while the objects of cognition are cognized as objects in that cognition. Cognition cannot be the object of another cognition also (*na ca jñānam jñānāntara pratyakṣam*) [14]. In other words the objects of or content of knowledge is relational to that knowledge or to an other knowledge but knowledge itself is foundational. Just as a lamp needs no other lamp in order to be lit, the cognition itself needs no object or experience in order to be known. It will cease to be knowledge if it is known as object. Objects of knowledge may be individual or universal which are known in a knowledge but cognition itself is neither an object-individual-or universal nor the knower (*Buddhi*) which is relative to witness-consciousness for their own illumination. Individual and univer-

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sal are adjuncts of percipient but witness-self is beyond all of them.[15] They cannot transcend themselves but witness-self, by nature, is transcendence. As the fire does not cognize fire nor does it cognize itself, everything is presented directly to the witness-self, otherwise, nothing will be founded at all.

The point discussed in the lines just mentioned in the above paragraph has been more clearly established by the *Vedāntins* at the occasion of exploring their observation on the *Upaniṣadic* statement which reads as follows:- *'Na hi draṣturdṛṣterviparilopo vidyate' vināśitvāt Na tu taddvitīyamasti tatoanyaḍ vibhaktam yat paśyet*[16] The text is quite obviously of the view that as there is no possibility of objects of consciousness, there is no possibility of subject-object (*Dṛk* and *Dṛśya*) relationship or content of experiences at the level of illumination itself, the *dṛ ṣṭi* [17] does not experience itself because it is neither a subject nor an object. It is also clear from it that it is not the *draṣṭā* or *pramātā* (self-consciousness) which is ascribed to perpetual illuminating principle (witness-self) but the *dṛṣṭi* (awareness or illumination itself) which is never destroyed or discontinued and is neither a subject not an object nor the relation between the two but the knowledge itslef. The same matter of fact is observed in the statement *Na hi vijñāturvijñāterviparilopo' vidyate vināśitvāt,*[18] according to which it is not *vijñāta* or *dṛṣṭā* (knower who is called relatively so as it knows something or it is the subject of an object) but the *vijñapti* or *dṛṣṭi* (knowledge itself eternally self-luminous and is never destroyed or sublated.) The use of possessive case in *dṛṣturdṛṣteḥ* and *vijñāturvijñāteḥ* may be taken in terms of duality in between the illuminator and luminosity but *Advaitins* will not accept such duality as they do not assume any difference in designating the luminosity itself as the perpetual illuminator and the use of possessive case is significant only for those who can't understand the indivisible otherwise. *Witness-self is not draṣṭā but dṛṣṭi which is the principle of illumination of all distinctions of subject and object. There is no possibility of any case-relation in between the draṣṭā and the dṛṣṭi which are non-different at the level of witness-self.* The indivisible awareness itself is not subject to any

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change. There is no subject-object splice or split in awareness itself and that there is no possibility of its being limited by space and time as it is all pervasive. It is this pervasive-ness that it has been termed by *Chāndogyopaniṣad as bhūmā.* [19] As awarness of object in usual communication provides bliss, the awareness itself is bliss (*Vijñānamānandam*). The indivisible awareness is indivisible bliss itself. It is immediate and is realised by aspirant who by philosophical reflection (*Manana*) and religious means (*sādhana*) realises himself as awareness and bliss (*sa yo ha vai tat paramam Brahman veda Brahmaiva bhavati*)[20]

The Self-beyond is not changing in its experiences from moment to moment. It is indivisible awareness itself by nature and as there is no possibility of any division and change or parts in awareness itself and as it is beyond our experience, indivisible and perpetually existent, we can neither reject it nor accept it on the basis of experiences. We reject or affirm only the objects of cognition but not the cognition itself. Even in a rejection what is rejected or affirmed is the object of rejection or affirmation but not the cognition itself and rejection or affirmation ceases to be so if cognition of them is denied. It is the illuminating principle of all sort of experiences even of rejection-affirmation, etc., also and, at the same time, is independent not only from all of them but from the intellect (I-ness) which experiences them.

The purpose of my discussion on the concept of *Sākṣī-Caitanya* as mentioned above is confined only to show that though *Sākṣī-Caitanya* is beyond experience as it is a trans-empirical or beyond subject-object world, it is discriminately termed so only in the context of the experience[21] . If there is no context of experiences, there will be no occasion for talking about their illuminating principle and designating it as witness and if there is no perpetually given illumination there will be no possibility of cognition, the object of cognition and of the cognizer itself. If there is nothing to be witnessed for what reason it will be the witness-self. It is awareness or pure consciousness itself and is witness of the experiences presented before it during different states of I-Consciousness.

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The intellect is subject and the experiences are the objects but *Sākṣī-Caitanya* is neither a subject nor an object but transcendental to both. It illuminates both the subject, the object and their relation but itself is self-luminous.[22] This self-illumined is immediacy and is directly known as the awareness of the awarenesses it illuminates (*Pratibodha viditam*). Some of the scholars are of the view that we dream a dream in a dream and the witness consciousness is different from the dreaming consciousness and from the dream on the basis of which dreaming a dream in a dream is experienced in dreaming state. If *Sākṣī-Caitanya* as separate from the dreaming consciousness and that of the dream dreamt in that consciousness as well as is not accepted how can the dreaming of a dream in a dream be experienced? But, in my opinion, the dream-experience (of dream) in dreaming state and the object of that experience i.e. dream are experienced differently only with the differences of objects in dreaming and that of the experience of it by dreaming-consciousness and by this distinction the witness-consciousness is not discrminately admitted. In other words such an independent consciousness is not an experienced idea or the objects of ideas (dreaming state and the objects of dream) and, thus, with these differences to accept the *Sākṣī-Caitanya* which is beyond the dreaming state and the object of dream (may be a dream), as independent consciousness separated from the dream experience and the object of experience (dreaming) is not legitimate. It is contradiction in terms to say the independence of dreaming consciousness of a dream. *Sākṣī-Caitanya,* in fact, is none of them but beyond. Dreaming a dream in a dreaming-consciousness is the object of that consciousness and, thus, there is no case of experience of witness-consciousness in dreaming a dream in a dream internal to that state. Witness-consciousness as the basis not only of the dreaming experience but of the dreaming consciousness also is self-evident though it is known by presumption as the substratum of them.

After removal of I-ness in liberation, where it does not exist, there is no case of presenting it before *Sākṣī-Caitanya* and, thus, there is no need for such a designation as *Sākṣī-Caitanya* because at that state one realizes 'all is *Brahman' (Sarvam khalu idam Brahman).* However, so far

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I-ness exists the theoretical importance of concept of *Sākṣī* can not be denied as its illuminating principle.

So far as to the question of theoretical need of the concept of *Sākṣī-Caitanya* apart from the *Brahman* and *Jīva,* in non-dualistic philosophy of *Advaita Vedānta* is concerned, we come to remind two statements according to which 1. - The individual self (*Jīva)* comparable to the body of *buddhi* (intellect), *manas* (mind) and *ahaṅkāra* (ego) which is a product of *māyā* (*Prakṛti* in *Sāṁkhya*) is not self-illumined and as such it needs an illuminating principle in order to be illuminated. The individual self is not illuminating principle by itself. *Sākṣī-Caitanya* is the designation of the illuminating principle of it as, without it, nothing can be illuminated. Though, it illuminates the individual self (intellect), it is not subject to the changes of self and it is only by ignorance that he intellect is identified itself as the *Pramātā* (illuminator) in relation to its experiences which are not possible if intellect itself is not illuminated by the witness-consciousness. As the *Brahman* in *Advaita Vedānta* is the only illuminator which is non-dual, what is the theoretical need of *Sākṣī-Caitanya?* 2. It is true to say that *Brahman* is non-dual reality in the holistic philosophy of *Advaita* but it is designated so not only not in relation to conditioned and related knowledge but also not in relation to intellect or individual self and if this is not the case *Advaitins* will face the problem of apparent duality in between the conditioned and unconditioned. In order to remove the duality it is consistent to accept that though *Brahman* is the only non-dual-reality it is all pervading and ubiquitously given principle of illumination and this ubiquitously given principle of illumination in relation to intellect it illuminates in a non-personal way is designated as *Sākṣī-Caitanya* who as the illuminator of intellect is characterised *Sākṣī-Caitanya* only because all the activities of intellect is presented before it. The illuminating principle is non-attached, non-effected from any activities, experiences of the intellect and the intellect itself which it illuminates. By this concept *Advaitins* illustrate the idea of constant presence of absolute *saccidananda* in the inner most of

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the individual self as its illuminator.

Concluding the whole discussion it can fairly be said that our knowledge is confined to the world of experience and the witness-self as the illuminating principle of the world of experience is ubiquitously given. This luminous principle needs no epistemic-justification and empirical-evidences which work in the world of empirical experiences only. It is foundational to epistemic justifications and empirical evidences which cannot function without this principle. This principle is actually self-illumined but in order to convince others about its self-luminosity we provide inference, verbal authority, implications, imposition, direct perception and other proofs. Ultimately, it stands self-proved as the perceptual cognitive basis of all cognitive activities including proofs. It is knowledge itself and is known directly as the abiding principle in all cognition of the objects acquired through the cognitive process (*Pratibodha viditam*). We provide arguments to prove its existence but as all proofs, evidences, etc, function in the circuit of empirical world of experiences based on objective way of thinking, the luminous, though it illuminates them all, is beyond the world of their function. Here lies the limitation of experience in describing the witness-self which is beyond the world of experiences. *By the use of the terms 'transcendental' and 'beyond' we do not mean utter-void or some existence belonging to a world separate from the world of spirit. These terms are used in the text only to indicate the limitation of our knowledge, acquired by the knowing process, in knowing the witness-consciousness which as the basis of cognition and the intellect (buddhi) itself is ubiquitously given as their illuminating principle. It is witness not because it witnesses itself as there is no such need for a principle which by nature is witness. It is witness only because it witnesses the experiences of the objective or relative and conditioned world of subjects-and-objects comprising changes, defects and other limitations presented before it.* The witness is not an experience as a mental outcome because a witness is independent awareness itself (*tatastha*) and is non-attached from any activity of the intellect, object of the intellect and the intellect itself. Philosophically, it is not an object:

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empirical or transcendental : subject or object : but pure awareness itself by nature. Philosophical reflection as cognitive activity par excellence comes to the pure awareness not only by inference or implication as the ontological substratum of all cognitive activities but as self-proved or given prinicple of all awareness i.e., awareness itself which is described by the text as truth and bliss also.

NOTES

1 . A detailed discussion on the disinterested knowledge under the topic entitled "Possibility of disinterested knowledge: A Bhartrharian approach "by the same author is published in JICPR Vol XV : no3, 1998, pp 47-67.

2. So far the concept of Sākṣī as an ontological concept is concerned, we suggest those interested in ontological and axiological aspects of Sākṣī-Caitanya to go through the scholarly works, entitled 'Concept of Sākṣī in Advaita Vedānta, by A.K. Chatterji and R.R.Dravid published by Banaras Hindu University. 1979 And also Karl Potter's Encyclopaedia of Indian philosophy, Vol-III 1981.

3. Kath-up. 12 1-8

4. Sarva Vyavahāra Śūnya.

5. Parañci Khāni Vyatṛnat svamibhūh tasmātparānpasyati nāntarātman. Kaṭhopaniṣad. 211

6. Naiṣā tarkena matirāpaneya. Kathopanisad 129 As there is nothing similar to Sākṣī-Caitanya and as there is no possibility of its sensory perception there is no possibility of inference of it.

7. In Vedānta, the nature, function and relevance of allegories, myths, parables and anaology in understanding the trans-empirical experiences is a very wide issue and needs an independent research work.

8. The analogy of the three states of waking, dreaming and sleeping is found in the older Upaniṣads. See, Brh up, 439-38. Praśna.up. Caturthapraśnottara.

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9. A number of philosophers. psychologists and scientists have tried to solve the most peturbing problem of experience in sleeping (susupti). To me, philosophical solution to this problem seems stisfactory. According to the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta, in sleep, the senses. the vital air (Prāṇa) and the mind are not at work though they are not dead. One gets rid of all experiences of waking and dreaming but he is neither dead nor liberated as he comes back to dream or to waking. How can his experience 'I slept without any object to disturb' be explained? Two fold solution of the problem is given by the text. According to first-particular experiences of particularities and universalities are the factors which disturb us in waking and dreaming and as consciousness in susupti (sleep) pervades the whole body in form of a different experience universal in nature and void of all particularities one is not disturbed in sleep. 'yadāmanodavāgnivadaviśeṣa vijñaua rūpeṇa kṛtam śarīram vyapyavatiṣṭhate tadā susupto bhavati 'Praśna. Upśaṇkara bhāṣya 4/6. According to the second, the senses, the object-consciousness and the self-consciousness are at rest in sleep. There is only concealment and not projection of ignorance in sleep. The stopping of projecting activities of I-ness for the time being keeps him close to his real nature that is witness-self which is beyond all disturbances where all disturbing factors lying dormant and unmanifested. When I-ness gets back to waking from sleeping only then it involves itself in its activities of object consciousness and self-consciousness and then it comes to know the sleeping experiences (aham sukham syāpsam) by presumption (arthāpatti) and non-apprehension of waking and sleeping experiences. (anupalabdhi).

10. Brh.Up.4/3/19

11. Scientific Temper and Advaita Vedānta, R.R.Pandey, P.61, Sureshonmesh Prakashana Varanasi, 1991.

12. Bhartṛhari's view of Sabda-Brahman as the self luminous and illuminating principle, has been discussed in great detail and clarity in an unpublished project entitled 'Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of Language' under the General Fellowship award, ICPR, 1994-96 by the same author.

13. For Bhartṛhari's view of difference between cognition itself and the cognition

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of the objects see my paper entitled 'Cognition, Being and Possibility of Expressions; A Bhartrharian Approach' JICPR VOl. XIV.No.1 p.89, 1996 and "JICPR Vol.XV NO.3,p.55,1998.

14. Iṣṭasiddhi p.61.

15. Yato vāconivartanteaprāpya manasā saḥ Tai.Up. 2/4/1.

16. Brh.up 4/3/23.

17. If Pramātā in the context of these statements is taken as knower (self-conscious being), it will not be self-luminous to which difference of Pramātā and Pramātr is not applicable as it is pure knowledge itself void of all difference. The term knower' is relative to what it knows and a knower is knower only when it knows. The text only says that the Dṛṣti of knower is perpetual and it is the specific mention of drsti in the text as perpetual that I have taken the term dṛṣṭi for knowledge itself analogous to the uses like Jivasya caitanyam' in which jīva is transient while caitanyam (consciousness) is perpetual.

18. Ibid 4/3/30,32.

19. Ch.up 7/23/1.

20. Mu.up 3/2/9.

21. Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophy Vol. III. K. Potter's summary of Naiskarmasiddhi book 2. Stanza 74-96,p.540.

22. Tamevabhāntamanubhāti Sarvam Tasya bhāsā Sarvamidam Vibhāti, Kath. Up. 2/2/15.

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STRAWSON ON PRESUPPOSITION

AMIT KUMAR SEN

I

P.F.Strawson develops his theory of Presupposition mainly, in two places namely in the paper 'On Referring, published in 1950 and in the book *'Introduction to Logical Theory'* published in 1952. In 'On Referring' Strawson gives a general characterisation of the theory of presupposition by analysing his 'Use Theory of meaning', But in *Introduction to Logical Theory* Strawson defines and explains his notion of presupposition and contrasts it with the notion of entailment. In 'On Referring' Strawson's, objective was to criticise Russell's Theory of Description'. In fact, Russell's philosophical ideas have been the main target of attack amongst Oxford logicians who see in those ideas the source of Germanic American formalization which they deeply mistrust. The locus classicus is Strawson's 'On Referring', an attack on the sacred doctrine of formalists. But in *Introduction to Logical Theory* Strawson's objective was simply to defend the laws of traditional logic from the clutches of self-contradiction they involve.

In 1950 Strawson's theory of presupposition emerges from the criticism of Russell's Theory of Description and so it is convenient to begin with Russell. Russell made, inter alia, the following claims in [1] that:

(1) 'The present king of France is bald' is logically analysable into three propositions, namely :

a) at least one person is the king of France;

b) at most one person is the king of France; and

c) whoever is the king of France is bald.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 1&2
January - April 2000.

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(2) The relation between 'The King of France is bald' and 'There is a King of France' is one of entailment, and

(3) When the entailed proposition is false, the entailing proposition is false In his 'On Referring' Strawson introduces the following distinctions:

A1) A sentence

A2) A use of a sentence.

A3) An utterance of a sentence

Similarly he distinguishes :

B1) An expression

B2) A use of an expression

B3) An utterance of an expression.

On the basis of the above distinction Strawson concludes that (1) 'The present King of France is bald' presupposes that there is a king of France and asserts that he is bald, (2) the relation between the statements 'The present king of France is bald' and 'there is a king of France' is the relation of presupposition and not of entailment as Russell thought and (3) if there is no king of France to refer to, the statement 'The king of France is bald' is neither true nor false and not false as Russell thought. Thus, presupposition is opposed to entailment. The reason behind Strawson's conclusion lies, in his view. "The same expression can have different mentioning use, as the same sentence can be used to make statements with different truth values. 'Mentioning' or 'referring' is not something an expression does; it is something that someone can use an expression to do. 'Mentioning', or 'referring to', something is a characteristic of a use an expression just as 'being about' something, and truth or falsity, are characteristics of a use of a sentence". (Strawson[2]). Viewed in the light of the above remarks of Strawson we may say that the problem which gave rise to Russell-Strawson controversy is as old as the history of philosophy. How can we refer to or talk about that which does not exist? This question is raised in the past when

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philosophers had tried to explain and analyse the differene between the significance of a term and what it stands for. In other words," is the meaning or significance of a term always the thing or person referred to by means of it?" If the answer to this question is in affirmative, then meaning is reference and hence 'I met a unicorn' which is meaningful must refer to something. For example, Meinong argued in the following way: let the sentence 'The king of France is bald' be called S.

1) The king of France is the subject of S

2) To say 1) is to say that S is about the king of France.

3) If S is about the king of France then it is true only if the king of France is bald and it is false only if the king of France is not bald.

4) But 2) and 3) could not be true unless there were a king of France.

5) Therefore, if S is significant there must be an object named the king of France. Russell's theory of description is an attempt to show how S can be significant even though its referring expression does not refer to anything, that is, even though there is not now a king of France.

We should note that neither Strawson nor Russell is prepared to say that S is not significant. Russell wants to say that S is significant because it really states a proposition that is quite different from the proposition that it appears to state. When we unpack such a sentence, we find that it really is a series of conjoined propositions that are being asserted and that this series of conjoined propositions is meaningful even though it is often seen to be false. On the other hand according to Strawson while the sentence itself has meaning, only use of it can be said to mention or to refer and to be true or false. Where the context of utterance justifies its use, the question of its reference or its truth arises but where the context of ulterance does not justify its use, those questions do not arise at all. Russell holds that sentences are either true or false, or meaningless. But Strawson holds that sentences by themselves are either meaningful or meaningless. They need however, to be used by someone to say what is true or false. It is not sentences but statements uttered in a context which are true or false.

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To Russell, a meaningful sentence is either true or false, whereas to Strawson it is not so. Strawson holds that a sentence could be meaningful even though a particular use of it is neither true nor false. Meaning, according to Strawson, is the function of an expression of Mentioning, referring and truth or falsity are the functions of the use of an expression of a sentence. To give the meaning of a sentence is to give general direction for its use which follows "the rules, habit and conventions" of the language. Thus Strawson is careful to say that it is not his view that S is meaningless. Rather his idea is that the use of a sentence in an act of asserting presupposes the success of another act i.e. referring which we perform in order to go on to assert. That is, in order to assert that a predicate applies to the subject of a sentence we must first refer to the subject. If the subject term lacks a referrent this presupposed act of referring fails, and as a result the attempt to assert cannot succeed. This is the case with the presumed use of S as an attempt at asserting. Since there is no king of France now, the attempt to assert now that the present king of France has any predicate e.g. is bald, is neither true nor false since the presupposed act of referring fails.

II

In [3] Strawson develops his doctrine of presupposition from a different angle. Here he tries to defend the traditional logic. In traditional logic general propositions both universal and particular, that is A,E,I and O propositions are considered as categorical. A categorical proposition is that which involves unconditional assertion, that which is amenable to a sucject-predicate analysis and in which a certain predicate is unconditionally ascribed to a certain subject. Thus a categorical proposition is contrasted with a conditional or hypothetical proposition which involves a conditional predicate.

The view of the traditional logicians that all general propositions are categorical enabled them to set up a relationship between four kinds of general propositions in their theory of opposition of proposition. Again an important feature of a categorical proposition is that it has existential import with respect to its subject term which means existence of the object denoted by the subject term is a necessary condition for the truth of the proposition.

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So in traditional logic all forms of general propositions have existential import.

Thus in traditional logic both the theory of existential import of propositions and the theory of opposition of propositions are accepted. But it is very easy to see that both the theories cannot be maintained together. If the A proposition: 'All angels are beautiful', the E proposition" 'No angels, are beautiful', the I proposition: 'Some angels are beautiful' and the O proposition: 'Some angels are not beautiful' all have existential import which means existence of the object denoted by the subject terms is the necessary condition for the truth of the proposition, all of them become false because the class of angels is an empty class. Under such circumstan es, A and O, and E and I cease to be contradictories and I and O cease to be subcontraries. Here we find the self contradictory character of the traditional logic.

In modern standard predicate logic A and E propositions are interpreted as hypothetical and carry no existential commitment, but I and O propositions are interpreted as categorical and carry esistential commitment. Thus modern logician differs from the traditional only in respect of A and E propositions but hold the same opinion with the traditional logicians in respect of I and O proposition. In modern standard predicate logic A proposition is treated as hypothetical and so it can be true when both the antecedent and the consequent are true or when the antecedent is false. "(x) $(\theta x \supset \psi x)$" this form of A proposition is true when the (x which are $(\theta)$are also (ψ) when no x is (θ). If there is at least one x which is (θ) but not (ψ) then "(X) $(\theta x \supset \psi x)$' this form of A proposition is false. In other words, if "$(\exists x)$ $(\theta x \,\&\, \sim \psi x)$" is true, then A proposition is false. This is why the precise form of A proposition in modern standard predicate logic is $\sim(\exists x)$ $(\theta x \,\&\, \sim \psi x)$". Similarly "$(X)$ $(\theta x \supset \sim \psi x)$" this form of E proposition is true when the x which are θ are also not ψ or when no x is θ . If there is at least one x which is θ and also ψ then"(X) $(\theta x \supset \sim \psi x)$" this form of proposition is false. In other words, if "$(\exists x)$ $(\theta x \,\&\, \psi x)$" is true, then E proposition is false. This is why the precise form of E proposition in modern standard predicate logic is $\sim(\exists x)$ $(\theta x \,\&\, \psi x)$.

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Modern logicians as we have told earlier hold the same opinion with traditional logicians in respect of I and O propositions. So the form of I and O propositions in modern predicate logic is "$(\exists x)\ (\theta\ x\ \&\ \psi\ x)$" and "$(\exists x)\ (\theta\ x\ \&\ \sim\ \psi\ x)$" respectively. Modern logicians' interpretation of A,E,I, O proposition saves contradictory opposition between A and O, and E and I but at the cost of contrary, subcontrary and subalternation. We have seen above the precise form of A and E propositions as $\sim(\exists x)\ (\theta\ x\ \&\ \sim\ \psi\ x)$". and $\sim(\exists x)\ (\theta\ x\ \&\ \psi\ x)$ respectively which are contradictory to "$(\exists x)\ (\theta\ x\ \&\ \sim\ \psi\ x)$" and "$(\exists x)\ (\theta\ x\ \&\ \psi\ x)$", that is O and I form of proposition respectively. Thus contradictory relation is maintained in Modern standard predicate logic. Let us see why contrary, subcontrary and subalternation relation cannot be maintained in modern standard predicate logic. In modern standard predicate logic both the propositions. 'All angels are beautiful' and 'No angels are beautiful' are true because angel is an empty class and in the case of hypothetical or conditional proposition which has no existential commitment if the subject term is empty, the proposition would be true. And if both the above propositions are true, they are not contrary. Again both the propositions 'Some angels are beautiful' and 'Some angels are not beautiful' are false becaue angel is an empty class and in the case of categorical proposition which carries existential commitment if the subject term is empty, the proposition would be false. And if both the above propositions are false, they are not subcontrary. Since ' All angels are beautiful' has no existential commitment (it rather denies existence) but 'Some angels are beautiful' does have it (as it asserts the same), A proposition does not entail the I proposition and the same is true in the case of E and O. Hence subalternation does not hold. With the rejection of subalternation, conversion by limitation and the strengthened syllogisms viz; DARAPTI, FELAPTON, BRAMANTIP and FESAPO become invalid.

Now we are in a dilemma. Strawson puts it in this way : "Either the A and E forms have existential import or they do not. If they do, one set of laws has to be sacrificed as invalid, if they do not, another set has to go" (Strawson [3] page 165). Strawson's line of thinking is that the laws of traditional logic are rooted in the ordinary use of human language and so

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these laws are to be saved. Interpretation of existential import in traditional logic annihilates, as we have seem, contradictory and sub-contrary relations. Again, interpretation of existential import in modern standard predicate logic annihilates, we have seen, contrary sub-contrary and subalternation relation but only saves, contradictory relation. According to Strawson interpretation of existential import of categorical proposition is to be given in such a way that all the laws of traditional logic can be preserved and for this purpose he offered two solutions, a formalistic solution, an ad hoc patching up, as he calls it and a realistic solution (Strawson [3])

Strawson felt that the existential interpretation of all the four forms of A,E,I,O propositions given in traditional logic could save more laws of traditional logic than the modern interpretation could do. So he decided to save the laws of traditional logic by improving upon the former. The main shortcoming of existential interpretation was that it failed to maintain contradictory relation between A and O, and E and I and also subcontrary relation between I and O.

In order to make A andO, E and I contradictories Strawson suggested a mere formal interpretation of I andO. He argues : contradictory of ~P & Q is P V ~Q. So the contradictory of A proposition which can be expressed in existential interpretation as ~ (∃x) (fx &~ gx) & (∃x) (fx) must be (∃x) (fx & ~ gx) V ~ (∃x) (fx). Similarly, the contradictory of E proposition which can be expressed in existential interpretation as ~ (∃x) (fx & gx) & (∃x) (fx) must be (∃x) (fx & gx) v ~ (∃x) (fx). Now, when translated, the four forms of A,E,I, O stands thus :

f A g : ~ (∃x) (fx & ~ gx) & (∃x) (fx) [It is not the case that there is at least one thing which is f but not g though something is f]

f E g ~ (∃x) (fx & gx) & (∃x) (fx) [It is not the case that there is at least one thing which is both f and g though something is f]

f I g : (∃x) (fx & gx) v ~ (∃x) (fx) [Either there is at least one thing which is both f and g or nothing is f]

f O g : (∃x) (fx & ~gx) v ~ (∃x) (fx) [Either there is at least one thing

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which is f but not g or nothing is f]

This manoeuvre, according to Strawson, not only saves the contradictory relation but also the law that I and O are subcontraries without sacrificing any law of the square of opposition in traditional logic. Strawson, however, points out that this new formulations fail to work in simple conversion of E and I propositions. Let us see why. In new formulation E reads as: ~ (∃x) (fx & gx) & (∃x) (fx) which leaves open the possibility of 'g' being an empty class i.e, the denial of existence of 'x' belonging to 'g' or ~ (∃x) (gx) is consistent with this interpretation of f E g but not with its simple converse g E f i. e, ~ (∃x) (gx & fx) & (∃x) (fx). Similarly, (∃x) (gx) & ~ (∃x) (fx) is consistent with f I g i. e, (∃x) (fx & gx) v ~ (∃x) (fx) but not with its converse g I f i.e, (∃x) (gx & fx) v ~ (∃x) (gx). Thus, according to Strawson, the reason for the break down of the new formulation in the few cases is their lack of symmetry. So he proposes his formalistic interpretation as follows in which term-symmetry is added to all the A,E,I,O Propositions:

f A g ~ (∃x) (fx & ~ gx) & (∃x) (fx) & (∃x) (~ gx)

f Eg ~ (∃x) (fx & gx) & (∃x) (fx) & (∃x) (gx)

f I g (∃x) (fx & gx) v ~ (∃x) (fx) v ~ (∃x) (gx)

f O g (∃x) (fx & ~ gx) v ~ (∃x) (fx) v ~ (∃x) (~ gx)

For this interpretation Strawson claims all the laws of traditional logic hold good together and this he regards as the formalistic solution to the problem of the square of opposition which over-throws the orthodox criticism of traditional logic by modern standard predicate logic. An important characteristic of this interpretation is that I and O are no more existential propositions. They no more categorically claim the existence of members in the class denoted by their subject term ' f '. Both I and O propositions being formulated disjunctively, become true if their second disjunct ~ (∃x) (fx) is true. In other words, they are true even if 'f' is a null class i.e, there exists no member in the 'f' class. Thus while modern standard predicate logic gives a non-existential interpretation of A and E forms and preserve the existential meaning of I and O forms with traditional logic, Strawson gives an existential

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interpretation of A and E forms and non-existential interpretation of I and O forms. In respect of A and E he opposes modern standard predicate logic and in respect of I and O he opposes both modern standard predicate logic and traditional logic.

Though Strawsin claims that all the laws of traditional logic hold good together in his formalistic interpretation, he fails to see that the law of Identity is hostile to his interpretation. An expression of the law of Identity, 'All barren women's sons are barren women's sons can be symbolised in Strawson's formalistic interpretation as ~ (∃x) (Bx & ~ Bx) & (∃x) (Bx) & (∃x) (~ Bx). Here the second disjunct (∃x) (Bx) which means there is at least one thing which is barren women's son is certainly false and so is the entire proposition. But the proposition all barren women's sons are barren women's son expresses law of Identity which can not be false.

Secondly instead of proving that the meaning of A and E are respectively contradictory to the meaning of O and I Strawson tries to find out the formulations which would be contradictory to A and E and calls them translation of O and I.

Thirdly, Strawson proposes to save the laws of traditional logic by his formalistic interpretation because these laws are rooted in common human language and based on ordinary speech of common man. But that his formalistic interpretation does not entertain the ordinary speech of common man can be shown by considering translation of E proposition. According to Strawson, the E proposition 'No figure is a square circle 'is translated as ~ (∃x) (fx & sx) & (∃x) fx & (∃x) sx which reads as 'there is no thing which is both a figure and a square circle though there is at least one thing which is a square circle'. But when we say 'No figure is a square circle 'we never assert in ordinary speech that there are certain things which are square as well as circle.

To preserve the laws of traditional logic Strawson's realistic solution came in the wake of his formalistic. Solution is based upon the belief that interpretation of A,E,I,O forms need not be in explicitly existential terms. In developing his realistic solution Strawson holds that one cannot normally or

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poperly say 'All John's children are asleep' unless he believes that John has children. If John has no children we cannot say anything about the truth value of the statement 'All John's children are alseep'. In other words, according to Strawson, if John has no children, the question of truth or falsity of the statement 'All John's children are asleep' does not arise. The truth or falsity of the statement may be said to presuppose the existence of John's children, such that if John has no child, the statement is neither true nor false. The existence of John's children thus, "is a necessary precondition not merely of the truth of what is said' but of its truth or falsity". (Strawson [3] 174.)

This concept of presuppostion has to be very carefully distinguished from the concept of entailment. If the truth of a statement entails the existence of something, the statement may be said to be positively existential and have existential commitment. If the truth of a statement does not entail the existence of anything the statement may be said to be negatively existential and has no existential commitment. But if the truth or falsity of the statement entails existence; then the statement presupposes existence. The last implies that if the class denoted by the subject term of a statement be a null class, then the statement would have no truth value and be pointless. According to Strawson all forms of general propositions have existential presupposition and none of them are positively existential or negatively existential. The effect of these different interpretations on the truth value of A,E,I,O propositions about empty class can be seen at a glance in the following table:

Statements about empty class :

	A	E	I	O
Traditional Logic	F	F	F	F
Modern Standard Predicate Logic	T	T	F	F
Strawson's Formalistic View	F	F	T	T
Strawson's Realistic View	Pointless	Pointless	Pointless	Pointless

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This table shows that both the modern and the Strawsonian formalistic views revise traditional view in mutually opposite ways. But the difference between Strawson's realistic view and the three others is more basic. According to the three other views, the non-existence of members in the subject class does not deprive a general proposition of its truth value but according to Strawson's realistic view, it does. If there is no members in the subject class, A,E,I,O forms of proposition lose their truth value and become pointless in realistic view since according to it the existence of members in the subject class is a necessary precondition for any statement to be either true or false. This view sympathetically revises the traditional view. While according to the traditional view all propositions entail the existence of such members according to Strawson's realistic view, they only presuppose their existence. To quote Strawson "...If a statement S presuppose a statement S' in the sense that the truth of S' is a precondition of the truth or falsity of S, then of course there will be a kind of logical absurdity in conjoining S with the denial of S'....But we must distinguish this kind of logical absurdity from straight forward self-contradiction. It is self contradictory to conjoin S with the denial of S' if is a necessary condition of truth simply of S. It is a different kind of logical absurdity to cojoin S with the denial of S' if s' is a necessary condition of the truth or falsity of S. The relation between S and S' in the first case is that S entails S'. We need a different name for the relation between S and S' in the second case, let us say, as above, S presupposes S' " (Strawson [3] page 175)

III

Thus according to Strawson entailment is a relation between sentences such that the truth of the entailed sentence necessarily follows from the truth of the entailing sentence. A sentence S will entail a sentence S' If when S is true, S' must also be true. It is, therefore, not possible to assert the truth of S and deny the truth of S'. This relation of entailment can be formulated differently as the truth of S' is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the truth of S ; whereas the truth of S is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the truth of S'. For example, the statement made by uttering' this is a mango' (S) entails the statement made by uttering 'this is a fruit' (S') since if

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S is true S' must be (demonstrating the sufficiency of the truth of S for the truth of S'). On the other hand, S' is to be, though this does not itself gurantee the truth of S demonstrating the necessity of the truth of S' for the truth of S. It follows from this defining conditions that if S' is false then S must also be false. However, if S is false S' can be either true or false.

Presupposition differs from entailment in two ways: the consequence of S being false and the consequence of S' being false. For S to presuppose S', the truth of S' must follow from the truth of S but if S' is false then S will have no truth value at all. If follows from this that if S is false S' must be true. Like entailment then, for a presupposition relation to hold between two statements the truth of S' must be a necessary condition of the truth of S and conversely the truth of S must be a sufficient condition of the truth of S'. But in addition, the truth of S' must also be a necessary condition of the falsity of S, and conversely, the falsity of S must be sufficient condition for the truth of S'. 'All John's children are asleep' is said to presuppose John has children since, as Strawson argues, one determines the truth or falsity of this statement by assuming the existence of John's children and by assuming on the basis of this assumption whether or not they are asleep. If John has no children, then the statement 'All John's children are alseep' is neither true nor false. It follows from this that John's children are not asleep (which asserts the falsity of 'All John's children are asleep) is also said to be either true or false only if John has children. If John has no children it is said to be just as odd to say John's children are not asleep as it is to say 'All Johns children are alseep'. As Strawson said the question of whether these statements are true or false does not arise if John has no children. The difference between entailment and presupposition is summariesed as follows:

Entailment			*Presupposition*		
S		S'	S		S'
T	⟶	T	T	⟶	T
F	⟵	F	~(T V F)	⟵	F
F	⟶	T v F	F	⟶	T

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Why Strawson had introduced the notion of presuppostiion is an obvious question in the reflective mind. One of the general theses of Strawson is that in a realistic study of the logic of ordinary speech we have to "Think in many more dimensions than that of entailment and contradiction, and use many more tools of analysis besides those which belong to formal logic. (Strawson [3] P 213). The notion of presupposition, according to Strawson, is to be one of the additional concepts required. Hence Strawson's notion of presupposition can be viewed as an attempt to establish that by formal logic alone, we cannot see realistically the logical relation between statements like 'All John's children are asleep' and 'John has children'. Suppose, Strawson argues, by applying the apparatus of formal logic we try to describe the logical relation between these two statements. The statement 'All John's children are asleep' can be interpreted in two ways: as an instance of the statement form: (1) (X) (Fx $\supset$ Gx) or as an instance of (2) (X) (Fx $\supset$ Gx) & ($\exists$x) Fx. While the statement 'John has children' is an instance of ($\exists$x) Fx. If we take the first interpretation, then the falsity of the statement 'John has children' is the sufficient condition of the truth of 'All John children' are asleep'. If we take the second interpretation then the falsity of the statement 'John has children' is the sufficient condition of the falsity of 'All John's children are asleep'. Thus the use of formal logic "forces us to conclude that the non-existence of any children of John's is sufficient to determine the truth or falsity of the general statement", whereas "the more realistic view seems to be that the existence of children of John's is a necessary precondition not merely of the truth of what is said but of its being either true or false". (Strawson [3] P. 174). By saying it is more realistic view, Strawson means that it conforms more closely to what "we normally should say" in such a case, namely, that "since John has no children, the question does not arise". (Strawson [3] P 174)

The above argument appeals to what we 'normally should say' in order to show that a realistic logic will use the notion of presupposition. In later contexts, Strawson argues that using only the apparatus of formal logic, a logician finds himself committing a kind of linguistic outrage. Thus he objects as follows to the first interpretation according to which, for example

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someone who says 'There is not a single book in his room which is not by an English author' has made a true statement, in case there are no books, at all in the room.

"So it is that if someone, with a solemn face, says 'There is not a single foreign book in his room' and then later reveals that there are no books in the room at all, we have the sense, not of having been lied to, but of having been made the victim of a sort of linguistic outrage. Of Course he did not say there were any books in the room, so he has not said anything false. Yet what he said gave us the right to assume that there were, so he has misled us." (Strawson [3]P 178)

Strawson made a similar charge against the second interpretation where, for example, the statement 'He will die in the course of the next two months' would be considered to include the statement 'He is now living' and hence false in case he is not now living. Thus if someone says,'He will die in the course of the next two months' it is linguistically outrageous to reply 'No, he won't and then give as one's reason 'He is dead already'. If the event has already taken place, the question whether it will take place within the next two months or not is a question which does not arise. 'He is dead already' disputes the presupposition that his death lies in the future, that he is not dead already. But it does not contradict the original statement since to do this would be to admit its presupposition; and hence does not contrdict anything entailed by the original statement." (Strawson [3] P 213)

Thus Strawson argues, either the first interpretation or the second leads us to commit outrages when we are dealing with ordinary statements. In the case of original example we would be forced to say either 'you are right in saying that all John's children are asleep, because he has no children' or 'you are wrong in saying that all John's children are asleep because he has no children'. To avoid this, Strawson concludes we should enrich our logical vocabulary by bringing in the notion of presupposition.

An important outcome of Strawson's theory of presupposition is the recognition of the logic with value gaps. In Strawson's opinion if the statement John has children (S') is false i.e, if John has no children, then the

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statement 'All John's children are asleep' (S) is neither true nor false or the question of its truth or falsity, as Strawson phrases it, does not arise at all. Strawson, Quine says, 'exploits this idea in a detailed defense of the traditional syllogistic logic apropos of the famous question, raised by Leibnitz and others, of existential import'. (W.V.Quine [4]). Strawson's method is to construe the categorical forms of propositions, of traditional logic, in such a way that where a term is empty of extension the question of the truth of the containing categorical statement does not arise. He argues that this view does justice to ordinary language.

A substanital off shoot of Strawson's notion of truth value gaps is a theory expounded earlier in (Strawson [2]) in which he made a distinction between the referential role and the predicative role of a singular term. Normally, if the role of a singular term in a given statement is referential, the question of truth or falsity of the statement does not arise in case the purported object of the term is non-existent. Since modern formal logic closes all such truth value gaps, there is nothing in that logic to correspond to the referential role of terms.

NOTES

(1) B. Russell - On Denoting, *Mind*, 1905,

(2) P.F.Strawson - On Referring, *Mind* Vol-59, 1905

(3) P. F. Strawson - *Introduction to Logical Theory.* (Methuen & Com. London, 1952.)

(4) W.V.Quine - Mr. Strawson on Logical Theory, *Mind,* Oct. 1953.

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3. B. Russell- *My Philosophicl Development* (New York : Simon & Schuster, 1959.

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WHY "BEING-FOR-OTHERS"?

BHAGAT OINAM

In the later part of Sartre's play *In Camera*, where the three characters are locked in a room, the male occupant Garcin cries out--*L'enfer c'est les autres*, menaing whereby "Hell is the Other". That each of these personages is trapped eternally in moral and erotic impasses from which none is able to allow any of the other to escape.[1] Precisely speaking, each one of us is posited in a similar situation in our own worlds. And so did Jean Paul Sartre voiced the phenomenon through his character, Garcin. In fact, "other" plays a formidable role in the philosophy of Sartre.

While exploring Sartre, one of the questions that predominantly emerges on the problem of "other" is --if "other" is an off-shoot of the *self*, or is entirely an independent category. If the former is true, then *Being-for-others* is bound to be a subsidiary development of *Being-for-itself*. In case "other" is distinct and different from *self*, then *Being-for-others* is a separate and exhaustive category. Interestingly, *Being-for-others* is made a separate category by Sartre, yet it is an extension of *Being-for-itself*. The third proposition denies the validity of the first two hypothesis taken in their exclusivity.

In this paper, I propose to explore the grounds for the development of *Being-for-others* as a separate category by Sartre. Let me therefore begin with the question-Why *Being-for-others* is necessary for the formulation of any human relationship?

Sartre's characters in the *In Camera* is the symbolic representation of the world in which we are living. The problem of love, hate and conflict as shown in the play is what we face ourselves in the multitude of persons. "Other" is shown always as a threat to my existence. The most intriguing paradox is that on the one hand, one is always being watched by suspicious

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 1&2
January April 2000.

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eyes and there is a tendency in each one of us to escape the look of the other, yet on the other hand, one cannot live in total isolation all by oneself. The example of Robinson Crusoe, as expounded by many, can be contested on the ground that while living in isolation he has to visualise the possible existence of an "other", in formulating and reformulating rules for his own living.

I

Satare's distinction between *Being-for-itself* (non-conscious) and *Being-for-itself* (conscious) finds foundation in consciousness. In addition to these two, he coins the new term, *Being-for-others.* This is a further classification of the "conscious". Why is this further classification? Putting aside the view that humans are different form non-humans (or to put it in Sartrean termonology, as conscious beings are different from non-conscious beings), what finds significance is that there are differences between "I" and the "other" (between/among conscious beings). I do not know if the other exists and thinks in the same way as I do. My subjectivity is accessible to me and the other's subjectivity is accessible to the other. There is always a gap between I and the other, hence a need for a distinction between the two.

I do not perceive other's consciousness, yet I behave as if other has consciousness. It may be a fact that other is conscious, too. But we have to find good reasons to believe that other is a conscious being as much as I am. To follow Cartesian doubt-if at all there is anything of which we cannot doubt it is the existence of the mind as a substance. For Sartre, distinction between mind and consciousness is redundant, nor does he agree with the distinction between body and mind- the body being an extended substance and mind being the thinking substance. Nor does he speak of consciousness per se, for consciousness is always as embodied consciousness. He also rejects the realists' view that there are no difficulties in other's existence to the extent that realism takes everything including the existence of the other as "given and doubtless".[2] If I see everything as given without any doubt, then I can also perceive my consciousness, my body, other's body, and other's consciousness distinctly. In that case, it would mean clubbing together substances/ideas which are ontologically different and incompatible. Con-

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sciousness cannot be perceived in the same way as body is perceived. While body can be perceived as (inanimate) object, consciousness cannot be perceived without embodiment. This argument also denies dualism of Cartesian kind where consciousness (mind) and body are seen as two separate substances. As Sartre avers:

> If the souls are separated by their bodies, they are distinct as this inkwell is distinct from this book; that is, we can not conceive of the immediate presence of the one in the other. And even if we admit that my soul can be immediately present in the other's body, I will have to overcome all the density of a body before I touch his soul. Therefore, if realism bases its certitude upon the presence "in person" of the spatial-temporal thing in my consciousness, it can not lay claim to the same evidence for the reality of the other's soul since by this very admission, the other's soul does not give itself, "in person" to mine. It is an absence, a meaning; the body points to it without delivering it.[3]

Unperceivability of consciousness in isolation, here, does not mean the kind of inconceivability of the noumenal relity as propounded by Kant. For Sartre, the distinction between noumenal and phenomenal realities is superfluous. This distinction is based on the assumption that for any perceivable object, there is an inner or true reality which is imperceivable. This makes the objects we preceive as mere images, an illusion. Unperceivability of consciousness is not like that of perceiving an illusory image but of conceiving a *function.* Consciousness is not a substantival or perceivable substance, it is merely an operational notion- a function.

Similarly, when we speak of "pain", it is not like perceiving the phenomenon "pain", and some *real* "pain" hiding behind this phenomenon. Pain is not a perceivable object. It is inferred from some perceivable phenomena like say, yelling, crying, etc., though these phenomena by themselves are not pain. For example, I see a stone falling over the foot of my friend. Then I hear him yelling. I see a change in his expression; his eyes closing, mouth widely open and his hands holding the foot. Then I say that he is writhing in pain. What I perceive is series of happenings and also

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different bodily gestures performed in a stretch. But where is the pain? It is like Ryle's "where is the university?". If we put them,i.e. "pain" and "yelling" in the same footing or category, we commit the fallacy of *Category mistake.* Yelling is not pain, nor closing the eyes, nor writhing. Idea of pain is derived out of this "yelling", "closing of eyes" and "writhing". I quote Sartre for clarification:

> In the first place the appearance of the Other in my experience is manifested by the presence of organized forms such as gestures and expression, acts and conducts.
>
> These organized forms refer to an organizing unity which on principle is located outside of our experience. The Other's anger, in so far as it appears to his inner sense and is by nature refused to my apperception, gives the meaning and is perhaps the cause of the series of phenomena which I apprehend in my experience under the name of expression or gestures.[4]

It is the commonality of behaviour and gestures, and unification of these impressions through consciousness that we know what we call as the feeling of the other. We come to know the other's state of mind since all of us have common forms of life. I see the gestures of my friend as similar to mine when I am in pain. I compare our gestures; his yelling, closing of eyes, writhing and holding of feet, etc. to my own when faced a similar situation. Through analogy we infer other's inner existence. "Organized forms" as stated above by Sartre, is precisely this comparison of collective experiences. But form is not experience, it is merely an idea. Experience is a *vehicle* to arrive at the state of "form".

Negation is also seen by Sartre as one of the foundation for the distinction between I and the other. ".....there is a fundamental presupposition: others are the other, that is the self which is not myself. Therefore we grasp here a negation as the constitutive structure of the *being-of-others.*"[5] I cannot be the other and the other cannot be me. It is a case of complete exteriority between the two. There is no relationship[6] between the two. the two exist in a completely different spatial frameworks. If there is any relationship

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between the two it is the relationship of nothingness. "Nothingness" does not derive its origin from myself nor from the other, nor is it a reciprocal relationship between the other and I. "On the contrary, as a primary absence of relation it is originally the foundation of all relation between the other and me."[7] The absence is because of the completeness of each body, each being exhaustive and encompassing by nature. Since bodies are extended substances and consciousness is imperceivable, I naturally see a lack of relationship between the two because extended substances are complete in themselves. Interestingly, the idea of negation is conceived by the consciousness. Without consciousness, bodies would remain as complete in themselves, incapable to bring out the idea of negation or alienation. From this negation that I am not the other and other is not me, all subsequent meanings are formulated.

Let me bring here similar concepts like shame, anguish, hate, love, etc. for further explanation. Arthur Danto invites some interesting points when he writes that we feel ashamed before someone, and because of something one is or one has done-before God or one's parents, or someone whose moral perceptions one respects and whose good opinion somehow matters. To feel ashamed is to be committed to the belief that one is not alone and the existence of others as a structure of one's consciousness is being built into the very concept.[8] One may argue against this contention by holding that one can feel ashamed of oneself, and not necessarily to others. But it must be seen that even in such a case, I may feel ashamed of myself because I imagine that others might observe me in the way I am observing myself. But my observing myself (as an object) is also influenced by the way others observe me (as an object). It is kind of vicious circle-the way others look at me and I presume others look at me. "The structure of shame is such that one who had no concept of other persons could not sensibly be supposed to feel shame; the feeling simply cannot arise except with reference to other persons."[9] As mentioned earlier, even a Robinson Crusoe who lives all alone cannot dissociate himself from the concept of other's existence. He could not so much as rise to a concept of himself as himself if he did not have this further notion of "company". To see oneself as oneself means one

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is distancing oneself as a first person, and then observing from a third person's perspective. An argument may follow that there might be a possibility of a person who throughout his life lived alone and never thought of himself as himself, i.e. not even thinking of himself as a person. In this case, he is either not a man to be able to be conscious of his own consciousness or we have to put him into an ontologically distinct category as his being cannot fall in the boundary of what we call by the term "man". It is like thinking of a creature like sphynx, or some living beings landing on earth from another planet. (In such a case, our perspective of this world will get changed in terms of an addition of a new ontological category.)

Sartre sees acts of consciousness as the foundation of not only my own world but also the other's worlds. Let me present the following three propositions: (a) my consciousnes of myself, (b) my consciousness of the other, and (c) the other's consciousness of me. It is quite obvious that (b) and (c) do not require further explanation as the phrases are self-explanatory, clearly showing the involvement of the "other". Even in case of (a), to be aware of myself as object presupposes an awareness of (c), i.e. awareness of other's awareness of me (as an object). This implies that "since I am my body, I arrive at bodily self-consciousness only when I have the concept of my body as it is for others".[10] Therefore, the "way my body appears to me" is more or less close/similar to the "way my body appears to the other". Let me also add here that the "way my body appears to the other" is close/similar to the "way other's body appears to me". In other words, my-being-for-other is synonymous to other's-being-for-me. The emergence of a new *being* (being conscious of the other) helps in the seeing of a different order than that of being conscious of mere objects and myself. Formulation of *Being-for-others* shows Sartre's commitment towards the social life and also that he is not a solipsist as many critics charged him of.

II

"The original relation of the other people with myself is to the 'look'. This is not the eyes of the other person, but something different".[11] It is true that through eyes I perceive the other. And it is also through the eyes of the other that I come to know about other's looking at me. But it is not the eyes

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alone that are seen by me, but a "look" which makes me passive, consequently turns me into an object. "Look" is something different, it is not a part of my body. I see "look" of the other as a threat to my own existence, it threatens my secutiry. I start thinking as if others have already tresopassed over my secrets. "In perceiving an eye as *looking*, I perceive myself as a possible object for that look, I lose my transparency as it were and become opaque even for myself."[12] It is however not necessary that I have to perceive suspicious eyes in order to confront a look. Even without seeing anybody in person, I may start visualising the look of the other. Supposing that I am making love to a girl in a dark corner of a park and all of a sudden hear the sound of footsteps. I may come to an abrupt halt thinking that I may get caught in the act. This shows my awareness of other's existence and my possibility of becoming an object in front of other's suspicious eyes. Further, I may indeed be caught. But on the contrary, if it were not a person, but say a dog, then I calm down thinking that my privacy is still preserved. But had it been a person, I would have felt an infringement on my privacy and would have become an object in the eyes of the person.

Look also leads to conflict. A conflict-because I try to objectify the other and other tries to objectify me. It is a reciprocal act of objectification. There is always a kind of selfish motive behind every individual. I always want that the other should consider me as a "freedom" while I treat the other as an "object". The same attitude is possessed by the other towards me out of which arises this irreconcilable conflict. Danto writes:

> My world, of which I as its centre am not a proper part, is taken from me and I am reduced to an object, become a proper part of the world of another...At this point, accordingly, a kind of logical drama begins, in which there is a spontaneous struggle for centrality and for ownership of worlds: as though I could get my world back as mine only if i can reduce him to an object in it, and he likewise with me, as though there could not be room for two foci in a single world.[13]

In fact, it is a tussle of possession, to possess the other in my world,

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and not letting myself being possessed by others in a similar way.

Beginning from the act of mere meaning-giving, man tries to create a world of his own through the act of totalization. In order to control and bring others under the fold of *his* own world, he uses "look" as a tool. In such a situation, conflict is bound to happen. Similarly because of the look of the other, I get reduced to an object and go into the fold of other's world.

But my being-object-for-him is not possible without my being-object-for-myself, i.e. my consciousness must conceive myself as an object before becoming an object for him. Danto further writes:

> I did not perceive myself as being a location in any world at all, being logically outside if looking in. I was not an object for myself. But I have become just that by recognizing that I am, or at least can be, an object for an other. This is achieved through the concept of the look.[14]

By conceding defeat to the *look* of the other, I allow my being-for-myself to be concerted into my-being-for-others. The problem of bad faith comes when I choose to become an object knowingly, for I could have avoided myself from becoming an object. It is not merely the *look* of the other that freezes me but my participation in the game of being looked at. I perceive the *look* of the other, take into consideration his *look* and choose to become an object to escape responsibility of countering the *look*. In Sartre's example, the girl who allowed herself to be seduced by her lover knowing fully the motive of her lover, yet pretending to remain like an object is in fact attempting to escape the responsibility of responding either positively or negatively to her lover. Though she does not like her body to be played with, yet she is afraid that her lover might desert her if she resists. Interestingly, in the process it is not only the girl who has become an object, but also her lover who tried to seduce her. For I disrobe others only by disrobing myself; I foreshadow and outline the other's flesh only by outlining my own flesh. So my-becoming-object-for-me is closely related to my-becoming-object-for-others or others'-becoming-object-for-me.

I have maintained above that look leads to conflict, and conflict

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subsequently leads to objectification, that is objectification of one another. Objectification is possible because both "I" and "others" are bodies (partly objects). It is because of my being body that others act upon me, similarly others as bodies that I act upon them. The body, thus, helps us in objectifying one another. The idea of objectness is the fundamental principle of an interpersonal relationship. But one thing which demands attention is that I/other can never be fully an object,i.e. I cannot be an inert object like this pen or the table. Quoting an example from Sartre, "A man passes by those branches. I see this man; I apprehend him as an object and at the same time as a man...What do I mean when I assert that this object is a man?"[15] Here I would distinguish two different acts of perception: (a) that I perceive a group of spatial-temporal things; (b) I perceive a group of spatial-temporal things besides a person. In the first case I perceive concrete inanimate objects like books, papers, and pen on my table. All these *are,* and *will be,* there, if we do not move them from their respective places. I may see them as a *totality* making myself at the centre of them or each of them separately. This is possible becaue they are inert objects (*Being-in-itself).* But in the latter case the arrangement of objects with myself at the centre is broken up because of his (other's) existence. The reason being, other can also create a totality of things including me and posit himself at the centre of the totality. My presence in his act of totalization [16] is more or less turned into an inert existence, as much as I put him when I undergo the act of totalization myself.

III

The root of objectification and conflicts lies in facticity, that is my objectivity primarily lies in my bodily presence (my facticity). "Other's existence is experienced through the fact of my objectivity."[17] My facticity as objectively given becomes meaningful only so far as the body is a conscious body. "The problem of the body and its relations with consciousness is often obscure because of the fact that while the body is from the beginning posited as a certain thing having its own laws and capable of being defined from outside, consciousness is then reached by the type of inner intuition which is peculiar to it."[18] But Sartre holds out, against this view, that body cannot be separated from consciousness, and what we

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conceive of as body is the *conscious body.*

> *Being-for-itself* must be wholly body and it must be wholly consciousness; it cannot be united with a body. Similarly being-for-others, is wholly body; there are no "psychic phenomena" there to be united with the body. There is nothing behind the body. But the body is wholly psychic.[19]

Faticity as bodily presence of a person means the *conscious bodily presence*- the totality of the two, and not addition or conglomeration of two separate substances.

Considering facticity as the ground for understanding human existence, and body as the primary means of perceiving the other, let me examine the nature of body at three possible levels:[20]

(1) My body is for myself. That is, the body-for-me.

(2) My body is for others. My body is an object in the eyes of the other (as subject).

(3) My body is for me in the eyes of others. Or, I exist for myself as a body known by others.

Taking note of the first statement "My body is for myself", it seems that "body" and "I" are different entities because of the words, "my body" and "myself". "Body" can be analysed of its existence and relationship with other things at two levels[21]; firstly, body cannot be taken in isolation. It has to have a backgorund upon which it exists, i.e. we must take into account the surrounding objects. For example; The table is at my right, The bed is beside the chair, etc. Secondly, my body is a unity of different parts. Suppose that I say, "I see a cup in front of me". It is the eyes which perceive it, my ears cannot, for each of my sense organs performs different functions. My ears can listen, my eyes have sight, tongue has taste, etc. But I can never say, "It is my eyes, and not me, which see the object". Even if I say that my eyes see a cup in front of me, I cannot mean two eyes in isolation to other organs. It is the *whole* body as a *conscious body* which is considered when I say " I see a cup in front of me." The first statement- My body is for myself-

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implies my facticity. I have to see my body first as a concrete reality. My body as the *for-itself* must exist prior to the idea of my existence/reality, and consequently, the human reality. Facticity, as to be noted, has an interesting implication for Sartre. While my existence in this world is an ontological necessity,[22] it is a contingent fact that I exist. It could have been anyone in my place or no one at all. But once my reality is founded in this world, my being-in-the-world becomes a necessity. Though my existence is contingent, yet once I exist it is a necessity.

I have so far tried to show that "My existence as a body" is "my facticity". But I do not merely see my body as for myself alone. I also see my body as it appears to others. [Refer second statement]. Similarly, I perceive other's body as an object. Here, we see two acts synonymous to one another, i.e. the way my body appears to the other and the way the other's body appears to me. They are similar because the other is also a conscious body like me. If I were in his (other's) place, I would have looked at my (present) body in the same way as he is looking at my body now. The relationship of my body to other's body is an external relationship.

But an argument may arise that if the relationship of my body to other's body is a pure relationship of exteriority, then in what way is it different from the relationship between a table and a chair. As stated earlier, there can be no relationship at all between two things if they are completely exterior to one another. There has to be something else. And that is found in *internal negation*. Sartre sees that "my connection with the other is inconceivable; if it is not an internal negation."[23] That internal negation is the mediating force, and mediation is possible because man is conscious. Thus appearance of the other's body is not the primary mode of mediation between me and the other. Existence of the other as a conscious being is apprehended prior to the involvement of the body as a *means* of mediation. Sartre writes:

> The appearance of the other's body is not therefore the primary encounter; on the contrary it is only one episode in my relations with the other and in particular in what we have described as making an object of the other. Or if you prefer, the other exists for me first and

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I apprehend him in his body subsequently. The other's body is for me a secondary structure.[24]

Further when I perceive the existence of the other, other cannot be isolated from the body. That is to say, I cannot think of Pierre without visualising Pierre as a person (as a body). To talk of body as *first* and consciousness as *later,* or consciousness as *first* and body as *later* do not make much sense. If we are talking of Pierre, we are thinking of him as a conscious body, a complete *Being-for-itself,* and not separately as a body or as a consciousness.

Finally, let me talke up the last statement- "I exist for myself as a body known by the other". It is true that I exist for myself. But that is not all. My facticity cannot ignore the other's facticity. Let me state a case of a man who is embarrassed by his own body. But he cannot be embarrassed by himself alone. "I cannot be embarrassed by my own body as I exist it. It is my body as it is for the other which embarrass me."[25] It is conceiving myself as seen and understood by others. In our practical life, each one of us, to a large extent, see ourselves more or less in the light of what others conceive or would conceive of us. That is seeing ourselves in the light of others' perception of us.

To conclude, I have tried here to present three ontological levels of human relationships as perceived between "I" and "others". To talk of human reality is to conceive the bodily existence. Before establishing any kind of interpersonal relationship, we must first assume the notion of facticity. My bodily presence is not for myself alone. I become an object in the eyes of others and similarly the other becomes an object in my eyes. This leads to my seeing myself as an object as visualised/imagined through the eyes of the other. These are the ontological dimensions which I see as grounds for understanding an interpersonal relationships-and subsequently the reason for the formulation of *Being-for-others,* as a separate category like *Being-for-itself.*

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NOTES

1. Arthur Danto, *Sartre*, Fontana, 1975,p.105. Henceforth, it will be known as *SRT.*
2. J.P.Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, tr. H.E.Barnes, Washington Square Press, 1966, p.303. Henceforth, it will be known as *BN.*
3. *BN*,p.304.
4. *BN*,p.307.
5. *BN*,p.312.
6. Non-relationship, here, only is indicative of the bodily existence of I and other, that the two are separate beings. Relationship, however, is later sought through consciousness.
7. *BN*,p.313.
8. *SRT*,p.108.
9. *SRT*, p. 109.
10. *SRT*, p. 112.
11. Anthony Manser, *Sartre: A Philosophical Study*, Athlone Press, University of London, 1966,p.77.
12. *SRT*, p. 117.
13. *SRT*, pp. 115-16.
14. *SRT*,p. 117.
15. *BN*, p. 341.
16. Sartre defines "totalization" as the constantly developing process of understanding and making history. See,J.P.Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, tr. Alan Sheridan -Smith, Verso, 1982, New York, p. 830.
17. *BN*, p. 400.
18. *BN*, p. 401.

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19. *BN*, p. 404.
20. *BN*, p. 460.
21. *BN*, p. 453.
22. *BN*, p. 407.
23. *BN*, p. 445.
24. *BN*, p. 446.
25. *BN*, p. 463.

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DISCUSSION : I

SAJAHAN MIAH ON RUSSELL'S CONSTRUCTIONISM

Sajahan Miah wrote an interesting paper "Constructionism: Russell's Resolution of Realism-Empiricism Dilemma", published in the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* (Vol. XXIV, No.4, Oct. 1997). In this paper, Miah attempts to explain how Bertrand Russell's theory of construction paved the way to resolve the Realism- Empiricism dilemma. Mr. Miah has to be congratulated for the pains he has taken in understanding and presenting Russell's views on this issue. However his paper contains certain conspicuous mistakes. The aim of this paper is to focus the lapses that Mr. Miah has committed in his presentation.

In the course of his presentation Miah observes that Russell embraced both realism and empiricism. However there "is a *prima facie* conflict between Russell's empiricist task of grounding all knowledge claims in sense-data and his realist view of the independently existing physical world...."[1]. In order to resolve this conflict Russell upheld the causal theory of perception in his early work *PP*. * Subsequently Russell felt that the constructionist theory is advantageous over the causal theroy in solving the realism and empiricism dilemma and hence he preferred constructionism to causal theory. Thus Miah writes: "Russell preferred the constructionist theory as more advantageous than The problem of philosophy theory in compromising between realism and empiricism".[2] What Miah means by *Problems of Philosophy* theory is the causal theory of perception which Russell committed in that work.[3] The whole of Miah's paper centres round the above theme and this is what exactly I would like to refute. This is my first and foremost objection to Miah's paper. Had Miah gone through carefully the later works of Russell like *OP* and *MPD*, he would have not made such remarks. Miah's

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observations on Russell's Philosophy of perception are only partial. They did not carry the full spirit of Russell's thoughts. It is true that Russell supported constructionism in his work *OKEW*. but he did not prefer this theory throughout his works. In his late work *OP*., which was published much later than his work *OKEW*, Russell upheld the causal theory of perception which he originally professed in his *PP*.

In his *OP* Russell remarks: "What is called a perception is only connected with its object through the laws of physics. Its relation to the object is causal and mathematical, we cannot say whether or not it resembles the object in any intrinsic respect, except that both it and the object are brief events in space time."[4] In this context Russell says that the colours that the percipients see and the sounds they hear are events and these are only causally related to the physical object through the intermediary events. Therefore the data of perception that the observer sees should not be confused with the real qualities of the physical object. Russell writes: "where the philosopher's child at the zoo says 'There is a hippotamus over there', the philosopher should reply: 'There is a coloured pattern of a certain shape, which may perhaps be connected with a system of external causes of the sort called a hippopotamus".[5]

The causal theory of perception was also preferred by Russell in his much later work *MPD*. In this work Russell writes: "The world of which we have been speaking hitherto is entirely an inferential world."[6] In this context Russell remarks: "....the whole of what we perceive without inference belongs to our private world. In this respect I agree with Berkeley."[7]

Therefore it is obvious that Russell no more prefers the theory of construction in his late works like *OP* and *MPD*, but prefers in these works only the *Problems of Philosophy* theory or the causal theory of perception.

The question that agitates one's mind is why Russell had to switch over from one position to another in his different works. It appears that Russell's thinking was in oscillation between causal theory and constructionism (phenomenalism). In his *PP* Russell considered sense-data as mere appearances and not the real properties of the physical object. The physical

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object, if any, acts as the sources of sense-data. The existence of the physical object cannot be perceived directly but could only be inferred as the source of sense-data. However Russell realised that such a theory makes the physical object very shadowy because we do not know its colours, shapes, sounds etc., and not even its space and time. The very existence of such an object is also doubtful. In order to avoid this embarassing situation, Russell dispensed with the causal theory in his *OKEW* and subscribed to the constructionism, according to which the sense-data are no more appearances of the physical object, but constitute the real properties of the object. Thus the physical object is considered as a sum total of actual and possible sense-data.

Though the constructionist considers the sense-data while explaining the nature of the physical object and thus conceives the physical object as a concrete entity, still the theory of construction is not free from defects because it overlooks the significance of causal properties. For the constructionist, the physical object is identical with a set of sense-data and nothing more. But this is not so. The physical object could exhibit causal properties even in the absence of its sense-data. (For instance in complete darkness we may not get any sense-data of a wall, but its causal properties are observed while a ball is rebounded on throwing towards it). Therefore the constructionist's identification of the physical object with a set of sense-data alone is not correct. Being alive to this fact, Russell left constructionism and subscribed again to the causal theory in his late works.

Moreover Russell's fascination to physics and his attempt to introduce scientific method in philosophical inquiry, made him come back to the causal theory of perception which he professed initially in his *PP*. Thus, while dealing with the problem of perception Russell's thinking was in oscillation in between causal theory and constructionism and ultimately he preferred the causal theory.

In this context it is apt to mention H.H.Price, who made an improvement over that of Russell by attempting to reconcile between causal theory and phenomenalism (Constructionism). In his masterly work *Perception*, Price conceives physical object as an admixture of sense-data and

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its causal properties. He writes that physical object is a complex of family of sense-data (actual and possible) and physical occupancy that exhibits its causal characteristics. For him, if we see a sense-datum 'S' of a physical object 'M' , this means that the sense-datum 'S' is a member of the family 'F' where the family 'F' is coincident with the physical occupancy 'O', to constitute the physical object 'M'.[8] Price calls this the "Collective Delimitation theory".[9]

Confining our discussion to Russell, it is obvious that Russell did not prefer the constructionism to causal theory as he came back to the causal theory in his late works. Russell's preference to the theory of construction is only transitory and not final. Therefore it is wrong on the part of Miah when he remarks that Russell preferred constructionism to the *Problems of Philosophy Theory* (causal theory). Miah's presentation has been abruptly stopped with Russell's *OKEW.* It did not progress further.

Secondly, Mr. Miah has not properly understood Russell's notion of 'Sensibilia'. This led Miah wrongly to distinguish between 'sensed sensibilia' and 'unsensed Sensibilia'. Throughout his paper Miah used frequently the term 'Unsensed Sensibilia'. He even quotes 'unsensed Sensibilia' as if it were the terminology of Russell. While wrongly quoting from Russell's work Miah writes, "Verification consists always in the occurrence of expected sense-data [unsensed Sensibilia]"[10]. If one goes through the text, it is obvious that Russell writes "verification consists always in the occurence of an expected sense-datum."[11] Therefore what Miah puts in brackets [unsensed Sensibilia]' is his interpretation and not Russell's words, However Mr. Miah puts them within double quotes as if they were the words of Russell. If we look carefully, it is clear that Russell distinguishes between sense-data and unsensed sense-data and call the latter, sensibilia. Russell argues that when the observer comes into contact with sensibilia, these will become sense-data just as a man becomes a husband on getting married. To quote Russell:

> I shall give the name sensibilia to those objects which have the same metaphysical and physical status as sense-data, without necessarily being data to any mind. Thus the relation of a sensible to a sense-datum is like that of a man to a husband; a man becomes a

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husband by being entering into the relation of marriage, and similarly a sensible, becomes a sensedatum by entering into a reltion of acquaintance. It is important to have both terms; for we wish to discuss whether an object which is at one time a sense-datum can still exist at a time when it is not a sense-datum. We cannot ask; Can sense-data exit without being given?' for that is like asking 'can husbands exist, without being married? we must ask can sensibilia exist without being given?' and also 'can a particular sensible be at one time, a sense-datum, and at another not? unless we have the word sensible as well as the word 'sense-datum', such questions are apt to entangle us in trivial logical puzzles."[12]

The moment the sensibilia are sensed by the observer, they are no more sensibilia, but get transferred into sense-data. Therefore the question of 'sensed sensibilia' does not arise. So also the very term 'Sensibilia indicates that they are unsensed. Hence to call unsensed Sensibilia' is superflous. Therefore Miah's distinction between sensed sensibilia and 'unsensed Sensibilia' is baseless and his conception of 'unsensed Sensibilia' is a misnomer.

My third observation on Miah's paper is this. He mistakenly thought that 'realism' and 'representationalism' as two independent thesis. This is evident when he said that the passages of Russell's work *PP* indicate about his explicit commitment "to two theses viz. the realist one that physical objects exist independent of perception and the representationalist one that physical objects are causes of our sense-data"[13]. But this is not a sound statement because representationalism is a form of realism and is not an independent thesis over and above realism. Naive realism, representationalism (an early form of critical realism), neo-realism and new critical realism are the different stages in the development of realism. Russell's discussions of *P.P.* reflect his commitment to realism and this he expressed through his support to critical realism (representationalism). Therefore Miah should not think that Russell was committed to two theses - Realism and Representationalism. Representationalism is a part and parcel of realism.

To conclude my discussions: (1) Miah's view that Russell preferred

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constructionism to inferential theory is false, as this is not true with reference to his late works like *OP* and *MPD*. (2) Miahs' conception of "unsensed Sensibilia" is a misnomer and (3) Miah has mistakenly thought realism and representationalism as two independent theses.

B. SAMBSIVA PRASAD

NOTES

1. *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* Vol. XXIV, NO.4, Oct. 1997, p. 481.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 493.
3. *Ibid.*,p. 483.
4. Russell, *An Outline of Philosophy*, pp. 154-55.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 291.
6. Russell, *My Philosophical Development*, Unwin Books, 1975 p. 16.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
8. H.H.Price, *Perception*, p. 303.
9. *Ibid.*,
10. *Indian Philosophical Quarterly, op. cit.*, p. 487.
11. Bertrand Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, Reprint 1952., p. 89.
12. Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays*, pp. 148-49.
13. *Indian Philosophical Quarterly, op. cit.*, p. 482.

* The abbreviations used in my discussion refer to the following works of Bertrand Russell. The years of their first publication are indicated in brackets. *PP - The Problems of Philosophy* (1912) *OKEW - Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914) *OP - An Outline of Philosophy* (1927) *MPD - My Philosophical Development (1959)*

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DISCUSSION -II

THE MESSAGE OF THE MĀṆḌŪKYA UPANIṢAD A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Phenomenological Analysis of Deep Sleep :

I want to make certain observations on the above paper of R. Puligandla (IPQ Vol. XXVI No.2 P.P. 221-32) partly appreciative and partly critical.

The author has done well in drawing attention of the western philosophers to the Indian thinkers, particularly to Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, for the analysis of the state of deep sleep. Even the phychologists have not taken care of this experience of deep sleep. The Advaitins particularly are greatly interested in this unique human experience for drawing significant conclusions regarding the nature of ultimate reality. Even the Indian yoga psychologists have paid their attention to sleep (nidrā), but the Western psychologists like Freud and Jung could not understand the deeper significance of the deep sleep. I wish that henceforth at least, the westerners will be alive to the meaningful experience of sleep to understand reality both subjectively and objectively, I too was wondering all these years that the most ancient Indian seers grasped this subject of sleep for study while the most learned thinkers of the occident would take sleep for granted as a very familiar and universal experience. Familiarity breeds contempt, indeed ! But I think, The phenomenological method can't be applied to ontological subject matter. The author of the paper has approached Māṇḍūkya from the phenomenological point of view, and whatever could be said he has done so.

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But phenomenology has its own limitations and cannot bring out the essence of the subject under study, being of ontological or metaphysical nature and importance, as I view it to be.

The author has rightly raised the question ,"How does one know that one had deep sleep on waking up, if one does not know that one is in deep sleep during the state of deep sleep?" In answer he has granted that there is a knowing that does not involve any mental activity-mental operations-and the knower is consciousness itself. He has also clarified the two senses that (1) consciousness is the ultimate necessary condition for any knowing, and (2) consciousness itself is knowledge. All mental knowledge is tripartite, namely, the knower, the known and the knowledge or activity of knowing, while Māṇḍūkya points out to non-partite knowledge. (p.222).

Thus the mystery of the knowledge of the deep sleep remains. The author has indirecity accepted this mystery of mental knowledge thrice in his paper by using the words, "Once one knows, *no matter how*, mind will simply report." According to the author this mental reporting is not remembering, since remembering is a mental activity. But how can we differentiate reporting from remembering, hence it remains a mystery which is hardly possible to overcome by a phenomenological approach. He uses the word recover (225), having the same difficulty as 'report' .

The phenomenological approach is limited to mental experiences only, and here is consciousness or knowledge which transced mental activity. There is a certain sort of immediacy or intuition in this consciousness which cannot be the subject matter of phenomenology. Admitting that conseriousness or *ātman* is an ontological subject matter, it cannot be made an object of phenomenological study or method. The noumenal and the phenomenal are two distinctive realms not on the same par.

Controversy Regarding Triprtite and Non tripartite Knowledge :

This is the epistemico -ontological controversy between Śankracārya on the one hand and Ramanujacārya and the other non-advaitins, on the other

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hand. For the non-dualists or the ubsolutists the ultimate reality is of the nature of knowledge itself wherein the other two elements or aspects are inherent, namely being and bliss, That is, Ātman or Brahman is of the nature of sat-cit-ānanda. These aspects are distinguished in their connotations, but cannot be separated in their denotation, which is the one without any second.

Thus for the non-dualist ontologists there is knowledge in itself which is beyond the differentiations of the tripartite divisions or beyond any dualism of the subject- object, subject-predicate or the substance -attribute, or any relationship between the two.

But for Rāmānuja and the others there is no knowledge worth the name where the tripartitle or dualistic division does not take place. Hence they do not accept Śankaracharya's Nirgun Brahman, and subscribe to the ultimacy, in one way or the other, of the Sagṇna Brahman. They interpret the meanings of nirguṇa and sanugṇa in their own way to suit their ontological stand point, which are only apparently monistic.

The author rightly accepts the non dualistic Vedānta point of view, but mere phenomenology cannot lead to such a point of view, unless it is presupposed independently by the author, inspite of his phenomenological approach to the problem.

Caitanya (spirit) and Manas (mind) Distinguished :

Mind is normally divided by the psychologist into the conscious, subconscious and unconscious. If this is right, then where does the basic consciousness as understood by its menaing (1), stand in relationship to these three divisions of mind? According to this meaning consciousness is the very necessary condition of any knowing. It is again according to the meaning (2) identical with knowledge itself. In any opinion, neither of the three divisions of mind, accepted by the psychologist have anything to do with the foundational or ground consciousness. It is absolute unconditional consciousness, unlike that of the mind. My submission is that the term consciousness has been confused with psychological consciousness. The foundational

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reality is cit or caitanya it, is spiritual in nature, altogether different from the psychological consciousness. While for the phenomenologist, what he calls intentional consciousness, is his proper subject-matter, he cannot confuse it with the non-intentional consciousness, to call it non-intentional is to acept its altogether non-mental character. It is the proper subject matter of ontology or metaphysics, which does not come within the survey or perview of the phenomenologist.

The Three Mental states and the Fourth non-state :

Mind while awake has external objects, while in dream has internal objects. And it is said that while in deep sleep has no objects whatsoever. While it is true to say that the deep sleep has neither the external nor the internal positive objects, it is not true to say that it has no object or objects at all in that experience. The experience is described as "I slept happily, I did not know anything ' (sukham aham asvapsam, na kincidapi avediami). The kind of knowledge that takes place here is both positive and negative. There is positively an enjoyment of bliss, and negatively there is absence of objects, or to put in other words, non-existence of objects itself constitute on object of knowledge. It is still a mental knowledge of a sort, of a superior nature than that of the other two states. It must not be forgotten that just as the two states of waking and dreaming are there, yet there is a third state of dreamless deep sleep. These three are mental states (avasthātraya: Jagrat, svapna and suṣupti). So long as the states are there, these are only the mental or intentional states, whether the objects are positive or negative, or mixed. There can be knowledge of the non-existence of the object so when I say. "There is no flower pot on the table."

In order to distinguish from these three states, that the fourth (turiya) is spoken of, but which, it must be understood not as a state, but spiritiual reality itself which does not have or come within any, state. Therefore, the various stotras (praise-poems) of god or Goddess as *Sri Gaṇapati Atharvaśīrśa* or *Devi Atharvaśīrśa* deseribe them as beyond the three states (avastha trayātita); identiying the Deity with the Ātman or Brahman, as the absoulte

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reality.

Author's awkward interpretation of turiya :

Turīyā is thus the reality which is above mind and anything that is mental, Ātman is beyond *manas, buddhi, citta* and *ahaṅkāra.* Therefore, there cannot be, by defination itself, a phenomenological study of the transcandental, that is, transmental reality of *Ātman.* But the author insists upon this self-contradicory study of the ontological reality through phenomenology, which deals merely with the appearances. He actually blames the commentaries for not offering "any phenomenological clarification of turīyā (227). But, in my opinion, the commentaries are right in not attempting to do the impossible. The author's phenomenological interpretation of *turīyā* is as follows, "turīyā is just like the state of deep sleep, except for one important difference: the difference is that whereas during deep sleep one does not know one is in deep sleep, in turīyā one does know that one is in deep sleep." I consider this to be the most awkward interpretation. He futher says that, "this is the mode of highest wakefulness"(228). The highest reality can have no modes, but for the author turīyā is a mode. He again says that in this mode of highest wakefulness," I am' persists even when there are no objects," though he admits that 'I' is not to be identified with ego. But actually the highest reality of the spirit or self or Brhman is without any 'I' or 'thou', the subject and the object. It cannot be brought down to the lower phenomenological level of appearances.

It is not clear as to how by the application of the phenomenological method of analysis the author jumps to the conclusion that what happens in turiyā is the realization of Ātman, Brahman, immortality of one's going beyond birth and death. That this is the highest philosophical and religious goal that sages exhort us to attain, during this life, and not after death, and that it is a life of freedom from pain and suffering, of peace and joy. To me it appears that the author reads this already framed belief or bias for advaitism in his phenomenological study, rather than a logically drawn conclusion from his study.

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Turiyā stands for the transcendent :

The highest misjudgement of his is when he says "that in the teaching of the Māṅḍūkya Upaniṣad there is no trasnsedental Focus. focus such as God, the Devil, Judgement, heaven hell etc.... There is a sense in which we are always in turīya " This only means that *Ātman* is omnipresent.

Turīyā though called fourth is not to be understood, according to me, as at the top of the vertical stages of the three states, rather it runs parallel but having no direct relationship with the three states. It is wholly transendent to them, and hence cannot be grasped in terms of any ordinary categories. This will be clear from the following quotation from the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.*

वैश्वानरः प्रथम पादः । तैजसो द्वितीयः पादः । प्राज्ञः तृतीय पादः । एष सर्वेश्वर एष सर्वज्ञ एषोऽन्तर्याम्येष योनिः सर्वस्य प्रभवाप्ययौ हि भूतनाम् । नान्तः प्रज्ञं न बहिःप्रज्ञं नोभयतः प्रज्ञं न प्रज्ञानघनं न प्रज्ञं नाप्रज्ञम् ॥ अदृष्टं अव्यवहार्य, अग्राहयं अलक्षणं अचिन्त्यं अव्यपदेश्यं एकात्मप्रत्ययसारं प्रपंचोपशमं शान्तं. शिवं अद्वैतं चतुर्थं मन्यन्ते स आत्मा स विज्ञेय : ॥ १.१२

This refers to the four aspects of the AUM or of soul and its states. The Viśvanara (jagrat), Taijas (Swapna), Prajñā (sleep) the fourth being Ātman proper, transcenedning the three souls, their bodies and their states. It is important that, unlike the author's claim, the Prajñā is described as God (Sarveśvara), "the Lord of all, the omniscient, the inner controller, of all, the origin and end of all beings. contrasted with these stands the Ātman (who is dehatraytiah, transcending the three bodies called Sthula, sukṣma, kasthya , as much as the three states. This is what is philosophically, called the Absolute or Brahman. It is described as, "neither inwardly nor outwardly cognitive, nor yet on both sides together, It is not a cognition mass, and is neither knower nor not-knower. It is invisible, impracticable, incomprehensible, indescribable, unthinkabe and, unpointable. Its essence is the intuitive knowledge or experiences of itself. It negates the whole expanse of the universe, and is tranquil and blissful and without a second. This is known as

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the fourth, the Ātman, which is to be understood."

The above is the description of the transcendental, ontological, metaphysical reality which has nothing to do with any psychological consciousness. Ātman or Brahman is the spiritual reality *caitanya,* not to be identified with any aspect of mental consciousness. The misunderstanding is caused by the usual but unfortunate translaltion of cit or caitanya as consciousness.

Thus, inspite of the author's otherwise wishes, this Upaniṣad does contain the transcendental focus- focus of the Absolute which relegates God to the Prajñā stage or state. Hence I think that this is not a proper subject for phenomenological analysis for drawing any final conclustion about the transendental Absolute Reality. As shown above the author accepts "that there is a knowing that does not involve any mental operations." (222). The Absolute is thus known transecending mental operations by what is known as unmanībhāva. Phenomenological study is obviously of mental operations only, and cannot be undertaken significantly for any study of the transcendent which is in my opinion the essential subject matter of Māṅḍūkya Upaniṣad.

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DISCUSSION III

A NOTE ON SOME IDENTITY SENTENCES OF NYĀYA AND ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

Language analysis is very important for any kind of speculation - particularly if it is Philosophical. The ascertainment, the consequent discussion, the debate - everything is impossible without the help of language analysis. Language is absolutely necessary for communication. What is language? It is, in a sense, a sumtotal of meaningful sentences (vākya). Vākyārtha-vicāraṇa or scrutiny of the meaning of sentences is important for any philosophical discusstion. It has been mantained by the Advaita Vdānta philosophers that in order to realize Brahman (Brahmāvagati) the scrutiny of the meaning of sentences (vākyārtha vicāraṇa) is in a way indispensable. (Of course this vākyārtha vicāraṇa here refers to the consideration of the Vedāntic sentences).

In this Note I shall try to deal with a certain class of sentences, which are known to be identity sentences (of course with a limited examples). Identity sentence has been taken here in a wide sense. A question may be raised as to why I have selected such a class? The mahāvākyas of Advaita Vedānta are identity sentences. These do not exhaust the total class of identity sentences. But undoubtedly these sentences are very significant as they express the metaphysical truth accepted by the Advaita Vedāntins. Hence the justification of the topic. As is clear from the title I shall not confine my discussion within the boundary of a Advaita Vedānta. I shall also try to clarify the notion of identity sentence as accepted by the Nyāya philosophers with the help of certain accepted examples of identity sentence.

But before this discussion we must have some idea of what a sentence

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is. A sentence is a concatenation of padas or words. Any concatenation however does not constitute a vākya or sentence. The words that form a sentence must have ākāṁkṣā and āsatti. Besides the words must be associated with yogyatā and tātparya. Thus generally it is accepted that the cognition of ākāṁkṣā, yogyatā, sannidhi and tātparya are operative in the generation of verbal cognition that issues from a series of words.[1]

In any categorical sentence there are two parts - subject (uddeśya) and predicate (vidheya). Informally a subject is that about which something is said and a predicate is what is said about the subject. The property that limits uddeśya is called the uddeśyatāvacchedaka and the property that limits vidheya is called the vidheyatāvacchedaka. In the case of a meaningful sentence generating verbal cognition the uddeśyatāvacchedaka and the vidheytāvacchedaka must be different. If in a sentence like expression these trun out to be identical. the expression becomes repititive and thus would serve no purpose. Such expressions are therefore at best pseudo sentences. Suppose there is a series of words- 'Rama is Rama'. ('Rāmaḥ Rāmaḥ'). These words will not constitute a sentence proper until and unless the property qualifying the subject and the property qualifying the predicate are different. If this stipulation is correct then we can understand that among the two kinds of identity sentences - informative and non-informative only the informative identity sentences are considered to be sentences proper. The non-informative identity sentences lack cognitive value and thus are pseudo sentences. For example a Nyāya philosopher would say that 'Rama is Rama' ('Rāmaḥ Rāmaḥ') is a pseudo sentence while 'Rama is the eldest son of Daśaratha' ('Rāmaḥ Daśarathasya Jyeṣṭhaputraḥ') is considered to be a sentence proper. It is hard for the ordinary people to accept such a position though the Nyāya philosophers claim that all of their views conform to commonsense. The Naiyāhikas try to defend their case strongly against the charges of the ordinary people as well as the opponent philosophers. Gadādhara in his Vyutpattivādah, has given a detailed exposition of this. He has taken as an example the following expression 'Ghataḥ Ghataḥ, - i.e., 'The pot is pot', The attacks and the counter-attacks centre around different analyses of this expression. We will cite here only one of the analyses.- A

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charge may be put against the Nyāya philosophers in this way. If 'The pot is blue' ('Nīlaḥ Ghataḥ') is a sentence proper, then 'The pot is pot' ('Nīlaḥ Ghataḥ') is also a sentence in this sense, because these two combinations of words have the same syntactic structure. Considering the Sanskrit expressions. We may say that in both sentences, the subject term and the pradicate term have the same nominal ending. Moreover, the Neo Nyāya philosophers have admitted sentences like 'The pot is a blue pot' ('Nālaḥ nīlaghataḥ') on the ground that here something more is said in the predicate than in the subject. The objection runs that when we asert this sentence, we surely assert that 'The pot is pot' (Ghataḥ' Ghataḥ'). Unless 'The pot is pot', the pot cannot be a blue pot.

The Naiyāyikas very rightly point out that there is a difference between the status of the two sentences. This is clear from the structure and from the causes that produce them. Unless we recollect the referents of the words constituting the sentence, we cannot understand it. This differs in each pair of the two sentences we are concerhed with. In the first case, when we consider the sentence 'The pot is blue' we surely have to recollect Blue qualified by Blueness. This is not a precondition for the sentence. The pot is pot similarly when we consider the sentence 'The pot is a blue pot', we have to accept as its precondition the recollection of Blue pot qualified by Blueness and potness from the corresponding word. This is absent in the case of 'The pot is pot'. Therefore 'The pot is blue' or 'The pot is a blue pot' may be regarded as sentences generating verbal cognition, but 'The pot is pot' is not a sentence in the proper sense.[2]

This kind of conclusion is accepted by the Vedānta philosophers also. The repititive sentences are discarded. Both the Vedanta philosophers and the Nyāya philosophers admit that in order to have verbal cognition, there is the requirement of ākāmkṣā, yogyatā, āsatti and tātparya and last but not the least-the requirement of separate uddeśyatāvacchedaka and vidheyatāva cchedaka. It is to be remembered that the explanations of the preconditions of verbal cognition as proposed by the Advaita Vedānta philosophers and the Nyāya philosophers differ in many respects though they agree in the point that repetitive sentences are redundant.

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Now, according to the Advaita Vedāntin a sentence or vākya can be of two types - sakhaṅdārthaka. This sakhaṇdārthaka vakya can again be divided into two types -abhedasaṁsargāthāka and bhedasaṁsargārthāks. The concept of akhaṇdārthaka vākya is an Advaita Vedāntin concept. We can easily understand the sakhaṇdārthaka vākya. It is saṁsargārthaka, that is, from it we have a cognition, about some relation among the relata. A sentence is a combination of different words. Those words signify different referents. When a relation is established among these referents, then and then only verbal cognition is generated. If the relation is that of identity, then the verbal cognition is called verbal cognition expressing identity (abhedasaṁsargārthaka). If the relation is that of non-identity, then the verbal cognition is called verbal cognition expressing non-identity (bhedasaṁsargārthaka) suppose there is a sentence 'Nīlah, Ghataḥ' ('The jar is blue'). the referents signified by 'nīlaḥ' and 'ghata' are related by the relation of identity.

But if we take the sentence 'Ghatasya rūpam', the referent of the sixth case-ending attached to 'ghata' would be related with the referent of 'ghata' by the relation of nirūpitatva (being determined) which is not one of identity.

We think that identity sentences with which we dealt upto now fall under the calss of abhedasaṁsargārthāka vākya. But problem arises regarding the akhaṇarthaka vākya. Just in the beginning it was stated that the mahāvākyas are also identity sentences. They of course are so. But it is acepted in the Advaita Vedānta that a mahāvākya is Akhaṇdārthaka i.e. signifies Akhaṇdārtha - which is Unqualified, Non-relational Brahman. That means it expresses no relation - not even that of identity. That is, it is not abhedasaṁsargārthaka. These mahāvākyas are not identity sentences in the ordinary sense.

Let us take one of the mahāvākyas - 'Tat tvam asi' - ('That are thou'). The meaning of this vākya is Akhaṇdārtha. As has already been stated it means Non-relational, Unqualified Brahman. So it does not indicate any relation. A relation requires at least two relata. Brahman is only one ('Ekamevādvitīyam'). So He is non-relational (Asaṁsṛṣtra). If we try to

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analyse and understand the mahāvākya 'Tat tvam asi' - we find out that 'tat' indicates Parokṣa Sarvagña caitanya and 'tvam' indicates Aparokṣa Alpajña Caitanya. How can these indicate Akhaṇartha? The customary explanation is this we have to abandon the direct significatory capacity or 'Sākti' of the words. We have to take help of lakṣaṇā or indirect significatory capacity of the referent (padārtha) as indicated by the terms. The Vedānta view is that lakṣaṇā is connected with padārtha, while śakti is connected with pada.[3] This is not the Nyāya view. The Naiyāyikas held that both śakti and lakṣaṇā belong to the padas. Anyway, by the lakṣaṇā we get only caitanya from both 'that' and tvam'. This caitanya is Akhaṇdārtha Brahman, who is Asaṁsṛṣṭa. Hence no question of relation arises here.

If we keep in mind the metaphysical theory of Advaita Vedānta then the explanation is acceptable. But for the common people or say for the Nyāya philosophers a question may arise. If 'Tat tvam asi' is aṇ identity sentence, cannot we hold that a relation is there, which is the relation of identity? The referent of 'tat' and the referent of 'tvam' are related by the relation of identity. Actually when the Vedāntins are analysing 'Tat tvam asi', it is the vyavahārika level and there is kathañcit bheda of abheda. But when one has the aparokṣa jñāna the level is changed and a non-relational cognition is there (if it is said be cognition at all).

The fact these objections cannot influence the Vedānta philosophers, because their conception of 'tādātmya' is different from the conception of 'tādātmya' of the Nyāya philosophers. For the Vedānta philosophers any relation requires two relata, even if it be the relatiọn of tādāmya. It cannot be said that there is any other object than Brahman who is Akhaṇdārtha. Hence akhaṇdārthaka vākya does not indicate any relation. For the Vedāntins abheda means bhedasahiṣñu abheda, which is not necessary for be Naiyāyikas.

Another problem regarding this sort of identity sentence is very acute. According to the Advaita Vedānta philosophers these mahāvñkyas generate śabda aparokṣa jñāna or nirvikalpaka jñāna. So we are coming to the position that there may be some vākyas or sentences that do not generate

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verbal cognition. why cannot these produce verbal cognition? Because the preconditions of verbal cognition are absent there. By the preconditions we mean ākāṁkṣā, yogyatā, sannidhi etc. Each of these conditions involves relation. Ākāṁkṣā is abhidhānāparyavasānam. Yogyatā is ekapadārthe aparapadarthavatta. Sannidhi is the presence of relata without any time gap. As Akhaṇdārtha does not involve any relation, the mahāvākya indicating Akhaṇdārtha is not associated with ākāṁkṣā, yogyatā, sannidhi etc. Hence it does not produce verbal cognition. If anybody understands this mahāvākya, then he may have perceptual cognition which is nirvikalpaka or unqualified.

The Nyāya philosophers may ponder upon this position. Because I think that they will have no difficulty in accepting that verbal cognition may be generated from 'Tat tvam asi'. This can be treated as an informative identity sentence in another way. If we consider the vākyārthas of 'tat' and 'tvam' then we find that as their avacchedakas differ so in the sentence 'Tat tvam asi' the uddeśyatāvacchedaka and the vidheyatāvacchedaka are different. Hence there is no problem in regarding this sentence as a sentence proper which can generate verbal cognition. Though such an explanation is possible it is doubtful whether the Nyāya philosophers are ready to accept this as an identity sentence, (though this is so in yathāśrutārthe). Because the Nyāya philosophers accept the difference between jīva and Brahman.

Perhaps for the ordinary identity sentence the explanation proposed by the Nyāya philosophers is not so much different from the explanation of the Vedānta philosophers. But as their ontologies differ, there is difference of opinion regarding the analysis of the mahāvākyas like 'Tat tvam asi'.

BRINDA SEN

NOTES

1. Ākāṁkṣā is abhidhānāparyavasānam. According to the Nyāya philosophers it is padagata, while the Vedāntins take this to be padārthagata. Yogyatā is ekapadārthe aparapadārthavattā. Sannidhi is avilambena padārthopasthiti. It depends upon the pronunciation of the padas. Tātparya is the intention of the speaker.

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2. For a detailed discussion of the identity sentences from the Nyāya point of view please see Brinda Sen, 'Some problems regarding the identity statements' in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol XIII, Nos. 3&4 July-Sept. and Oct-Dec, 1986.

3. For the explanation of 'Tat tvam asi' see the relevant portions from Sadānandayogindrasarasvatī, *Vedāntasāra* and Dharmarājadhvarīndra, *Vedāntaparibhāsā*.

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DISCUSSION IV

DRAVID AND THE IDENTITY - STATEMENTS : SOME DIFFICULTIES

In his note[1] on Dyakrishna's paper[2] Dravid has expressed his differences in treating the Mahavakya Tattvam asi to be of the same type as Frege's statement 'The morning star is the evening star' along with many other issues which he discussed at length. A reply from Dr Dayakrishna is expected and awaited; but in the meanwhile some points in Dravid's note need a clarification for which this note is being written. The points in which the difficulties occur can be put as follows; but before that there is a point which needs to be mentioned. The two alleged statements belong to two different schools of philosophy, having almost nothing in common. It is therefore very difficult to assert or refute a point by using the tools of a different philosophical school. Such an attempt has a way of arguing at cross purposes which does not confirm or confute any thesis.

(1) Dravid rightly disagrees with Dayakrishna's view that the *Mahāvākya* and Frege's statemnet face the same problem. For he (Dravid) has rightly pointed out that the *Mahāvākyas* expresses the identity of two distinct entities, while the Fregean statement asserts that the two expressions concerned stand for one and the same entity, i.e. have identical reference. Now if Frege's statement is regarded as the true identy, statement, then the Mahāvākya ceases to be the identity-statement; and if at all it is to be treated as the identity-statement, then it will be the false one. Dravid agrees with this view, and accordingly remarks, 'If the referends were different, then the statement would be false...' (*Ibid.* p. 534) Now what standpoint should a reader take in deciding the identity of these statements? If we follow Frege, then a statement expressing the identity of two entities cannot be called an

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identity-statement. Thus the *Mahāvākya* will have to be declared as false. The sense in which the Mahavākya *That thou art* is an identity-statement has not been made clear.

(2) On page 536 (*IPQ*:Oct. '98 issue) Dravid remarks that even though the adjectives are treated like names, and their identity is established, the main purpose of discussing the sentence would have been defeated. When Dravid talks of the denotative view of names, he seems to mean that names have only connotation and no denotation. But understood in this sense, i.e. in the denotative sense only, no identity-statement of the type a=b can be asserted where 'a' and 'b' have only a denotation. One may recall here that the distinction between sense and reference intended by Frege is applicable to names concepts (or definite descriptions) and also to propositions. Dravid's above remark, therefore, needs clarification. The point to be noted is that mere names will not enable us to see whether they refer to one and the same thing. In each case one will have to identify the reference *via* the sense of the term. Thus 'Scott is the author of Waverley' and' The author of Waverley is the author of Marmion' are both identity-statements, the linguistic expression in each standing for one and the same entity in each of propositions. Dravid's remark mentioned at the beginning of this para goes against what he says on p. 538, where he says 'If names were supposed to be demonstrative, or they simply name things, in either case one and the same thing may quite well be denoted or named by different names, and be described by different expressions'. However, as has already been seen, names cannot be exclusively taken as demonstratives.

(3) Towards the end of his discussion-note Dravid analyses the Fregean identity-statement 'The morning star is the evening star' from the Nyaya point of view. This analysis, according to him, leads us to the conclusion that what the original statement means is that one property, viz. the evening-starness is the predicate ascribed to the planet as characterized by the property morning-starness. It is not clear how far this analysis can help in establishing any of the features of the original statement made by Frege. The purpose of making such an analysis is simply made unknown. This analysis does not shed any light on any of the features of the original

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identity-statement which Frege could not reveal so far. This analysis also presents a problem how far feasible and worthwhile it is to analyse a statement of one philosophical system by using the tools of an entirely alien, different system of philosophy. Would a Naiyāyika like any part of his system analysed with the help of the tools entirely alien to it? Again Dravid appears to try to reduce Frege's form of the statement to subject-predicate form of statement, but this does not seem to be possible by subjecting it to the Nyāya analysis.

(4) Dravid says that the statement 'The pot is a materilal substance', would be relatively simple, and, so to say, a better example than the statement 'The morning-star is the evening-star' of Frege. If Dravid wants Frege's statement replaced by the above statement, then that statement should also be the identity-statement like 'The morening-star....the evening-star'. But the two statements are entirely different. ' The pot is a material substance' can hardly be called an identity-statement. In the above statement the term pot is a singular term, but the phrase 'a material substance' is not a definite description; it is phrase standing for a property and the statement would be of the subject-predicate form, and not an identity statement. If we write this sentence in Sanskrit as'Ghatah Dravyam (or Padarthah), then since the two terms are in the same (nominative) case, as per the Nyaya role of *śābdabodh* there will be the non-difference (*abheda*) between the padas. It means whatever is known as a *ghata,* is also known as dravyam (or padartha). This non-difference of the terms, however, does not make the statement an identity-statement.

If we now analyse the above statement from the point of view of techniques used in Western logic, we find that it can be called either (1) class-membership statement or (2) as one expressing the relationship between a determinate and a determinable. This statement is thus similar to (1) 'Red is colour' or (2) A flea is an insect'. It is thus clear that Dravid's statement is not an identity-statement, and is not a substitute to Frege's example at all. The Non-difference between the terms revealed by the Nyaya analysis, and the identity between the two terms revealed by Frege, will have to be distinguished, and kept apart so as to avoid the confusion. It is now clear

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that the Mahāvākya, and Frege's statement are not of the same type. However the sense in which the Mahāvākya is regarded as identity-staement has not been made clear.

B.Y.DESHPANDE

NOTES

1. *I.P.Q.* Oct. '98 pp. 532-546.
2. *Ibid.* Jan. '98 pp. 1-15.

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BOOK REVIEW

BISWAS, GOUTAM : *ART AS DIALOGUE: ESSAYS IN PHENOMENOLOGY OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE.* New Delhi, Indira Gandhi Centre for the Arts, New Delhi in association with D K Printworld (p) Ltd, New Delhi., 1995.

Goutam Biswas's *ART AS DIALOGUE* includes six essays in all. These are (1) Introduction, (2) The phenomenology of aesthetic experience, a dialogical perspective, (3) Martin Buber's concept of art as dialogue, (4) Michael Polanyi's aesthetics, a phenomenological study, (5) Personal man and aesthetic truth, a dialogical view of Rabindranath Tagore's philosophy of art, and (6) Artistic knowledge, Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan's philosophy of art. Biswas's focus in the book is on the phenomenology of aesthetic experience and it is this theme which runs through all the essays and gives them a sort of unity.

Biswas works within the phenomenological tradition of Husserl, Heidegger, and Martin Buber. His objective primarily is epistemological. He sets himself the task of answering questions like 'what is the ontological status of a work of art?' ' how is the meaning of a work of art determined?' 'what is the nature of man's relationship to a work of art?', and'what is the nature of the creative process?'. He visualized a vantage point from where to throw light on these questions about any philosophy of art. He writes: "But, whatever the individual art form may be, its relationship with the spectator or the artist is a fundamental or universal phenomenon which has its own ontology. Its discovery may not only provide answers to the questions above, but lead us to envision a common platform on which all arts may stand

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together." (p.11.). On his view, that fundamental phenomenon is the aesthetic experience and its ontology is discovered in its phenomenological analysis which Biswas undertakes in this book.

Biswas considers aesthetic experience inclusive of the experience of the artist in the process of his creation, the experience of the spectator in appreciation of a work of art, and the experience of the critic in his appraisal of a work of art. He does not feel the need to distinguish these experiences one from the other, although it is possible and I am much inclined to think that these experiences are fundamentally distinct from one another. For instance, the critic's perception in evaluating a work of art need not be identified with the beholder's experience of enjoying a work of art; nor need the artist's creative experience be assimilated to either of these two. I agree with Biswas that underlying each of these different experiences there may be an unformed awareness or experiencing. But then how do we know it? My answer is that we know it and can analyze it psychologically or phenomenologically only as it appears to us and in no other way unless of course we choose not to have our feet firmly on the ground. Similarly, we need to keep different art forms and their distinctive features well in focus in any project of phenomenological inquiry, or else we put ourselves at the risk of falling in the trap of innocuous and vacuous generalizations frustrating the standard purpose of aesthetic inquiry, which is illumination. Biswas looks for that something which is fundamental in aesthetic experience and is common to all the art forms,- poetry, painting, sculpture, architecture, dance, drama, and music, and the result of this pursuit may turmout to be conceptually disastrous; instead of greater clarity and sharper perception, we may land ourselves in the swamp of muddles.

Let us see what Goutam Biswas means by a work of art. On his view, a work of art is an "unfinished product" (p.15). He writes: "What I mean by 'never a finished work' is that there is no fixed, fully enclosed or exhausted fully actualized content in the work of art because it essentially admits of appreciation in terms of ever unfolding possibilities of meaning. There is no one particular appreciation of a work, nor can the work's content be exhaustively brought out. The work is an 'unfinished product' in so far as it

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is a source of unfinished possibilities for appreciation and interpretation." (p.15). I am afraid Biswas's reasoning here has got mixed up. From the fact that a work of art is a source of unfinished possibilities for appreciation and interpretation what follows is that a work of art admits of several possible interpretations, but it does not follow that a work of art is an unfinished product unless of course we use language metaphorically and mean by "unfinished product" something of which many interpretations are possible. Biswas adds: "From the standpoint of the creator-artist, the work may be a finished product, but even to the artist, let alone to spectators, the work is 'unifinished' in the sense that it assumes an 'open textured' character by becoming an ontologically peculiar entity" (p.15). This too does not help much. Characterizing a work of art as "an ontologically peculiar entity" is not illuminating. It is not much communicative either, it falls short of literally saying that we really do not know how to characterize a work of art significantly.

On Biswas's view, the epistemological significance of a work of art lies in its dialogic character, a transcendence of subject-object dichotomy." (p.22). This is so because a work of art has an experiential as distinguished from discursive dimension such that when one is face to face with a work of art there is in an I-Thou, and not an I-It relationship with it, and further in creating, enjoying, or evaluating a work of art, one is in dialogue with it, a sort of interaction in which there is an openness, reciprocity, and a deep sense of personal involvement between the individual and the artwork. So far so good. But a dialogical relationship has to be reciprocal. This condition, however, appears to be unsatisfiable by the relation of an individual with a work of art. Biswas seems to suggest that this relation satisfies the condition. (p.35). He writes: "The mode of intentionality in aesthetic experience can be characterized as dialogic only, because the intentional acts of consciousness with regard to our aesthetic expreience do not emerge from consciousness as a centre or ego, or from the art object alone. These acts flow from the interplay itself- from the dialogue. The concept of dialogue is, therefore methodologically significant for us". (pp.33-34). He adds: I-Thou relation in virtue of its dialogic nature "is relation in its true sense" (p.35). "It is its own

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ontology". (p.35.). "Knowledge is generated not from any of the units of relation, but from and in the phenomenon of relation itself-from and in the sphere of I-Thou." (p.35). Thus, it is dialogue itself which as a method makes possible a "holistic view of man in terms of the unification of divergent aspects of him "envisioned through an integration of his states of becoming both in I-thou and I-It forms of relationship." (pp. 35-36). Further, "In a dialogical method I know the other as a Thou, and hence grasp directly his capacity for both I-It and I-Thou forms of relationships and knowledge," (p. 36). Saying this is not enough. It does not show the possibility of dialogue between the individual as a creator, enjoyer, or critic, and a work of art, which obviously lacks sentience, speech, and the capacity to reciprocate. Biswas's argument, at best, is persuasive.

A key concept in his theory of art as dialogue is the idea of I-Thou relationship between the individual and a work of art. He insists that this is the idea of an open, reciprocal relationship infused with a deep sense of personal involvement. Thus he speaks of 'Thou orientation' of the individual in relation to a work of act. Can this be a two-way relation? I am afraid it can be had one way only, not two ways, from an individual to a work of art but not conversely. Biswas therefore need not insist that in understanding, enjoying, or creating a work of art the individual's relation to it is dialogical in the sense in which it must be a two way relation. That would be mistaking a metaphorical use of the expression "dialogue" and "dialogical" as literal. Literally, one can be said to have a dialogue with an artist but not with a work of art. A work of art is not characterized by openness, reciprocity and a deep sense of involvement which essentially are personal attributes and which a work of art cannot be said to have.

Following Martin Buber Biswas's locution "Thou orientation" towards a work of art broadly suggests that when we speak of a work of art, if we are operating the framework of I-Thou relationship we take the work of art seriously *as if it* were of an intrinsic interest to us, we treat is *as if* it were an act of God which commands devotion akin to religious attitude to it, or we look at it *as if* it had what Biswas calls a "quasi conscious existence" (p. 37), *as if* it were a "being for itself" (p. 37). Given these so many as-if's the

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ISSN 0376-415X

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

VOL., XXVII NO. 3 JULY 2000

JOURNAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF POONA

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Articles in the Journal are indexed in the *Philosopher's Index, U.S.A., Reportorie Biblographique de Philosophie, Belgium and Indian Documentation Service, Gurgaon (Haryana).*

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BROUWER'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE LOGICAL CONSTANTS

GUSTAVO FERNANDEZ DFEZ - PICAZO

1. *Verificationist Interpretations : Meaning as Provability*

Most attempts to define the intended interpretation of the intuitionistic logical operators take as the basic key concept the notion of 'proof'.

The idea is to equate the meaning of the mathematical statement with its provability coniditions. That is: to give the interpretation of a statement by means of definition of what is to be a proof of it.

This seems more adequate for intuitionistic semantics given that, in contrast with the structural (platonistic) point of view, intuitionistic mathematics focuses primarily on the *subject* (the creative mathematician) and his ability to perform certain mathematical operations by applying his previously designed constructions (*knowing how*). Hence a notion such as 'proof', which refers to the successful completion of a human action, appears to be more suitable than that of 'truth'.

On the other hand, classical mathematics focuses essentially on the *object*: eternal pre-existing mathematical structures (*knowing that*); and for this reason, the notion of 'truth', with its prominent descriptive untensed character, is more appropriate. Of course we can also use the predicate 'true' with its intuitionistic sense, e.g. as 'having been proved', as many intuitionistic mathematicians do, but that could be misleading to a classical mathematician if we do not make our intention explicit, especially in the context of a semantic definition.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 3
July 2000

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The idea that intuitionistic meaning should be equated with the proof-conditions is implicit in many of Brouwer's writings, although he never states it directly. The following quotation is a relatively clear illustration. It is taken from the *Cambridge Lectures*, but the same idea is expressed in many others of his papers, sometimes with almost the same words (cf.e.g. (1955), pp. 551-52) :

> "Classical logic presupposed that indepenetdently of human thought there is a turth, part of which is expressible by means of sentences called 'true assertions', mainly assigning certain properties to certain objects or stating that objects possessing certain proeperties exist or that certain phenomena behave according to certain laws.
>
> "(...) Only after mathematics had been recognized as an autonomous interior constructional activity(...) the criterion of truth and falsehood of mathematical assertion was confined to mathematical activity itself, without appeal to logic or to hypothetical omniscient beings. An immediate cosequence was that for a mathematical assertion *A* the two cases of truth and falsehood, formerly exclusively admitted, were replaced by the following three:
>
> (1) *A* has been proved to be true;
>
> (2) *A* has been proved to be absurd;
>
> (3) *A* has neither been proved to be true nor to be absurd, nor do we know a finite algorithm leading to the statement either that *A* is true or that *A* is absurd." (Brouwer (1981), pp. 90-92. I always quote using my choice of notation).
>
> In a footnote he adds: "the case that *A* has neither been proved to be true nor to be absurd, but that we know a finite algorithm leading to the statement either that *A* is ture, or that *A* is absurd, obviously is reducible to the first and second cases" (p.92).

2. *Verificationist interpretations : Meaning as Problem-solving*

A variant on this view is to consider that every mathematical statement

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is the statement of a problem, to be solved either positively or negatively. This is the idea exploited in Kolmogorov's interpretation [Kolmogorov, (1932)], and is also suggested more or less directly by Brouwer's writings in some places.

For example in (1928) Brouwer urges the formalists to accept "(...) the identification of the principle of excluded middle with the principle of the solvability of every mathematical problem." (p.491).

This identification means that the principle of excluded middle holds if and only if each mathematical problem is solvable. In the direction from right to left the implication is obvious: if every mathematical problem were solvable then the principle of excluded middle could not fail to hold. However, the implication in the other direction, that is, from excluded middle to the principle of solvability, seems to entail that the meaning of each statement is the formulation of a mathematical problem. Otherwise we clould not understand why the fact that either a statement or its negation holds entails that the respective problem is solvable.

Of course in classical mathematics we can also assign to each statement a corresponding problem: the problem of proving that what the statement affirms is true; but that would only be an oblique interpretation with respect to the primary meaning of the statment, which, e.g. under the platonistic view, would be the statment of a mathematical 'fact'.

3. *The Operational Interpretation*

Finally, in Brouwer's writings we also find support for a more basic explanation of the meaning of mathematical statements, in terms of elementary manipulations with mathematical constructions, I shall call this interpretation 'operational'. The term was suggested by Professor Machover; it appeared in Prawitz, (1973, p.231) in reference to the verificationist interpretation, but it has not been used again since then.

The idea of the operational interpretation is that a mathematical statement expresses an expectation that the result of performing a particular construction will satisfy certain properties, or better, that it will *agree* with

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the constructions corresponding to those properties, if they are also completely effected. This idea is very well-known, and indeed essential to intuitionism and to Brouwer's thinking, Here are a couple of quot, from Brouwer's PhD Dissertation and from (1923) :

> "Often it is quite simple to construct inside such a structure, independently of how it originated, new structures, as the elements of which we take elements of the original structure or systems of these, arranged in a new way, but bearing in mind their original arrangement. The so-called 'properties' of a system express the possibility of constructing such new systems having a certain connection with the given system.
>
> "And it is exactly this *imbedding* of new systems in a given system that plays an important part in building up mathematics (...)". [1907, p.52].
>
> "Within the limits of a definite finite main system one can always test, that is prove or reduce to absurdity the properties of the system, i.e. test whether a system can be fitted into another according to prescribed incidence of elements since the fitting-in as determined by the property can in every case be executed in only a finite number of ways, which each in turn can be undertaken and pursued either until it is successfully completed or until it gets stuck." [1923, p.235 ; this translation, however, is from van Stigt (1990), P.243].

In the case of a numerical equality over natural numebr, for example, this would mean that the two completed constructions fit perfectly well into each other, for example '$12^2 = 144$' would mean that the result of effecting both sides of the equality comes to the same final construction.

In the case of an atomic statement other than an equality, this would mean that the constructions corresponding to the objects involved satisfy the construction corresponding to the relation in question; for example the meaning of '$2^{11213} - 1$ is prime' would be that the result of effecting the

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operation $2^{11213} - 1$ would satisfy positively the constructive procedure to test the property of 'being prime'.

On the other hand, in the case of more complex statements, the expectation would be that some simpler constructions can be connected according to the main logical operator, which itself would be a constructive procedure of some kind.

4. *The Verificationist versus the Operational Interpretation*

The operational explanation is fairly close to the provability or verificationist interpretation, and has been assimilated to it by most authors. The point would be that the proof of a statement consists precisely in producing the mathematical construction which the statement demands.

Brouwer himself seems to support this identification when he writes, for example, "the words of your mathematical demonstration merely accompany a mathematical construction that is effected without words" (1907, p. 73).

However, this identification is correct only in the cases where it is obvious that the construction which has been produced has the required properties in particular, for instance, with proofs of atomic statements–. In general however, the proof of the statement in question will have to include not only the required construction, but also an argument that it is in effect such a construction; and in some cases this argument may necessarily be very complicated.

This is not the time, however, to carry on this discussion. It is enough to notice that the two interpretations may not coincide, and that we should not equate them beforehand.

5. *The Meaning of Negation*

As Brouwer made clear many times, for him to negate a mathematical statement was to claim the absurdity or impossibility of what the statement says. Apparently, Brouwer was not the first person to conceive negation in this way; it seems that similar definitions had been given before at least by Husserl and Oskar Becket [cf. Heyting (1931) p.59].

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Indeed, Brouwer often writes ' is absurd' and similar phrases instead of 'not' or is false'; for example, he formulates the law of excluded middle as the principle that every property is either correct or impossible (1923, p. 335).

In (1949) he says: "by non-equivalence we understand absurdity of equivalence, just as by noncontradictority we understand absurdity of contradictority (p.95, footnote 2); and sometimes he even writes "false i.e. absurd" (e.g. (1955), p. 552).

In classical mathematics to say that a statement is 'absurd' means that it is obviously false, something which has to do more with the psychological perception of the statment than with the statement itself. 'Absurdity' in this sense, is not a proper technical term of classical mathematics.

In intuitionistic mathematics, on the contrary, 'absurdity' is the most interesting way of expressing negation. The absurdity of a hypothetical consturction means that not only is it difficult to effect it – because it required great ingenuity or hard work – but that it is intrinsically impossible, so that we shall no longer bother to attmept it.

Sometimes the absurdity is plain to see and does not need any demonstration (e.g. '1 =2': it is obvious that the two constructions do not 'agree' or fit into each other). Some other times the absurdity is not obvious but we can find a way of reducing the construcions in question to a point where the impossibility becomes clear.

It is for this reason that some later authors define a negation $\neg A$ as the conditional statement $A \rightarrow \perp$, where $\perp$ is a fixed absurdity, In fact $\perp$ is often called a 'contradiction', but that must not be interpreted in the classical sense (e.g. as any statement of the form $(B \wedge \neg B)$, because then it would be obviously vacuous.

Instead, we can take $\perp$ as a basic absurdity, such as "1 = 2', whose only role is to make absolutely evident that the construction which has been reduced to it is impossible: "at the point where you enounce the contradiction, I simply perceive that the construction no longer *goes*, that the required structure cannot be imbedded in the given basic structure." (1907, p.73).

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Later, Dummett (1977) has suggested that given a decidable atomic statement B we could identify $\perp$ with $B \wedge \neg B$, where the meaning of $\neg B$ would be given directly by the decision procedure, attached to it. Then, anyone who understands the decision procedure will recognize that it is impossible for it to give two opposing results, and hence that whichever construction that has been reduced to such a statement is also impossible.

Other authors; in a vaguely similar way to Kripke semantics, have defined a proof of $\neg A$ directly as 'a proof that there cannot be a proof of A' (Bell and Machover (1977), p. 406, and Dummett himself in (1976), p.110). However, it is difficult to make constructive sense of this idea independently of the reduction to basic absurdity. For, in general, the impossibility of a complicated construction will not be plain to see, and will have to be shown by means of reduction of this construction to another, elementary one, whose absurdity is obvious.

On the other hand, the claim is not simply that *as a matter of fact* we shall never be able to perform A–e.g. because A is too complicated –, but that A is intrinsically impossible. However, we cannot admit a priori this type of impossibility because that would imply a certain reification over the universe of constructions; constructions are not assumed to exit or not (to be possible or impossible) independently of us – independently of our ability to prove it so–.

Hence the only way of making sense of this idea is, again, by means of a reduction of A to a basic impossibility.

6. *Negation and Hypothetical Constructions*

As for hypothetical constructions, there is a passage in Brouwer's PhD Dissertation which has misled some into believing that he rejected them:

> "In one particular case the chain of syllogisms is of a somewhat different kind, which seems to come nearer to the usual logical figures and which actually seems to presuppose the hypothetical judgement from logic. This occurs when a structure is defined by some relation in another structure, while it is not immediately clear

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> how to effect its construction. Here it seems that the construction is supposed to be effected, and that starting from this hypothesis a chain of hypothetical judgements is deduced. But this is no more than apparent; what actually happens is the following: one starts by setting up a structure which fulfils part of the required relations, thereupon one tries to deduce from these relations, by means of tautologies, other relations, in such a way that these new relations, combined with those that have not yet been used, yield a system of conditions, suitable as a starting-point for the construction of the required structure. Only by this construction will it be proved that the original conditions can be fulfilled." (1907, p.72)

However, he is not condemning the appeal to hypothetical constructions in general, but only the assumption that a mathematical construction can exist without us having first *proved* that it could be effected and how. Moreover, he himself often referred to hypothetical constructions in his proof of negation and conditional statements (e.g. in his proof of the law of triple negation [1981, p.12].

Later Freudenthal (1937) and Griss (1946) criticized the use of hypothetical constructions especially in the cases where the supposed construction turns out to be impossible, as happens in a proof of a negation, if the proof is successful. This led Griss to the extreme position of trying to develop intuitionstic mathematics without using negation at all (1946), (1955).

Heyting (1937), (1961), on the contrary, defended the use of hypothetical constructions in mathematical reasoning:

> "The following simple example shows that the problem $A \rightarrow B$ in certain cases can be solved without a solution for the problem A being known. For A I take the problem 'find in the sequence of decimals of π a sequence 0123456789', for B the problem 'find in the sequence of decimals of π a sequence 012345678'. Clearly B can be reduced to A by a very simple construction." (1937, p. 117; the translation is from Troelstra and van Dalen (1988, p.31)].

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Thus, by reducing the negation to an absurdity operator, and more in general, to the construction which shows that absurdity, the intuitionistic mathematician manages to assign a *positive* meaning to each negation statement, in accordance with the constructive philosophy of mathematics. An intuitionistic negation is strictly speaking a positive claim – that which reduces the hypothetical construction to a basic impossibility such as '1 = 2' –, but it carries with it an implicit denial – the denial that we shall ever be able to perform the construction corresponding to the statement negated –. Moreover, this will be obvious to anyone who understands the absurdity of the basic impossibility in question - e.g. the absurdity of ' 1= 2'.

7. *The Meaning of the Conditional*

Brouwer's conception of the conditional in its strongest sense appears in his attempted proof of the bar therorem (e.g. in (1927); a neat exposition and discussion is Dummett (1977, pp. 94-104). There, Brouwer considers a conditional statement (bar induction), classifies all possible proofs of the antecedent into three types, and tries to show that each of these proofs can be converted into a proof of the consequent.

This suggests that an intuitionistic proof of a conditional statement $A \rightarrow B$ is a method of transforming every proof of *A* into a proof of *B*.

An obvious question, however, is how can we know in advance which form any arbitrary proof of the antecedent should take, so that we ensure that our method will transform all of them into proofs of the consequent. This question turns out to be a deep one.

We must notice that, in particular, as it happens, Brouwer's attempted proof of the bar theorem is incorrect, and no way has been found to correct it while preserving its original form (see again Dummett (1977) pp. 101-102).

In practice, most intuitionistic proofs of conditional statments appeal to only one obvious proeprty that every proof of the antecedent must satisfy: *to be a proof of the antecedent* - that is, to have the antecedent as the final line or conclusion of the proof –. The method then does not enter to transform the proofs of *A* internally, but simply *extends* them to obtain proofs of *B*.

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Brouwer himself, in other proofs of conditional statements returns to this simple procedure. For example, in his proof of the law of *triple* negation (e.g. (1981), p.12). he first assumes $\neg\ \neg\ \neg\ A$ (that is, $\neg\ \neg\ A \rightarrow \perp$) and then show how we can transform that construction into a proof of $\neg A$ (that is, into a proof of $A \rightarrow \perp$), independently of any actual proof of the former. Moreover, every notable intuitionstic proof of a conditional statement has proceeded in a similar way as well (Dummett (1977), pp. 15 and 104).

8. *Disjunction, Conjunction, and* $\leftrightarrow$

From his discussion of the law of excluded middle we can see that in order to accept a disjunction Brouwer required that one of the disjuncts in known to hold — or at least that a decision procedure is known which could be used to determine which one —.This is something on which he insists many times. The following quote provides an illustration:

> "Now consider the *principium tertii exclusi*: it claims that every supposition is either true or false; in mathematics this means that for every supposed inbedding of a system into another, satisfying certain given conditions, we can either accomplish such an imbedding by a construction, or we can arrive by a construction at the arrestment of the process which would lead to the imbedding. It follows that the question of the validity of the *principium tertii exclusi* is equivalent to the question *whether unsolvable mathematical problems can exist.* There is not a shred of a proof for the conviction, which has sometimes been put forward that there exist no unsolvable mathematical problems.
>
> "Insofar as only finite discrete systems are introduced, the investigation whether an imbedding is possible or not, can always be carried out and admits a definite result, so in this case the *principium tertii exclusi* is reliable as a principle of reasoning." (1908, pp. 109).

However "in infinite systems the *principium tertii exclusi* is as yet not reliable " (p.110).

In this way Brouwer succeeds in attaching a constructive meaning to

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disjunction statements: to assert a disjunction, the subject must be able to perform the constructions corresponding to one of the disjuncts.

Conjunction shall not detain us long.This is indeed, among the five logical operators, the only one which essentially does not change its meaning. except for the fact that it is now embedded in an intuitionistic language, and the other logical operators to which it relates are different from those of classical mathematics.

For that matter, the biconditional is also *defined as in classical logic* - e.g. '$A \leftrightarrow B$' is an abbreviation of ' $(A \rightarrow B)\ (B \rightarrow A)$'. This is not to say that intuitionistically '$A \leftrightarrow B$" means the same as in classical logic, because again both '$A \rightarrow B$' nad '$B \rightarrow A$' have changed their meaning with respect to classical logic.

Similarly, 'A $\wedge$ B' does not mean the same, because A and B will have also changed their meaning with respect to their classical counterparts.

9. *The Quantifiers*

Brouwer's conception of the existential quantifier is probably the most characteristic of all the logical operators. Intuitionistically mathematical objects are not assumed to exist by themselves, but only as a result of a generation of construction process. To prove that a certain entity satisfying a given condition exists, it is not enough, for example, to reduce the hypothesis that it did not exist to a contradiction: we must actually produce one, or at least show how it could be produced: " (···) in intuitionist mathematics a mathematical entity is not necessarily predeterminate" (1955, p. 552). This means that $\exists$ can no longer be read as 'there is' in the classical sense – i.e. there exists independently of us –, but rather, as 'we can construct'.

The following quote is an illustration :

> "(...) now let us pass to infinite systems and ask for instance if there exists a natural number n such that in the decimal expansion of π the nth, (n+1)th, ..., (n+8)th, and (n+9)th digits form a sequence 0123456789. This question (...) can be answered neither affirmatively nor negatively. But then, from the intuitionist point of view, because

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outside human thought there are no mathematical truths, the assertion that in the decimal expansion of π a sequence 0123456789 either does or does not occur is devoid of sense." (1981, p.6).

Finally, as for the universal quantifier, Brouwer's requirement for a proof of a universal statement$\forall$ x A (x) was that method had been produced to establish A (c) for each element c in the domain. In particular it would not be enough, as before, to derive a contradiction from the hypothesis that an object d such that $\neg$ A (d) exists; that derivation would not be enough in general to prove A (c) of evey individual c. Instead, he required an effective method – a construction – for doing exactly this.

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THE PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE IN QUANTIFICATION LOGIC

KANTILAL DAS

I

The problem of existence not only vitiates the traditional system, it vitiates the quantification logic as well. In quantification logic one can legitimately infer 'Fy' from '(x) Fx' by applying UI on "(x) Fx'; and '(∃x) Fx' from 'Fy' by applying EG on 'Fy'. Since logic deals with the 'form', but not with the 'content' of proposition, prima facie, one should not be concerned about what the variable 'y' stands for. Of course, logicians have interpreted 'y' as an arbitrarily selected individual. But the term arbitrarily selected individual' is very much unperspicuous. Following Nicholas Rescher, Mackie says:" ... that any talk of" arbitrarily selected individual "is inept and misleading, that if S is said to be an" arbitrary element" it is not an "element" or individual at all, but a notational device, a surrogate for individuals."[1] Now, if the variable 'y' being an arbitrarily selected individual, is supposed to be vague, unperspicuous, a problem may arise in its interpretation. The problem will come into existence when one will try to interpret the rules of UI and EG in terms of empty noun expressions. In this paper, I shall try to explain, as clearly as I can, where the problem of existence actually lies submerged in quantification logic. What will be the impact if quantification logic is to be understood with regard to the notion of existence? Or what will be the impact if the said logic is to be understood irrespective of the notion of existence?

II

The problem which I am going to envisage, has centred round in

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 3
July 2000

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Quine's many writings. In his celebrated article: "On What There Is", Quine remarks : " A curious thing about the ontological problem is its simplicity. It can be put into three Anglo - Saxon monosyllables: 'What is there?' It can be answered moreover in a word - 'Everything' - and everyone will accept this answer as true."[2] The same remak, of course, in different tone of voice, is found in his *Mathematical Logic*. There Quine says: "To say that *Something* does not exist, or that there is something which *is not*, is clearly a contradiction in terms, hence' (x) (x exists)' must be true"[3] But in the subsequent lines of the same book, Quine draws our attention to an obvious predicament. He opines that on the basis of the true assertion '(x) (x exists)', one can infer true, false or even meaningless conclusion from it. He says, '... from the truth of '(x) (x exists)' one can logically derive not only to the true conclusion 'Europe exists' but also to the controversial conclusion 'God exists' and the false conclusion "Pegasus exists if we accept 'Europe' "God' and 'Pegasus' as primitive names in our language."[4] This makes sense to say when we infer 'Fy' from '(x) Fx' we may have different sorts of conclusions, subject to the interpretation of 'y'. If we make sense of 'F' as exists' and substitute 'Europe' for 'y', then the inference holds good; if we make sense of 'F' as exists ' and substitute 'Pegasus' for 'y', the inference is to be false; since 'Pegasus' lacks existence; and again if we make sense of 'F' as 'exists' and substitute 'God' for 'y' then the inference is to be controversial as the existence of 'God' is itself controversial. So for Quine whether the inference (1) (x) Fx, so Fy, and the inference (2) Fy, so $(\exists x)Fx$ are to be valid or not depends entirely on what the arbitrarily selected individual, viz, 'y' stands for. It seems clear from the above that if the variable 'y', being an arbitrarily selected individual, stands for non-empty noun-expressions, or in other words, if the variable 'y' is substituted only by non-empty noun expressions, then of course the above inferences hold good, but if 'y' stands for or is substituted by empty noun expressions, then the said inferences are thought to be illegitimate. According to Quine, the following two inferences are objectionable to our intuitions These are:

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Inference : a

1. (x) Fx
   / ∴ Fy } Corresponding to : (x) (x exists)
   So, Pegasus exists.
2. Fy 1, UI

Inference : b

1. Fy
   /∴ (∃x) Fx} Corresponding to : Pegasus does not exist
   So, (∃x) (x does not exist)
2. (∃x) Fx 1, EG

Quine seems to have believed that the above two inferences are objectionable simply for the fact that in each inference we have a false conclusion from a true premise. But this is not the case which actually happens in all inferences. Let us consider the following two inferences which are not objectionable on the same ground.

Inference a'

1. (x) Fx
   / ∴ Fy } Corresponding to : (x) (x exists)
   So, Socrates exists
2. Fy 1, UI

Inference b

1. Fy
   /∴ (∃x) Fx Corresponding to : Socrates, does not exist
   So, (∃x) (x does not exist)
2. (∃x) Fx 1, EG

Unlike (a) and (b) we have a true conclusion from a true premise both in (a') and (b'). This makes sense to say that the rules of UI as well as EG do not hold good for each and every interpretation of 'F' (where F stands for predicate expression) and each and every substitution for the free variable.

Uptil now, we have examined, following Quine, in what situation the applications of UI as well as EG give rise to a false conclusion from a true

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premise; and in what set-up the applications of UI as well as EG give rise to a true conclusion from a true premise. It can be said that an inference can preserve its validity only if the applications of UI and EG are confined to the non-empty noun expressions for which the variable 'y' stands for. This view is taken into account simply for considering empty noun-expressions as meningless. If it has been presupposed that all noun-expressions, irrespective of empty or non empty, are meaningful, then no problem will arise in interpreting the above inferences. And at the same time the rules of UI as well as EG can be applied without imposing any reservation on them. So it is a matter of *decision* whether empty noun-expressions are to be regarded as meaningful or not. Philosophers, however, have disagreed on this vital issue. A few influential philosophers hold that a noun-expression can be meaningless if it lacks existence, i.e. if it fails to designate or denote anything. Quine, however, does not agree with the idea that empty noun-expressions are meaningless simply for the fact that they fail to designate anything. Unlike many other philosophers, he favours the use of such words as 'Pegasus', 'Cerberus' 'Centaur' etc., under certain reservations. Instead of considering such words as meaningless, he rather sets out different logical laws for contemplating such terms. He opines that there are certain unequivocal rules which can be proved as true for any noun-expressions, empty or non-empty, and also there are certain unequivocal rules which can be used only for non-empty noun-expressions. Since Quine solicits or aspires to different sets of rules for contemplating empty or non-empty noun-expressions, one has to make sure beforehand whether the noun-expression, he may like to employ, is empty or not. This, of course, is an empirical decision. Quine further claims that all the restrictions that we have, should be observed not only in the case of empty noun-expressions; but also in the case of those expressions which are yet to be identified specifically either as empty or non-empty.

III

Czeslaw Lejewski, however, does not agree with the conviction that

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some of our rules of inference are based on empirical enquiry. For him the so-called empirical enquiry is exotic to the character of logical enquiry. Instead of quizing empirical information, says Lejewski, one has to look into a thorough re-examination of the inference. He then goes on to examine on what ground the assertion '(x) (x exists)' is taken as true; while the assertion '(∃x) (x does not exist) is taken as false by Quine. Besides this, he also endeavours the logical method by which the rules of UI and EG can be applied legitimately to reasoning with empty noun-expressions. Finding out a solution on these quips, he, however, turns into the interpretation of the quantifiers.

According to Lejewski, as far as existence of the noun-expressions is concerned, we find two types of interpretations of the quantifiers, viz., the restricted as well as the unrestricted. Those who stand by the restricted interpretation have opted for substituting individual variable with regard to non-empty noun-expressions. On the contrary, those who comply with the unrestricted interpretation have gone for substituting individual variable with regard to both empty and non-empty noun-expressions. So far as the scope of the applications of UI and EG are concerned, the restricted interpretation is limited while the unrestricted interpretations is unlimited. Let us first explain the restricted interpretation of the qunatifiers.

The Restricted interpretation of the quantifiers :

In outlining the restricted interpretation of the quantifiers, Lejewski, however, refers to Quine's interpretation of the quantifiers which has been approved by most of the modern logicians. In his *Methods of Logic*, Quine remarks: "If we think of the universe as limited to a finite set of objects a,b, ..., h , we can expand existential quantifications into alternations and universal quantification into conjunctions, '(∃x) Fx' and (x) Fx become respectively:

Fa V Fb ... V Fh, Fa . Fb ...b . Fh"[5]

Ensuing Quninian interpretation of the quantifiers, Lejewski, however, circumscribes the universe fictitiously. He says, let us suppose that the

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world consists of just two objects, such as, 'a' and 'b'. Accordingly, the corresponding expansions of '(x) Fx and '(∃x) Fx' become . Fa . Fb and Fa ∨ Fb', respectively. Having presupposed the universe in such a manner, Lejewski; however, does not rule out the appearance of any new noun-expressions in the universe. Precluding noun-expressions as a linguistic matter, he then goes on to say that the language we do practice and employ may leave room for new noun-expressions other than the singular names, such as, 'a' and 'b' cited above. Suppose, by taking the advantage of language, one may familiarise a new noun-expression, say c, which fails to designate either 'a' or 'b'. Since 'a' and 'b' are the only real names in the universe and 'c' fails to designate either of these; 'c' must be an empty noun-expression. Again one may also presuppose a noun-expression, viz, 'd', which designates either 'a' or 'b'. Since an appearance of a new noun-expression is a linguistic concern, it does not vitiate the universe comprising 'a' and 'b' only; nor does it produce irrelevant consequence in interpreting the universe. Again, as 'c' is an ampty noun-expression, the proposition regarding 'c' namely, 'c does not exit' turns out to be true. And moreover, by converting the noun-expression 'd' into a predicate-expression 'D', one may assert a true proposition '(x) Dx' by virtue of the fact that 'd' designates either 'a' or 'b' and hence the proposition (x) Dx' can be instantiated either in Da' or in 'Db'. Under this interpretation an entity belongs to the universe only if it exists. Or in other words, to say that something exists is tantamount to saying that it belongs to the universe. In this sense the proposition 'a exists' and proposition 'b' exists' turn out to be true and their negations such as' a does not exist' and 'b' does not exist' also turn out to be false. Again if the propositions 'a exists' and 'b exists' are taken to be true, we have a true proposition, say (∃x) Fx' from either anyone of these. And further if, (∃x) Fx' is taken to be true, then, of course, the proposition namely, '(∃x) (x does not exist)' becomes false. Again if '(∃x) (x does not exist)' is taken to be false, then its negation, namely, the proposition '(x) (x exists)', happens to be true. This is authenticated by the expansion of universal proposition. The expansion of '(x) Fx', as we saw earlier, is 'Fa. Fb'. Both 'Fa' and 'Fb' are held to be true in isolation, so their conjunction is also held to be true. But what can we think about 'c' or 'd' ? As they do not belong to the universe, the rules of UI

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and EG do not hold good if applied to 'c' or 'd'. Lejewski says, "Within the fictitious universe the rule of universal instantiation and the rule of existential generalisation fail if applied to 'c' or 'd'. They are valid rules of inference if their application is restricted to reasoning with 'a' and 'b'.

Having delineated the restricted interpretation of the quantifiers in the above manner, let us pass on to appraise, after Lejewski, the following two points put up by Quine. These are :

(i) In what sence Quine asserts that the proposition '(x) (x exists)' and the proposition (∃x) (x does not exist)' have turned out to be true if we adhere to the restricted interpretation of the quantifiers.

(ii) In what sense the inferences (1) and (2), cited earlier, do not hold good for every interpretation of F (where F stands for a predicate expression) and for all substitution for the free variable 'y'.

Let us try to answer the above two questions in the light of the restricted interpretation. Since the restricted interpretation of the quantifiers deals with the notion of existence, the assertions:

(a) (x) (x exists)

(b) (∃x) (x does not exist)

can be logically paraphrased as :

(a') (x) (x exists ⊃ x exists)

(b') (∃x) (x exists and x does not exist)

Now, on the basis of (a') and (b'), it is obvious why (a) is accepted as true, and (b) is accepted as false. As far as the restricted interpretation is concerned both the pairs (a) and (a'); and (b) and (b') are equivalent in the sense that in each pair one logically entails and is entailed by the other. It is clear that (a') is a mere tautology and what it entails, namely (a), must be true. Again (b') is a mere self-contradiction, so what it entails must be false.

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Now, it is clear in what sense Quine holds that the proposition (a) is true and the proposition (b) is false.

In answering to the second point, let us consider the following expressions in the light of the restricted interpretation :

1. $(x)\ Fx \supset Fy$

2. $Fy \supset (\exists x)\ Fx$

As in this interpretation, we are allowed to use the notion of existence, the above two expressions (i.e., 1 and 2) can be logically paraphrased as :

(1a) (x) (x exists $\supset$ Fa) $\supset$ Fy

(2a) $Fy \supset (\exists x)$ (x exist . Fx)

Paraphrasing (1) and (2) into (1a) and (2a), let us presuppose that 'F' stands for 'exists' and 'y' stands for Pegasus'. On the basis of this presupposition it seems clear that the antecedent of (1a) becomes a tautology; but at the same time its consequent turns out to be false. Accordingly, the inference is proved to be illegitimate for having a false conclusion from a true premise. Again, if it is presupposed that 'F' stands for 'does not exist' and 'y' stands for 'Pegasus' then the antecedent of (2a) turns out to be true and its consequent becomes false, the inference is to be regarded as invalid again for having a false conclusion from a true premise.

Again, consider the expressions (1) and (2) cited above with regard to the following assertions.

Suppose 'F' stands for 'exists' and 'y' stands for 'Socrates' then from (1), we have the inference.

(1b) (x) (x exists $\supset$ Fx) $\supset$ Socrates exists.

which is supposed to be valid as here we have a true conclusion from a true premise. Again, if it is presupposed that 'F' stands for 'does not exist' and 'y' stands for 'Socrates'. then from (2), we have the following inference :

(2b) Socrates does not exist $\supset$ $(\exists$ x) (x exists . x does not exist) which

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again is supposed to be consistent as here we have a false conclusion from a false premise. The above consideration makes it clear why the above inferences do not hold good for every substitution for the free variable 'y'. If 'y' is substituted by an empty noun-expression, the inference under consideration does not hold good but if 'y' is substituted by a non-empty noun-expression, then the inferences hold good.

Uptil now we have considered the restricted interpretation of the quantifiers. As far as the existential import is concerned, we find a specific reservation on the uses of UI and EG. Logicians of course, do impose some restrictions on the uses of UI and EG, but the reservation that we have in the restricted interpretation is not similar to them. In quantification logic, when we have ('x) Fx' we can instantiate it by 'Fy' without knowing what 'y' stands for. An individual variable, 'y' may stand for any noun-expressions, empty or non-empty. Quantification logic should not be restricted or even perhaps cannot be apprehended in connection with the restricted interpretation of the quantifiers, rather it should be udnerstood in a pervasive point of view so that it includes all noun-expressions, empty or non-empty, as meaningful. In this regard Lejewski advocates the unrestricted interpretation of the quantifiers. Let us pass on to explain the unrestricted interpretation of the qunatifiers following Lejewski.

IV

The Unrestricted Interpretation of the Quantifiers :

In formulating the unrestricted interpretation of the quantifiers. Lejewski, however, goes along with Lesinewski who adopted a similar interpretation. Like the restricted interpretation, Lejewski, admits the universe consisting of just two objects, such as, 'a' and 'b'; but unlike the restricted interpretation empty noun-expressions do not function as the components of the expansions of the quantifiers; but in the case of unrestricted interpretation both empty as well as non-empty noun-expressions do function as the components of teh expansions of the quantifiers. Accordingly, under the

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present interpretation '(∃x) Fx' becomes 'Fa V Fb V Fc V Fd', and '(x) Fx' becomes : 'Fa . Fb . Fc . Fd', where 'a' and 'b' stand for non-empty noun-expressions; 'c' stands for an empty noun-expression and 'd' stands for a general non-empty noun expression. Here 'd' is a general non-empty noun-expression in the sense that it denotes either 'a' or 'b'.

Let us examine in what sense the restricted interpretation differs from the unrestricted one. It is said that the restricted interpretation of quantifiers be at odds with the unrestricted on two important counts : (i) unlike the restricted interpretation here all noun-expressions, irrespective of empty or non-empty, are regarded as meaningful; and (ii) all empty noun-expressions do function as the components of the expansions of the quantifiers. Following the two important differences, let us find out ,more differences between the two interpretations. Unlike the restricted interpretation the proposition, (∃x) (x does not exist) happens to be true since in this interprectation the proposition 'c' does not exist' is true. Now, if it is asserted that the proposition '(∃x) (x does not exist)' is true, then on the same ground the proposition '(x) Fx' turns out to be false. But the proposition, and (x) Fx' is proved to be true in the restricted interpretation. This is made clear in another way. If it is said that 'c does not exist' (i.e., in symbol ~ Fc) is true; then of course 'c exists' (in symbol Fc) becomes false. Now, if 'Fc' turns out to be false, then the expansion of and '(x) Fx' i.e., 'Fa. Fb. Fc. Fd' also turns out to be false so '(x) Fx' is false. But in the restricted interpretation of the quantifiers, we have seen that both the propositions' (∃x) (x does not exist) and '(x) Fx' became false and true respectively. The outcome of this interpretation is that it does not set up any restriction regarding the application of the rules of UI and EG. Both the rules can be applied without knowing whether a noun-expression is empty or non-empty. Under this interpretation the variable 'y' can not only be substituted by non-empty noun-expression, but it can also be substituted by empty as well as non-empty general noun-expressions. Unlike the restricted interpretation here the general noun-expression 'd' need not be converted into the predicate-expression 'D'.

Again, we make a comparison between the restricted and the

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unrestricted interpretation of the quantifiers. We have seen that in the case of the restricted interpretation, the inferences (1) and (2) become true if the variable 'y' is substituted by a non-empty noun-expression, and the said inferences become false if the variable 'y' is substituted by an empty noun-expression. But in the case of unrestricted interpretation both the said inferences turn out to be consistent without specifying what the individual variable 'y' stands for. Unlike the restricted interpretation the propositions, namely, 'Pegasus exists' and 'Pegasus does not exist' are meaningful in the unrestricted interpretation. Here every noun-expression, empty or non-empty, must be regarded as meaningful and accordingly may be treated as a component of quantificational expressions. Now, the proposition 'Pegasus exists' is false as there is no Pegasus existing in the universe. If the proposition 'Pegasus exists, is false then the corresponding unviersal proposition '(x) (x exists)' must also be false. Since by the expansions of '(x) (x exists)' we have a conjunctive proposition of many components of which at least one component, namely, Pegasus exists, turns out to be false. Accordingly, the conjunctive proposition turns out to be false and hence '(x) (x exists)' becomes false. As a matter of fact the inference (1) turns out to be consistent as here we have a false conclusions from a false premise. But the same inference turns out to be false in the case of the restricted interpretation. Again, if it is asserted that the proposition 'Pegasus exists' is false, it is *ipso-facto* asserted that the proposition 'Pegasus does not exist' is true. If the proposition ' Pegasus does not exist' is asserted as true then the proposition '(∃x) (x does not exist)' also turns out to be true. Hence the inference (2) becomes consistent for having a true conclusion from a true premise. But the same inference became false in the restricted interpretation as there we had a false conclusion from a true premises. So Lejewski goes on to say that unlike the restricted interpretation; the two inferences thus considered "cannot be used as counter examples to disprove the validity of the rules of universal instantiation and existential generalisation in application to reasoning with empty noun-expressions"[7] in the unrestricted interpretation.

So far we have examined, following Lejewski, the restricted as well as the unrestricted interpretation of the quantifiers with regard to a finite

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universe. In both these itnerpretations, it is presupposed that the universe under consideration consists of just two singular names, viz, 'a' and 'b' and on the basis of this assumption the corresponding expansions of the quantifiers have been examined. It is said that the unviersal porposition '(x) Fx' is *equivalent* to its expansion, such as 'Fa. Fb; and the particular proposition '(∃x) Fx' is *equivalent* to its expansion, such as, {'Fa V Fb}. Under this presupposition the logical propositions (x) Fx ≡ {Fa. Fb} and (∃x) Fx ≡ {Fa V Fb} hold good but the principle of eauivalance between quantifier and its expansion is taken good enough as long as the unvierse is confined within a limited number of noun-expressions. Can we adopt the same relation between the quantifier and its expansion if the universe under consideration is supposed to be infinite? The answer, says Lejewski, is no. If the universe is supposed to be infinite having unknown number of objects, then we perhaps may not establish an equivalent tie between the quantifier and its expansion, because in such a case we cannot complete the expansion of our quantification. It would be imprudent for us to claim that : (x) Fx = {Fa . Fb . Fc ... Fx}; but it would logically be sound to say that (x) Fx ⊃ {Fa. Fb . Fc ... Fx}. Again , we should not say that: (∃x) Fx = {Fa ∨ Fb ∨ Fc ∨ ... Fn}; but it is rather logically justifiable to say that : (∃x) Fx ⊃ {Fa ⊃ Fb ⊃ Fc ... Fn}. That is why Lejewski has rightly pointed out by saying that in the case of infinite universe, one should dissolute equivalence in favour of implication. So instead of saying that a universal quantification is *equivalent* to any component of its infinite expansion, it is logically innocuous to say that a universal quantification *implies* any component of its infinite expansion. Similarly, instead of saying that an existential quantification is *equivalent* to any component of its infinite expansion, it is logically impregnable to say that an existential quantification is *implied* by any component of its infinite expansion. So whether the universe is to be presupposed as finite or infinite it is a matter of decision. It is a decision on the part of the interpreter. But whatever the universe may be, finite or infinite, it does not, masquerade the interpretation of the quantifiers. What is important to be observed here is that under the restricted interpretation every noun-expression must denote only one object

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that belongs to the universe. But in the unrestricted interpretation whether a noun-expression designates or not, is not important to be observed. Here a noun-expression may designate only one object; it may designate more the restricted and the unrestricted interpretation is that in the case of the restricted interpretation, whether a noun-expression is meaningful or not, is decided simply by the fact whether it designates or fails to designate any object in the universe. But in the case of the unrestricted interpretation every noun-expression is to be meaningful even if it fails to designate anything.

A few Advantages of the Unrestricted Interpretation of the Quantifiers :

Lejewski favours the unrestricted interpretation rather than the restricted one. For him, besides so many other advantages, it ensures a uniform application of the rules of UI and EG with regard to any noun-expressions, empty or non-empty. It enables us to overcome so many difficulties quantification logic suffers from. Let us focus on a few problems of quantification logic which can be solved by the unrestricted interpretation of the quantifiers.

We have already noticed that quantification logic suffers from a serious setback. If it is understood with regard to the restricted interpretation the inferences '$(\exists x)\ Fx \supset Fy$' and '$Fy \supset (\exists x)\ Fx$' are not universally valid. Their validity, we observe, depends on the very meaning of the idividual variable 'y'. But in the quantification logic we are not concerned about what 'y' stands for. We can infer 'Fy' from (x) Fx' by applying the rule of UI. We do, of course, make it sure that 'y' stands for any noun-expression, but we are at the same time at inconvenience to make it sure whether 'y' stands for either 'Pegasus', or 'Socrates', or 'Unicorn'.So when we have 'Fy' from '(x) Fx' without knowing for what noun expression 'y' stands for we are really acknowledging the unrestricted interpretation of the quantifiers. This is made possible mainly for considering every noun-expression as meaningful. If it is presupposed that each proposition stands for any noun-expression and thereby regarded as a component of the quantificational expansions, then it is *ipso-facto* claimed that every noun-expression is implied by the

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corresponding unviersal proposition and it implies the corresponding existential proposition. Suppose 'Fa' is a proposition in which 'a' stands for a noun-expression, empty or non-empty, then 'Fa' must be regareded as a component of the quantificational expansions. If this is so, then it implies '(∃x) Fx' and is implied by '(x) Fx'. In this regard both the inferences namely, (1) and (2), become true. But this would not be the case if the quantificational theory is to be understood in connection with the restricted interpretation.

The unrestricted interpretation also gets rid of another important difficulty from quantification theory. Many philosophers have felt that the schemata, such as, (i), (∃ x) (Fx V- Fx)'and (ii) '(x) Fx ⊃ (∃x) Fx' can be valid only if the universe is conceived to be non-empty. They are not valid in the empty universe as their truth depends on their being something. This makes sense to say that whatever is true of the object named by a given singular term is true of something; and clearly the inferences under consideration lose their justification when the singular term in question does not happen to name. Quine remarks: "It has frequently been claimed that though the schemata: (i), (∃ x) (Fx V~ Fx)'and (ii) '(x) Fx ⊃ (∃x) Fx' are demonstrable in quantification theory, the statements of the forms which these schemata depict are not logically true. For, it is argued, such statements depend for their truth upon their being someting in the unvierse; and that there is something is, though true, not logically true."[8] Quine, then, rules out the empty universe for contemplating such schemata. He holds that in quantification logic the study of such schemata is entirely pointless if the universe is assumed to be empty. He, therefore, puts forward to dismantle the empty universe as relatively pointless and thereby holds that the study of quantification theory is to be worthwhile if the universe in known or confidently believed to be non-empty. This again confirms that the above schemata fail for the empty universe if we understand the quantifiers with regard to the restricted interpretation. This becomes evident from (1a) (∃x) (x exists.(Fx ∨ ~ Fx)' and (2a) '(x) (x exists ⊃ Fx) ⊃ (∃ x) (x exists.Fx), which are the corresponding translations of (1) and (2) respectively. It seems clear that both (1a) and (2a) turn out to be false if there exists nothing. If the universe is supposed to be empty, then (1a) turns

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out to be false simply for the fact that 'x exists' is false in (1a). (2a) also turns out to be false, because although its antecedent is true, its consequent becomes false and hence the inference becomes false for having a false conclusion from a true premise. But this would not be the case if we comply with the unrestricted interpretation. In this interpretation both the inferences turn out to be true irrespective of whether the universe is assumed to be empty or non-empty. Since this interpretation admits every noun-expression, empty or non-empty, as meaningful and thereby considers it as a component of the quantifier expansion, it follows logically that ' (∃x) (Fx V ~ Fx)' is implied by any component of the type 'Fa V ~ Fa'. Even if, it is asserted that ∃x) (Fx V ~ Fx) is implied by the quantifier expression (Fa V~Fa) where 'a' stands for an empty noun-expression, the expression '(∃x) (Fx V ~ Fx)' still turns out to be true. This is made possible, says Lejewski, mainly for the fact that the component 'Fa V ~ Fa' is not only true for a particular choice of universe; but also true for any choice of universe and hence true for (∃x) (Fx V ~ Fx). Again, if it is said that the antecedent of '(x) Fx ⊃ (∃x) Fx' turns out to be true, then by virtue of this assetion, it is *ipso-facto* asseted a proposition of type 'Fa' which is implied by '(x) Fx'. This is made possible in harmony with the unrestricted interpretation of the universal quantifier. Again, if we get 'Fa' as true from '(x) Fx', then we have' (∃x) Fx from 'Fa' too, since under this interpreatation any component of the quantificational expansions implies in turn the corresponding proposition of type '(∃x) Fx'. '. Accordingly, '(x) Fx ⊃ (∃ x) Fx' turns out to be true in the unrestricted interpretation. Lejewski says, ... in the establishing of the truth value of (∃ x) (Fx V-Fx) and (∃ x) Fx ⊃ (∃ x) Fx the problem of whether the universe is empty or non-empty is alogether irrelevant on condition, of course, that we adopt the unrestricted interpretation of the quantifier."[9]

Now if it is asserted that (∃ x) Fx' is logically implied by '(x) Fx' by virtue of the fact that (x) Fx' implies 'Fa' and 'Fa' implies (∃ x)Fx, then it is claimed that under this interpretation the existential quantifier lacks existential import. If 'a' in Fa stands for an empty noun-expression and 'Fa' logically implies '(∃ x) Fx' on account of the fact that any component of the quantificational expressions implies '(∃ x) Fx' then, of course. (∃ x) Fx' has no

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existential import. This makes sense to say that under this interpretation existential quantification has no existential import. So according to Lejewski under this interpretation the reading of '(∃x)' as there exists an x such that Fx' is wrong. He says. "... it would be misleading to read '((∃) Fx' as 'there exists an x such that Fx'. The non-committal' for some x, Fx' seems to be more appropriate."[10] Now, if the logical phrase 'there exists an x such that Fx' is replaced by for some x, Fx', then of course, the existential quantification should be replaced by 'particular quantification' as well as the existential quantifier should also be replaced by 'particular quantifier.'

Lejewski, then, points out another important feature for which he favours the unrestricted interpretation rather than the restricted one. For him unlike the restricted interpretation, the unrestricted interpretation has a close proximity to ordinary usage. Ordinarily, we do not believe that 'everything exists' and also we do not find any contradiction by saying that 'something does not exist.' But the logician's ingenuinity or innovativeness apprehends these statements rather differently. If we abide by the restricted interpretation, it seems clear to us that the proposition 'Something does not exist" turns into a contradiction and accordingly, the proposition 'Everything exists' becomes true. But this line of logical thinking is contrary to the ordinary line of thinking. By way of expounding the unrestricted interpretation of the quantifiers, Lejewski observes, logicians not only overcome the boom of the restricted interpretation, but also establish 'a nearer approximation to ordinary usage.' But this does not mean that by way of formulating the unrestricted interpretation, logicians deviate from quantificational theory. Rather it is claimed that the unrestricted interpretation of the qualifiers has a close approximation to the formal quantification theroy.

Claiming the inviolability or sanctity of the unrestricted interpretation, Lejewski, however, throws a challenge to find out a formula which is demonstrable in the formal quantification theory, but which is not applicable to the unrestricted interpretation of the quantifiers. He says, "I do not know of any formulae which are demonstrable in the formal quantification theory and which, under the unrestricted interpretation, are not applicable to reasoning with empty noun-expressions or do not hold for universe of some

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specific size."[11] Lejewski opines that it is a great slip-up on the logicians part not to comply with the restricted interpretation; but to work out this interpretation with a strict adherence to the notion of existence. Quantification logic, should not or even perhaps cannot be interpreted with the notion of existence. If it does, then it would be the logic of 'content' rather than the 'form' of proposition. Following Von Wright we can say that the sole and whole business of quantificational logic is to detect the 'form' but not the 'content' of the proposition. The restricted interpretation of the quantifiers should not be accepted mainly for considering the idea of quantification with the notion of existence. Lejewski says, "In' my opinion the most serious disadvantage of the theory of the restricted quantification is that by merging the idea of quantification with the notion of existence it has put logicians and philosophers on a wrong track in their endeavours to elucidate the problem of existence in logic."[12] If Lejewski is right in his own standpoint, we think actually he is, then our all important conclusion is that the commendation of the unrestricted interpretation is an advancement in solving the problem of existence in quantification theory.

NOTES

1. Mackie, J.L. : "The Rules of Natural Deduction", *Analysis*: 19.2, December 1958; p.27
2. Quine, W.V. :"On What There Is, "in *From* a *Logical Point of view*; Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1953, p.1
3. Quine, W.V. : *Mathematical Logic*, Harvard University Press, 1951, p. 150
4. *Ibid.*, p.150
5. Quine, W.V. : *Methods of Logic*, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1952, P. 117.
6. Lejewski, C. : "Logic and Existence" in *Logic and Philosophy*, Edited by J Buchler and S. P. Lamprechat, The Century Philosophy Series, P. 167.
7. *Ibid.*, P.175

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8. Quine, W.V. : *From* a *Logical Point of View, op. cit.*, P.160
9. Lejewski, C. *: op. cit., P. 177*
10. *Ibid.*, P. 177
11. *Ibid.*, p. 177
12. *Ibid.*, p. 177

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THE CONCEPTS OF METAPHOR AND TRUTH : AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

RAGHUNATH GHOSH

In Indian tradition the phenomenon of metaphor is explained by the term *Rūpaka*, a kind of alaṁkāra. The characteristic features of *Rūpaka* or metaphor are as follows. The imposition of identity (*abhedāropa*) between the object considered as well-standard (*upamāna*) and the subject of description (*upamey*) is called metaphor. Metaphor remains in the representation of the subject of description, which is not concealed, as identified with another (well known standard) ("*Rūpakam rūpitaropād viṣaye nirapahnave*"[1]) . The subject is an entity on which something is superimposed. When the face is identified with the moon (*mukhacandra*), face is a visaya or subject upon which *candratva* is superimposed. On the other hand, *Viṣaya* is the subject superimposed upon another i.e. moon which is visayi as it is superimposed on 'face'. In other words, *Viṣaya* or *Upameya* is 'face' which is identical with the 'moon. In this case the distinction between these is not concealed in spite of having excessive similarity.[2] In other words, the ascription of identification between two objects inspite of not concealing their difference. ('*Atisāmyāt anapahnutabhedayoḥ upamānopameyayoḥ abhedāropaḥ*') is *Rūpaka.*

The phrase *'nirapahnava'* appeared in the definition bears a great significance on account of the fact that it can differentiate metaphor or *Rupaka* from illusion and *Apahnuti.* In the case of *Rupaka* the distinction between *upamāna* and *upameya*, though known, is not concealed but in the case of illusion the distinction between them is not ascertained at all (*bhedāgraha*). In *Apahnuti* an object is denied to be what it really is and something else is ascribed to it. (e.g. This is not face, but the moon-*nedaṁ*

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 3
July 2000

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mukham kintu candra) while in Rupaka there is no such denial.[3] As the Viṣayī imposes its form (*rūpa)* on the Viṣaya, it is called *Rūpaka.* Though two objects possess different opposite properties and though their distinction is completely known, yet sometimes there is hypothetical ascription of identity in order to show their extreme similarity (*kālapanikabhedāropaḥ*). We may quote here a beautiful example of *Rūpaka* from Āyurveda, which runs as follows : "*Vāyupittakaphebhānām Śarīravanacārinam eka eva nihantāsti lavanārdrakakeśarī*". (That is, the lion in the form of salt with wet-ginger is the only killer of the elephants in the forms of wind, bile and cough roaming about the forest in the form of body). In this case we find so many metaphors as body is identified with forest, wind etc. with elephants and salt etc. with lion.

In these cases both the counterparts of the metaphor are mentioned. But there are a few cases of metaphor where there is no mention of either of the counter-parts like *upamāna* or *upameya.* as in the case of implicative and suggestive meaning. Here in most of the cases *Upamāna* is mentioned clearly and *Upameya* is assumed after taking the literal meaning of the term into account.

This assumption may vary from man to man, which entails that *Upamiti* varies from individual to individual though *Upāmana* is the same. When Buddha says to his disciples - "The Sun is set' (*gataḥ astamarkaḥ*) the main import of the sentence which is conveyed here is taken in different ways by three disciples according to their own desire and purpose. In this case the desire and purpose of a disciple which is *Upameya* is identified with the setting of the sun which is Upamana. Hence, this may be taken as a case of metaphor. But the problem arises as to the fact that we do not know clearly the object which is metaphorised. Three disciples having different *saṁkāras* may have diffferent desire and purpose which is indicated by the single *Upamāna.* From this it follows that the use of metaphor does not always help in making an accurate or precise statement but instead it may lead us to the world of ambiguity. Hence, the position of those who believe that metaphor is used for better and precise communication is not always true. Such is the case with suggestive meaning. In the case of *Mukhacandra*

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the *Upamāna and Upameya* are mentioned clearly and hence, there is no ambiguity. The metaphors in the forms of implication and suggestion have got aesthetic value no doubt and hence they may be desirable in literature. But in our everyday life they may not be always desirable as they stand as obstacle to our understanding. In these cases *upameya* is not constant though *upamāna* remains the same. Like other language the metaphorical language is also to be understood from the convention which is described by the Naiyāyikas as *Vṛddhavyavahāra* (i.e. verbel usage of the seniors) in most of the cases, but not in all cases. If someone hears a metaphor for the first time, it will not be able to yield any knowledge to him due to the absence of conventional meaning. It is true that sometimes metaphors are used intentionally only to keep a thing ambiguous. Ambiguity of language may sometimes be virtuous or sometimes vicious depending on the situations or contexts. The use of metaphor does not always communicate in a better way, but it may create misunderstanding also.

Metaphors are used after keeping the characters of the object called *upameya* in view. The identification between *upameya* and *upamana* is possible if there is extreme similarities (*atisāmyāt*) between them. Otherwise the metaphors are not to be taken as healthy. If an argument is able to substantiate the thesis and reject the antithesis, it is called *Sutarka* (good argument). Otherwise it is called *Kutarka* (bad arguement). In the same way, if *Upamāna* can adequately explain the extreme similarities with the *Upameya*, it is a good metaphor. Otherwise, it is bad which gives rise to a defect technically called *Dṛṣṭanta - darṣṭāntika-virodha* (i.e. contradiction in respect of *Upamāna and Upameya*). We can mention here the Advaita Vedāntin's critique of *Sāmkhya*. In *Tarkapada* chapter Śaṁkara has criticised the Sāṁkhaya-view that the world is originated through mutul co-operation between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* metaphorised as Andhapaṇgunyāya. It is the contention of the Advaita that the *Saṁkya* philisophers have committed a mistake by using the metaphor mentioned above which cannot substantiate their position due to having the defect called Dṛṣṭānta-darṣṭāntikavirodha. Because, to them both blind and lame men are conscious, but both *Prakṛti and Puruṣa* are not conscious, and hence co-operation is not possible. Here we find a fallacious metaphor which is vicious (not virtuous) which is

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otherwise called a bad metaphor. The metaphor in the form of co-operation between lame and blind man is not the same with that existing between *Purusa* and *Prakrti*. In the former both are conscious but no in the latter. Hence, there is no extreme similarity (*atiśāmya)* between *Upamāna* and *Upameya*. So it is a case of bad metaphor.

In our day today life there are some usages which give rise to meanings which are completely different from their primary meanings. We come across some writings such as 'we do not smoke here' etc, which indirectly point to 'please do not smoke here'. The latter meaning is derived through the analysis of the primary meaning of the original sentence. Should we call them metaphor? The answer would be in the negative. In these cases there is no identification of *upāmana* and upameya and hence they would not come under the purview of metaphor. In the West the 'metaphor' means to go beyond the given'. Hence, any type of extended meaning would be called metaphor, which is not accepted in Indian tradition. When someone says - 'Kalinga is brave' (Kaliṅgā Sāhasika), 'Rickshaw', we mean 'The inhabitants of Kalinga are brave', 'Rickshwa-puller' through implication. In such implicative sentences there is no *Upamāna-upameyabhāva*. What is available here through implication is only the extension of meaning, which is not accepted as metaphor in Indian tradition.

Sometimes the *Upameya* is used as *Upamāna* in order to show the incomparability of the object. In other words, sometimes the object metaphorised is used as a metaphor in order to show its incomparability as pointed out by *Bhatṛhari*.[6] As for example- 'Calcutta is Calcutta' '*Prasāada* is *Prasāada'* etc. In these cases *upameya* is identical with *Upamana*. In Indian tradition the *Vivakṣa* (desire of saying) of a speaker has got a prominent role. One is allowed to say something according to his will though it is completely necessary. One is allowed to infer the object where truth is established (*Siddhi*), if one strongly desires so (*Siṣādhayiṣā*).[7] In the same way, due to having strong *vivaksa* of the speaker *Upamāna* may be assumed as different from *Upameya*, though actually not, and indentification between them is shown which is kind of articifical intellectual exercise in order to

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show the incomparability of the object. Though there is the imposition of identity (*abhedāropa*), the two objects (*upamāna and upameya*) are not bearing the contradictory properties (*parasparavir-uddhadharmavattvena upasthāpita'). Hence, such cases are not called metaphors, but a different type of Alaṁkāra called *Ananvaya.* In case of metaphor here is the ascription of the artifical identity between *upamana* and *upameya* though their difference is completely known. This deliberate artifical identification may be described as Āhāryābheda. This imposed identification is possible only between two objects bearing contradictory properties. If the same object is described as both *upamana* and Upameya and identification is shown between them, it is not metaphor, because there is identity in the real world bearing no contradictory properties. But the beauty generated by such type of usage is not denied in our tradition and hence, this is called *Ananvaya.*

It is argued by a section of philosophers that metaphor is used to express the Reality which is not capable of being expressed through ordinary language. We may have some experience or feelings which can be expressed through ordinary language. It is too inadequate to express the feeling. Hence, metaphor is taken recourse to for expressing the feeling accurately. But this theory is not applicable to the Reality accepted particularly in *Advāita Vedanta.* It has been stated that as ordinary language fails to express the Reality, (*yato vāco nivartante* etc), metaphors are used to give a picture of the Reality as conceived in *Advaita Vedānta.*

The view is not true. The reality cannot be expressed through language. Even the metaphors cannot give the full picture of Reality. If one realises, the Truth, it is not communicable to others due to its *guhya* or secret character. The use of metaphor can give us some idea which is nearer to Reality, rather for our conceptualisation it can give a rough idea of Reality which is not Reality in the true sense of the term. It is to be noted in this connection that metaphor is also language. In fact, in *Upaniṣads, Brahmasūtras* we get metaphors trying to sketch a picture of Reality, which is described as superimposed (*adhyasta)* just after the realisation of Brahman or Reality. All these linguistic exercises through metaphor etc. as found in *Upaniṣads* or in

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ordinary life are useful for having a hazy picture of Reality so that one may be inclined to know it So, this description about Reality has a phenomenal value, (but not ultimate) as these are taken as illusory when the Reality is realised.[8] Hence, if it is said that the Reality can be expressed through metaphor though it is indescribale, it leads us to contradiction. Because, conceptualisation and realisation is not the same thing. Metaphorical language may lead us to conceptualisation, but not realisation of the Reality.

In Literature Truth is expressed through metaphors. Any abstract thing which is not possible to express through ordianty language is expressed through metaphors. 'Truth' in literature is *'creation of beauty'*. Poets can bring such beauty in literature through the poetic language i.e. metaphorical language. Poetic language is completely different from the nonpoetic one due to its capacity or arousing the aesthetic experience or sentiment in a reader. In ordinary language there is the power of denotation (*abhidha*), the faculty of denoting a given object. Clearly the power to arouse aesthetic experience cannot be reduced to it. Hence, the poetic language needs metaphor to arouse the aesthetic feelings of the *Sahṛdayas* (connoisseurs).

Metaphor (*Dhvani*) is a unique power acquired by words and meanings in the province of poetry.[9] In ordinary life words have only two types of meanings : one is conventional and other is implicative. even the second meaning is rarely utilized in life, since it is resorted to only when the surface meaning seems incompatible. But in literature the surface meaning will be found to be totally inadequate since the purpose of literature is not merely intelligibility.

That may be there incidentally, but its main concern is to evoke certain emotions which are universally present in men. To accomplish this purpose, language in literature takes the assistance of a new power which is metaphor (*Dhvani*). A poet's greatness lies only in the best service he can derive from this unique process of suggestion while he composes his work. If a poet fails to make his poetry suggestive of *Rasas*, he stands condemned because Rasas cannot be delineated in any manner.[10]

Emoptions are not communicated by poet through ordinary language. He only suggests them. Poets make us feel the truth through the use of

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metaphor which acts as stimulator. The ideal *Saḥradaya* is one who becomes happy after enjoying the scene of happiness, becomes unhappy at the sight of grief and becomes full of pity at the sight of the piteous.[11] This is what later writers describe as hrdayasmvada i.e. emotional sensitivity. (*Varnaṇiya vāsayatanmāyibhāvanāyogyatā).*

After considering the importance of metaphor Sri Aurobindo has emphasized the metaphorical meaning in his *Sāvitrī.* Through his *Kavya* Sri Aurobindo tries to metaphorise that just *like Savitri* one can be the abode of knowledge, religion, love, emotion, power and yogic experience and can transform oneself into divinity. After bringing down the Supramental Consciouness in oneself one can conquer Death, the king of decay, and can prepare in this world a firm footing of an immortal world, full of bliss. This is the message of Savitri. The epic opens with the description of the first flush of self-consciousness from the sleeps of unconscious, which is metaphrorised as Dawn (uṣā). The Divine mother comes to this world as an incarnation (in the name of Sāvitrī) who conquers Death, the main obstruction for bringing the Supramental power and conciousness in this mortal world. Without the use of metaphor such poetic excellence cannot be made.

According to some scholars, the poetic approach is an irrational approach or 'cold philosophy'. It is correct that there is some sort of 'irrationality' in literature. But this 'irrationality' can be supported through some reason. Behind irrationality of literary art there is some justificatory reason which does not come from the normal mind. It is true that the reason arising from normal mind is not there. The disinterested delight comes out from something deep where there exist the vision, light and power which are the products of overmind. The joy from a *Kāvya* cannot be realised through the mind 'limited by intellectual activity, practical utility and the externals of life.' The beauty in poetry cannot be generated through infra-rational power, but through suprarational power or vision as Sri Aurobindo has observed. This vision does not come from the ordianry mental platform, but from the planes of the overmind. Hence, the poetry is described as *Mantra* or overhead poetry. So, the *Savitri* is described as *Mantra* or the poetry of vision.[12]

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That poetry cannot be defined in terms of ordianry human logic has been accepted by *Viśvānath* also. According to him, poetry or *Kāvya* is a peculiar unworldly phenomenon, an extraordinary creation of a supernatural or super-normal genius and hence, it cannot be governed by the rules of ordianry human intellect. In ordinary life, sorrow comes from sorrow and fear follows fear, but in the world of poetry we find pleasure deriving from the painful, horrible and terrible situation.

The asethetic pleasure (*Rasa*) saturated in an individual's heart leads him to the world of creativity (*Raśāveśavaisadyanirmānakṃ-amatva).* After perceiving the separation of the curlew couple Valmiki became very much moved and out of his grief he composed *Sloka.*[14] He had intense feeling of pathos in which he had lost himself. Due to the complete loss of personality he had a sense of joy out of grief. This joyous experience of pathos provided him with the power of creation. Valmiki's grief was not this-wordly. If it were so, he would have sympathy with the bird from which the creation of *Kāvya* would not have been possible. This worldly grief makes an individual disabled while poetic vision empowers. When a poet's vision becomes deep and clear, he will surely get an inspiration from within, the materials for a *Kāvya* like characters, plots, metaphors etc. follow automatically due to having *Pratibhā* just as water overflows automatically from the jar already filled in water. So, poet's genius depends on the absorption of the aesthetic enjoyment which results in spontaneous creation of a *Kāvya.* If a poet's heart is filled with emotion, it finds a spontaneous outlet in the matrical form spontaneously. Because, creativity can never be supressed. It should be clearly borne in mind that such spontaneity comes if there are no barriers like absence of contemplation, absence of saturation with *Rasa,* absence of *Pratibhā* etc.[15]

In other words, when the vision is clear and deep, the poet will effortlessly achieve the task of marshalling all his materials towards the one goal of *Rasa* and devises his plot etc.

For Sri Aurobindo also poetry is the spontaneous overflow of the powerful feelings. It is not possible for a poet to give a logical account in

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respect of using a particular word or phrase to the critical intellect. It should be clearly borne in mind that no purpose is involved in the use of some phrase or some word by a poet, but it is to some extent spontaneous. A critic of *Sāvitrī* once wrote a letter to Sri Aurobindo enquiring about why the word 'great' is repeatedly used in the line about the 'great unsatisfied god-head' (p.19). In reply, Sri Aurobindo says that his poetry is the spontaneous overflow of his feelings. He does not himself deliberately choose or arrange word or rhythm but only sees it as it comes in the very act of inspiration. If there is any purpose of any kind, it also comes by and in the process of inspiration... "This I cannot tell you for what purpose I admitted the repetitions of the word 'great'. [16]

It has been accepted by some thinkers that truth in poetry varies from person to person, time to time. This view, I think, is not supportable. Because, there is something in literature which has external value. Any work of literary art may transcend particular time and space. It reminds me a line of Rabindranath Tagore who told that work of art is not bound in the net of hisory, in space and time (" *yena itihāsajāle vāndhā naha deśakāle*"). From this it follows that the literature has an universal appeal which surpasses particular time and space. Each and every piece of literary work would be universally appreciable if the readers become sahṛdaya in the true sense of the term.

From the above discussion we may come to the conclusion that the use of metaphor is highly essential for poetic expression. It is true that we generally use metaphor in our day to day life to achieve certain purpose, which is not of a compulsive nature. In the case of poetry however the use of such language is inevitable. It is to be borne in mind that what makes a poem is '*beauty*' and not merely metaphor in the form of suggestion. The key-word is *cārutvapartiti* i.e. enjoyment of beauty which may otherwise be described as *Visrāntisthāna* (i.e. a place affording the reader aesthetic repose) by Abhinavagupta.[17] If there is no aesthetic repose, the function of metaphor or suggestion cannot unfold itself. In such case it cannot do the required job and hence, it is confined to its literal meaning.[18] The metaphor is the instrument

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through which a poet can provide the reader an aesthetic repose as done by Rabindranath Tagore, Sri Aurobindo etc. Thus use of metaphor etc. is possible by poet almost spontaneously if he has proper practice (*anuśilana*), creative intuition (*Kārayitrī pratibhā)* etc. Hence, metaphor is the essence of literary art which conveys as aesthetic beauty which is the truth in literature. From this it follows that without the help of metaphor the Truth in literature cannot be realised.

NOTES

1. *Sāhityadarpana*, Ch. X.
2. Aproah sādṛśyātiśāyavasat... sāropākhyalaksanayā āropanam rupakam.' *Kusumapratimā on Sāhityadarpana.* Ch. X
3. Nirapahnave upameye upamānāsyabhedropo rupakam. Sapahnave tupameye upamanasyabhedaropo' pahnutiritianayorapi bhedah." *Ibid.*
4. "Rupāyati upamānopaemeyayorābhedaropanam karotīti rūpakam. *Ibid.*
5. *Śamkarabhāsya* on Sutra 2/2/7
6. *Vākyapadīya* - III 14.563-566.
7. "Siddhau satyāmpai sisādhayiṣāsattve' numitirbhavatyeva." "*Siddhāntamuktāvali* on verse no. 70.
8. "... Ityādīni sāstrāni atmani varnāsramavayo' vasthādivisesādhyaśamasrityā pravartate." *Adhyāsabhāṣya* of Saṁkara
9. *'Prasiddhātiriktam* vibhāti lāvanyamivangānāsu' Dhvanyāloka 1/4.
10. "Yatra tu rāṣadīnāmavisayatvam sa kāvyāprakāro na sambhavatyeva' *Dhvanyāloka.*
11. "Yastuste tustimāyāti, śoke sokamupaiti ca/ Dainye dīnatvamabhyeti sa nāye prekṣakaḥ smratah//"

    Kāvyālamkāra -27\52

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12. Sri Aurobindo : Future Poetry, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry.

13. "Hetutvaṁ śokaharṣādergatebhyo lokasaṁśrāyat śokaharsadayo loke jāyantām nāma laukikah, alaukikavibhāvatvam prāptebhyah kāvyasaṁśrayāt, sukham sanjṬyāte tehbyah sarvebhyo 'pītī ka kaṣtiḥ."

14. "Krauṇcadvandvaviyogotthaḥ 'śokahvamāgatah" Dhvānyalokā 1/5.

15. "Sa eva tathābhūtavibhāvatadutthakrandādyanubhā vacarvanaya hrdayasamvādatanmayībhāvanakramadasvādyāmanatām pratipannath karunarasatāṁ laukikasokavyatiriktāṁ ... rasaparipūrnakumb hoccalanvaccitta vrttinihsyandasvabhāva vāgviläpādivacca ... samucita chandavrttādiniyantritas-lokarūpatām praptah" Locana on Dhvanyaloka - 1/5.

16. Sri Aurobindo : Letters on Savitri pp.839-840, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry.

17. "Cārutvaṁ viśrāntisthānam"

Locana, Dhvanyāloka, p. 433.

18. "Tadabhāv · sa vyaṅjakātvavyāpāro naivonmīlati pratyāvrttya vāeyleva viśrānteḥ..." *Ibid.*

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FROM DIALOGUE TO DIALECTIC : SOCRATES, KANT, HEGEL AND MARX

R.P. SINGH

The present paper is an attempt to investigate into the sources of the emergence and development of dialectic as expounded by Kant (1724-1804), Hegel (1770-1831), and Marx (1818-83). The roots of dialectic can be found in the dialogues of Socrates (c. 470-399 BC) which have been compiled in the works of Plato (c. 428-348 BC). I shall expound and examine the nature and status of a dialogue - not in general, but specifically referring to that of Socrates - and bring out its stimulating charactristics that may have helped the emergence and growth of dialectical thinking.

I would like to state at the outset that a dialogue, as expounded by Socrates, was a method, a procedure, in the early stages of the development of philosophy. During modern times, due to complex developments in various fields, multiple disciplines emerged and consequently, various methods are evolved. Dialectic, as developed by Kant, Hegel and Marx, is one of the most significant methods in modern times. I shall explicate those features of Socrates' dialogues which have now become operative terms for dialectic.

A dialogue is a process of conversation, argumentation and mutual supplementation of ideas between two individuals. With dialogue, a method is evolved in which the encounters with other thinkers is essential. It is just opposed to a monologue which can formulate nothing but a dogma. The ideas I formulate to defend my standpoint must confront me with other approaches, must give expression to other thinkers *as others*, and not as possible elements of a system in which I can recognise my own thought.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 3
July 2000

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Other thinkers must be permitted to speak as others on the same subject. I am and remain only a participant.

We come across such instances in the dialogues of Socrates. Here the totality of the moments of participation come to be on a specific subject. Two or more than two thinkers exchange their ideas through argumentation with the aim of the *search for truth*. It is the search for truth that provides food for *thought and thus* thinking is stimulated. In Plato's *Theaetetus*, for instance, in discussing the question of the nature of knowledge, Theatetus advances an ostensive definition. He says that sciences like Geometry, Astronomy, Harmony and Calculation are knowledge. Socrates examines this definition thus :

Socrates : Too much, Theaetetus, too much; the nobility and Lbierty of your nature make you give many things, when I am asking for one simple thing.

Theaetetus : What do you mean, Socrates ?

Socrates : Perhaps nothing. I will endeavour, however, to explain what I believe to be my meaning: When you speak of cobbling, you mean the art or science of making shoes?

Theaetetus : Just so.

Socrates : In both cases you define the subject-matter of each of the two arts?

Theaetetus : True.

Socrates : But that, Theaetetus, was not the point of my question; we wanted to know not the subjects, not yet the number of arts or sciences, for we were not going to count them, but we wanted to know the nature of knowledge in the abstract. am I not right ?

Socrates : Let me offer an illustration; suppose that a person were to ask about some very trivial and obvious thing - for example, what is clay? and we were to reply, that there is a clay of potters, there is a clay of oven-makers, there is a clay of brick-makers; would not the answer be ridiculous?

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Theaetetus : Truly.

Socrates : In the first place, there would be an absurdity in assuming that he who aksed the question would understand from our answer the nature of 'clay', merely because we added 'of the image-makers', or of any other workers. How can a man understand the name of anything, when he does not know the nature of it ?

Theaetetus : He cannot.

Socrates : Then he who does not know what science or knowledge is, has not knowledge of art or science of making shoes?

Theaetetus : None.

Socrates : Nor of any other science?

Theaetetus : No.

Socrates : And when a man is asked what science or knowledge is, to give in answer the name of some art or science is ridiculous; for the question is 'what is knowledge? and the replies, ' A knowledge of this or that?'

Theaetetus : True.

Socrates : Moreover, he might answer shortly and simply, but he makes an enormous circuit. For example, when asked about the clay, he might have said simply, that clay is moistened earth - what sort of clay is not to the point."[1]

And this way, the dialogue goes on. Socrates is often portrayed as seeking definitions of particular excellences: courage (in the *Laches*), soundness of mind (in the *Charmides*), piety (in the *Euthyphro*), or excellence in general (in the *Meno*). The only method which is followed here is dialogue. Professing perplexity in the process of dialogue, Socrates goads another person into offering an account of an excellence, but refuses to be satisfied with examples, insisting on a general characterization that can be used to tell whether something is, indeed, an example of that excellence.

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When an account is offered, Socrates presses the other party with questions requiring a 'yes' or 'no' answer, and by means of inferences drawn from the statements to which the other party is committed, Socrates drives him into contradiction. Another definition may be tried, or occasionally the other party may be given a chance to change his answer to one of Socrates' question. In either case another contradiction results and the dialogue eventually ends with the participants in the same state of perplexity as Socrates.

In a dialogue, it is the contradiction or the views of the other *as the other* which is the operative term. But a dialogue is possible only when both the speakers maintain a fundamental consensus, i.e. both the speakers "(a) speak *and* (b) listen, (c) aim at truth (d) understand each other's language; (e) udnerstand each other's way of thinking (f) do not live in two worlds whose contents totally differ."[2] These elements prepare a meeting ground for a dialogue to be possible. "As speaker, I am successful when my words elicit a response. Total silence or applause interrupts or ends my speaking. The listener who assimilates what I have said can produce an answer, which can stimulate me in return. My listener becomes speaker and vice-versa. Master and pupil exchange places."[3]

In Socrates' dialogues, we thus find, two characteristic features; namely, consensus and contradiction. These are the two operative terms for the possibility and development of ideas under the method of dialogue. Absolute consensus is nothing but a dogma. Absolute contradiction leads us nowhere. It is only under certain degree of consensus that certain amount of contradiction is entertained and thinking is stimulated.

In dialogue, there is a sophistical use of logic in pretending to prove false or ungrounded views of the opponents. And this is the meaning which Kant attributes to dialectic. Just as in Socrates' dialogues with Theaetetus, there is a movement of thought through criticism; similarly, dialectic, for Kant, is the critical movement of thought, or the self-criticism of reason itself. In dialogue, both the speakers are related to each other like the subject and the object in proposition; in dialectic, reason is both the subject

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and the object of the critique. Dialectic is inherent in the nature of reason itself. In the Preface to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant writes:

> "Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer."[4]

Similar is the situation in the process of dialogue too. Several definitions are offered, but due to one or the other contradiction arising, the dialogue eventually ends with the participants in a state of perplexity. In dialectic, Kant discusses such questions which human reason can neither comprehend nor reject. Reason cannot comprehend those issues because it cannot present them in reality. Reason cannot avoid those issues, because they arise out of the very nature of reason itself. These are called the antinomies of pure reason. Kant, here, presents a critique of reason itself in order to resolve certain contradictions which create a conflict of reason with itself.

It is in the discussion of the antinomies that Kant does justice to his general claim that reason investigates various series of conditions in an attempt to discover the absolutely unconditioned. He expounds four atninomies. In each antinomy, there is a thesis with supporting arguments, and an antithesis with supporting arguments. By conjoining thesis and antithesis, we come across an antinomy, an apparent contradiction.

Although transcendental Dialectic is the third part of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, its main problems are the fundamental pre-occupation of the critical philosophy. The first two parts hinge on his answer to one question: How is scientific knowledge possible and to what extent? The answer, Kant found, lies in his formulation of 'synthetic a priori judgement'. As synthetic, it amplifies the concept of predicate and is thus more than a mere tautology. As a priori, it expresses universality and necessity. What we require in science, according to Kant, is such an ampliative knowledge with the characteristics of universality and necessity. But scientfic knowledge, Kant

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warns, has a limit; i.e. it can not pretend to apprehend what is beyond experience. This is the point where we come to Kant's exposition of dialectic.

In the context of dialectic, Kant's contributions to German philosophy consist in his attempt to draw a distinction between 'understanding' and 'reason, and, to give an insight into the nature of our attempt to apply our concepts to the absolute unconditioned.

The crux of Kant's dialectic consists in exposing those tendencies which attempt to overstep the experience, and, thus, precipitate into antinomies. Such a tendency, in Kant's terminology, is characteristic of traditional metaphysics. Kant argues that the absurd results of the antinomies can only demontsrate that metaphysicians must give up the attempt to 'know the infinite'. Therefore, metaphysics is not possible, what is possible is science.

What is central to Kant's dialectic is one of the fundamental tendencies of Socrates' dialogue; i.e. contradiction. Under the title Antinomies of Pure Reason, Kant formulate four pairs of contradictions, namely, finite and infinite, simple and complex, causality and freedom, and, conditioned and unconditioned. Kant, however, leaves these contradictions unresolved. And by doing so, he draws a limit to the extent of the categories of understanding. Reason is never in immediate relation to objects given in sensibility. It is understanding that holds sway in Kant's epistemology. Reason is required as the indispensable corrective to the deficiencies of understanding. Since there are four main heads in which categories are divided, there will be four kinds of absolute totality and four kinds of search for a complete series of explanatory conditions, right upto the absolute unconditioned. First, there is the search for a complete series of objects in space and a complete series of events in time. Second, there is the search for a complete series of parts of matter. That is, we begin with some material object and attempt to divide and sub-divide it into its constituent parts, so obtaining a series of simpler and simpler parts of matter. The third and the fourth searches are for two kinds of complete causal series, consisting of a given event, the cause of

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that event, the cause of that cause, and so on. In every case, reason urges us to pursue the search until the series of conditions is completed, until we reach the absolutely unconditioned that requires no further explanation. But reason, in every case, despite arguing rigorously from apparently true premises, arrives at an antinomy, a contradiction. Reason comes to such an embarrassing situation because it uses the categories of understanding separating them from sensibility, i.e. without corresponding sensible intuitions.

Kant, in his formulation of dialectic, however, fails to incorporate the other characteristic feature of Socrates' dialogue, i.e. the moments of consensus. It's precisely due to this failure that Kant could not resolve the antinomies. He over-emphasized the moments of contradiction, but ignored the significance of a meeting ground between two contradictory concepts. Kant's dialectic is therefore not as dynamic and alive, as Socrates' dialogues are.

It goes to the credit of Hegel to recognize the significance of identity in the every moment of contradiction. The strikingly new interpretation of Hegel's dialectic consists in his attempt to incorporate logic into it. It requires two lines of argument: the first, showing that a given category is indispensable; the second, showing that it leads us to a characterization of reality which is somehow contradictory. Hegel, infact, fuses these together. This has certain amount of resemblance to the characteristic features of Socrates' dialogue. Just as, for Socrates, it is only consensus and contradiction that keep a dialogue in continuity; similarly, for Hegel, the operative terms for dialectic are sublation and contradiction. Hegel's dialectic is thus in many ways analogous to Socrates' dialogue.

Despite such similarities, there are certain fundamental differences between Socrates' dialogue and Hegel's dialectic. The amount of consensus in Socrates' dialogue is not, and can not be, the same as sublation (*aufheben*) in Hegel's dialectic. Moreover, contradiction in Hegel's dialectic is radically different from the contradiction in Socrates' dialogue.

Sublation, in Hegel's dialectic, means to resolve into a higher unity or to bring into the wholeness that which is fragmentary. The deduction of

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categories from one another in the *Science of Logic* shows that all lower categories are sublated into the higher ones and they have a direct reference to the wholeness. To substantiate this point, I would like to take up Hegel's analysis of Kant's position on understanding and reason. Hegel, undoubtedly acknowledges Kant's Transcendental Dialectic as his greatest contribution to philosophy; both for its basic distinction between understanding and reason, and for its insights into the nature of our attempt to apply our concepts to the absolute unconditioned. The Kantian antinomies effected the fall of the previous metaphysics by examining the finitude of the contents of the categories. But for Hegel, the function of understanding – through a process of abstraction – is to present contradiction between individual and universal, identity and difference, and so on. And the realm of reason seeks to unify that which the understanding has divided. Reason shows that the function of understanding - to define things in terms of their isolation - constitutes a process of abstraction. The function of reason is to make manifest the concrete relation in which an idea, concept or reality subsists. Kant argues that the function of reason is to draw a limit to the extent of the categories of understanding. Hegel's criticism of Kant's concept of reason consists in the fact that while recongnizing its dialectical characteristics, reason fails to overcome the antinomies between finite and infinite, etc. Hegel, however, regards reason as the indispensable corrective to the difficiencies of understanding. In the process of unifying the opposites, reason sublates the finite and its negation, so that they are revealed as moments of a more inclusive whole. This wholeness in which the contradictions are sublated, Hegel terms as the 'Absolute'. the 'Truth'. Hegel says :

> "The true is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute, it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only in the end, is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its nature."[5]

The *Phenomenology of Spirit*, however, does not adequately furnish the whole dialectical process through which the knowledge of the Absolute, the Truth, is possible. Its foundations are given in the *Science of Logic* with

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an exhaustive formulation on the notion of contradiction. Hegel says :

> "... everything is inherently contradictory. and in the sense that this law in contrast to others expresses rather the truth and the essential nature of things ... contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves. has an urge and activity."[6]

It may here be recalled that for Socrates, human thought develops by the elimination of cotradictions in the process of dialogue; but, for Hegel, contradiction is interna' to each term. That is why every term whether a concept or a reality develops. Hegel continues,

> "... internal self-movement proper, instinctive urge in general ... is nothing else but the fact that something is, in one and the same respect. self-contained and deficient. the negative or itself. Abstract self-identity is not as yet a negativity. goes outside itself and undergoes alteration. Something is therefore alive only in so far as it contains contradiction within it and moreover is this power to hold and endure the contradiction within it."[7]

Hegel concludes near the end of the Logic that there is nothing, whether in actuality or in thought, that is as simple and abstract as is commonly imagined. "Nothing exists as just brutely given and simply possessing one or two fully positive characteristics. Nothing exists that is just first and primary and on which other things depend without mutual relation... what appears at first simple and immediate is actually complex and mediated."[8]

Hegel, thus, rules out the possibility of the elimination of contradiction once and for all. And with it, Hegel's dialectic deviates from Socrates' dialogue. And this is how Hegel incorporates Logic into dialetic. The traditional belief, that human thought develop gradually with the elimination of contradictions, is central to Kantian philosophy. This is the reason why Kant separates logic from dialectic. Hegel is fundamentally opposed to this view. He applies his dialectic in the *Science of Logic* to the gradual

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explication and development of not only of the 'separation' but also of the 'connectedness' between one category and another.

In the process of the deduction of categories from one another, Hegel arrives at the "System of Subjective Logic" which is the third division of the *Science of Logic*. Hegel, here, develops the concept of subject which is the same thing as the doctrine of Notion in which the categories of Being and Essence are merged into a unity. With Notion, we come to the point where subjectivity is the true form of objectivity. Hegel's analysis of it goes in the following scheme :

> "The true form of reality requires freedom. Freedom requires self-consciousness and knowledge of the truth. Self-consciousness and knowledge of the truth are the essentials of the subject. The true form of reality must be conceived as subject."[9]

The Notion presents an objective totality in which every particular moment appears as the 'self-differentiation' of the universal that governs the totality. That is to say, every particular moment contains, as its very content, the whole, and must be interpreted as the whole. For explanation, let us refer again to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* where 'the true is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development'. The Notion designates the general form of being in which being, through development by means of contraduction and sublation, realizes its essence. At the same time, Notion expresses the free subject which adequately represents the true being. The free-subject exists in a movement from lower to higher modes of self-realization. Hegel calls the highest form of this self-realization - the Geist.

The *Geist* in its final form is the 'free-subject', the Notion. Its otherness and negation is the object, being. And both the Notion and its otherness are constantly overwhelmed by the ontological conceptions of Hegel's absolute idealism. Hegel's *Science of Logic* thus ends where it began, with the category of being. This, however , is a different being that can no longer be explained through the concepts applied in the analysis that opened the Logic. For, being now is understood in its Notion, that is, as a concrete

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totality wherein all particular forms subsist as the essential distinctions and relations of one comprehensive principle - the Absolute Truth.

It may here be recalled that just as Socrates' dialogue, due to contradictions, eventually ends with the participants in the same state of perplexity; similarly Hegel's logic and with it his dialectic ends where it began. This similarity is, evidently, because of the similar driving force operating behind the possibility and progress of both the dialogue and the dialectic.

One of the most significant development in this field - from dialogue to dialectic - takes place with the emergence of the dialectical materialism. Marx and Engels entered the philosophical arena when materialism, in its various forms - those of Descartes, Locke, Kant and Feuerbach - had developed to the extent that there was no need to reformulate philosophical materialism. What was lacking in all kinds of materialism including that of Feuerbach was dialectic. At this point, Marx and Engels recognized the significance of Hegel's dialectic.

It is true, as Marx and Engels repeatedly said, that they were not the inventors of dialectic. In modern European philosophy, its fundamentals were first exhaustively formulated by Hegel. However, as formulated by Hegel, the dialectical principles were mysterious in character. Engels explains Hegel's dialectic thus :

> "The mistake lies in the fact that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of thought, and not deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and often outrageous treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, has to conform to a system of thought which itself is only the product of a definite stage of evolution of human thought. If we turn the thing round, then everything becomes simple, and the dialectical laws that look so extremely mysterious in idealist philosophy at once become simple and clear as noonday."[10]

As expounded by Hegel, however, the laws of dialectic were of the nature of a mystery, as Engels explains it, in as much as Hegel was an

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idealist and his formulation of dialectic was confined within the general framework of idealism. Marx and Engels extracted the rational core of Hegel's dialectic - or as Lenin figuratively said, picked out the pearl of dialectiic from the dungheap of absolute idealism - and established it on the foundation of philosophical materialism. In the *Capital*, Marx declares enigmatically :

> "The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means, prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working ... with him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernal within the mystical shell."[11]

Marx further explains :

> "My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but its direct opposite. To Hegel ... the process of thinking which, under the name of 'the Idea' he even transforms into an independent subject is the demiurgos (creator) of the world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea'. With me, on the contrary, the 'ideal' is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of throught."[12]

Thus, for Marx and Engels, the ultimate source and sustenance of the laws of dialectic lies in the philosophical materialism.

Marx's dialectic, as for Hegel, is motivated by the contradictory character of reality. But different from Hegel, the ultimate basis of the contradiction, for Marx, is philosophical materialism, and, on this foundation, the achievement of dialectic is imposed. This is where even Feuerbach failed. Feuerbach failed to interpret matter dialectically. Consequently, as Lenin points out, Feuerbach's materialism goes 'below' and idealism comes 'above'. Lenin calls the materialism of Feuerbach, including those of Descartes and Locke, as 'stupid materiallism'. He says, "Intelligent idealism is closer to intelligent materialism than stupid materialism."[13] What Lenin wants to demonstrate here is that Feuerbach's materialism could recognise the world

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only in terms of its corporeality, and not from the point of view of dialectic operating in nature and society. Marx attempts to correct the materialism of Feuerbach with the help of the dialectic of Hegel which, as we have seen, is itself an outcome of Kant's dialectic. It is the idealism of Kant and Hegel that Lenin calls as 'intelligent idealism'. Both 'stupid materialism' and ' intelligent idealism'. according to Marx and Lenin, are abstract or one-sided. Nevertheless, what is so 'intelligent' with the idealism of Kant and Hegel is the formulation of dialectic. And dialectic, with its operative terms of contradiction and sublation, has its historical reference to Socrates' dialogue.

What is central to Socrates' dialogue and the dialectic of Kant and Hegel is their idealism. In his dialogues, the kind of questions Socrates is occupied with are generally the questions of ethics - justice, truth, courage, etc. He is known to be the first philosopher who shifted from the questions of physics to the questions of ethics. And the kind of interpretation and definition, if at all, we come across in Socrates is confined within the general frame of idealism as such. And the stimulating characteristics of Socrates' dialogue - consensus and contradiction - represent the key terms of the dialectic of Kant and Hegel. This again is the development within the general frame of idealism.

Marx and Engels did not re-open the question of idealism and materialism as two contrary trends in philosophy. This question was resolved by their predecessor - contemporaries like Feuerbach. What Marx and Engels did engage in was to formulate their position on Hegel's dialectic with the aim to interpret it materialistically. Hence the dialectic of Kant and Hegel - derived from Socrates' dialogue and developed within idealism - is incorporated and interpreted materialistically by Marx, Engels and Lenin.

Marx considered Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and its final outcome - the dialectic of negativity - as one - sided and limited in many ways. Marx strongly criticised the final chapter of the *Phenomenology* entitled as "Absolute Knowledge" in which we come across Hegel's speculative dialectic. What is central to Marx's criticism of Hegel's speculative theology is Marx's own conception of man as a social and historical being, whereas, for Hegel,

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"The self-abstracted entity, fixed for itself, is man as abstract egoist-egoism raised in its pure abstraction to the level of thought."[14] Just as 'man' is conceived and interpreted by Hegel in terms of 'consciousness' of 'self-consciousness', similarly, all the laws of dialectic are formulated by Hegel abstractly. Marx's answer to the question of the nature of man represents his doctrine of dialectical and historical materialism. This is what was lacking in all earlier philosophies in general and Hegel's philosophy in particular. In his attempt to transform Hegl's dialectic, Marx reached the first full formulation of dialectical and historical materialism during 1844-45.

To bring my paper to a close, I would like to point out that dialogue as a philosophical method developed by Socrates is still alive. The basic features of Socrates' dialogue still stimulate thinkers to incorporate them into their own methods. Kant and Hegel attempted to substitute dialogue with dialectic within the general frame of idealism. Marx tried to develop the same features within materialism. This, in no way, undermines the changes and developments introduced by Kant, Hegel and Marx with reference to their specific philosophical systems.

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ADVAITA VEDANTINS ON JÑANALAKṢAṆA : A CRITIQUE

BHUPENDRA CHANDRA DAS

Jñālakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa (Acquired Perception) is one of the three types of supernormal perceptions admitted by the Naiyāyikas. This type of cognition is not included under perception by the Advaita Vedāntins. In this paper an attempt has been made to give a critical examination of the arguments put forth in refutation of *Jñanalkṣaṇa* as a *Pratyāsatti* or contact by the Advaita Vedāntins.

The word *Jñānalakṣaṇa* refers to the *Jñāna* (congnition) which acts as the contact in this perception. Here *lakṣaṇa* means nature of *svarupa.* The contact in which *Jñāna* (knowledge) becomes an essence is called *Jñānalakṣaṇa Sannikarsa.* This knowledge is in the form of memory. If the recollective conginition of previously perceived object serves as the qualifier *(prakāra)* of the object present to our sense organ then that kind of supernormal contact is called *Jñānalakṣaṇa Sannikarsa.* The recollective congnition (smṛti) or previous cognnition of the object concerned is the cause of *Jñānalakṣaṇa Prātyakṣa.* On finding something when a person says, " I see a fragrant sandalwood" he has an immediate knowledge of its fragrance. The memory of our past experience of fragrance in the sandalwood through the olfactory organ acts as the contact between the present fragrance and the ocular organ. This is a familiar example of *Jñanalkṣaṇa.* The Naiyayika points out that the seeing of 'fragrance' which is ordinarily perceived by olfactory organ cannot be explained without the help of *Jñānalakṣaṇa.* This is why, he accepts *Jñānalakṣaṇa* as a *pratyasatti.*

There is a clear distinction between the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* and the *Jñanalaksana.* In case of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* the knowledge of *Sāmānya*

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 3
July 2000

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(universal) leads to the *perception* of the individuals in which it inheres and in *Jñānalakṣaṇa* a previous knowledge of the object concerned served as the present perception of its own object.[1]

It has been argued in the Prabhā commentary that there are two types of *viṣayatā* or contentness in the case of *Jñānalakṣaṇā*. When we are apprehending a piece of sandalwood and its fragrance, the phenomenon of fragrance is perceived through the extraordinary relation of contentness (*alaukika viṣayatā sambandha*) through the relation of contenteness (*Viṣayatā Sambandha*) existing in the content of another cognition i.e., the cognition of sandalwood. In other words, the ordinary relation called *viṣayatā* between self and the content of knowledge grasped earlier gives rise to the perceptual awareness of an object which is supernormal in character through the relation called supernormal contactness. It may be said that both the contacts i.e. *Jñānalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*,by virtues of being the form of knowledge give rise to two different types of activities, as the limitor of contactness (*pratyāsattitāvacchedaka*) is different in two cases. Though both of them seem to be the forms of knowledge, yet the results arising from them are completely different in character (*phalavaicitrya*). The knowledge of unviersal (*sāmānya*) leads to the knowledge of the individuals existing in different times and places, while the knowledge of sandalwood can lead us to the knowledge of fragrance. Hence, we have to accept two different cause - and effect relations, in these two cases.[2]

It has been argued by Dinakara that the knowledge of fragrance in a piece of sandalwood is not possible due to the lack of contact of eye with the fragrance. The knowledge of fragrance is not possible through *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* due to the absence of accessories connected with the collocation of causes (*Sāmagrī*) behind the ordinary perception characterised by fragrance. In other words, if fragrance is taken as grasped by us, we have to look for some assisting causes of the totality of causes of ordinary perception, which is not available here. Moreover, when the fragrance is taken, no other attributes existing in it are apprehended. From this, it is concluded that the knolwedge of fragrance is not possible through *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. Hence,

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there are no other alternatives than to accept *Jñānalakṣaṇa* as a means of knowing it.

Śri Harirāma Tarkavagīśa, in his "*Jñānalakṣaṇa* - Vicararahasyam" mentions four kinds of cases for the justification of *Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa*. The cases are : (1) recognition (*Pratyabhijña*), (2) the perception of negation (*abhāva*) (3) the visual perception of fragrance in a piece of sandalwood (*surabhi candanam)* and (4) apperception or the knowledge of knowledge *(anuvyavasāya*).

An objection may be raised here : knowledge (*jñana*) cannot be regarded as a *sannikarṣa* or contact. A *sannikarṣa* (contact) implies the relation between the sense-organ and its object. As knowledge exists in the self, it cannot stay in between the sense-organ and the object. In response to this objection, the Naiyāyika points out that the word 'knowledge' means the relation of being the object of the memory-knowledge and this memory - knowledge inheres in the self which is in contact with the mind connected with the sense-organ (sva-samajukta manamh-samyuktātamasamaveta - *Jñānavisayatvarūpa - sambandha*).

That the knowledge of fragrance in a sandalwood is known through *Jñānalakṣaṇā* is evidenced from the following fact. If an individual finds a sandalwood or comes to know a sandalwood for the first time in his life, he has no previous experience about the concomitant' of being a sandalwood' (*candanatva*) and 'being fragrant' (*saurabha*). Due to the lack of previous experience he will surely gather the knowledge of sandalwood alone, but not its fragrance. In other words, the knowledge of fragrance is not possible as *Jñāna* does not work as a *sannikarṣa* or intermediate factor. When an individual comes to know that piece of sandalwood is fragrant, he will be in a position to know about the fragrance as soon as he perceives a piece of sandalwood, because *Jñāna* which is very much present acts as a *sannikarsa*. From this, it can easily be concluded that *Jñāna* serves as a *sannikarsa* in the case of cognitions as of the fragrance etc.

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The theory of error propounded by the Naiyāyikas is called *anyathākhyātivāda* which is referred to by them for the substantiation of the *Jñanalaksana Sannikarsa*. According to them, two pieces of knowledge alone cannot cause volition (*pravṛtti*). So, in the case of recognition and error, if one particular piece of determinate knowledge is not accepted, there can be no volition without the knowledge of the conduciveness to desired object (*iṣṭasādhanatajñāna*). Hence in the case of the illusory perception such as, "This is silver', the knowledge of the conduciveness to desired' as the following is to be accepted : This is a means to the attainment of my desired object on previous occasions. Such inferential knowledge is possible only for those who recognise *anyathākhyāti*. In the case of erroneous congnition, the persons who do not admit one particular piece of determinate knowledge and yet, recognise two pieces of knowledge experiential and previous have no silverhood in the object perceived and there can be no such knowledge of iṣṭāsādhanatā (conduciveness to what is desired).

The Vedantins have an objection against the Nyāya theory of *Jñānalakṣaṇā*. They argue that the *Jñānalakṣaṇa* of the Naiyayikas is nothing but inference. The Nyaya theory advocates that a man can perceive the fragrance of sandalwood with his visual organ because he perceived previously the fragrance of it at another place. Here the Vedantins point out that the previous knowledge of fragrance makes him possible to infer the unperceived fragrance of sandalwood. In the same way, the perception of smoke as related to fire in all cases can be inferred from the perception of a particular case of smoke as related to fire. Therefore, there is no need of accepting the supernoral perception called "*Jñānalakṣaṇa* as propounded by the Naiyayikas.

Dharmāraja Adhvarindra[4] opines that *Jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* consists of two acts of knowledge:perception and inference; perception in respect of that which is present before the sense, and inference in respect of that which was perceived in the past. In this way, Dharmaraja points out that the case ' the sandalwood is fragrant' is an example of two acts of knowledge: perception in respect of 'sandalwood', and inference in respect of 'fragrance'.

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But the transition from the perception of sandalwood to the inference. 'This is fragrant' is so swift and sudeen that we think as if we 'see fragrance'.

We shall have now to examine whether the judgement I see a fragrant sandalwood is a case of perception as held by the Naiyayikas or a case of inference as stated by the Advaitins. The above judgement is the another instacne of 'complication' as advocated by the Western Philosophers, such as, Stout, Ward and Wundt. The said proposition is equivalent to "The sandalwood looks fragrant". The other examples of complication are as follows :"Ice looks cold, " A piece of stone looks hard." "The armour looks hard" etc.

There is a clear distinction between perception and inference. Perception is an immediate knowledge of something which is not attained by any other knowledge. Inference is the indiret knowledge of something through the medium of some sign (hetu) which is always related to it. Or, in other words, it is a multiple mediated consciousness of an object which may be expressed as this - therefore that. In both the cases of perception and inference, there is an explanation of some data. A difference between a given and a suggested content is found in both the cases. There is a synthesis of some sensuous elements and some non-sensuous elements in case of some perceptions. In case of perception, these two elements are not kept distinct. Here, they become one whole. They may form parts of a complex object. Therefore, in case of a man's visual perception of a sunflower, the sensory element, for instance, its colour immediately suggests its other qualities, i.e. its touch and smell, and the sensed and the presented elements produce the perception of the sunflower.

According to the Advaitin, to recognise *Jñānalakṣaṇā* as a form of perception is to obliterate the distinction between perception and inference. We do not agree with this view. When we express such judgements, as," Ice looks cold", "The sandalwood looks fragnant", we do not proceed from ice to coldness or from the sandalwood to its fragrance. Here, we cannot say, "since sandalwood therefore, fragrant", "since ice, therefore cold".

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On the contrary, fragrance or coldness is the part of the presentation of the sandalwood or the ice. Or, in other words, we can say, "we see the fragrant sandalwood"or" we see the cold ice". In like manner, we may state " we see the distant mountain". When we infer fire from smoke, we don't say, "I see the fiery smoke". Here, fire and smoke are the distinct objects. We think of the fire but it is not presented to us. Therefore, to admit *Jñānalaksana* as a form of perception is not to ignore the difference between perception and inference.

There is the union of certain sensuous elements with non-sensuous presentations in case of perception. This union is turned into one whole.The sensuous elements are the given and the non-sensous elements are presented by the given. Prception takes place when there is either a natural or a habitual association between the sensuous and the non-sensuous elements. These are the two alternative conditions of perception. An individual can realise these associations through repeated experiences of the object of the world. Here one element immediately calls up the other and the two are transformed into one whole as some object. A 'natural association' is an association of one sense quality with such other sense qualities which are by nature, connected with it and this association is rooted in our minds. So we experience this type of associations very often.

We have five senses and five respective sense qualities e.g., smell, taste, colour, touch and sound. According to these sense qualities in the above order, we can say that there is a natural connection of that which precedes to those which succeed it, but not vice-versa. Therefore, a smelling object possesses some taste, colour, touch and sound. But an object having sound like air or space has no colour, taste and smell. Hence it can be said that to smell an object is to find and touch it. But to see or touch a thing is not to taste or smell it. Thus, a smell or taste sensation generally calls up the colour and touch of a thing.

But a "habitual association" is the association, in our minds, of one sense quality with those which are not by nature, connected with it. So we experience it less frequently and in many cases, it is loose but not strict as in

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natural association.[5] If a habitual association between them is formed in our minds, one sense quality immediately calls up others and all of them are mixed up into one whole and perception of one object takes place. So, there is no connection between sound and touch because sound is in space but no touch. In the like manner, touch has no natural connection with colour because there is touch in the air but no colour. In the same way, colour has no natural relation with taste and smell. Hence colour is found in light but no taste and smell. The mere smell of Kerosene immediately suggests its colour but the latter by itself cannot possibly suggest the former. But a habitual association between them may be established in our minds by continuous experiences of their uniform connection with one another and one sense quality may present another that is not generally connected with it. In this way, the tactual and visual qualities of a bell are presented by the sound of it and the auditory perception of a bell is possible through our particular sense organ. In the like manner, the sight of the bell presents its tactual and auditory qualities and a visual perception of it is possible by us. In this way, to say "I hear the bell" is another way of saying "I see the bell". So this may be an instance of *Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa.*

A natural association is not innate. If it were so, every child should have perceptions like any aged person. Hence the association is made in the mind of every man after his or her birth. A natural association is very often realised through the experiences by an individual and it has an important role in the constitution of things. Therefore, if both natural and habitual associations are produced by repeated experiences, two important results will follow:

(a) The knowledge of the same object may be a matter of perception or inference for different individuals in case of the same objective conditions.

(b) The knowledge of the same object may at first be a matter of inference and subsequently that of perception and vice-versa.

The cognition of a sunflower which is seen is a perception for the person in whom the continuous experiences of sunflower produce a natural

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or a habitual association between its colour, touch and smell. Under the same objective or external conditions, the knowledge of the said sunflower will be an inference for another person. For want of repeated experiences the colour of the sunflower does not immediately give rise to its other qualities, like smell and touch but indicates them as distinct ideas. For instance, there is a diffference between our knowledge of a new type of sunflower and that of the gardener by whom it is shown to us. A grown-up person who is familiar with a piece of stone may look it hard. A small child may just imagine it to have different qualities like tactual quality, etc.

The fragrance of sandalwood may be directly known by visual organ i.e. by *Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa* by those who are familiar with it but for others its visual perception may only be a sign from which its fragrance is inferrred. If I go to a foreign country I can infer the size and distance of an object from its visual appearance. But a native of the country who is familiar with the environment has a perception of the object. And if I stay for some months in that country and get familiar with the environment, the visual perception of the size and distance of the object takes place while the objective conditions remain the same.

From the above discussion we can conclude that there is no absolute, rule for making distinction between perception and inference. Sometimes the knowledge of an object may be a perceptual one and it may be an inferential to another individual at other time i.e. we cannot say that under the same objective conditions the knowledge of an object must always be a perceptual for every individual and that it can never be otherwise. We cannot also say that such knowledge must always be an inferential for all individuals and that it can never be a perception.

The answers which have been given to the two questions quoted above are justified because under certain condtions it is possible that there may be a presentation of fragrance through the visual sense-organ. If these conditions are fulfilled, we can attain an immediate knowledge of fragrance through the visual organ i.e. the eye. Therefore,the Vedāntins must admit that there can be a visual perception of fragrance, because they say that

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perception is an immediate knowledge of fragrance and it is not a knowledge achieved by sense - stimulation. Thus, it is admitted that there can be a visual perception of fragrance, coldness, softness etc. However, as such perceptions are presented by sense-organs and as these sense-organs cannot perceive their objects, we should call them supernormal and place in a separate class called *Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa.*

The Naiyāyikas explain illusion with the help of the theory of *Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa.* The illusory silver is perceived because it is presented through our previous knowledge of silver as seen at some other time and place. But the Vedāntins object to the Nyāya theory of *Jñānalakṣaṇa.* They argue that to recognise *Jñānalakṣaṇa* as a type of genuine perception is to reduce ordinary inference to perception. If the fragrance of sandalwood be perceived because we have a previous knowledge of it as connencted with sandalwood, then in the inference of fire from smoke, the fire may be said to be perceived since we have also previous knowledge of it as related to smoke. There is nothing to distinguish between two cases. In the one we have a perception of sandalwood and previous knowledge of its relation to fragrance. In the other, we have a perception of smoke and a similar knowledge of its relation to fire. Hence, if the fragrance be in supernormal contact with sense and so perceived, there may be such a supernormal perception of fire and, for the matter of fact, of all objects of inference. So the Vedāntins hold that our knowledge of the fragrance of sandalwood, seen at a distance, is due to inference and not any supernormal perception like the Naiyayikas *Jñānalakṣaṇa.*[6]

The objection raised by the Vedāntins, is not tenable for the following reasons :

According to the Naiyāyika, the theory of illusion, viz., the theory of *Anyathākhyāti* cannot be explained if the supernormal perception called *Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa* is not accepted. But the Advaita *Vedāntins* hold a different theory of illusion known as *Anirvacaniya Khyātivāda* According to them, the nature of the object of illusory knowledge is indescribable, it is neither real nor unreal, nor both real and unreal. As in the case of snake -

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rope illusion, where one mistakenly perceives a snake in a piece of rope, the snake cannot be taken as either real or unreal, it is something the nature of which is indescribable. The false appearance of a piece of rope as a snake is due to ignornace (avidyā). Similarly Brahman, the non-dual absolute pure consciousness appears as the world of multiplicity due to Māyā, the cosmic principle of illusion, which is also indescribable by nature.

Thus if the Vedāntins accept the Nyaya theory of *Jñānalaksana Pratyakṣa* then their theory of *Anirvacanīya Khyātī* will not be established, for the theory of *Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa* is consistent with the theory of *anyathākhyaīi* which goes against the *anirvacanivakhyātivāda*. In other words, if *Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa* is not accepted, the theory of *Anyathākhyāti* cannot be explained due to the reasons already mentioned.

When someone attains the knowledge of fragrance from sandalwood, knowledge of cold from ice, the knowledge of heat from fire, these are not at all inferential. Because, the fact of being fragrant or being cold or hot is incorporated in the very connotation of the terms 'sandal', 'ice' or 'cold'. In these cases, we do not get any new information. As soon as we remember the words 'sandal', ice, 'fire' etc., they give rise to the knowledge of fragrance, cold, heat etc. If an attempt is made to infer the coldness of ice or heat of fire, it will lead us to the fallacy called *siddhasādhana* (establishment of the fact which is already established).

In this case one suggestion may be borne in mind that if one has a strong desire to infer (*sisādhayisā*), one is allowed to do so even though there is a siddhi. But it is a case of inference which is deliberately done. In the same way, if someone desires to infer coldness from ice etc, he is allowed to do so out of *siṣādhayiṣā* but not necessity.

The Advaitins have interpreted *Jñānalakṣaṇa* as a form of inference, but not supernormal perception as accepted by the Naiyāyikas. On this one comment can be made. When we come to know of the fragrance of a sandalwood if it is a case of inference, in the same way, it can be said that taste of a fruit is inferred on the strength of a particular colour (*Rupāt rasānumānam*) which is described as *Sāmānyatdrsta* inference. But a time

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comes when we know of the fragrance or taste of a fruit as soon as we know of the sandalwood and of a fruit possessing a particular colour. Though these are taken as cases of inference initially, these can be known through *Jñānalakṣaṇa* in the habituated state (*abhyāsadasa*). It is true that when we infer *rasa* from a particular rupa, when coldness is inferrred from the ice, these are no more the result on inference afterwards, but the result of *Jñānalakṣaṇa*. When we are habituated in our everyday life, something is known from something '*Spontaneously*' without taking recourse to the form of inference. When water is seen, it gives rise to the knowledge of its capability of quenching thirst spontaneously as we are habituated in getting water when of feel thirsty. Though initially there was inferential procedure, yet afterwards they are known on the basis of habit. Hence, it is taken as a case of Jñānalakṣaṇa in which we do not take care of the intricasies of inferential procedure.

The Vedantins do not admit the supernormal connection called *Jñānalakṣaṇa*. In the case of illusory cognition of silver in shell there is, they opine, the perception of silver as they admit the existence of the indescribable silver in this case. In the case of knowledge ' sandalwood is fragrant' we admit the apperception in the form 'I recollect fragrance' (*Saurabhaṁ smarāmi*) and hence it cannot be the case of perception. So far the sake of the law of parsimony (*lāghava)* it is better to take defects as the cause of the origination of the knowledge of the indescribable silver. Hence, the silverness etc. have to be accepted as the effect of the defect. So, there is no proof of the supernormal contact called *Jñānalakṣaṇa.*[7]

The above-mentioned view is not tenable. For to the older Naiyayikas, the knowledge of the silver is attained through the supernormal contact called Jñānalakṣaṇa. If there is no Jñanalaksana, the knowledge in the form ' sandalwood is fragrant' would be attained with the help of the knowledge of a piece of sandalwood attained through eye. As there is no normal contact with the fragrance or the property of being fragrant, the knowledge of sandalwood has to be taken as a contact.[8]

The Vedāntins point out that the fragrance of a sandal is always

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inferential. According to them, when it is said, 'Ice looks cold, 'Fire looks hot' it is merely a case of inference. We have added various arguments in denying the inferentiality of such cases earlier. Apart from those arguments we can add a new one. To Nyāya such cases are not inferential due to having *vādhita hetvābhasa*. If it be taken as inferential, it becomes fallacious. And fallacious inference is not real inference. According to Nayāy, when the absence of a *sādhya* is known through some other *pramāṇa*, it is called *vādhita* (*Yasya sādhyābhāvaḥ pramāṇāntareṇa niscitaḥ sa vādhitaḥ*). In these cases the coolness of ice and hotness of fire are already proved by perception which is accepted as a *Pramaṇa*. If they are taken as inference, they would involve the fallacy called *vādhita*. In order to avoid this it is better to accept *Jñānalakṣaṇa* as a form of perception.

Therefore, in conclusion we can point out that the theory of illusion, that is, the theory of *anyathākhyāti* and some other cases like the above, cannot be explained if the supernomral perception called *Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa* is not accepted. Hence the *Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa* should be admitted.

NOTES

1. Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyāsathistu Yadviṣayakaṁ, tasyaiva pratyāsattiriti - *Siddhāntamuktāvai*, Verse No. 65.

2. Tathāca alaukika viṣayatāsaṁ vandhena pratyakṣaṁ prati Viṣayatāsaṁvandhena Jñānapratvāsatterhetutvāditi bhāvah evaṁca ubhayoh pratyāsattyoh Jñānasvarupatve'pi phalavaicitryāt pratyāsattitāvacchedaka saṁvandhabhedena Kāryakāranabhāvadvayaṁ svikāryamiti nigudhabhiprayah. Prabhā commentary on Siddhāntamuktāvali on verse No. 65. Kārikāvali, Ed. Shri S. Shankaram Shastri, Choukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, Delhi - 7. P. 467.

3. Candanakhandasya caksuse Jayamane Upasthitasaurabhabhanā na syāt saurabhamase caksuṣhsannikarṣabhāvadityārthāh. Saurabhatvaprakārakalaukikapratyakṣāṣamagrayāh sahākariṇyā viraheṇa saurabhat

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vasāmānyallakṣaṇavā' pi saurabhabhānaṁ na sambhavatīti bhāvah ..... Jñānalaksanayā Jñānalaksanyaiva. Tadānī saurabhatvāms'e dharmāntarasanāyaivā sāmānyalakṣanayā tadbhānānirvāhāditi bhāvah. *Dinakarī commentary on siddhāntamuktāvalī* on Verse No. 65. *Ibid*, pp. 467-469.

4. Surabhi candanamityādi Jñānamapi candanaṁs'e aparoksam. Saurabham se parokṣam, saurabhāsya cakṣurindriyāyogyatayā yogyatva ghatitasya niruktalakṣanasyābhāvāt. Dharmarāja Adhvarīndravedānta Paribhāsā, Ed. Panchanan Bhattacharyya, Chapter - I (Pratyakṣa Paricheda), Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta, PP. 42-43.

5. Stout : *A Manual of Physchology*, pp. 102-103.

6. *Advaitasiddhi*. with the commentary Bālabodhinī. By M.M. Dr. Yogendranath Bagchi, Ed. by Dr. Sitansusekhar Bagchi, vol.1, Tara Publications, 1971, pp. 334-335.

7. Tathāhi suktavidain rajatamity bhramasthale' bhinavanirvācyaraja totpattisukkarad rajatasya pratyaksopapattih.

Kinca 'Surabhi candanamityādi Jñānasthale saurabhaṁ smarāmityadyānuvyavasāyasya svikārādupanayādeh pratyakṣahetutve mānābhāvāt. Ataeva dosānāmanir-vācyarajatatvādyutpattau hetutvaṁ lāghavād, rajatatvādinaiva doṣākaryatāsvīkārācceti Jñānalaksanasanniakarse nāsti pramānam.

Shyamapada Mishra - Sāmānyalakṣananirāsah - a paper published in *Our Heritage* (special number) 150th Anniversary Volume. Ed. Bishnupada Bhattacharya, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, years : 1824-1974, pp. 73-74.

8. Tatra prācinai naiyāyikaih rajatādyaṁse Jñānam Jñānalaksana - Sannikarasajanyaṁ ...

Evaṁ Jñānalakṣanānagīkāre Jñātasya surbhicandana Khandasya cakṣusā surabhi candanamiti Jñanaṁ na syāt saurabhamse saurabhātvámis'eva pratyāsatterabhāvāt atastatra tajjñānameva pratyāsatti" riti collekhat. *Ibid*. pp. 73-75

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MARX AND THE ISSUE OF MAN'S SELF-REALIZATION

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The publication of Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 in 1932 commanded widespread attention. These *Manuscripts* revealed a side of him as the passionate humanist concerned above all with the issue of man's self-realization. This in turn resulted in the popularization of the term 'alienation' used extensively in the *Manuscripts* in Marx's criticism of contemporary society and his characterization of contemporary man. The *Manuscripts* thus occupy a position of great importance in relation to current discussion of alienation. The Manuscripts also draw attention to Hegel's discussion of alienation in Phenomemology through Marx's extensive analysis of it, and through the importance he attributed to the *Phenomenology*.

Marx's interpreters are divided on the issue whether the concept of alienation has a place in his natural thought. Sidney Hook[1] takes the position that the notion of 'self-alienation' is foreign to the historical, naturalistic humanism of Marx, Robert Tucker, on the other hand, has argued that "Alienation remains his central theme"[2]. The term 'alienation figures centrally in the *Manuscripts*. It has also been pointed out that "wage labour" has the same force in Marx's later writings as does "alienated labour" in the *Manuscripts*.

I

Marx held Ludwig Feuerbach in high esteem, and remarked that Feuerbach's writings, since Hegel's *Phenomenology* contained a real theoretical

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 3
July 2000

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revolution. What Marx considered revolutionary in Feuerbach was his redirecting attention to the real world. He held that the conception of God was nothing other than a conception of the essential natural man. In two of Feuerbach's works, *The Essence of Christianity* and *Lectures on the Essence of Religion* there is a systematic anthropological reduction. Theology, argued Feuerbach, describes the actual structure of things, but not applied properly. The right configurations of predicates are attributed the entities which are mere abstract images of the actual concrete ones. Therefore a programme of reduction is needed to reveal the objects of metaphysics and theology to be nothing other than the concrete ones. "Theology is anthropology ... the God of man is nothing other than the divinised essence of man".[3]

Marx may be said to have carried the programme of reduction further, the reduction of Hegel's philosophy of spirit to political economy. But the fact remains that he was indebted to Feuerbach for the basic idea of reduction. He criticised Hegel saying that the abstract, logical and speculative expression of the historical process that we have in Phenomenology is not yet the real history of man. Man there appears only as spirit or self-consciousness, To characterise man in abstract fashion is to misrepresent *real*, corporeal man. Consequently, Hegel's idea of alienation and the way of overcoming it are also abstract or vacuous.[4]

The criticism may be questioned with regard to its fairness. It is true that Hegel's instances of alienation are different forms of consciousness and self-consciousness, but they are not unduly abstract. When the individual regards the social substance as something alien to him, his regarding it in this manner, the *thought is* the reality of the alienation. The alienation takes place at the level of consciousness and self-consciousness, and could not have obtained otherwise.

II

Marx however seeks to outline the *real* history of man. Hegel had used the term *Entauesserung* in connection with property transfer and labour contract in his *Philosophy of Right*, and had at times used *Entfremdung*

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interchangeably with this term in the *Phenomenology*. Marx finds here a place to begin the reduction of Hegel's philosophy to the concrete, for its transformation into political economy as suggested by Hegel's own usage, Marx notices that the two German terms have a close connection with the concepts of "labour" and "personality". It suggested to him that the submission of one's labour to the direction of another could itself be characterizd in either of the terms. To contract one's labour or personality to another is to surrender it to another, and thereby to make it alien to oneself. This is how the story in the *Manuscripts* comes to be told. And we shall take the *Manuscripts* as the text of our study. In this we shall be following Tucker, who suggests that the *Manuscripts* served to make it plain that Hegel's *Phenomenology* is the work with which Marxism is immediately affiliated. Schacht of course comments without minimising the importance of *Phenomenology* that Marx's concept of alienation of labour has its origin in the *Philosophy of Right* as well. We do not intend to take any side.

III

Marx approaches the question of man's essential nature in terms of the kinds of "activity" or "life" which corresponds to it. The whole character of a species, says Marx, is manifested in its type of life - activity. Hence he identifies man's nature with the types of "Life-activity" characteristic of genuinely "human" Life. And he places greatest emphasis on production. Labour or productive life, for Marx, is man's species-life. In addition, he designates as essential two other general kinds of life; "social life", or existence in fellowship with other men, and "sensuous life", or cultivation and enjoyment of the senses. This specification indicates that Marx regards man as essentially social and sensuous being. Man's essential characteristics are those of individuality, sociality and sensuousness. The first two characteristics are strikingly similar to what one finds in Hegel. Both conceptions refer to man's individuality. But is individuality always consonant with universality which Hegal had insisted on? In spite of the similarity, there is a difference between Hegel's and Marx's anthropologies. The

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Marxian characteristics of sensuality was not seriously contended by Hegel. So Marx could be taken as having modified Hegel's conception of man.

As regards Marx's emphasis on production, the production serves as a link between it and the self realisation of the individual person. Hegel discusses it at length in the *Phenomenology*. The *Philosophy of Right* devotes considerable space to a discussion of "Property". *Qua* "person" one is characterized by one's particular characteristics and by the freedom to express them. Production is the primary activity through which property comes to exist. Property, says Hegel, is the embodiment of personality, through it alone personality achieves objective reality. Further, he contends, property is the first embodiment of freedom. It is through acquiring property that one's essentially free will becomes actually free. In the process of acquiring property one's freedom becomes something actual in as much as one translates his freedom into an external sphere. Hegel further observes that we acquire property by taking possession of things. This may be done in three way's (a) by grasping it physically; (b) by farming it and (c) by making it ours. The first is subjective and temporary. The third, he says, is indeterminate. The second is of greatest significance. "When I impose a form on something, the things determinate character as mine acquires an independent externality".[5] In the third case, Hegel explains, the thing's relation to me is neither feeling nor superficial, for it is essentially transformed through my productive on "forming" activity in such a way that it bears my imprint." I put my will into it,'.[6] In doing so one objectivies his will and personality. In the formed thing they attain objective embodiment in the actual world. It is thus that Hegel shows an essential connection between production and the actualization of personality. The same idea is expressed in *Phenomenology*, it is through engaging in production that self existence becomes truly realised. In the work one does self-existence is externalized and passes into the condition of permanence. Through productive activity one becomes factually and self-consciously self existent.[7]

IV

Marx can be seen closely following Hegel, even in the language he uses, in stating his position. For the individual the sensuous external world

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is the meterial out of which and through which he produces things. The thing produced is the product of labour and the product is an *objectification* of labour. In all this the individual's labour becomes an object and assumes an external existence. Marx calls this process " externalization".[8]

It may be noted in this context that in presenting Marx's view we shall have the *Manuscripts* as our basic text, and shall cite passages and phrases from the Early Writings, which includes the *Manuscripts*.

Marx argues that initially the self of personality is implicit in the realm of objectivity, but in and through the product of his labour man reproduces himself. The reproduction of himself constitutes an actualization of his implicit self. Through this process, man becomes an objective fact for himself. In Marx's account of man's self-realising process there is much that is Hegelian in temper. For example, Marx emphasizes upon the importance of property in this connection. There is a mistaken idea that Marx had the complete abolition of property in the *Manuscripts*. He rejects, instead "crude *communism*", arguing that this would "negate the *personality* of man in every sphere". He echoes Hegel's contention that property is essential to the realization of personality and urges its "genuine appropriation". He speaks of "the positive nature of private property". The institution of private property as it *presently exists* is objectionable, as Marx says.[9] But released from its alienation, "private property is the existence of essential objects for man, as objects of enjoyment and activity"[10]. Marx's is a call for a positive transformation of private property, not its complete obligation.

Marx contends that only man produces in accordance with the laws of beauty. As distinguished from the animals human production alone is essentially *free* production. In saying this Marx could be said to be looking back to Kant, who in *Critique of Judgement* has a similar point in section 43, "Analytic of the Sablime". Art, says Kant, is production through freedom. The product of bees is called "art" only "by way of *analogy*". What is more interesting is the fact that this very example of bees, and celebration of freedom finds an elegant statement in Tagore collection of essays in Bengali, called *Kalantar*. However, the point for Marx is that man

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produces when he is free from physical need and truly produces in freedom from such need. Marx's conception of production, if it is also a theory of artistic creation, is obviously non-naturalistic in the sense that it is free from the exegencies of biological and economic determinations. The kind of production that Marx considers is man's "life-activity", motivated by nothing more than the need to create, to express himself, to give ourself external embodiment.

Man also is conscious of the fact that what he does is his 'life-activity". Man is not, as Hegel had shown him to be "self consciousness", rather he is a self conscious being. who produces and perceives at the same time that it is his nature to do so, Conscious life-activity distinguishes man from the life activity of animals. Only for this man is a species-being." From this it does not of course follow that all men are conscious of their essential nature. The point however is that man alone is *capable* of such consciousness.

The fundamental form of production, for Marx, is material production. But he recognizes that" religion, the family, the state, law, morality, science, art, etc."[12] are also human products. He attempts to subsume such particular forms of production under the general law of material production. But he is not blind to the wide range of man's productive activity.

We may now turn to Marx's conception of labour. It should be noticed that Marx does not employ the terms 'labour' and 'alienated labour' interchangeably in the *Manuscripts*. Without the adjective" alienated", labour refers to production of" practical human activity". In the context of acquisitive society the purpose of labour is merely the increase of wealth - Marx has a negative attitude toward such labour. It is a perversion of labour. But viewed from the standpoint of its essential nature, labour is " end in itself" which has" human significance and worth". Marx suggests that labour should be an activity through which man" fulfills himself", and "develops freely his spiritual and physical energies". It should be itself "the satisfaction of a need", rather than a mere means through which other needs can be

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satisfied. It should be *voluntary* and *free*, a man's "own work", his spontaneous activity".[14]

Man, for Marx, is essentially social as well as individual. Life is human when it is characterized not simply by productive activity, but also by fellowship with other men. In a world marked by disunity, antagonism and exploitation Marx speaks of the possible "return of man to his *human*, i.e. social, life"[15]. In civil society man's species-bonds" with other man are severed. The concepts of community, solidarity, harmony and fellowship are undermined. That man is essentially a social heing is not only intuitively plausible idea, it has been one of Marx's most profound convictions. His argument for this contention does not appear very strong, since, the fact that man is a "species - being" because man is a being capable of consciousness of his essential nature may not be enough. Possession of a social nature is by no means entailed by the capacity for self consciousness. Some thing more is required.

However having stated his initial conviction that man is a social being, Marx goes on to state that man is sensuous being, his" subjective human sensibility" requires to be cultivated or created. His basic point is that a man cannot be considered fully "human" until his "senses have become *human*"[16]. Here again he distiguishes between "humanised sense" and' sense which is subsurvient to crude need." What is noteworthy is the fact that Marx distinguishes humanised sensibility of man from that of animals, and also the refined sensibility from the brutish, and the aesthetic from the materialistic. It is clear that Marx has in mind the cultivation of the capacity for aesthetic appreciation. Possession of a cultivated sensibility according to Marx, is connected with "social existence" and self-objectification through production. How are the three characteristics are related to one another is not very clear. To live in fellowship with others and being able to appreciate things aesthetically are different. Again, aesthetic appreciation involves an appreciation of things in virtue of their having a certain form, whose production consists in giving things a new form which reflects one's own personality. However as Marx conceives man's nature three dimensions of life, though conceptionally district, are the three essential characteristics.

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V

Schacht has remarked that in Marx Hegel's two senses of 'alienation' come together, and a single general sense emerges. We may now notice how this obtains.

In the context of alienation there is a point of agreement between Hegel and Marx. Marx does not consider that product constitutes alienation as Hegel did. Nor does he think that production as such leads to alienation. The product is not rendered alienated from its producer merely because in it the producer's labour has become an object, assuming an *external* existance. The product is the objective embodiment of its producer's self and it is far from alien to him. The product becomes alienated only when it comes to exist independently, outside himself, i.e. *out side of his control*, or stands *opposed to him as an autonomous power*[17]. Hence Marx distinguishes between externalization or objectification and the alienation of the product. Hegel had referred to the social substance as alienated when the individual is related to it as to an alien reality. For both Hegel and Marx an object is alienated only when it is related to the individual as something remote and foreign, which he no longer feels or experiences as his own.

In the *Manuscripts* the situation that Marx has in mind is the capitalistic system of production. Under this system the product ceases to be the objective embodiment of the individuals' own personality and the distinctive expression of his creative powers and interests. When the product is not distinctive in having any relation to the individual's personality, when he does not choose to maket it, rather is directed to it, nor does he choose how to make it, and is compelled to supress his individuality in the course of its production, it is only then the product gets alienated. When, again, the production is finished it is no longer his, nor is he in any position to do with it as he pleases, the product, then, is alien to him.

Marx adds further that the alienness of the product is not a passive affair. It exerts its detrimental influence being a power independent of the producer, and "sets itself against him as an alien and hostile force."[18] Marx attributes" hostility" to the alieneted product. The source of its hostility is in the power, the capitalist mode of production, which governs it.

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The capitalist mode of production consists of (a) the "other man" for whom the product is produced, and (b) the set of economic laws which govern the behaviour of capital. The first is a human power, while the second is an "inhuman power".

This view of Marx profoundly affected his later programme of political action as well as the development of his theoretical position. He holds that if my product is related the me as an alien and hostile object, this is so because it belongs to someone alien and hostile to me. Its alienetion from me is grounded in my surrender of it to another person. Marx finds this state of affair objectionable under any circumstances. He uses the term *Entfremdung* to refer to the alienation of the object. The product now serves the purposes of another man. In return I get the means of mere subsistence, Marx suggests that I am made to produce the object what the other man desires, and I have *often* to do so even at the cost of my own self-realization, and even at the cost of my physical wellbeing. So the product is an instrument of the other man's will, and he becomes all the more powerful in relation to me by possessing it. My product thus contributes to my own oppression. The circumstance is such that my product is a hostile force to me as well as unrelated to my personality.

As regards market economy Marx writes "Alienation is appareant not only in the fact that *my* means of life belong to someone else..., but also that ... an *inhuman power rules* over everything."[19] This inhuman power is the set of laws governing capital and the market. These laws operate upon the products of the workers' labour, and are brought into operation by the workers themselves. This is the irony. The worker, under this economic system, produces large quantities of the same item, which he cannot use. "The more objects the worker produces, the fewer he can possess."[20] The worker has to do it in order to secure the necessities of life, and also to enrich himself. He becomes dependent on the fluctuations in market price and in the movement of capital. The fluctuations are governed by economic laws, that are "power" alien to the worker, and have no regard for his welfare. The inevitable result of the operation of economic laws is such that a part of the workers is beggery or starvation"[21]. Their alienness is marked

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by "hostility". The product here is "alien" to its producer as it reflects the market profile rather than his personality. In short, Marx terms the product "alinated" from its producer when it comes under the sway of an alien hostile power, human or inhuman. Two of Hegel's senses of alienation have together in Marx: (a) the alienated product is separated from its producer; and (b) it is separated from him because he has surrendered it to another man, or to the market - its alienation through surrender.

VI

The term "alienation" is applied not only to the product of labour, but also to labour itself. Marx's discussion in the *Manuscripts* has a title." Alienated Labour". "The alienation of the object of labour merely summarizes the alienation, the surrender, in the work activity itself:.[22] Labour is alienated when it ceases to reflect one's own personality and interest, and instead comes under the direction of an alien will, i.e., another man. Alienation of labour, for Marx, involves its surrender, and its surrender - its separation from the worker's personality. Labour is alienated when one is related to "his own activity as something alien and not belonging to him"[23]. If my labour does not belong to me, to whom does it belong? Marx answers the question as follows:" If the worker is related to his own activity as to unfree activity, then he is related to it as activity in the service, and under the domination, coersion and yoke, at another man".[24] One whose labour is alienated from him views his labour as an alien activity. The individual does not "feel at home" in the work he does. It is not part of his nature, says Marx, since it has no connection with his own interests, and is no expression of his personality. Man's labour is truly his own labour only when it is spontaneous, free and self-directed activity, when it is prompted by his own need to build or create or do something of his own choosing. It must be what he wants to do. In a famous passage in the *German Ideology* Marx has suggested that in communist society it will be possible for a man to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, first in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as he pleases.

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Marx appears to suggest that alienation is a relation not merely between two terms, the worker and his labour, but also a third, another man to whom the worker surrenders direction of his labour. He refers to alienated labour as "slave labour"[25]. His basic concern is with the dissociation of labour from the worker's interest and personality. But given this concern, does it follow that the dissociation obtains because of the submission of labour to the direction of another man ? Labour performed under the direction of another man need not necessarily be alienated. A musician playing under the direction of the conductor of a symphony, or a cameraman shooting a film under the director's direction are not examples of alienated labour. It is possible to think of labour dissociated from one's interests and personality though not subjected to the direction of another men. An independent farmer or a shop keeper may be able to sustain himself through an expenditure of all his time and energy, and be never able to do things he really wants to do. He is oppressed by physical need, and Marx would say, he does not truely produce. Hence the connection between one's labour and one's interests and personality can be severed with the mediation of an alien will. The surrender of labour to the direction of another man is a matter of factual correlation, and need not be looked upon as a matter of definition.

We may now ask about Marx's conception of alienated labour and the nature of labour. For him, when labour is subjected to the direction of another man, then occurs the resulting separation from the interests and personality of the one who performs it, and it also involves its divorce from its essential end and function. Essentially considered, labour for Marx is productive activity through which the individual objectifies and thus realizes himself, simultaneously expressing and developing himself as an individual personality. It is therefore a perversion of its essential function, according to Marx, When it is undertaken nearly under the compulsion of direct physical needs or of that selfish need which is greed, under these circumstances it is not what it should be, Man only truely produces in freedom from such need.

This is suggested to be a condition of labour in the wage system. When it is regarded as something to be exchange for pay, labour appears not as an end in itself but as the servant of wages, and thus loses its human

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significance and worth, Hence it is not the satisfaction of a need, but only a means for satisfying other ends. In return for wages it is placed under the direction of another men, and thus no longer performs the function of self-objectification.

There is thus a radical disparity between the character and function of labour in the kind of economy Marx describes, and those in terms of which he conceives the essential nature of labour. He characterizes labour of the farmer sort as the alienated form of human activity as species-activity. When he specks of alienated labour, he has in mind this general disparity between such labour and its essential nature, as well as its separation from the interests and personality of the worker as such. It is not only alien to the worker, but also alien to itself.

VII

An important dimension of alienation is alienation from other men. According to Marx, it is relationship between each man and other men that the economic fact of the alienation of the worker and his production is first realised and expressed. In particular it has the direct consequence that man is alienated from other men.

Marx writes, "In the relationship of alienated labour every man regards other men according to the standards and relationships in which he finds himself placed as a worker."[26] He further contends that" communism, through which human self-alienation is overcome , is thereby also the definitive resolution of the antagonism ... between man and man."[27] Marx seems to have in mind a situation in which men regard others as rivals rather than fellows, and as of no inherent worth. He suggests further that a state of constant impersonal strive prior to the advent of communism. There are among the features which for Marx characterize the relation of men to each other in capitalistic or "Civil" society. He speaks of the member of civil society as man saparated from other man. He refers to civil society as the sphere of the war of all against all. It is, he contends, one only exists for another person, as the other exists for him, insofar as each becomes a means

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for the other.

Civil society, according to Marx, is the sphere of egoism. It is a world of atomistic, antagonistic individuals. Man in civil society is egoistic man, man regarded as an isolated moved and, withdrawn into himself. Marx describes egoistic man as "... as individual separated from community, withdrawn in to himself, wholly preoccupied with his private interest and acting in accordance with his private caprice ... The only ford between egoistic men is natural necessity, need and private interest, the presentation of their property and their egoistic persons,"[28]. Egoistic man is motivated solely by self-interest, which leads every man to see in other man not the realization, but rather the limitation of his own liberty. Instead of regarding other men as his fellows, he regards them as his rivals and adversaries. Accordingly, he is hostile to them, His antagonism toward them is motivated only to the extent that enlightened self-interest suggests cooperation with them is desirable, and shows him that they may be of use to him.

Thus the alienation from other men of which Marx speaks is to be understood as involving a complete absence of fellow feeling, an estimation of others as of no more positive significance than that of means to personal ends, an antgonism based on a feeling of rivalry and the anticipation of attempted counter exploitation. It is grounded in a self-centredness which attends only to private advantage, and in a self-conception which excludes an idea of sociality.

In the standard usage of 'alienation', the term refers to interpersonal estrangement. But for Marx, more importantly, egoism appears to be the necessary and sufficient condition of its occurrence. And secondly, when alienation in Marx's sense occurs, it is total, one is separated from other man *generally*, not that one is estranged only from certain individuals, while remaining close to others, Further, in ordinary usage alienation does not necessarily imply that one regards the others in question merely as means to one's own ends. The ordinary conception also comprehends cases of indifference, regretted lost intimacy as well as cases of antagonism. In cases of interpersonal estrangement, the background situation is one of actual

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unity of some sort, which has given way to a feeling of alienness, some one has become alien, who formerly was not so. Marx of course, presupposes no previous actual unity of the egoistic individual with other men. There is through an *ideal* unity of the individual with other men generally, which Marx predicates of him on the ground that men's essential nature requires it. This is something that is not presuppored by the ordinary usage of 'alienation'.

The difference between Marx's conception and the ordinary usage of 'alienation' raises problems.Marx conceives of communism as the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and man, and thus of the alienation of man from each other the elimination of the basis of egoism. Can one suppose that it would thereby also bridge the generation gap, restore to intimacy erstwhile friends who have drifted apart, or rekindle love grown cold?

There are other forms of alienation. How is egoism as a mode of alienation related to other forms of alienation? For Marx, alienation from other men is a direct consequence of the alienation occurring at the level of production. What is Marx's actual point in saying that? The relation he conceives to exist between egoism and civil society in such that egoism is both encouraged and virtually required for survival in civil society. "Civil Society" ... severs all the species bonds of man, establishes egoism and selfish need in their place, and dissolves the human world into a world of atomistic, antagnoistic individuals."[28] To live in civil society is to live under the economic system of alienation. This economic system is the essence of civil society as Marx conceives it. The whole society is purportedly organized to facilitate the accumulation of private property through alienation. The point is that the alienation of the individual from others is related to the alienation of his labour and product as one result to another of his existence under the general economic organization which is the basis of civil society.

Marx seems to think that everyone who exists in civil society necessarily becomes a creature of it, i.e. becomes egoistic. But is it not possible for an individual to cease to identify with the values of his society, and to adopt an attitude of opposition to them? Marx himself is a perfect

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case in point, Moreover, his own behalf the possibility of solidarity among the members of the working class within the framework of capitalistic society presupposes the ability of men who continue to live in this society to over come their egoism and alienation from each other. Marx's call to the workers of the world to unite and overthrow captalism at the conclusion of the *Manifesto* would be pointless if men could only remain egoistic and therefore mutually antagonistic creatures of civil society as long as they live in it.

VIII

We may now turn to consider the case of self-alieation. Marx's concept of self-alienation involves the idea of a two-fold separation. He has in mind both the separation from a person of something which is very much a part of him, and the resulting separation of the person from his essential nature. One may speak of two such senses of self-alienation in Marx'ian usage.

In one sense the expression "self-alienation" characterizes more profoundly the alienation of labour, and occasionally, that of the product. The point he wishes to stress in doing so is that a Man's labour is his life, and his product is his life in objectified form, and that therefore when they are alienated from him, his own "self" is alienated from him. Marx takes the position that the substance of my being, or my "self", is made into another's propetry to the extent that I give another the use of my labour.

Marx also uses the expression 'self-alienation" to refer to one's separation from his truely human self, or essential nature. In this sense, " alienation" conveys the idea of total loss of humanity Alienated labour he says, "alienate for men .... his spiritual life his life".[29] It produces man as spiritually and physically dehumanized being. At this level, " self-alienation" is virtually synonymous with "dehumanization." A man is self-alienated if his true "human" nature is something alien to him, if his life fails to manifest the characteristics of a truly human life. There are three such characteristics for Marx; individuality, sociality and cultivated sensibility,

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self-alienation thus takes the form of dehumanization in the spheres of life which correspond to them; production, social life and sensuous life., It may best be understood in terms of dehumanization in each of these areas. According to Marx, the worker in contemporary civil society is dehumanized *qua* producer in a numebr of ways. He is dehumanized in the sense of being reduced to the level of an animal, because he produces merely "under the compulsion of direct physical needs". When he does not "produce in freedom from such need", his production falls to the level of mere animal production, and he thereby loses his advantage over animals. He is also dehumanized in the sense of being reduced to the subhuman condition of a slave, by virtue of his surrender of his labour power to another man. Marx views labour directed by another man as slave labour". And finally, as a result of the division of labour, the worker is dehumanized in the sense of being reduced to the condition of machine. The activity required of him is merely" simple machanical motion."[30] In short, the worker, under the system of alienation, is reduced to the level of an animal, a slave, and a machine, common to all of these descriptions is the idea of sinking to a subhuman level, or dehumanization. The worker is truly human only if his labour is truly human, i.e. manifests and develops his personality. This is one dimension of his self-alienation in which his actual condition fails to correspond with his essential nature.

In another respect, a man is not truly human until his senses and feelings have been cultivated or humanized. Such a man will have had no occasion to develop "The wealth of subjective *human* sensibility (a musical ear, an eye which is senstive to the beauty of form)", and an appreciation of things in virtue of their intrinsic qualities.[31] His sensibility will be subhuman; and therefore he himself will be less then human as well.

There is another aspect of man's self-alienation. This concerns his relations with other men. Marx holds that life is not truly human unless it is "social" life, life in genuine community with other men. If one is alienated from other men, one's existence is "inhuman" existence. It fails to manifest one's essential society. Thus one is self-alienated. Marx appears to trace

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alienation from others to existence under the conditions which prevail in civil society. In his view, therefore, all three forms of dehumanizations or self-alienation, have the same origin, and thus tend to occur together.

It is also possible to explicate Marx's concept of self-alienation in terms of the perversion of productive, social and sensuous life. He uses the expression 'alienated labour', in part, to convey the idea of labour the actual character and function of which do not correspond to its essential ones. He also speaks of 'the alienation of the senses' in characterizing the sensibility which view things as if they were "means of life" to be utilized in some way"[32]. In like manner he terms the "exploitation of human communal life.[33] In their contents the term "alienation" serves to indicate that the forms of life in question are *not as they should be*, For Marx, man's nature is realized only when these forms of life *are* as they should be, their perversion entails that the person affected is not as *he* should be, their alienation is his self-alienation.

It may be of interest to note that Marx's senses of 'self-alienation' are similar to Hegel's senses of self-alienation in the *Phenomenology*. In each, the expression is used to refer both to the separation from the individual of something which is importantly "His", Marx is concerned with the individual labour and particular product; Hegel with social substance. The sense in which the expression refers to a disparity between the individual's actual condition and his essential nature, the unrealized essential nature is conceived by Marx in terms of individuality, sociality, and cultivated sensibility, by Hegel, in terms of individuality an universality. Thus, while they employ the expression in the same senses, their conceptions of self-alienation differ.

Marx's use of the expression is of greater interest than Hegel's. One may question whether the social substance may legitimately be considered the individual's objectification, and a part of his "self", but his own product may quite reasonably be so conceived. The same is true of his productive capacity. Marx's notion of the alienation of labour and the product indicates perspicaciously the usefulness of the expression "self alienation". It enables one to indicate the deeper significance of the phenomenon.

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In respect of Hegel and Marx, one estimates of their conceptions of man's essential nature, and of their suggestion that a disparity can exist between it and a person's actual condition. Marx's conception and suggestion should enable one to refer to the existence of such a disparity conveniently, and the expression "self-alienation" will serve the purpose well.

Apropos Marx's conception of man's nature, there is much to be said for his insistence upon the inclusion of reference to man's senses and his interpersonal relationships. Marx is keenly aware of the power of social institutions to shape men, but he shares the Romantic views that the influence of these institutions are deterimental to human development. In his eyes, they serve primarily to serve or further the interests of the dominant class. But he has little to say about them in his characterization of "truly human life" in the ideal, classless society.

Here Hegel may have had deeper insight, in his insistence upon the importance of the "social substance" in human life. For him, the idea of participation in socio-cultural institutions is inseparable from the idea of life that is truly human, Marx's insistence on the exploitative character of existing political and economic institutions urged him to depreciate their importance and the broader functions these institutions generally have. In the question of justifibility Hegel's concept of man's nature appears superior to that of Marx's.

IX

Marx traces alienation to egoism and the existence of alienation to the predominance of egoistic need". This expression implies the idea of greed or acquisitiveness, and "physical need", i.e. the kind of need associated with survival. These needs are only the immediate source of alienation, while the fundamental source lies in the nature of civil society and the institution of private property around which it is organized.

This has profound implications for the issue whether and how such need can be eradicated, and the resulting alienation overcome. It is commonly held that human nature and human inadequacy are responsible for the

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greediness and neediness of men. The latter either are ineradicable or can be mitigated only by changes effected at the level of the individual person and in the technological sphere. Marx takes the position that both the "desposition of physical need" and the greed which prevail in civil society are results of the nature of civil society itself. He concludes that their eradication can *only* be accomplished by changing the socio-economic system of civil society. He quite explicitly takes the same position, and draws the same conclusion, with regard to the origin and overcoming of the various forms of alienation. For Marx, "the positive suppression of *Private property* .... is the positive suppression of all alienation"[34]. In this light, one can understand Marx's intense dissatisfaction with Hegel's programme for the overcoming of alienation. It can hardly be overcome, in Marx's view, by conforming to the existing social order, for he holds that contempment in it is precisely the root of the problem. For both Hegal and Marx, the problem is to reslove the conflict between existence and essence. For Marx, however, the true solution of the conflict is possible only through a fundamental socio-economic reorganization, namely, the positive suppression of private property. It is in these terms that he conceives communism. Indeed, Marx states that communism is the solution. It is because he traces it to this source that he can speak of "the categorical imperative to over through all these conditions in which man is afased, enslaved, abandoned, contemplible being."[35] Marx observes that it is only when industry is very highly developed that "the emancipation of humanity" from the necessity of working simply in order to live becomes a possibility." Prior to this stage of development, labour is a mere means of physical existance, regardless of the character of the prevailing socio-economic institutions. In is only under certain circumstances, therefore, that the deposition of physical need can legitimately be attributed to the operation of socio-economic institutions, and that its diminution can reasonably be expected through their transformation.

This is quite an attractive view. But Marx does not provide a satisfactory explanation of how civil society comes to have the character he attributes to it, if not because *men* are inherently egoistic. If men are inherently egoistic, its character is easily explained. It reflects man's innate

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disposition., Marx rejects this explanation, but appears to have no adequate one of his own. His only attempt to provide one has in his blaming christianity. He contends that christianity taught men to be spiritually self-centred, and thereby to a spiritual egoism" which "in practice becomes a material egoism". The character of civil society is thus suggested to reflect not on innate disposition of man, but one acquired under the influence of christianity. Can this view be globalised covering other religions like Buddhistm? However, Marx's critique of Judaishm and Christianity only *postpones* the need for an explanation of the emergence of egoism. Marx's explanation occurs in his early essay "On the Jewism question", but he does not suggest it in the *Manuscripts*. One could argue that if Marx has failed to give an explanation as how and why egoism originated, then his discussion of the origin and overcoming of alienation is rendered questionable.

And finally as a point about conceptual methodology I should like to state the following. Hegel uses the term 'alienation' in two distinct senses: in the sense of "separation" and in the sense of "surrender". Marx neither rejects one of these senses, nor introduces a radically new sense of the term, but rather fuses Hegel's two senses. This results in that the term for him has the single sense of "separation through surrender". Hegel equivocates his term, using alienation' in two distinct senses. This is a sourse of confusion. Marx may be expected to improve on Hegel by eliminating the possible confusion. But this does not happen. Marx's retention of the ideas or both separation and surrender allows him to emphasize first the one and then the other, even when speaking of the same kind of alienation, thereby giving rise to antiquities concerning its necessary and sufficient conditions. In one passage, for example he characterizes the alienations of labour as "the relationship of the worker to his own activity as something alien and not belonging to him."[36] In another, he refers to it as " the act of alienation of practical human activity."[37] The former suggests that labour is termed "alienated" primarily by virtue of its separation form the worker's interests and personality; while the latter suggests that its surrender by the worker is the definitive factor. Hegel at least avoids ambiguities of this sort.

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NOTES

1. *From Hegel to Marx*, University of Michigan Press, 1862, 8,5.
2. *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx*, Cambridge University Press 1964, 13, 176.
3. *The Essence of Christianity*, quoted in Schacht, *Alienation*, P 68.
4. *Early Writings* (ed, and trans) T.B. Bottomore, London:C.A. Watt, 1963, 215.
5. Philosophy of Right, trans, T.M. Krook, Oxford, 1942, Section 56. In the paragraph above we have been summarizing Hegel's views as in the sections 35,45,54,54 and 58.
6. *Op. cit.* Section. 44
7. *PM* 238. 239
8. *Early Writings*, 148
9. *Early Writings*, 153
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11. *Early Writings*, 127
12. *Early Writings*, 156.
13. *Early Writings*, 132
14. *Early Writings*, 125
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16. *Early Writings*, 189
17. *Early Works*, 122-123
18. *Early Works*, 122-123
19. *Early Works*, 177-78.
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21. *Early Works*, 72-73
22. *Early Writings*, 124.
23. *Early Writings*, 126.
24. *Early Works*, 130.
25. *Early Works*, 71
26. *Early Works*, 129
27. *Early Works*, 155.
28. *Early Works* 26., 38-39
29. *Early Works*, 129.
30. *Early Works*, 71.72 and 187 - 188
31. *Early Works*, 161
32. *Early Works*, 159-160
33. *Early Works* 169
34. *Early Works*, 156
35. *Early Works*, 52
36. *Early Works*, 126 (Emphasis added)
37. *Early Works*, 125 (Emphasis added)

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ON BASIC PARTICULARS

JASHOBANTA RAY

'Particulars' play a primary role in the core of our thought structure. It is 'particulars' with which we think about the world which is presented to us. The world consists of 'particulars' and therefore any thought about the world will involve the use of particulars. In this paper an attempt is made (1) to give a brief exposition of the viewers of Locke, Hume, Leibnitz and early Wittgenstein on the nature of basic particulars, (2) to give a detailed account of Strawson's view of basic particulars, (3) to put forward Strawsonian argument against the views of these philosophers, and (4) to show some inadequacies in Strawsonian view of basic particulars.

I

Let us begin with the Locke's view of 'particulars. Locke says that in reality there are only particulars but in our minds there is something else not images but ideas. By 'idea' he means that the term, which stands for the object of the understanding when, a man thinks. He adds that it will easily be granted to us that there are such ideas in man's mind, everyone is conscious of them in himself also conscious of them in others. Whatever conscious activity we are engaged upon, we must necessarily be ' having ideas'. Locke sometimes thought of these ideas as 'mental images' or 'pictures in the mind's eye'. It is assumed that, in relation to anything in the world, there can be my idea of it and the thing itself. We all have ideas, which are expressed by the words such as whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion etc. These 'ideas' Locke considers as 'simple ideas' which supply the materials for our experience. He says that in our experience of

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 3
July 2000

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the objective world we are directly confronted with our own ideas or sensory states; he thinks that in everything we say our immediate subject-matter consists of our own ideas, the reference to things being a secondary one. The material of our knowledge is the simple ideas out of which complex creation is composed.

Hume begins by saying "All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into distinct kinds, which I shall call impressions and ideas."[1] Hume departs from Locke's position. He called Locke's ideas of sense and reflection 'impressions' and 'ideas' as representations of imagination and memory. But Hume seems to be very clear when he says that if a primary information consists of representations and our thoughts of copies of those represention, then we cannot find out how accurate the representations of sense may be, nor can we form any idea of the real world, as distinct from our impressions of it. In our perception we find that two things always come together i.e., ideas and impressions always appear to correspond each other. So not only in every prescription of the mind either an impression or an idea, it also looks as if there is an exactly resembling idea for every impression and vice-versa. Hume argues that everything in the mind is either an impression or an idea and everything in the mind is either a simple impression or comes to be there as the result of the appearance in the mind of simple impressions because all simple ideas are caused by their corresponding impressions. But all complex perceptions are made up of simple perceptions alone and so without simple perceptions there would be no complex perceptions at all. All simple impressions are either impressions of sensations or impressions of reflections. But impressions of reflections occur only as a result of something appearing before the mind. And since impressions and ideas are the only things that appear there, it could not be the case that only impressions that occur on a mind are impressions of reflection. So there would be no impressions of reflection unless there were some impressions of sensation. Taken all together this implies that everything that comes into the mind comes there as a result of our having impressions of sensations. Thus, according to Hume, there is no thought or mental activity unless there are impressions of sensations. So from Hume's point of view it follows that 'ideas' and impressions' are primary in our thoughts structure.

Leibnitz considers monads as basic particulars in our conceptual

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framework. He argues that monads are in the real world and they represent the world only because of their association with their organic body. Bodies are composed of simple substances, without parts. Leibnitz says, "there must be simple substances, since there are compound substances, for the compound is only a collection or agreatum of simple substances,"[2] These simple substances are called monads by Leibnitz, of which empirical things are composed. They are 'the true atoms of nature and, in a word, the elements of things.'[3] Since monad is without parts, we cannot ascribe extension, figure, divisibility to it. Each monad develops according to its own inner constitution and laws, it is insusceptible of increase through the activities of other monads, since the simple cannot have parts added to it or subtracted from it. But each monad, being gifted with some degree of perception, mirrors the universe, that is the total system, in its own way. The ultimate realities are monads or simple substances. There are, of course, invisible, what we perceive are aggregate of monads. Substances in the sense of aggregates of monads are phenomenal, according to Leibnitz. The world of everyday life, the world of sense-perception and also of science is phenomenal. The monads or ultimate realities are not phenomenal, they do not appear for perception but are known only by a process of philosophical analysis.

The ultimate realities are monads, simple substances conceived according to an analogy with souls. No two of these monads are alike. Each has it's own particular characteristics. Moreover, each monad forms a world apart, in the sense that it develops its potentialities from within. Leibnitz does not, of course deny that on the phenomenal level there is what we call efficient or mechanical causality. We have to distinguish between the physical level at which this statement is true and the metaphysical level at which we speak about monads. Each monad is like a subject, which virtually contains all its predicates, and the primitive force of the monad is, as it were, the law of its variations and changes. But though there are innumerable monads or simple substances, each of which pre-contains all its successive variations, they do not form a chaotic mass. Though each monad is world apart, it changes in harmonious correspondence with the changes in all other monads according to a law or harmony pre-established by God. The universe is thus a system in the sense that world would be different from those which now are if anything is taken away or supposed different. Thus each monad or substance

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expresses the whole universe, though some expresses it more distinctly than others as they enjoy a high degree of perception.

Wittgenstein says, " A proposition is a picture of reality. A proposition is a model of realities we think it to be "[4] According to *Tractatus* a proposition really is a picture, of what it represents. In a picture, according to the *Tractatus* picture and the things is the state of affairs it represents. Since a proposition is considered to be a picture, there must be as many elements to be distinguished in it as in the state of affairs it portrays. The two must have the same logical or mathematical multiplicity. According to the *Tractatus*, a picture must have something in common with what it pictures. This common thing is the picture's form of representation. "All pictures must have in common reality the same logical form in order to be bale to picture reality at all, either truely or falsely. This logical form also is called "The form of Reality'.[5] is defined as the possibility that things in the world are related as are the elements of the picture. Propositions since they are pictures have the same form as the reality they depict.

II

After discussing the views of Locke, Hume, Leibnitz and early Wittgenstein regarding the nature of 'particulars', let us give a detailed account of Strawsons' view of particulars. Strawson considers material bodies and persons as basic particulars. A Strawsonian person, to begin with, is to be understood as distinct from a material body, which retains the contrast customarily observed between person and things. Material bodies, according to Strawson, are basic to our schemes of identification. But if we experience only material bodies, the question arises of whence derives the idea of that which has these idea. How do we identify ourselves as distinct from the particulars, which we identify or re-identify?

It would seem to follow certain obvious answers to these questions that we are not material bodies and that our idea of ourselves is not the idea of material body. This, in fact, is Strawson's view, but he desists from following the tempting path, followed by Locke, which leads to the conclusion that we are immaterial entities, instead he emphasizes that many of the terms which are correctly applicable to material bodies can also be correctly applied to ourselves as a person.

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Now, an important question may arise here: How to describe this conception of material body in terms of predication? A Strawsonian reaction to such a question would begin with an obvious classification of predication. There are two kinds of terms, M- predicates and P-predicates applicable respectively to material bodies and to persons; but there is an overlap . If it is sensible to say of a person that he is sad; it is no less sensible to say of that very same person that he weighs three hundred pounds. Persons, then, are distinct from material bodies, but they are not therefore immaterial bodies or incorporal nonbodies. A person has states of consciousness as well as physical attributes and is not merely to be identified with one or the other.

Persons are irreducible to parts of themselves and are thus "primitive" in just the same ways in which material bodies have been said to be. This means that our ability to identify and re-identify material bodies is insufficient for identification and re-identification of persons, for we might exhaustively identify an individual X under all the M-predicates true of X without thereby identifying X as a person. P-predicates are accordingly, identifiable in terms of and are not to be reduced to M-predicates. We have not identified X as a person until we have correctly ascribed to him at least one P-predicate.

To understand the fact material bodies are basic, we have to note that what Strawson says about identification. He holds that they are basic with respect to identification. To identify a particular means to pick it up. Conceptually discriminate it from other particulars (speaker identification); and to identify a particular about which someone else has made a remark is to know which particular it is that has been referred to in that remark. In explaining this, Strawson speaks of criteria or requirements of identification. He says that the requirements of hearer-identification could be regarded as fulfilled if the hearer knew that the particular being referred to was identical with some particular about which he knew some individuating fact or facts, other than the fact that it was the particular being referred to. He further says that to know an individuating fact about a particular is to know that such and such a thing is true of that particular and of no other particular whatever. Now the question is: How is this requirement ordinarily fulfilled? The answer is that the individuating fact known about a particular by someone identifying it is a fact which locates it in our common spatio-temporal

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framework or uniquely relates it to some other particular whose place in the framework is known.

Strwson further argues that we can identify particulars only if we employ "a single unified spatio-temporal system." We can have such a system only if we are able to re-identify objects i.e., able to identify object B encountered at time t_2 as the same object as object A encountered at t_1. Hence we must have criteria of re-identification.

To say that a given kind of particulars is basic is to say something like the following: particulars of kind 'a' are basic particulars if and only if we can identify particulars of kind 'a' without referring to particulars of any other kind, and there are particulars of some other kind such that we cannot identify particulars of that kind without referring to particulars of kind 'a' . According to Strawson, pains and other images are not basic particulars, for in general we can identify a pain only as so and so's pain. Our identification of pains essentially involves a reference to particulars of a different type, namely persons. And from the premise that we can identify particulars only by relating them uniquely to this "unitary spatio-temporal framework" Strawson infers that material bodies are basic particulars in the above sense.

But how can it be defended? Strawson continues his argument and says that if a class of particulars is basic, then particulars of that must be "publicly observable", he then asks what categories of publicly observable entities are available? As it turns out, there are three such categories: (1) events and processes, (2) states and conditions and (3) material bodies or things possessing material bodies. Strawson's argument in essence consists in showing that due to "the contingent limitation of human powers", particular of groups (1) and (2) do not provide framework of the kind which are all adequate to our referring needs; they do not provide frame works which could be used for the purpose of identification. Material bodies, on the other hand, can and do provide such framework, hence they and they alone are basic particulars.

III

After discussing different kinds of particulars, the question arises whether

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these particulars can be considered as basic particulars in the Strawsonian sense. In answering this question we can very well say that these particulars cannot be regarded as basic particulars in Strawsonian sense. To begin with Locke's simple ideas as particulars, we can say that those ideas cannot be called basic in our thought structure. By 'basic particulars', Strawson means a particular which needs no other reference for its identification. If this is the criterion of basic particulars, then the Lockean simple ideas cannot be regarded as basic particulars. In the case of Lockean simple ideas, it is difficult to identify these ideas as they reside in individual's mind. If these ideas are 'ideas' in mind only, then we cannot locate them in space and time and thus question of identification and re-identification does not arise at all. But space-time locatability and identification and re-identification are the required criteria for thing to be particular. As Lockean simple ideas lack these criteria, it cannot be given the status of particulars in the Strawsonian sense.

Given the criteria of felt-resistance and endurance as the criteria of basic particulars. Humean sense-impressions cannot be regarded as the basic particulars. Hume considers ideas and impressions the basic elements in our thoughts structure. It is ideas and impressions, which make our knowledge possible. In this sense only we can consider Humean impressions as basic. But from the Strawsonian point of view Humean impressions cannot be considered as basic particulars. As Humean ideas and impressions come and go, it cannot be said that they can be re-identified as the same ideas and impressions previously identified. As they are only ideas in the mind, they cannot be said to have persistence. Hence we find that if we apply the Strawsonian criteria of basic particular, Hume's impressions cannot be considered as basic particulars in our conceptual framework.

Similarly, particulars of Leibnitz and *'Tractatus'* also cannot be considered as basic particulars too. Leibntiz considers monads as the basic particulars. He argues that reality consists of monads and thus in order to know reality we have to know monads. In this sense Leibnitz considers monads as the basic in our conceptual framework. But we find that Leibnitzian monads are spiritual in nature and they are windowless, and thereby we do not have access to them. As they are spiritual in nature, we cannot locate them in our spatio-temporal framework and

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thereby cannot be considered as basic particulars. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein talks about basic proposition as the primary particular in our thought structure. He says that proposition pictures the reality. But we cannot agree with Wittgenstein on this point. There are certain propositions, which picture certain facts, which do not have any existence in reality. Therefore we cannot consider elementary propositions as the basic particular.

An attempt can be made to show some inadequacies in Strawsonian view of basic particulars. As already discussed, for Strawson something to be called particulars must fulfil the characteristics of 'durability', 'identification and re-identification' and 'felt-resistance'. He argues that "material bodies" are the basic particulars, which satisfy all these required characteristics. But it can be argued that even if material bodies fulfil all these Strawsonian criteria yet they cannot be called basic. Material bodies can be considered as particulars but not basic particulars. Because to identify a material body we need a reference to space and time. We distinguish one material body from another only with reference to 'here and now', 'then and there'. So we find that the categories of space and time are basic in our conceptual framework. Though we cannot ignore the importance of material bodies in our thought structure, but we cannot consider them as basic.

The required criteria to call something-basic particular are also lacking in the case of person. The concept of person is not to be understood in terms of material body of individual, according to Strawson. He repeatedly mentions that the concept of person is to be understood as logically primitive concept failing which no ascription of corporal and non-corporal attributes is possible. The primitiveness of the concept, for Strawson, stands for the unanalysability of it. But as we have already seen that Strawson tried to analyse the concept of person as a being that admits of both. M-predicates and P-predicates. He says that in order to identify a being or thing as person it must have a reference to M-predicates and P-predicates. Thus, we see that on the one hand, Strawson is trying to introduce the concept of person as pre-requisite for simultaneous ascription of M-predicates and P-predicates and on the other hand, he is trying to understand the concept of person in terms of M-predicates and P-predicates. It seems Strawson is arguing in a circle Moreover, Strawsonian particulars must possess the criteria

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of 'durability', 'identification and re-identification' and 'felt-resistance. And these criteria cannot be applied to person if we accept the concept of person as a primitive concept. The primitiveness of the concept of person does not prove the 'business' of the concept. Thus, we fail to understand the primitiveness of the concept of person and its relation with basic particulars.

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THE IDEA OF AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY IN AFRICAN LANGUAGE

GODWIN AZENABOR

It was Gene Blocker who once said that we cannot resolve any problem, question or idea in African Philosophy, until we first of all settle the meaning of 'African', 'philosophy' and then 'African philosophy'.[1] We therefore begin by settling the words 'African' 'philosophy' and then 'African philosophy'.

The term 'African' is racial geographical entity. 'Africa' is a continent inhabited by people of a particular race, which could be black, white, Arab, Negro, etc., but definitely with similar culture, custom, common history of colonial experience and tutelage. So in spite of the diversity of forms in African cultures, there are common traits and similarities.

The conception of philosophy is decisive in determining what we take African philosophy to be. By philosophy we mean a rational, critical and systematic reflection or study of the nature of the world, of man and his position and goal in the world. Philosophy can also be seen as the study of the principles underlying conduct, thought and knowledge. Furthermore, Africans have a particular constellation of problems; a recent colonial history, a multiplicity of diverse sub-national indigenous traditions, a foreign language, a literary culture are still very much in the making.

And by 'African philosophy', we simply mean the philosophy that is nourished within an African cultural experience, tradition and history. There is always the spirit of African philosophy. The spirit is that of a metaphysical and spiritual orientation which is more of co-existence with nature rather than conquest, more of collectivism rather than individualism, more of holism rather than

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atmoism, more of synthesis rather than analysis, more of relations rather than separation, unity rather than dualism or monism.

The idea of African philosophy has given rise to the problem of language. The argument here is that for a philosophy to be truly African, the language and form in which it is expressed must be African. For example, "Bantu Philosophy" was not written in African Language but in Dutch, and so it is said not to qualify as African philosophy.

The question of Language, as it relates to the idea of African philosophy is that, there can be no African philosophy, (so it is argued), until there is a philosophy in African language(s), not just a translation or interpretation. This is because English philosophy, for example, is written in English, Chinese philosophy is in Chinese language, French philosophy is in French language, German philosophy is in German language, etc., but African philosophy (e.g. Yoruba, Igbo, Uchi, Hausa's philosophy) is still being written and communicated in foreign languages. These foreign languages, it is argued, may not depict the true picture of African philosophy. It is the indigenous languages that really take care of issues of identity, feelings, empathy and meaning. Hence, a genuine African philosophy should be written in African language, since language is societal and experiential. Frontline advocates of this view are F. Ogunmodede, S.B. Oluwole, Gene Blocker, Chris Uroh, etc.

It is precisely this question of language, "that has led to skepticism about African philosophy by some contemporary African philosophers".[2] And it is precisely because of the need to reverse this trend that made some scholars to request that we write and teach African philosophy in African Language in order to make it authentic. The question of Language is, perhaps, inspired by Miguel Unamino's assertion that "a philosophy is a philology".[3] The question of language has become important because language is the tool and primary medium of philosophical expression, it is the vehicle of the philosopher's thought and it plays an important role in the way people know and understand. The language of a people is said to be the principal feature that marks them off from other people - it is their essence and authenticity.[4] So linguistic forms have been said to have powerful control over the minds of people. Language has been said to be a good

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store of people's ideas about their own environment and that "one is able to arrive at the structure of reality of a particular people beginning from their language..."[5]

Arguing the case for African philosophy in African Language, Chris Uroh writes:

> The problem becomes more complex when foreign languages with markedly different world views are imposed on a people in place of their own language. In that case, they are forced to perceive themselves through an alien cultural screen, which is bound to distort their own image. Such a people will suffer an identity crisis, for they will neither really be like "themselves" nor exactly like the culture they are imitating.[6]

It is along this line that Francis Ogunmodede also argues in his paper, "African philosophy in African Language." According to Ogunmodede, we cannot critically explain human experience well enough to an African by using a foreign language, like English or French. To use foreign language to explain African experience and culture, according to Ogunmodede, is to be culturally alienated, live unauthentic life and become irrelevant to our society.[7] Citing Cheikh Anta Diop's *Civilization and Barbarism*, Ogunmodede buttresses his argument further, when he writes" "Flight from one's own language is the quickest short-cut to cultural alienation."[8] The point that is made here is that if we do not utilize African Language in education, especially in philosophic thought and discourse, our emancipation from colonial domination remains incomplete. And in lending weight to this position, Wiredu had written that the nature of a given philosophical position, may be influenced by the structure and other characteristics of the language in which it is formulated and may derive plausibility from the form of its expression.[9] But then, Wiredu quickly adds that any language is flexible and can be adopted to any conceivable needs of communication.[10]

The Problem of African Philosophy in African Language(s)

For historical reasons, which we believe we all know, the African scholar writes in foreign languages. Whereas, in his or her philosophical meditations and

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during conversations with the elders and or sages in the traditional settings, the African scholar communicates in an African language, but does not finally write in this language. There is, of course, reason for this development. This is because most indigenous languages are not taught in schools, especially in Nigerian schools, and where taught, they are taught in colonial languages. So, right from the onset, the scholar cannot really grasp the understanding and mastery of local languages enough to enable him to put it to writing for education purposes. The point is that indigenous languages are confined to lower status in African countries. After all, there is no higher institution in Nigeria, for example, where a Nigerian language is used as the official medium of instruction, other than for courses in African languages and literature. This failure in encouraging the use of Nigerian languages as the official means of instruction in our higher institutions is the root of the language problem in African philosophy.

The problem of language is further complicated because most African languages are local, whereas philosophy is an international study. So, talking of international realism, most African languages cannot pass the mark. If we use a language that does make meaning to the international scholars, that work or philosophy shall perish for its lack of being understood, and understanding is a factor of development. So the question of writing African philosophy in African languages poses of linguistic trap. If for example, we decide to write this article or paper in my own language (that is Esan language), ninety-nine percent of my audience and readers would not understand - in fact I would not be communicating. We can therefore see that the indigenous language approach in African philosophy if adopted will narrow the scope of discourse in African philosophy. Exchanging English or French which are international languages for a national African Language, would be building a barrier to philosophical communication and make thought difficult. This is why Wiredu on this issue of language rightly advises caution until unity is achieved in Africa to make it possible to realize the idea of a continental lingua Franca.[11]

Thirdly, there is nor unity of language nor do we have a lingua franca in Nigeria, talk less of Africa. This is precisely why we translate into English or French, in order to reach out to a wider range of people and remove unnecessary barriers to communication and understanding. But even with translation, there is

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still the problem and even failure in translating some categories, expressions or abstractions in the native languages into foreign languages, without falling into ontological fallacies or even fantasies. Wiredu already gives another note of caution in this area, when he writes in "Philosophy, Mysticism and Rationality", that: "unless different languages share basically the same logic, it would be impossible to translate one into another,"[12] and even when translated, there is still the problem of correctness in the translation. Quine in his "Principle of Indeterminancy of Translation", is said to have emphasized certain areas of discourse in which it is impossible to convey the exact meaning of an original assertion into a translated one. The difficulty here, according to Quine, is more evident when dealing with systems involving beliefs, world views and other social values, all of which are culture dependent.[13] The point is that in translation, the original meaning may not be conveyed. Consequently, it is argued that in the absence of a language in our own tongue, through which we could analyze the true nature of African philosophy, we cannot get a tolerable translation or interpretation. All we have now is mere reductionism, which conceals.

Resolution of Problem

On our part, we point out that the problem of language is mainly that of linguistic contrast in words, especially when it comes to the question of translation. There might not even be one or single word in an African language for English or French words and vice versa (for example, in most African languages there is no gender pronoun like "she" in English language). But there is always a concept for a word or a thing in any language. And philosophy is essentially the articulation of concepts not words. Furthermore, philosophy deals with ideas and thought and these precede language. "Experience shows that there are many ideas for which we have no words, as well as words that do not correspond exactly with our perceptions of reality in their general grammatical structure and classification."[4]

In conclusion, one might argue that the problem of language is really not philosophical but linguistic and its emergence is as a result of semantics and vocabulary. "In their account of language, the two leading British philosophers... Locke and Berkely - consider language as an artificial creation, chiefly to keep

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records and for communicating ideas."[15] What matters therefore, is that one succeeds in communicating to the target audience, the language notwithstanding. So beyond linguistic variances and expression one does not see how the issue of language is a determinant factor of a philosophy.

African philosophy is not alone in the use of foreign languages to communicate in African Studies. There are other disciplines such as African history, African literature, etc., which are still being written and communicated in English and French. Why then should that of philosophy be different? We need not write in African languages, in order to write authentic African philosophy. What we need is to express our thoughts in a language that is universally understandable and intelligible and to avoid foreign categories and models. Furthermore, learning, understanding and writing in African language is not what really matters; rather, what matters is sharing the experience of African people. This is not to say, however, that an African philosophy in African language is wrong. No. Rather, all we are saying is that the language does not determine the authenticity of African philosophy. This may explain why we have not had any African philosopher writing in an African language. Another reason, is that most African languages are really under-developed in syntax, localized and lack the needed vocabulary to meet up with modern challenges and sophistication.

Finally, it is instructive to note that philosophy is not African on racial or linguistic lines but what makes a philosophy African is the tradition of the philosophy : African cultural experience, history and tradition, with a grounding in an holistic ontology, which is more of co-existence with nature, rather than conquest, more of collectivism, rather than individualism, more of holism rather than atomism or monism, more of synthesis rather than analysis. Authentic African philosophy is that philosophy that is applied to the conceptual problems of African life.

The other characteristic of African philosophy which marks it off from western philosophy is the drawing from a common pool; the African traditional past. This drawing from the traditional source of African philosophy is a second difference between African philosophy and any other philosophy. This is precisely why Prof. Kwesi Wiredu remarks that it is necessary to develop a sympathetic

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reflective understanding of traditional modes of thought, and to a large extent our modes of thought remain much closer to traditional ideas than many are willing to acknowledge.[16]

NOTES

1. Gene Blocker: "African Philosophy" in *African Philosophical Inquiry*, Vol. I, No.1, 1987, p.2
2. M.A. Makinde : 'Philosophy in Africa' in *Substance of African Philosophy* (Auchi: African Philosophy Projects, Publications, 1989), p.106.
3. Cited by Olabiyi Tai: "Theory and Pratice in African Philosophy" in *Second Order,* (Vol. VI No.2, July 1977), p.13
4. Charles Uroh: "Colonialism and the Language Question - A Reply of Godfrey Tangwa" in *Quest Philosophical Discussions,* (Vol. VIII, No.2, December, 1994), p.138.
5. D.A. Masolo: *African Philosophy in Search of Identity* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), P.101.
6. *Ibid.*, p.139
7. Francis Ogunmodede. "Of History and Historiogrphy in African Philosophy", A paper presented at the International Conference on African Philosophy held at the Seminary of SS Peter and Paul, Bodija, Ibadan, 27th-31st March, 1995.
8. *Ibid.*
9. K. Wiredu: *Philosophy and An African Culture*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p.34
10. *Ibid.*, p.35
11. *Ibid.*
12. Quoted by H. Odera Oruka: *Sage Philosophy* (Nairobi, Kenya: African Centre for Technology Studies, 1991), p.27.

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13. Cited by Godwin Sogolo: *Foundations of African Philosophy*, (Ibadan: Modecular Publishers, 1992), p.27 and 28.

14. D.A. Masolo: *op. cit.*, p.96

15. Adebayo Adesanya: "Yoruba Metaphysical Thinking" in *Odu: Journal of Yoruba and Related Studies*, (no.5, 1958), p.36

16. *Cited by K.A. Appiah : In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture* (London : Methuen, 1992), p.145

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THE PERSON AND HIS SOCIETY

SAURVAPRAN GOSWAMI

It was probably Kant who for the first time declared in his *Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten (Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals)* that "Man is a person". This "man" was an antithesis to a "thing" by virtue of the former's being a rational agent and an end in himself. Prior to Kant the human life was allowed a place of esteem in the classical philosophy primarily for its participation in the divine life through rationality - rationality being a divine quality - than for its own sake. Moreover, a distinction was made in the Pre-Kantian philosophy between free men and slaves. The slaves were denied all rights and given a status almost on a par with the brutes. Hence it is no wonder that Kant should be accredited as bringing about a Copernican revolution with his rigorous prescription to treat a man, irrespective of sex and social status, always as an end and never as a means. Being a member of the Kingdom of Ends, a man is essentially a moral agent as distinct from a mere rational self-conscious substance.

Howsoever incomplete and question-begging may this Kantian account of person be, it is still revolutionary in so far as it brings down the concept of person to earth from aloft. And it is in this sense that Kant, after Aristotle, one of the "very greatest philosophers"[1], is the first philosopher for the modern thinkers on the issue.

A person is made person by his surroundings. Nature is no more viewed as antagonistic to him. Being non-natural or supra-natural is not to add anything to a persons' credit. A person is exemplified best by me or you.[2] Persons are beings like ourselves, "ones of us" - conscious bodied individuals who can originate action and interact with us as persons.

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To count as "one of us" one has to stand in the "Right Relation" to you and me", i.e. to share "with us enough of the human world constituted by interpersonal relationships"[3]. This "interpersonal relationship" is again to be understood independently of the concept of person as "human ties", for otherwise it will involve a circularity. This relationship can hold between human beings and human beings alone, and not between a human being at one end and a Martian or a Computer at the other. It depends upon "international understanding" of each other. "Right Relation" is a "direct understanding involving relation[4] which holds between "Right Kind of Beings."

So this is a point of view which perceives a person as a member of a society. Hence, apart from being a rational agent, which characterized a person in the metaphysical point of view, a person has to be "physical agent, endowed with memory, expectations and other psychological and intellectual capacities, not all of them implicitly contained in the rationality conditions as it is usually formulated. The development and exercise of these capacities required both a complex biological organism and a complex social environment."[5] A person is a responsible agent and responsibility being something to be understood only in the social context, a person must be viewed in his historic-social background alone.

This social life, marked by interpersonal relations, is made a necessary requisite of the being of a person also by N.V. Banerjee.[6] Banerjee expresses this interpersonal relation with the formula "I *with* others". The concept of a person is radically different from that of an individual. It required the "neutralization of spatiality", the very mark of an "individual" which "divides" him from others.

Persons are persons because of this interpersonal relation. In absence of this tie they would be mere individuals like Leibnitzian monads. But this tie is not something imposed upon from without, rather "person *qua* persons are held in this relation."[7] What Banerjee has insisted upon is the "realm of the personal" rather than a person as such. So to say, in his view, there cannot be a person abstracted from the realm of the personal, which is defined by the word *we* analysed as *I with others*.

Strawson's account of person[8] consists in viewing him as an irreducible

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and primitive being that admits of both P and M-predicates simultaneously. Coupled with Strawson's account of "basic particulars" where he reserves that name for material bodies and those who have material bodies, a Strawsonian person may be described as a predicated material body. This is plain naturalism in that it stands on the demolition of the Cartesian ego-person - the latter being conceived as a supra-natural principle. However, it also refuses at the same breath to reduce a person to the level of a material body. This is not to opt for any "non-naturalism" of Moorean type, but to retain and honour a person's distinctive character from a thing. The words "nature" and "natural" need not have narrow applications confining to trees and rivers and thunderstorms, it can very well be allowed a wider sense so as to embrace not only cows and monkeys but also much higher evolutes like human beings including their hopes and fears and thoughts and beliefs. This explains why a person is said to be an unbreakable unit. A broken person is a former person. The breaking may be thought to result in two (why only two?) Cartesian substances, but these substances neither separately nor together qualify for personhood.

This description of the metaphysics of a person makes him essentially a part of nature, a member of the class of persons.[9] It is clear from Strawsons' insistence on the logical priority of other-ascription over self-ascription of a P-predicate. A person derives his own identity from the identity of the class to which he belongs. This is *objectification* of oneself. So personifying oneself is classifying oneself.

It may however be objected that apart from the class-identity, the individual subject does have his own private and personal self-identity. This is undeniably true. But this consciousness of self-identity unmixed with class-identity can be only a secondary kind of identity derivable after a withdrawal, either complete or partial, temporary or permanent, from the society. This is secondary not only logically but also temporally. For a child cannot be thought to be having self-identity first. Now, since this self-identity consists in either temporary or permanent withdrawal from the society, submerging into this would mean de-classifying and, therefore, de-personifying oneself. It is permissible for an ordinary empirical person to occasionally submerge into such a self-search. But our logic would make us say that in those particular moments he, may be what he-is-in-himself,

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ceases to be a person. His return to the family, due to hunger for instance, makes him a person once more.

A person, seen in this light, is essentially an Aristotelian social animal. The personhood is characterized by the social involvement and interpersonal relationship. And this makes a person essentially a moral agent - a free and responsible one. His activities may and do affect the interest of others in this or that way. Others, therefore, react to him with gratitude or resentment, and in case of his activities affecting the interest of the society, i.e. in the vicarious level, with moral approbation or indignation. He can also react to himself with pride or remorse when his own activities, he feels, affect others, interest in this or that way. This picture of a moral person has been beautifully and convincingly illustrated by Strawson in his celebrated essay "Freedom and Resentment."[10] This is also glorified by H.G. Frankfurt in his easy "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a person."[11] Frankfurt makes it a necessary point to contingently have or lack freedom of the will for determining the personhood of one. A lower animal necessarily does not, and a divine being necessarily does, enjoy this freedom of the will, hence none, in this view, qualifies for being a person. It is only man, who sometimes enjoys and sometimes does not enjoy this freedom that can be called a person.

This picture of a person is one of an ordinary human being as found in his spatio-temporal situations. His role in these situations and the impact of the latter upon his being is essential to the make-up of his personhood. This concept of 'role' however is not a new concept, rather we can go so farback to the etymological derivation of the word 'person' from Latin persona standing ambiguously either for a mask worn by a dramatic character or for the dramatic character itself. So the first entry to the word 'person' in the oxford English Dictionary[12] reads:

> "I.1. A character sustained or assumed in a drama or the like, or in actual life, part played; hence function, office, capacity, guise, semblance, one of the characters in a play or story..."

So the situations in which the person finds himself make him a person. Any withdrawl from this situation will lead to the destruction of his personhood.

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A solipsist or a subjectivist is not a person but an individual. A person is inseparable from the "realm of the personal". A person is a moral person - responsible and accountable for his deeds.

A question may be raised at this point: whether the modern man has been losing his personhood gradually? For is he not withdrawing himself from the society and thereby evading his responsibility towards it " The present age is one of consumerism and the person seems to be in the process of being consumed up by his situations. He is running after wealth and money at the cost of everything else. It is the craze for easy-money which encourages him to indulge in all sorts of anti-social activities. Corruption and violence is the daily headline. No one is dear to him, not even his spouse who can be easily put to death for a meger amount of money. He is allowing himself to be swept away by the blowing wind without the slightest resistance. He seems to have been gone without the consciousness of his role, which makes him a person.

Personhood consists in surpassing the narrow boundaries of an individual and in enacting one's assigned role. Then, can we not ("we" = who think ourselves to be persons) think of being more persons and less individuals by performing our roles in the best possible way? Can we not have dreams for a better society and better tomorrows for the future generations? If we have dreams then the ways for their materialization also can be found out. For this purpose those who have been working relentlessly with this commitment for the real betterment of the people and the society at large, call them the more evolved species of mankind, can probably serve as our model persons.

NOTES

1. The phrase was used by P.F. Strawson in *Individuals*" Introduction' p.11, Methuen, London, 1974 reprint.
2. "I am a person, so are you".Daniel Dannet : "Conditions of Personhood" in *The Identities of Persons* ed. A.O. Rorty, University of California Press, 1979, p. 175
3. Peter Smith : *"Human persons" in The person and the Human Mind* ed. C. Gill,

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Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, p. 70.

4. *Ibid.*, p.73

5. A.O. Rorty : "Persons, Policies and Bodies" in *"International Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (Mar 1973), p. 71

6. N.V. Banerjee : *Language Meaning and Persons*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1963.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 125

8. P.F. Strawson: "Persons" in his *Individuals*, Methuen, London, 1959.

9. *"A person is an interactive memebr of a community"* - A.O. Rorty : "*Persons and Personae*" in *The Person and the Human Mind*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, p. 35.

10. P.F. Strawson : *Freedom and Resentment* and *Other Essays*, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1974.

11. The *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LXVIII, No.1 (Jan. 14, 1971)

12. *Oxford English Dictionary*, Vol. VII, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1933.

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DISCUSSION - I

MAHĀVĀKYAS AGAIN

Skirting the issue of the similarity of the interpretations of the Fregean sentence, "The morning star is the evening star" and the Upanisadic sentence, *"Tat tvam asi"* known as Mahāvākya which was the bone of contention between me and Daya, Bokil has raised a quite different issue in his note on the Mahāvākya,[1] namely, whether there is identity at all between the empirical and transcendental selves. It is however a bit surprising that having stated very clearly at the beginning of his note that the said identity is "the cornerstone of Advaita Vedānta" Bokil should turn round later in the note to dub the identity as "Pseudoidentity". To question the identity of the empirical and the transcendental is to question the very fundamental basis of Advaita Vedanta. To answer the question we can do no better than to refer Bokil to welknown, voluminous and highly polemical treatises like Advaitasiddhi, which discuss threadbare and with utmost subtlety the problem of the said identity in all its aspects. This does not mean that the problem has been tackled once for all and no further investigation about it can be made. Great Madhva logicians have argued vigorously against the Advaitic defense of the identity or nonduality. Bokil however has cavalierly dismissed the Advaitic doctrine of identity or nonduality with the facile remark that "the Advaita Vedantins have not taken something more nearly their own size to strain at", without even remotely referring to any of the arguments marshalled in defense of identity by Madhusudana, Chitsukha or even a minor Advaitic author as Dharmraja. Moreover it is not quite clear from the remarks made by Bokil in the later portions of his note whether it is identity itself or the validity of the statement of the identity that he specifically objects to. On the second alternative, Bokil's argument amounts only to this that the demonstrative "Tat" can refer only to a material object and as such no empirical self can be sensibly asked to identify itself with a material object. This is a very flimsy

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argument. Although the said demonstrative is a neuter-gender-word it can well refer to pure consciousness with which the empirical self, which is essentially sentient in nature, can well be asked to identify itself. There is nothing grammatically or epistemically incogruous in exhorting the empirical self to feel itself identical with the universal self when the underlying nature of the two is the same, that is pure sentience.

On the first alternative, Bokil's argument to deny identity is, as he says, based upon the welknown principle of "the identity of the indiscernible". According to this principle distinguishables must be different from each other and so the empirical and universal selves being endowed with distinct incompatible properties must be different from each other. While arguing thus Bokil forgets that it is only by divesting the empirical and the universal selves of their respective distinctive properties that the identity of the underlying consciousness is asserted in the Mahavakya. It may be also be stated here that not all schools of Indian Philosophy accept this principle. Only Nyaya Vaiśeṣika may be supposed to accept it, as according to it differences of things are determined by their distinctive and mutually - incompatible properties. But according to Buddhism things are distinct *sui generis* . This is why they are called "Svalakṣana" or self defined. Advaita too does not subscribe to the principle, the reason for this being that if the difference of things is supposed to be determined by the difference of their properties then the difference of the properties would in its turn need the difference of the second level properties to determine it. This would lead to infinite regress. Besides, if things are different from their properties how can the difference of the latter be supposed to determine the difference of the former? Regarding the understanding of the meaning of the Mahavakya, it needs to be pointed out that the verbal understanding of the meaning is quite different from the introspective understanding or spiritual realisation of the identity in one's own being. In the mind of a spiritually well groomed disciple the Mahavakya as exhortatively pronounced by a competent preceptor would certainly produce the immediate realisation of the said identity. This is why this realisation is called verbally immediate by Advaitins.

Kanthamani's elaborate discussion[2] of mine and Daya's views has very

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little relevance to the central point I was at pains to make in my rejoinder to Daya. I have argued that the Fregean sentence, "The morning star is the evening star" is intended to serve quite a different purpose than that of the Mahāvkya. Frege is concerned to show that if the sense and the reference of words are not distinguished from each other the above sentence would be reduced to the tautology, "The morning star is the morning star" or "The evening star is the evening star". But when the distinction is made the sentence yields the significant meaning that, "the entity that is the morning star is the same entity as the evening star". Thus both the senses are known as applicable to the same reference in the sentence. In the Mahavakya on the other hand the situation is the diametrical opposite of this. Consciousness endowed with empiricallity is the referend of the demonstrative "*Tvam* and the same consciousness as endowed with unviersality is the referned of the demonstrative "Tat". The two cannot be identical. So by using the suggestive mode of meaning the two demonstratives are each made to shed a part of their meaning. What we are left with then is the common denominator of both the meanings, that is, the pure referend, which is pure consciousness, divested of both the distinctive properties. Thus while in the Fregean sentence the words retain both their sense and reference and the different senses apply to the referend, in the Mahavakya the demonstratives shed their senses and retain only their identical reference divested of the different senses. We can even say that the demonstratives are used only as mere pointers to the reality, common to both the empirical and the transcendental.

N. S. DRAVID

NOTES

1. Note on Tattvamasi', *IPQ* July 99, pp 425-434.
2. Are Mahāvākyas Identity Vakyas, *IPO* July 99, pp 415-423.

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DISCUSSION - II

REFLECTIONS ON DRAVID'S "MAHAVAKYAS AGAIN"[1]

Dravid's reaction to my "A Note On *Tattvamasi*"[2] begins with a bit of surprise he felt at my first stating clearly that the identity between the empirical and the transcendental selves is the cornoerstone of Advaita Vedānta and then turning round later in the note to dub the identity as 'pseudo-identity'. Let me make it clear that there is no incongruity involved in this. In saying that the said identity is the cornerstone of Advaita Vedānta and further that "the system stands or falls with it (p.425), I was just drawing attention of the readers to the very high importance which the Advaita Vedantins attach to the sentence which expounds, according to them, the said identity. This does not mean that I had subscribed to that view initially and then in the end I had backed out from it. In fact, the whole and sole purpose of my note is to argue that the professed identity is highly improbable and well nigh untenable.

But before I substantiate this purpose in reacting to Dravid's reaction to my note, I should write a few lines about the context in which I have written my note. My note is to be read as a reaction to Dayakrishna's original paper.[3] It was not intended to be a reaction to something that was being contended between Daya and Dravid regarding the issue of the similarity of the interpretations of the Fregean sentence: 'The morning star is the evening star' and the Upaniṣadic sentence" *'Tat tvam asi'*. Whatever may the bone of their contention. I am interested only in fleshing out the meaningfulness of *'Tat tvam asi'*, if it has any. Since 'Tat tvam asi' is a sentence that belongs to a language, it is certainly legitimate to raise the question as to how that sentence becomes meaningful at all and further whether it can be said to have the meaning, which the Advaitins claim it to have. Saṅskrit is as natural and ordinary language as any other language. It is a human creation. The very

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name given to it indicates this plainly. There is nothing sacrosanct about that language nor about any sentence that belongs to it. If, however, you look at 'Tat Tvam asi' right from the very start as a 'Mahāvākya' the die is cast and you beg the whole issue, which is normally regarded as a philosopher's sin. Dravid has missed the whole point as to why I state the essential difference between the Fregean sentence and the Upnisadic sentence as one between the scientific hypothesis and the metaphysical hypothesis. I think I have carefully stressed the major difference between the two in order to take the stand that '*Tat tvam asi*' is a metaphysical hypothesis. (It may be noted that the Fregean sentence has now almost ceased to be of a hypothetical nature while '*Tat tvam asi*' as stating identity between 'jeeva' and 'Brahman' continues and will continue to be hypothetical since there are no empirical as also conceptual means of knowing its truth. But then the difference becomes more accentuated.) To this distinction hardly can anyone object. My main question is: ' Whether any metaphysical hypothesis could be regarded as an identity statement in the sense of identity as referential identity?' (p.426) I do not know if anyone has raised the question in the form that I do. I have interpreted the title and the contents of Daya's paper referred to above from this angle. I know that philosophers with Advaitic leanings will be disturbed by my question because I do find that it is not at all an easy task which we philosophers can manage. It is not an easy task because philosophic inquiry, which involves '*nityānityavastuviveka*', is a never-ending job and it keeps on raising for ever new points and new queries owing to its unusually high criticalness as compared with other forms of inquiries. If Dravid thinks that my remark: "the Advaita Vedāntins have not taken something more nearly their own size to strain at" -cavalierly dismisses the Advaita doctrine of identity, he is free enough to hold his opinion to be sure, but he shouldn't think at least that it is a facile remark. I have made that remark with full awareness of what I have said and I have not just stopped at that. I have given my reasons to substantiate that remark. Instead of confining the discussion to those reasons, Dravid has referred me to the vast literature that either defends or rejects the Advaitin's view of identity or non-duality. I fail to see the relevance of this move of his. If he wants to suggest that I am ignorant of it, then he could be

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sadly mistaken and if he wants to suggest that the literature contains a very solid conclusive defence of Advaitin's view of identity, he could be badly mistaken. Thinking of an argument being conclusive could be different from argument's being really conclusive. If *Advaitasiddhi* or for that matter any other philosophical work by Advaitin were to prove conclusively the said identity of empirical self with the universal self, the situation would have been very much different from what it is. Unfortunately for Advaitins, they find themselves in singular minority when all other schools of Indian thought have chosen to be unanimous in opposing Advaita Vedānta on this crucial issue despite their own intra-school and inter-school controversies about the metaphysical status of individual self and the world. The reason for my remark would become further more clear when one sees insurmountable difficulties in understanding and defending the Advaita view of mind and consciousness especially in the light of modern naturalistic developments in the area of philosophy of mind and cognitive science apart from the linguistic and logical difficulties one faces in comprehending the exact import of the Mahāvākya. Such abstract names as, consciousness, empirical consciousness, individual consciousness, pure consciousness, universal consciousness, transcendental consciousness, consciousness of consciousness and witness consciousness and so on and so forth, which philosophers gliby assume to be crystal clear and intelligible, have in recent times proven themselves to be hard nuts to crack. This has happened mainly because scientists until recently did not turn their attention to human consciousness. From physical world, the scientists have now turned to what we call ' the world of inner experience' and I shall not be surprised at all if the philosophic inquiry into that world takes on a radically new turn which may make us give up old views and replace them with new ones in conformity with the new scientific researches. We know how science has affected our old beliefs and practice in other walks of life. It's impossible that with modern ways of global communication, the old philosophies will remain in tact. To add to this, we should also take into account the onslaught of modern logic, philosophies of science and mathematics and recent linguistic studies. Philosophic inquiry has no longer remained a closed affair between master and disciple. When in my

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note I made my skeptical minded disciple to ask his master as to how the master himself came to have the knowledge of Brahman and of jeeva's identity with Bhahman (p.430) it was rather a public request to make distinction between 'belief' and 'knowledge'. All those who are well aware of how this distinction which was supposed to be clear and distinct till recently has suffered at the hands of great thinkers in the West during the last few decades cannot be easily persuaded to accept the Advaitic position. Unless we clarify this distinction precisely and state what normative criteria would lead us from the state of mere belief to the state of knowledge, the skeptic cannot be silenced. Can we do this? All of us are indeed ridden with philosophical anxieties that center on the relation between mind and the world. I think that those anxieties cannot be shelved by creating metaphysical myths. They can be removed only by developing a logical space of reasons and not otherwise. It is quite possible that we may not be able forever to determine the boundaries of that logical space. It was indeed refreshing to read from Dravid's pen that "this does not mean that the problem has been tackled once for all and no further investigation about it can be made".[4] But like many other traditionalists he is unable to get out of the shell of dogmaticism.

In reacting to my reference to the principle of "the identity of the indiscernibles", Dravid has remarked that "it is by divesting the empirical and the universal selves of their respective distinctive properties that the identity of the underlying consciousness is asserted in the Mahāvākya."[5] This remark, though profound, I must admit, beats me completely. While reacting to Daya's original paper, I had not denied that there are some problems with that principle since I was working within the sphere of philosophic inquiry where language and logic play prominent role. Dravid is asking me and others like me to mind very well that "regarding the understanding of the Mahāvākya, it needs to be pointed out that the verbal understanding of the meaning is quite different from the introspective understanding or spiritual realization of the identity in one's own being."[6] I do not find all this of my own size to strain at. Dravid looks upon philosophy as a spiritual discipline, which I don't. For me philosophic inquiry is strictly argumentative and

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therefore I prefer to stop.

S. V. BOKIL

NOTES

1. Dravid N.S. : "Mahavakyas Again", *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XXVII, No. 3 (July 2000) pp. 335-37.
2. Bokil S.V. : "A note on *Tattvamasi*" *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* Vol. XXVI, No. 3 (July 1990), pp. 425-434. All page references in the brackets are to this article.
3. Dayakrishna: "Is *'Tattvam Asi'* the same type of Identity Statement as 'The Morning star is the Evening star?, *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XXV, no.1, pp. 1-13.
4. Dravid N.S. *Op. cit.* P. 335
5. *Ibid p. 336*
6. *Ibid. p. 336*

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BOOK REVIEW I

a) *Ātmatattvaviveka of Udayanācārya* **with Translation**, Explanation and Analytical - Critical Survey by N.S.Dravid, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, 1995, x + 587, Rs. 900

b) *Nyāyakusumāñjali of Udayanācarya*, Vol. I with translation and Explanation by N.S. Dravid, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1996, X + 500, Rs. 500/

N.S. Dravid, a Veteran scholar of Indian Philosophy, has translated two major works of Udayanācārya, a stalwart of the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika School. Both these books have been translated in Indian languages by competent scholars. Thus, *Ātmatattavivena* has been translated into Bengali along with elaborate notes by Pandit Dinanatha Tripathi, and a Hindi translation of this book prepared by Pandit Kedarnath Tripathi is also available. A Bengali translation of *Nyāyakusumāñjali* has been prepared by Pandit Srimohan Tarkatirtha, and a Hindi translation of the same has been done by Pandit Durgadhara Jha. Through the commendable efforts of these scholars, these abstrue texts of Udayanācārya have now become accessible to readers who cannot, by themselves, cope with the terse writing of Udayanācārya. It is gratifying to note that a scholar like N.S. Dravid has undertaken the difficult job of translating *Ātmatattavivek* and *Nyāyakusumāñjali* into English. Thanks to his efforts, these two masterpieces of Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika School are now accessible to a larger number of readers who are interested in Nyaya - Vaiśeṣika Philosophy.

Dravid has printed the Sanskrit texts along with the English translation,

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and he has also split up the Sanskrit words in the original text in such a manner that people who have some knowledge of Sanskrit can match the Sanskrit text with the English translation with ease. (He has not, however, mentioned which of the editions of these two texts have been adopted by him. There is also no evidence of preparing any critical editions of the texts concerned.) At the end of the translation of Sanskrit passages, there are explanatory notes where some different issues have been discussed. Many years ago, an English translation of the verse - portion (Kārikā-s) of *Nyāyakusumāñjalī* along with the commentary of Haridasa Bhattacharya was prepared by E.B. Cowell, and a few years ago, an Indian reprint of this work has been published. That translation is not, however, of much help to uninitiated readers. The translations prepared by Prof. Dravid are much more lucid, and accordingly, of much more help to interested readers. Prof. Dravid belongs to a very famous family of Pandits known for their Scholarship in Indian Philosophy, and one wishes there were more persons like him, who could translate such difficult works in Sanskrit into readable English.

These two books of Udayana are of two different types - *Ātmatattvaviveka*, which aims at defending the Nyāya theory of self against the criticisms of Buddihits, who are supporters of *nairātmyavada*, is overtly polemical in character. From a close study of the commentary *Atmatattvavivekakalpalata* by Śankara Misra, one can easily see that here, the principal opponents for Udayana were Jñanasrimitra and Ratnakirti, two famous Buddhist philosophers who belonged to the famous monastety at Vikramasila. This can be corroboratel further if we compare relevant portions of *Ātmatattvaviveka* with related portions of *Jñānasrinibandhvāli* and *Ratnakirtinibandhavāli*, photo-copies of which were brought to India by Mahapandita Rahula Sānkrityayana, and which have been since published from K.P. Jaiswal Institute, Patna. For the Naiyāyikas, self is a permanent substance that can be characterised by qualities like cognition, desire, effort, pleasure, pain etc. which may be an object of internal perceptions like "I am happy", "I am knowing" etc. Udayanacarya has anticipated four possible objections that may be raised by the Buddhist against this doctrine by opposing each of the separate claims made by the Naiyāyikas. Thus, the

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Buddhists might claim that since all existent entities are momentary, there can be nothing that can be permanent; and hence, the claim that the self is a permanent entity cannot be admitted. Again, the Buddhists may claim that cognition alone is real, and as such, there can be no self that can be a substratum of cognition. Further, the Buddhists may maintain that there is no substance over and above the qualities that are supposed to belong to such a substance, and hence, the claim that the self is a distinct type of substance different from earth, water, etc, is not tenable. Finally, the Buddists may claim that while we may be aware of internal states like cognition, pleasure, pain etc., we do not preceive any self apart from such states. These four possible objections have been discussed thoroughly, and then rejected by Udyanācārya in the four sections of *Atmatattvaviveka* that are known as (a) *Ksanabhangādhyāya,* (b) *Bahyarthabhangadhyaya*, (c) *Guṇāguṇibhedabhangādhyāya* and (d) *Anupalambhādhyāya. Ātmatattvaviveka* seems to be the first work of Udayanācārya, and in his youthful, vigour, he has adopted a very aggresive style while answering his opponents. The sarcastic expressions of Jñanasrimitra have been met with equally sarcastic answers. But. the style of Udyanacarya's writing is very terse, and it is often difficult to follow the chain of his reasoning without the help of commentaries that often provide us with the necessary hints for reconstructing his argument, or for connecting portions of his writing with earlier or latter portions of the same. The style adopted in *Nyāyakusumānjali* is comparatively more serene, though the terseness of his writing has perhaps increased; and here, Udayānācarya attepts at proving the existence of God against the anti-theistic arguments that were advanced by the opponents of the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika school. Here, too, Udayana begins his book by stating five basic objections that may be raised against the Nyāya -Vaiseṣika view that there is a Creator God, who is responsible for the creation, maintainance and destruction of the universe; whose commands regarding what we should do and what we should not do are enshrined in the Vedas, who is merciful and according to whose desire, words mean what they stand for. These five basic objections have been discussed and refuted in five chapters that constitute *Nyāyakusumanjali*. In both these works, Udayanācārya has discussed

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a number of epistemological and ontological doctrines that are central to the tenet of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school,and no scholar, who wants to gain some expertise in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy can afford to ignore these two important, but extremely difficult works of Udayanācārya. It may now be hoped that with the aid of the translations prepared by N.S. Dravid, studies in *Nyaya - Vaiśesika* philosophy will receive a new impetus.

These two translations would have been more helpful to readers if the Introductions had contained some more material about the other works of Udayanācārya, and also about his contribution to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy as a whole. A careful comparison of Udayana's works with *Tattvacintāmani* of Gangeśa' Upādhyāya, who is usually considered to be the father of Navya-Nyāya, clearly shows the extent to which Ganges'a was influenced by Udayana. A few lines about the commentaries on these works that are available would also have enhanced the usefulness of these translations. Dravid has promised to bring out another volume on *Nyāyakusumañjali* and we ardently hope that he will kindly enlighten his readers on these issues.

There are some minor blemishes in these two translations that are, on the whole, both faithful and readable. We mention some of them with the hope that they will be corrected when further editions of these works will be called for.

1) There are some misprints in the Sanskrit texts. Thus, in the Sanskirt text primted on p.20 of *Ātmatattvaviveka*, *avilamba* has been printed as *ahvilamba*. Again on p. 72 of the same book, *avastuna* has been printed as *anvastunah*, *sutasya* has become *suvasya*, *vakttva* has become *vaktutva*, *pramanam* has become *pramānat*, *vidyamānatvāt* has become *vidhmanatvan*, *asmat* has become *anmat* and *ucatye* has become *ucmate*. Again the same explanatory passage has been inadvertantly printed on pp. 241-242 of *Ātmatattvaviveka*. In the case of *Nyāyakusumānjali* too, *na Vidhantarasambhavah* has been printed on p. 105 as *na vicāra-antara-sambhavah*. Such misprints are a sort of eye-sore in such prestigious publications, and it seems that the proofs were not properly corrected when these translations were being printed.

2) In some cases, the Sanskrit expressions have been split up in an improper

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manner. Thus, on page 208 of *Ātmatattvaviveka*, *Kṣiram Vihaya ruchirarocakagrastasya sauvire* should be split up as : *Kṣiram vihaya rucih arocaka - grastasya sauvire* . Instead of this, it has been split up as ... *rucira - rocaka - grastasya* .... which is extremely misleading, because the word *rucih* stands for taste, while *rucira* means beautiful ! This is just one example. We refrain from citing other cases for keeping this review within the prescribed limits.

3) In some cases, transliteration of Sanskrit words has not been done properly. Thus, in place of correct transliteration as *"Jñanašri"* one reads *"Gñanasri"* on pp.211,214,215,228 and 388 of *Ātmatattvaviveka.*

4) In some cases, the translation has been careless. Take for example, the sentence: "Nānā Sāsnādimadvyaktivat svarga-locana-bāṇa-ambu-kulisādiṣu api gosabdasanketagrahavasānāvasāt tathāvidhapratyayanugamaprasangat" on page 181 of *Ātmatattvaviveka*, which has been translated as follows:

> "Just as the word 'cow' is used for different individuals endowed with dewlap, so by different conventions the same word 'cow' is used for heaven, eyes, arrows, water, thunder, etc., and so as a result of the urge for the knowledge of the conventions of this word, all these different entities denoted by the word 'cow' should be comprehended as endowed with a common character."

Here, Dravid has certainly overlooked the fact that while the Sanskrit word 'go' is used in that language in various senses,the same is not true of the English word 'cow'. The translation here would certainly astonish readers who are ignorant of Sanskrit.

Let us take another example from p.6 of *Nyāyakusumānjali.*

Here, the sentence "Sattve api tasyapramāṇatvat" has been translated as "that even if God's existence is envisaged on the basis of some proof, the latter is not valid."This runs totally counter to the opening sentence of the "Fourth bunch of flowers" on p. 333 which is directly linked to the sentence quoted above. Here, Udayana says - *"nanu sadapisvarajñanm pramānam tallakṣanayogāt"*, which has been duly translated on p.33, by Dravid as

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follows :

"Isn't it a fact that although God is all-knowing this knowledge is not valid, as it does not fulfil the definition of validity"?

The first sentence of the fourth Stavana merely amplifies the objections anticipated on p.6, and it should now be clear that the translation of *"Sattve api tasyapramaṇatvaṁ"* as provided by Dravid, is not tenable.

5) On p. 248 of *Ātmatattvaviveka*, the sentence tasya *pratijñarupatayā Kulirasyeva svaprasutayuktyāpatyenaiva pratihatatvaṁ* has been translated by Dravid as follows :

> "Thus like the mongoose being killed by its own progeny, reflection will be eliminated by the very cosequences which it entailed".

Here, it is obvious that for Dravid, the word Kulir stands for a mongoose. Similarly, on p.427 of the same work, we come across the sentence *caitya-civaradi partipadakanam tu svasthirmamasaṁsaya darsanatarsthitidveṣah* has been translated as follows :

"The basis of the doctrines prescribing obeisance to the sacred pillars and the discarding of clothes which entrench themselves on their own presuppositions,is their aversion to opposed points to view."

Once again, it is clear that for Dravid, the word *caitya* stands for a sacred pillar, while the word *civara* stands for discarding of clothes. We beg to differ from Dravid in all these three cases. First, as far as we know, the word *Kulira* stands for a crab, and not for a mongoose. It is not a well-known fact that a mongoose is killed by its own progeny. On the other hand, there is a widespread belief that when the offsprings of the mothercrab are hatched from the eggs, they feed upon their mother as they grow, and when they come out of the mother-crab's body, she diess as a result of this process. Compare, for example, the following sentence in *Arthasastra* of Kautilya - *kark.aṭakasadharmaṇo hi janakagaksāh rajaputrah.* Again, *caitya* is a structure that contains the mortal remains of some venerable saint of the Buddhist order and *civara* stands for the outer robe worn by a Buddhist monk. One of the principal rituals of Buddhist laity is known as *kathinacivaradāna*, where

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robes are offered to Buddhist monks. Besides, Buddhists specifically prohibit nudity on the part of monks. Thus, *civara* can never mean "discarding of robes".

In like manner, on P.192 of *Nyāyakusumānjali*, we come across the sentences.

(i) *tathā hi - bhuyastatra karmalāghavamityalasah*

and

(ii) *saptaghatikabhojanadisiddherjivikā ityayogyah.*

These sentences which seek to show that persons who are unacceptable to the society faithful to vedic practices are welcome to join the Buddhist order, have been translated by Dravid on p.201 as follows:

(i) "Since in the Buddhist fold none is required to work hard, even lethargic persons can thrive by espousing Buddhism.

(ii) "There are again those incomplete people who for the mess of pottage are drawn towards Buddhism which allows free board at all hours of day and night".

Here too,we are unable to agree with Dravid. The first sentence quoted above should be understood in the context of an earlier sentence, viz. *na hyaīralasyadinimittam, duhkhamaya karmapradhānatvāt* where Udayanācarya claims that no one joins the vaidika fold due to lethargy, because many rituals that are strenuous have to be performed by its members. Thus, *karma* in the sentence mentioned above stands from rituals which entail hardships like fasting, gifting of daksina etc., and not just for any activity whatsoever. Again, Buddhist monks are specifically prohibited from taking any meal after midday - in fact, a major split in the Buddhist Sangha took place when it was found that some monks from Vaisali were taking food even when the shadow indicating mid-day had increased by a length of two fingers and they were excommunicated by more orthodox monks. Thus, free board at all hours of day and night were not available to Buddhist monks, and Udayana being sufficiently knowledgable about Buddhist practices,

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he could not have brought baseless charges against them. It is however, a fact that the food collected by Buddhist monks through begging was usually brought to the monastery and shared by all - thus, all members could have some food within mid-day.

Take for example yet another, sentence that occurs on p.192 of *Nyāyakusumāñjali "Ubhayorantaram jñātvā kasya śaucam vidhiyate ' iti śravaṇāt avyagratābhimaninah.* This has been translated on p.201 as follows:

> "There are also those persons who following the precept contained in the well-known remark that if the body is filthy and the soul surrounded by the body is absolutely pure. then realising their radical difference, one cannot decide which of these two is to be purified; do not bother about piety, Straightaway adopt Buddhism."

Here, Dravid has kindly supplied the translation of the first half of the verse, the second half of which was quoted by Udayana. The full verse reads as follows :

Atyantamalino dehah dehi cātyantanirmalah |

Ubhayorantaram Jñatva Kasya šaucam vidhiyate||

But while this translation contains something important for understanding Udayana's intention, the sentence quoted above still remains grammatically incomplete.Perhaps some portion of it has been left out due to the printer's inadvertence.

(6) On P. 425 of *Atmatattvaiveka*, one comes across the line *traivanikabahiskartairanadadhikāribhirananyagatikatvāt, Kirtiprajñākaradivat.* This related to the reasons, for which some people, in the opinion of Udayana, join the Buddhist order, Dravid translates this sentence as follows :

"Also some persons who are ostracised by the people of the three main castes, and are not sufficiently qualified have upheld there gospels because they have no other go. Such are the scholars called Kirti and Prajñakara.

Here, 'Kirti' is an abbreviation for 'Dharmakirti', the name of the

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author of the famous Buddhist works like *Pramānavārtika, Nyayabindu, Hetubindu* etc. 'Prajñakara' is the short form of Prajñakaragupta, who composed a Bhāṣya on *Pramāṇavārtika* and was also the main founder of Sakaravijnañavada, as can be known from the works of Jñanasrimitra. Such information would have been enlightening to the readers.

On p.433 of *Atmatathvariveka*, the following sentence is found - 'alabhe mattakasinyah drsta tiryakāṣu kāmitā ityudāharaṇāditi. This has also been properly translated by Dravid as follows:

> "As the saying goes, if a ravishing beauty is not available for sexual gratification of a young man, he runs after even an animal to satisfy his lust".

The half verse quoted by Udayana has been taken from *Pramāṇavārtika* of Dharmakīrti.

7) On p. 433 of *Ātmatattvaviveka*, the word *samsārmocaka* has been translated as Buddha'. This is a case of serious mistake. *Samsāramocaka* happens to be the name of a heretic sect who believed that animals should be killed out of mercy, as it would free them from a life full of suffering. *Nyāyamanjari* and *Āgamadambara* of Jayanta Bhatta mention this sect, which was prevalent at that time, in *Kashmir,* and whose adheñents were asked to leave the country by Sankaravarman, the king of Kashmir, whom Jayanta served as a minister. The evil practices of this sect are described by Jayanta as follows "

> samsāramocakāh pāpāh prāṇihimsāparāyaṇah

Jayanta also clearly distinguishes between Buddhists and Samsāra - mocakas in the following verse :

> Samsāramocakam spṛstvā śistah snāti savāsasah
>
> Bauddharirapi sahaitasam vyavahāre na kaścana

PRABAL KUMAR SEN

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BOOK REVIEW II

Stephen H. Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics: Refutations of Realism and the Emergence of "New Logic"*, Matilala Banarsidass, Delhi, 1998, pp. Xii + 391.

Students interested in classical Indian philosophy face a dual challenge. First, many key works remain untranslated, thereby demanding of even the novice a considerable linguistic competence. And should this first challenge be met, the sheer technical difficulty and subtlety of many core arguments can quickly overwhelm any but the most determined reader. That a single text should confront both of these challenges head on is a testament to its author's scholarly competence. That it does so well is a testament to its author's philosophical activity. Stephen Phillips' 'book *Classical Indian Metaphysics: Refutations of Realism and the Emergence of "New Logic"* confronts both challenges, and does so well. As such it is a welcome introduction to classical Indian metaphysics, offering an often detailed survey of a sizable portion of the Indian philosophical tradition between the Second and Sixteenth Centuries.

Phillips' book consists of a general historically-based introduction to what the author calls the Realist-Idealist Debate, conjoined with translations and commentaries of key sections of texts from such classical philosophers as Śriharṣa, Gangeśa, Śankara Miśra, and Vàcaspati Misra II. These latter come late in the book; the reader is first gently introduced to the various topics through a series of chapters filling-out the background arguments and figures in increasing detail. The primary disputants in Realist-Idealist debate, as the author develops it, are the Advaita Vedàntin Sriharṣa and his Nyāya and

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Navya Nyaya challengers. What is in dispute is, at its most basic level, the ultimate reality of distinctness. Śriharṣa and the Advaitins deny it, the Nyāya affirms it. Phillips further asserts at several points that the Navya-Nyaya largely succeeds. I want to argue here that this particular conclusion is not justified by the arguments that he presents.

I. Śriharṣa on Distinctness

Is there an ontological basis for the numerical distinctness of things? A necessary condition for such a basis would surely be that the appearance of the distinctness of things would withstand analysis. If distinctness is real, then we should not find ourselves faced with paradoxes or aporia whenever we attempt to justify the claim that things are more than apparently distinct. In arguing against the reality of distinctness. Śriharṣa presents in the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya a series of reductio-type arguments to the effect that precisely such absurdities are the result of any attempt to find an ontological basis for distinctness. I will briefly present here the three limbs of this argument that most directly relate to the Nyāya, and then turn to the Navya-Nyāya responses to it, as Phillips presents them,[1]

Phillips engages Śriharṣa's argument through what he calls the *attribution dilemma*, which is familiar to most as the Bradley Regress. Consider the relation between two things, such as a qualificandum (or property-bearer) and a qualifier (or property). The relation seems itself to be another term, in addition to the two relata. But if it is another term, then regress results, for another relation must link this third term, the relation, to each of its relata. And so, on, *ad infinitum*.

An obvious response to this problem is to postulate relation as an ontologically distinct kind. Call this distinct kind inherence. Inherence might then be an ontological primitive, the essence of which is to tie qualificanda and qualifiers together. Its nature just is to be a tie, and so no further explanation of how it links to its relata is required. But now two further problems appear.

First, if we specify the essence of inherence with reference to that

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which it ties together, as by saying, for instance, that inherence is a linkage between a qualifier and a qualificandum, then inherence seems to be characterized in essence by reference to the terms which it relates, and so it seems to be uncharacterizable apart from them. This is problematic, since inherence is supposed to help to ground the difference of property and substance.

Second, if inherence self-links it this way, i.e., if it links by its nature properties and property-bearers, then the asymmetry between properties and property-bearers seems to be lost. A book, for instance, may have the property of being purple, but purple doesn't have the property of being a book. If inherence relates things by a kind of selflinkage, how is this asymmetry to be maintained?

With the attribution dilemma in place, three limbs of Śriharṣa's argument against distinctness can be highlighted as he brings them to bear against the Nyāya.

The first limb attacks the supposition that distinctness is real in virtue of its being in the very nature of an entity to be distinct from other things. We might say, for instance, that it is in the very nature of a pot to be distinct from a cloth. But this won't actually distinguish the pot from the cloth, since if distinctness-from-cloth is of the very *nature* of a pot, then the pot is *essentially* characterized only with reference to the cloth, and hence isn't essentially distinct from the cloth at all. Since distinctness is a relational notion, this argument seems to be easily generalized to any other apparently distinct individuals.

A second limb of the argument works to undermine the notion that distinctness is a kind of mutual exclusion or mutual absence. To say that a pot is not a cloth, it might be argued, is to express the mutual exclusion of pot and cloth by way of a *mutual absence of identity* between the two. For empiricists such as the Nyāya, it might thus be said that a real thing, such as a cloth experienced in the past, is absent now at a particular locus, such as the location of a pot.

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Here Śriharsa identifies problems similar to those above. First, mutual absence and mutual exclusion remain relation notions; for instance, an absence is an absence of an absentee. But then it would seem that the attribution dilemma immediately returns - what ground the distinction between the absence and the absentee? If nothing, then it would seem that the distinctness of the cloth, which is said to be absent from the locus of the pot, is not distinct from its own absence. Second, the identity of pot and cloth is in this case denied, which seem to entail that it is absent. But is this absence of the identity of pot and cloth itself a real thing? If so, then the identity of the two would seem to be real *qua* absentee. If not, what is the basis for finding an absence of the identity of pot and cloth? It's hard to see how the empiricist Nyāya could give a non-question-begging answer.

Finally, it might be argued that numerical distinctness is grounded in a difference in properties had by particular things. The property potness is distinct from the property clothes. A pot has or instantiated potness, the cloth has or instantiated clothness, and hence distinctness of entity is grounded in distinctness of property. So the reality of distinctness is established.

Two primary difficulties with this alternative are noteworthy. First, the attribution dilemma returns; we still need an explanation of how qualifiers such as potness are distinct from what they qualify. Second, the distinctness of qualifiers such as potness and clothness now requires establishment. That is, qualifiers can serve as the basis for the distinctness of individuals only if qualifiers themselves are distinct. Obviously to say here that qualifiers are distinct in virtue of being qualified would be to introduce a regress, and a vitiating one at that, in that no term in the regress seems to explain the distinctness of the predecessor.

As even this sketch of his argument illustrates, Śriharsa's denial of the reality of distinctness must be taken seriously. Phillips argues at length that the Navya-Nyāya took it seriously, and much of the second half of his book is devoted to their response.

II Navya-Nyāya Response

Phillips makes a clear case that Nyāya philosophers such as Gaṅgeśa

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were well aware of an attempt to respond to Śriharsa's argument (p.117), even if these latter were less of a focus than longstanding quarrels with Mimamsakas. Indeed, the author takes issue with the suggestion, from E. Frauwallner and D. Ingalls, that Gangesa not be included among the Navya-Nyaya in part precisely because, he argues, Sriharsa forced Gangesa to a deeper and less excessively formal philosophical position (cf. 119).

The degree to which the Navya-Nyaya actually succeeds in responding to the Advaitin position is, however, a bit fuzzy. Phillips opens his discussion of Gangesa's response to the idealists with an examination of Gangesa's ultimate definition of valid perceptual awareness. The basic argumentative strategy seems to be that if criteria for a determinate, valid cognition can be secured, and if the cognition of distinctness can be shown to fulfill such criteria, then the distinctness of objects cognized must be real. On the author's general but accessible presentation, a key component of Gangesa's argument involves a charcterization of veridical perceptions as awareness that are products of the appropriate causal relations. Misperceiving mother-of-pearl as silver, while it involves causal processes, is a defective perception in that the qualifier imputed is not causally active in the perception (cf. 129). A veridical awareness, then, is ultimately defined as "experience with predication content about ϕ - object as ϕ. (130, 216f). That is whatever qualified constitutes the predication-content of the cognition must be present in the thing cognized, and thereby causally efficacious. This grounds the veridicality of the perception.

As a response to Šriharsa individuation challenge, this line of approach is, as Phillips himself admits (131), likely to disappoint. The general problem is not hard to see; that the appropriate causal condition in a veridical perceptual awareness is fulfilled presupposes that the causal basis is already established. We cognize two objects, a pot and a cloth, as distinct. The cognition is veridical just in case distinctness is present and appropriately causally efficacious. Whatever its merits, it is difficult to see how Gangesa's theory of Perception will carry us an inch toward establishing that distinctness is present. Surely it is the Navya-Nyaya ontology which has to do the real work here.

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On this point, two components of the Logicia ontology seem to be essentinel to responding to Śriharṣa. The first is an account of the predication relation, which might plausibly resolve the attribution dilemma. The second is an account of identity and distinctness which might render these ultimately real.

Gangeśa attacks the attribution dilemma through two philosophical posits: inherence and self-linkage. On Phillip's presentation, inherence is an ontic primitive, which links qualities with substances and universals with instances of qualities. It is also asymmetrical, and thereby does the work of distinguishing qualificanda from qualifiers. Self-linkage is a kind of relational hook intrinsic to qualifiers. Being intrinsic to qualifiers, it cuts the relation regress, it is simply in the nature of a qualifier to link to a qualificandum. Phillips cites absences as prime examples of self-linking qualifiers (136). An absence is, for the Nyāya, a real entity, albeit not existent or present. Absences also serve as the referents of negative statements, such as "There is no elephant in this room." They are self-linking in the sense that a qualifier, such as absence-of-elephant, relates of its very nature to something, such as a locus in this room.

We may grant for the sake of argument that self-linkage solves the attribution dilemma. But now what secures the distinctness of self-linking qualifiers? If, for example, it is of the essence of the qualifier absence-of elephant that it self-link to some locus, then the qualifier is inseparable in its essence from the locus. Of course it might be said that the locus is to be regarded as some thing general, for the qualifier obviously need not relate to some particular locus. But the individuation problem remains, for even if the qualifier is related only to something general, it still seems to be essentially characterized with reference to that general thing and so not distinguishable in essence from it.

At this point Phillips claims that Navya-Nyāya introduce a powerful new argument against the Advaitin. The core of the argument is only vaguely outlined in Gangeśa himself, and developed more explicitly by his son Vardhamāna, by Śaṅkara Miśra, and by Vācaspati Miśra, II in particular.

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Unfortunately the actual argument, although hailed by the author as the basis of "an overall realist victory" (146), is a bit difficult to discern.

The Navya-Nyāya argument begins with the familiar claim that all qualification presupposes distinctness, and that distinctness is in turn secured by ontically real absences. We have already seen Śriharṣa reject an earlier form of this view, on the grounds that the absence of identity of pot and cloth, say, implies the reality of their identity given Nyāya empiricism. This time, however, the Navya-Nyāya add considerations about self-identity to the mix, beginning with what the author describes as "the rather trivial view that everything is identical only with itself." (147). This trivial view is nonetheless taken to serve as the basis for "the articulation of an individual's absolute identity, the qualificandum with all its qualifiers, the thick particular." *(ibid)*. At the risk of severe oversimplification, the idea seems to be that, given any object one chooses, when it is considered as all of its properties there is only one thing that is absolutely identical with it, namely itself. Every object is therefore distinct in virtue of being identical with itself alone, and this distinctness, while still cognized through an absentee, is cognized not through a relation (such as inherence) but through an identity. Thus a veridical cognition that a pot is not a cloth, for instance, would, in the author's words, "capture the pot as a locus of a mutual exclusion that has the cloth as the absentee as specified by the relation of identity", rather than by the absentee itself (141). Or in other words, "a pot is just in itself a mutual exclusion whose absentee or counterpositive as specified by the relation of identity is the cloth" *(ibid)*.

If this is to be the "crowning achievement of the Nyāya's ontological response to Śriharṣa," as the author claims (146), one would like to hear a bit more on this point. For instance, if a pot is just in itself a mutual exclusion specified by the relation of identity, what really distinguishes the Navya-Nyāya view from the classical Buddhist account of qualification as mutual exclusion (an account which the Nyāya clearly reject)?

Several problems are potentially more serious. I note here two of them. First, when conscripted to do ontological work, self-identity is not an

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obviously unproblematic concept. Self-identity seems to be a relation, but it is an odd one, in that it doesn't relate two or more terms. In itself this may not be bad, one can be one's own worst enemy, to borrow Saul Kripke's example, and perhaps one might also say, with Kripke, the self-identity is "the smallest reflexive relation."[2] But from the fact that some dyadic relations of the form Rxx are meaningful, it doesn't follow that all of them are. "X is to the left of X," for example, is not. Why should we think that "X is identical with X" is of the former, meaningful type? For while it is perfectly legitimate compare what appear as two numerically distinct things, and to speak of degree of closeness, sameness, identity, difference, etc., such comparison makes no sense in the context of talk about a single thing. Now if the meaning of identity statements can be plausibly argued to involve essential reference of comparison of apparently numerically distinct things, then talk of self-identity could cogently be argued to be vacuous.[3]

Second, suppose we do grant that self-identity is a substantive and meaningful relation. Is it ontically real? As part of the ground for real distinctness, it seems that it must be. But then what is it? Phillips thinks that Navya-Nyayaikas such as Šankara Mišra are inclined to treat it as a relation, and therefore as a species of property. But this seems seriously *ad hoc*. Does such a relation, which does not relate two terms, and which is an actual property of everything in the universe, have any claim to reality through anything more than sheer stipulation?

Perhaps on the other hand self-identity is not real, but is rather only "a manner of speaking," reflecting no underlying reality. This is the position, which Phillips attributes to Vacaspati Mišra (149). But this too is surely a problematic thing from a Nyayaika to say. Self-identity is postulated as a key component of an explanation as to why distinctness is real. Surely an Advaitin such as Šriharsa could only be pleased upon hearing - from the mouth of Nyayaika -that the ontic ground of distinctness crucially rests upon something which is itself only "a manner of speaking".

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NOTES

1. Cf.pp. 103-10 for Phillips' reconstruction of these arguemtns. Sriharsa's own argument is substantially more detailed than what I present here; cf. esp. section 9 of Chapter1 of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* translated by Ganganath Jha, Sri Satguru Publications, Delhi, 1986

2. See footnote 50, p. 108 of *Naming and Necessity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., 1972.

3. Wittegstein makes a number of comments in this direction. See especially pp. 26-7, 282-3 of *Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics*: Cambridge, 1939, Cora Diamond, ed., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1975. I note in passing that the appearance of numerical distinctness in all that is claimed to be necessary for the argument of this paragraph.

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BOOK REVIEW III

ADP Kalansuriya : *On Perception : A Language-Game Made Explicit,* Kalinga Publications, Delhi, 1999, pp 221

The theme of the book under review is the concept of perception in the contemporary English analytical philosophy. The theme is particularly impressive in the sense that perception as a philosophical concept is a much debated one. The author traces the various implications of this term from the date since it has started gaining momentum, to say precisely from early in 1930s. Confining reflections on the topic to the English speaking world does not diminish its importance. However tracing from continental and early Greek philosophy would have thrown much light on the issue. This I mention without forgetting the fact that Greek philosopher Aristotle and British enlightenment philosopher David Hume have found proper place in the discussion though occasionally.

The main idea which the author wants to convey through this book is that 'perception' is an 'occurrence' caused by the occurrences of 'sensing' and 'noticing', of the bio-chemical system together with the environmental forces and physicality. Here the author analyses the concept of perception from the phenomenological, ontological and conceptual points of view. That is the roles of phenomenological (sensing) and ontological (noticing) complexities and their derivatives together account for the language game of perception as envisaged in this book. The language-game of perception paves way for the perceptual cluster or family of notions (which reminds us of 'Wittgenstein's idea of cluster of notions) such as sensing occurrence, noticing occurrence, perception, sense data and knowledge. With all these

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points taken into account, the book aims to unfold an alternative, a language-game, asserting the logical impossibility of "perception as a direct affair" phenomenological, ontologically and conceptually. To reach this end the complexity of 'perception' is unfolded in and through an explicitness of the implicit phenomenological constant elements such as 'sensing occurrence' (affective occurrence), noticing occurrence (minding occurrence), and time interval which compose perception'. And conceptually the constant notion as 'designations of persons', the environmental world' and the reflections that hold between the notion of perception and those of 'body', existent etc. comprise perception. The book explains the first phase of language game or discourse of perception through an explanation of uses and logical boundaries of the concepts involved. D.M. Armstrong and J.L. Austin regard perception as a direct affair. But, this book explains the 'whys' and 'hows' of impossibility of direct perception both phenomenologically and conceptually. The author remarks. "Immediacy of perception or direct perception is rendered impossible due to its being causally conditioned." (p.7)

Perception used in an occurrence sense in the book differs from perception used in an exclusive achievement sense advocated by Gilbert Ryle. All perception in Rylean sense is achievement. Rylean notion of perception is based on the dispositional analysis which makes it difficult for us to think

(1) an analysis of perception in an extra-linguistic sense (or in an occurrence sense)

(2) its complexity

(3) the cluster of exact perceptual notions together with an understanding of what can be driven from this complexity.

The author is of the view that the occurrence (episodic) sense of perception when conceived explicitly reveals the three constant elements-sensing, noticing, time factor-making the occurrence a complex one. Therefore the author has come to the conclusion that perception is extra-linguistic and notion of perception plays a prominent role in the augmented perceptual cluster of notions of which the key notion is that of knowledge.

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The language-game as portrayed in this book divides the notion of perception into two - successful occurrence and unsuccessful occurrence. This is based on the idea that if all perceptions are successful then how shall we get into the other end of knowledge? Therefore there should be both successful and unsuccessful occurrences. But, according to the author only successful occurrence of perception plays a role in knowledge-talk. Further more, sensing, noticing, perception and knowledge form the cluster of perceptual notions. This way the author argues that the present perceptual talk shows ostentatiously itself. (This is certainly different from Ryle)

The book holds the view that all perceptions irrespective of their being successful or unsuccessful necessarily involve three constant elements of :

(1) sensing occurrence (affective occurrence)

(2) noticing occurrence (minding occurrence)

(3) time-interval

These three are called as implicit constant elements. From this it is evident that perception is neither a direct affair nor a simple affair. It is an occurrence caused by the twin complex occurrences called sensing and noticing. The role of constant element called time interval is important in the occurrence of perception. Now the point is that if perception is an occurrence dependent upon sensing (sentient) and noticing (cognitive occurrences) then the so called physicality is considered only in a third position. In the beginning of this review I have discussed the twin complexities - phenomenological complexity of perception-occurrence and the conceptual complexity of perception-occurrence. From these complexities two things follow,

(1) an emergence of logically sound base

(2) and a logical derivative

This derivation which brings out with great importance in perception-talk the impossibility of perception as a direct affair is a salient feature of Kalansuriya's view of perception. The recent proponents of direct theories

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in perception, as mentioned earlier, Armstrong and Austin, avoid explicitness concerning phenomenology, ontology and the conceptuality of the notion of perception.

Laying stress on the complex dependence of the occurrence of perception leads to the theme that perception is an effect caused by some other causes. This causation plays a significant role in this language-game of perception. Author expresses the view that for D.M. Armstrong perceptions are supportless and groundless and all perceptions are direct and simple. This support is nothing other than sense data or sense impressions from which perceptions/observations of physical objects are supposedly inferred. This implication of ground/support cause is conveyed through the words form Armostrong's book *"Perception and Physical World"* (p.20), where he says:, "Since sense-impressions do not stand between us and our immediate knowledge of the world, our theory is a Direct Realism". Austin also thinks on similar lines.

Author mentions the opinion of Russell and Strawson, as the whole story of causes of sensation is partly physical and party physiological and makes it possible to think that we should regard perception much less direct than what it seems to be. For Strawson perception is dependent on facts about one's own chemical system. Author projects his alternative language-game in perfect agreement with Russallean connotation of the direct perception. Armstrong and Austin fail to come up to this connotation of the notion of direct perception by Russell and Strawson. Author concludes that Armstrong's perception-talk in general is a failure to account for these significant perceptual facts.

The language of the book is indeed tough and ideas are so closely interwoven that any lack of comprehensibility will contribute to misunderstanding. However the constant reference to contemporary analytical philosophers makes a reading worth its while and to conclude that through this book the author has tried to give a new dimension to the concept of perception which will take our understanding of the concept to new heights, I feel that the author has been successful in this attempt.

SANGEETHA K. S.

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ISSN 0376 - 415 X

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

VOL., XXVII NO. 4 OCTOBER 2000

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JOURNAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
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TRANSLATIONAL INDETERMINACY AND MEANING FACTS

MANIDEEP SEN

1. Introduction

One of the many tasks that Quine's famous thesis of the indeterminacy of translation seems to fulfill is to, once and for all, do away with such intentional objects as propositions or what may also be referred to as meaning facts. Let us try to elaborate this by pointing out the various reasons which prompt philosophers to admit propositions over and above written and spoken sentences. There are three main demands that the notion of proposition is introduced to meet. Firstly, we require a noun to stand for that which two people who believe the same thing both believe, two people who doubt the same thing both doubt and the like. The claim is that the best way of explaining what is involved in the case when we say that two people share a belief is that there is some single object - a proposition - which is what they both believe. Secondly, a proposition is taken to be that which two declarative sentences, either of the same language or of different languages saying the same thing, both say. The respect in which two sentences are the same is what is commonly known as meaning, and therefore, propositions are taken to be meanings of declarative sentences. Furthermore, philosophers introduce propositions to give an account of the truth and falsity of an uttered or written sentence. It is only regarding a sentence which has been uttered and/ or written (that is, a sentence conveying a particular thought) that we can sensibly ask whether the sentence is true or false.

In spite of these apparently reasonable grounds for admitting propositions, hostility towards this notion among philosophers is not uncommon. This hostility might take various shapes. Some may say that

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 4
October 2000

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since propositions are abstract entities, an empiricist ought to understand and paraphrase such talks in terms of some more concrete notions. According to another form of the objection, we can permit talk of propositions but should keep in mind that they are of no value in clarifying any problem in the theory of meaning, the value of such talks might only be pragmatic. The last and the most radical approach is that we cannot permit talk about propositions at all, even as analysing and paraphrasing in some other terms, because the notion itself is infirm.[1]

Quine's reasons for dispensing with propositions are of the third and most radical kind. In the very beginning of *Philosophy of Logic* he writes,

> My objection to propositions does not arise primarily from philosophical parsimony - from a desire to dream of no more thing in heaven and earth than need be. Nor does it arise more specifically, from particularism - from a disapproval of intangible or abstract entities. My objection is more urgent.[2]

Again in *Word and Object* he says,

> The very question of the conditions for identity of propositions presents not so much an unsolved problem as a mistaken ideal[3]

It should be noted, at this point, that the way Quine approaches this problem in *Philosophy of Logic* is different from the way in which he approaches it in *Word and Object*. The 'urgent' objection that he puts forward against the notion of proposition in the former is that if we are to admit propositions, we have to admit them as determinate equivalence classes of sentences where the equivalence relation is the relation of synonymy. But Quine thinks that this equivalence relation does not make any sense.

In this paper we will concentrate on Quine's objection to propositions from the arguments from the indeterminacy of translation - arguments that are found in his book *Word and Object* (1960) and later on in the article 'On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation' (1970b). Our main tasks will be to show that Quine's arguments from the indeterminacy thesis do not work against the notion of proposition. Here one might say that even if we

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succeed in showing this , Quine seems to have a separate argument against the notion of proposition - the argument which can be found in *Philosophy of Logic*. Does Quine really have such an argument, independent of the one based on the indeterminacy thesis? It does not seem so. Once we closely scrutinise the two arguments, we will come to realise that the one found in *Philosophy of Logic* is a special version of the one that we get in *Word and Object.*

Quine's arguments against the notion of synonymy can be shown to be related to his arguments from the indeterminacy thesis. Once we admit indeterminacy of translation we will be able to show that the partitioning of sentences into determinate equivalence classes collapses, and therefore, the notion of a proposition makes no sense. Whereas, in *Word and Object* Quine's argument is roughly that if we can establish the indeterminacy thesis, then we have to reject any objective fact about meaning and thereby reject the notion of proposition altogether. The Quinean arguments may be schematised in the following way :

1. Indeterminacy of translation -> No determinate equivalence classes of sentences -> No propositions

2. Indeterminacy of translation -> No facts about meaning -> No propositions.

Having schematised the two arguments thus, it can be shown that 1 is really a special version of 2. The reason why Quine says that equivalence classes of sentences does not make any sense is that the equivalence relation, the relation of synonymy, based on which the partitioning is made, makes no sense. To say that the relation of synonymy makes no objective sense can be interpretated as saying that there are no objective meaning facts. This point can be elaborated thus : In 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' (1953) Quine raises doubts about the notion of synonymy. But one could argue that here Quine does no more than show that the notion of synonymy has not been satisfactorily explained, not that it can not be explained, and not that it makes no sense. Whereas if Quine's indeterminacy thesis is correct, then there are no meaning facts, and if there are no meaning facts there is no

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synonymy, as acceptance of the relation of synonymy implies the acceptance of meaning facts. So, the indeterminacy thesis, by rejecting meaning facts, hence propositions, provides an important argument against synonymy. The main aim of the paper is to state Quine's doctrine of the indeterminacy of translation, the two arguments - the argument from above and the argument from below - trying to establish the indeterminacy thesis, the assumptions on which the arguments depend and how we may try to answer Quine.

2. *The Indeterminacy Thesis*

Before stating the thesis itself, we need to mention that what is fundamental to much of Quine's philosophy is the naturalistic behaviouristic conception of language, and his major doctrines develop within this framework of language. This notion of language is explicitly stated thus,

> Philosophically I am bound to Dewey by the naturalism that dominated this last three decades ... knowledge; mind and meaning are to be studied in the same empirical spirit that animates natural science. There is no place for a *priori* philosophy.
>
> When a *naturalistic* philosopher addresses himself to the philosophy of mind he is apt to talk of language. Meanings are, first and foremost, meanings of language. Language is a social art which we all acquire on the evidence solely of other people's overt behaviour under publicly recognisable circumstances. Meanings, therefore, those very models of mental entities, end up as grist for the *behaviourist's* mill.[4]

After having characterised language in this way, Quine goes on to say that meanings, which are primarily meanings of linguistic expressions, must be construed in terms of behaviour. But, Quine argues, if meaning is primarily a property of behaviour, then we have to admit that there are no meanings, not likenesses and distinctions in meanings, beyond what are implicit in people's dispositions to overt behaviour. What, according to Quine, results when we turn towards a naturalistic view of language and a behavioural view of meaning is that we give up the assurance of determinacy. The question whether the two expressions are alike or unlike in meaning has no determinate

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answer except insofar as the answer is settled by people's speech disposition.

Having noted this we can start our discussion of Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. Suppose a translator, for convenience take her to be an English speaker, is attempting understand an unknown language, with no link to the language he is familiar with. To study how semantic facts are manifested in behaviour without any risk of relying upon information which already requires a semantic interpretation of the alien language, the translator.

(a) cannot appeal to dictionaries or existing partial translation manuals,

(b) cannot appeal to a partial translation into a third language for which translation into English already exists, and,

(c) cannot indulge in a historical study tracing common origins of English and the language to be translated.

Quine discusses this special case of 'radical translation', translation of the language of a hitherto untouched people.[5] This is a fundamental case - a case where, by abstracting from institutional frameworks involving both the linguist and the informant, we are free to focus exclusively upon the relation between physical facts and verbal behaviour. If this is the case then Quine thinks.

> Manuals of translating one language into another can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another.[6]

The above statement brings out the essence of Quine's indeterminacy thesis. A translation manual can be taken to be a function which maps expressions of one language onto the expressions of another language. Concerning the variety of translational manuals available, we usually regard one to be better than the others, because we believe that it gets right what is said in the language under translation, and we also believe that there is such a thing as the correct translation of a language, etc. Quine's thesis questions all these claims. According to him, between any two languages there are likely to be many translation manuals, all of which are adequate[7], yet which offer radically different translations of many sentences of that language.

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To understand the arguments put forward by Quine for his indeterminacy thesis, it is essential to be clear about some of Quine's general concerns. These may be clarified by pointing out what Quine is *not* concerned with.[8] In the first place, Quine in this thesis, is not offering a description of the actual experience and the process of translation. He is aware that, as a matter of fact, translators do not encounter a huge number of manuals of translation which are incompatible with one another.

Neither is he suggesting that translation is much harder (or easier) than we usually suppose it to be. He is not denying the fact that most of the time we come across a translation manual which is obviously the best and reasonably take other translators to agree with it. Nor is he making the obvious claim that the differences in nuances and tones make it impossible for any translation to be adequate. As Hookway points out, "The problem runs deeper than that and concerns how we are to describe what occurs in translation.[9] It is usually taken to be the case that it is an objective factual matter whether or not the meaning of an alien utterance is the same as the meaning of utterance of an English sentence, and therefore, in the case of translating an alien utterancewe come to discover this objective fact and thus translate the alien utterance accordingly so that it conforms to the objective fact of the matter. Quine challenges this assumption itself. The translator does not discover any fact of the matter about whether an alien utterance is synonymous to some utterance in English simply because there is no fact of the matter to be discovered.[10]

3. *Background to the Arguments for the Indeterminacy Thesis*

There are two arguments advanced to establish the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. They are, *the argument from above* based on the under determination of physical theory by observation and the *argument from below* based on Quine's famous 'gavagai' example or inscrutability of reference. Quine clearly distinguishes these two elements in his thought about the indeterminacy of translation in the following way,[11]

> There are two ways of pressing the doctrine of indeterminacy of translation to maximise its scope. At the upper and there is the

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> argument, early in the present paper[12], which is meant to persuade anyone to recognise the indeterminacy of translation of such portions of natural science as he is willing to regard as underdetermined by all possible observation. If I can get people to see this empirical slack as affecting not just highly theoretical physics but fairly commonsense talk of bodies, then I can get them to concede indeterminacy of translation of fairly common-sense talk of bodies. This I call pressing from above.
>
> By pressing from below I mean whatever arguments for indeterminacy of traslation can be based on inscrutability of terms.

So it seems that the fact about 'gavagai' and the fact about the empirically undetermined character of physical theory are two separate issues. Though it should be pointed out here that some philosophers, like Blackburn (1975), think that the argument from below is needed merely to bolster up the argument from above and therefore should not be treated separately. It does not seem, reading Quine, he himself takes the relation to be so. We will follow him and try to develop the arguments separately.

Both the argument from above and the argument from below start from the same considerations. Quine takes the example of a radical translator where the language which is being translated into English is completely without any pre-existing aids to translation. The two considerations from which both the arguments start are, according to Quine, as follows.

> As always in radical translation, the starting point is the equating of observation sentences of the two languages by an inductive equating of stimulus meanings. In order afterwards to construe the foreigner's theoretical sentences we have to project analytical hypotheses, whose ultimate justification is substantially just that the implied observation sentences match up.[13]

So the first step in radical translation consists of translating a significant class of observation sentences. This is done by making inductively checkable guesses as to what the native's signs of assent and dissent are. In this way the radical translator correlates native utterances with sentences of his own

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having the same stimulus meaning.[14] The second step consists in going beyond observation sentences and gaining access to the rest of the native language by adopting certain analytical hypotehses.[15] It will become clear, from a detailed discussion of the arguments, how they diverge after starting from the same considerations. So let us pass on to the main arguments.

4. *The Argument from Above*

Quine (1970b) remarks that philosophers wrongly take the 'gavagai' example as the ground for his doctrine of indeterminacy and hope, that by resolving the example, doubt can be cast on the doctrine itself. But the real ground is very different from the argument from above. It should be noted that we are not, contrary to what Quine's remark suggests, assuming that the argument from below has lesser value. It, in fact, seems to be a very important argument and will be discussed in full. The argument from above is based on the underdetermination of physical theory, the essential feature of which consists in the fact that a physical theory transcends all observational evidence, and hence, different competing physical theories can be developed from the same set of observational evidence. Quine argues for this in the following way :

> Naturally, it (i.e. the physical theory) is underdetermined by past evidence; a future observation can conflict with it. Naturally it is underdetermined by past and future evidence combined, since some observable event that conflicts with it can happen to go unobserved. Moreover, many people agree, far beyond all this, that physical theory is underdetermined by all possible observation... Theory can still vary though all possible observations be fixed. Physical theories can be at odds with each other and yet compatible with all possible data even in the broadest sense. In a word, they are logically incompatible and empirically equivalent.[17]

It should be noted that there is a basic difference between the third characterisation on the one hand, and the first two, on the other. In the first two characterisations Quine says that physical theories are, *in fact*, underdetermined - they are underdetermined by past observations because

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future observations could conflict with them, or undetermine by past and future observations because some conflicting observation may go unnoticed.. Whereas in the third characterisation he makes a stronger claim that they are, in principle, underdetermined.

Having noted this underdetermined character of physical theory, suppose we set up to translate a foreigner's physical theory from scratch. We begin by pairing observation sentences of the foreign physicist with ours, on the basis of the identity of stimulus meaning, subject only to inductive uncertainty. In translating theoretical sentences of this foreign physicist we adopt some analytical hypothesis, the justification for which is that they deliver results consistent with all the evidence bearing on sameness of stimulus meaning of observation sentences we have already obtained. Quine thinks that it would now become clear what happens in radical translation of a radically foreign physicist's theory is the following,

> Insofar as the truth of a physical theory is underdetermined by observables the translation of the foreigner's physical theory is underdetermined by translations of his observation sentences. If our physical theory can vary though all possible observations be fixed, then our translation of his physical theory can vary though our translations of all possible observation reports on his part be fixed. Our translation of his observation sentences no more fixes our translation of his physical theory than our own possible observations fix our own physical theory.[18]

Gibson (1982) in his commentary on Quine points out that Quine's argument for the indeterminacy of translation is directed towards those who already accept the underdetermined character of physical theory. So we accept that a physical theory is underdetermined insofar as observation by itself is insufficient to fix, in any unique way, the theoretical sentences of a theory. Now when setting out to translate a physical theory, the linguist does so by translating the observation sentences of the theory, and this he does by equating stimulus meaning. To go beyond the observation sentences, he has to use the analytical hypotheses. However the same old empirical slack[19], as

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Quine puts it, arises at this level as well. The analytical hypotheses are themselves underdetermined by all possible observation, and the linguist could have chosen a different set of analytical hypotheses compatible with the observational evidence.

This, however, is not the whole story, because Quine remarks,

> The indeterminacy of translation is not just an instance of the empirically underdetermined character of physics. The point is not just that linguistics, being a part of behavioural science and hence ultimately of physics, shares the empirically underdetermined character of physics. On the contrary, indeterminacy of translation is additional.[20]

Quine says that where we have two physical theories - A and B - compatible with all possible data, we may adopt A for ourselves and still remain free to translate the foreigner either as believing A or as believing B. Now our choice between A and B may be guided by simplicity. If both A and B involve complicated and cumbersome translation rules, then another possibility might be to refrain from ascribing to the foreigner either A or B, What would happen in this case is to ascribe to the foreigner a false physical theory which can be refuted, or some obscure physical theory, or hold that he has no physical theory at all. It might happen that A and B are equally attributable. In a situation of this kind, Quine says,

> The question whether,... the foreigner really believes A or believes rather B, is a question whose very significance I would put in doubt. This is what I am getting at in arguing for the indeterminacy of translation.[21]

Indeterminacy of translation, not just being an instance of the empirically underdetermined character of physics, should have properties which do not follow solely from the underdetermined character of physical theories, but from some other principles. The *additional principles* on which indeterminacy of translation is based is Quine's naturalism and his adherence to scientific realism. Though there is a parallel between translation and physical theory, at a certain point this parallel breaks down. Being a scientific realist, Quine believes that all facts are physical facts and all explanations are

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physical explanations. Physical theory is the ultimate parameter, and despite its underdetermined character, the currently accepted physical theory serves as the last word regarding the truth of nature. In comparison no manual of translation enjoys the status of ultimate parameter. So while we can expect to settle questions like: are there electrons? in science, we can never expect to settle questions like 'what does 'gavagai' really refer to?' in linguistics. Indeterminacy of translation is its infactuality. But science is the paradigm of facts. As Gibson says,

> The former kind of question has a (physical) fact of the matter, by dint of physics being the court of last appeal; the latter kind of question has no (physical) fact of the matter because when all the (Physical) facts are in, the question (i.e, indeterminacy) remains unanswered. Translation, therefore, is indeterminate, for there is no fact of the matter for the translation to be right and wrong about.[22]

According to Quine correctness of a translational manual is not determined by facts, facts here being physical facts. His adherence to the thesis that physical facts are all the facts plays an extremely important role in his indeterminacy thesis, and we will come back to this point later on in the discussion.

5. *The Argument from Below*

In *Word and Object* Quine almost entirely concentrates on showing how indeterminacy can be derived from the argument from below involving the famous 'gavagai' example. In 'On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation' he points out that the 'gavagai' example works as a direct example for inscrutibility of terms and not of indeterminacy of translation as such. But it does have a vey important, though indirect, bearing on the argument for the indeterminacy of translation. According to Quine the 'gavagai' example is aimed not at proof but at helping the reader to reconcile the indeterminacy of translation imaginatively with the concrete reality of radical translation.[23] By working as a concrete example of radical translation it helps in persuading us of the indeterminacy thesis. Let us see how it proceeds.

As has already been mentioned, the first step in trying to translate an

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utterance of a wholly unknown foreign speaker into English consists of the linguists' observation of the agent speaking - that is, a close observation of the overt behaviour of the speaker in a particular context of linguistic utterance. Thus the most elementary step involved in translating the foreign language is the translation of the speaker's utterance associated with the present event that is conspicuous to the linguist and his subjects. The linguist experiences that whenever a rabbit scurries by, the foreign speaker utters 'gavagai'. So he notes down that 'rabbit' is the tentative translation of the utterance 'gavagai' in this unknown foreign language, but with the proviso that it is subject to future test.

The next step in the translation consists in testing whether the speaker assents to the utterance 'gavagai' when spoken by the linguist. This step is necessary for two reasons :

(a) There may be situations where the foreign subject could have said something, but in fact does not. It may very well happen that a rabbit runs by but the speaker does not uttter the sentence 'gavagai'. The only way to find a solution to this problem for the linguist is to utter the sentence under consideration himself and see whether the native speaker assents to it or dissents from it;

(b) Furthermore, the linguist must be able to discriminate among terms that overlap in their reference, and he can do so only if he has settled on the native expressions of assent and dissent. For example, the linguist would have to discriminate between foreign equivalence of 'rabbit' (which is 'gavagai') and the foreign equivalence of the term animal. So, on the basis of these observations the linguist makes a guess as to what is the assent and dissent behaviour of the native, and if any difficulty follows in his taking assent and dissent in the way he does, he may discard his first hypothesis and guess again.

Once the linguist decides on the native's expressions of assent and dissent, his next task is to equate observation sentences of the foreign language with observation sentences in English. This is done by learning to utter sounds in the foreign language sufficient to the task of querying a

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native speaker for assent or dissent under various stimulus conditions. Working inductively the linguist is able to make approximate identification of stimulus meanings. It is true that the linguist cannot directly compare his own stimulus meaning for some sentence of English with his subject's stimulus meaning for some sentence in the particular foreign language, but the linguist can learn that his subject is prepared to assent to or dissent from the query 'gavagai?' in the same public conditions where the linguist himself would be prepared to assent to or dissent from the query 'rabbit?' So he concludes that the two stimulus meanings are approximately the same.

All these careful observations suggest that the stimulus meaning of the alien utterance 'gavagai' is the same as that of the English sentence 'rabbit' or there is a rabbit'. However many other English sentences may have the same stimulus meaning as 'there is a rabbit. We may list a few here:

(a) this is an undetached part of a rabbit.

(b) This is an instance of rabbithood.

(c) This is a stage in the history of a rabbit.

The point to be noted is that all these sentences, although derived from different translation manuals, are compatible with all the facts about stimulus meaning which hepls us in translating 'gavagai' as there is rabbit. The linguist may be reasonable enough to equate 'gavagai' with 'rabbit' but he will be mistaken if he thinks that the correlation of two observation sentences fixes the references of the term 'gavagai' uniquely. It may quite well be possible that instead of being a concrete general term, 'gavagai' is an abstract singular term referring to rabbithood, or even if it is a concrete general term, it may be one that is true not of rabbit but of undetached rabbit parts or rabbit stages. What this suggests is that meaning and reference are indeterminate on behavioural grounds and to enquire beyond the possible behavioural evidence for a unique meaning or a unique reference is a mistake. So, we give up determinacy of meaning and we recognise that there is no fact of the matter regarding unique translation. That is, there are no unique meanings or unique referents of native expressions beyond what can be

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established on behavioural evidence.

It should be noted that Quine does not deny that a community of translators are more likely to have terms for rabbits rather than for parts of rabbits or, more unlikely, for stages in the history of rabbits. However, the supplementing arguments that may help us in narrowing down the choice among different candidate translations are really pragmatic considerations and is not, if Quine's argument is right, settled by the observable data.

Ostension, or pointing to the object concerned along with utterring of the name 'gavagai' is also ineffective in deciding the issue because it so happens that by pointing to a part of rabbit the linguist points to the rabbit as well. The questions that the linguist is concerned with at this stage are two-fold; Is the term 'gavagai' used to talk about an object at all, and if it is used to talk about an object, which object is it talking about? Quine believes that the facts about stimulus meaning do not give any determinate answers to either of these two questions. The only way for the linguist to start to settle these questions is by fixing the English equivalences of plural endings and pronouns, etc. of the language under study - only then can he asks questions like, is this gavagai the same as that one? Or is there one gavagai or two? But while this method of translation is the best one could hope for, it is not sufficient for settling absolutely the indeterminacy involved in the case, because we can, by appropriately varying our analytical hypotheses about the translation of native's plurals, identity predicates, etc., accommodate whatever answers they supply to queries put to them. Therefore, it is possible to formulate alternative systems of analytical hypotheses all of which are compatible with the totality of speech dispositions of all concerned, and at the same time incompatible with one another. Quine admits that there is an obstacle to offering an actual example of two such rival systems of analytical hypoteheses. Known languages are known through unique systems of analytical hypotheses established in tradition or painfully arrived at by a unique skilled linguist. But he goes on to say

> ... one has to reflect on the nature of possible data and the methods to appreciate the indeterminacy. Sentences translatable outright,

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> translatable by independent evidence of stimulatory occasions, are sparse and must woefully underdetermine the analytical hypotheses on which the translation of all further sentences depends. To project such hypotheses beyond the independently translatable sentences at all is in effect to input our sense of linguistic analogy unverifiably to the native mind... There can be no dount that rival systems of anaylytical hypotheses can fit the totality of speach behaviour to perfection, and can fit the totality of dispositions to speech behaviour as well, and still specify mutually incompatible translations of countless sentences insusceptible to independent control.[24]

The above discussion brings out that in the Quinean framework there can be no useful sense to question what 'gavagai' really means - there is no fact of the matter corresponding to the utterance.

6. *The Philosophical Implications of the Indeterminacy Thesis*

Hookway (1988) discusses what consequences about mind and meaning on the one hand, and reference and truth on the other, follow from the indeterminacy thesis.[25] Semantic notions which are intensional[26] - such as synonymy and analyticity - have no place in Quine's account of logic and philosophy of language. Furthermore our ordianry ways of describing and explaining mental events presuppose that they have propositional content, and we try to identify these propositional contents. There are two things on which we rely on in doing this. On the one hand, we observe the external behaviour of the agent and try to guess what beliefs and desires they have. On the other hand, we attend to their verbal behaviour and treat their utterances as manifestations of beliefs and desires. According to Quine, the behavioural evidence never fixes the contents of Propositional attitudes. The consequence of adhering to the indeterminacy thesis is that Quine rejects propositions, senses and attributes. So, for Quine, there is no point in asking questions like, do these two sentences express one proposition or two? Propositional contents, thus, being indeterminate, propositional attitudes have no place in the scientific study of mind and language.[27] The same arguments he puts forward against intensional notions like necessity and possibility.

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Indeterminacy of translation casts doubt not only on intensional concepts, it affects the way in which we think about reference, truth and ontological commitment. The answer to the question, when the native utters gavagai what is he talking about? can be, according to Quine, rabbit, rabbit part, rabbit stage, rabbithood, etc. As it is possible to construct adequate translational manuals, between which no possible evidence could decide, there is no fact of the matter concerning which of them is correct. It should also be pointed out that, although it is meaningless, in a Quinean framework, whether a term like gavagai really refers, we can ask the question only relative to a translation manual. Therefore, statements about the ontological commitment of theories will always be relative to a particular manual of translation.

This is a problem which not only affects radical translation, it affects the understanding of one speaker by another speaker of the same language. In case where one English speaker is trying to understand another English speaker (that is, the case of homophonic translation), when someone says there is a rabbit, we take him to mean exactly that, by translating the speaker's utterance onto our own idiolect. It is true that homophonic translation has a role to play in domestic understanding to which nothing corresponds in radical translation the basic words and phrases of our mother tongue are learned by imitating our elders and it is here that homophonic translation becomes useful. But this special role is not to be explained by saying that, in the homophonic case, we uniquely capture the fact of the matter corresponding to what our fellow speakers say. So Quine's claim is much stronger than it appears. As Hookway says, reflection should make clear that Quine denies that even what I say has any determinate meaning for me : the ontological commitments of my own assertions are inscrutable to me. I can systematically reinterpret my own utterances and conclude that 'rabbit' in my mouth is true of rabbit parts and stages. The conclusion is that there is no fact of the matter about the ontological commitments of any sentences of theory.[28] So if Quine's indeterminacy thesis is correct, then there is no objective fact of the matter whether a sentence (this includes sentences involving perfectly ordinary terms and not just vague ones) is true or false, other than relative to a particular manual of translation.

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7. *The Indeterminacy Thesis Evaluated*

This is, in brief, Quine's thesis for the indeterminacy of translation and the philosophical implications it has. By arguing for the indeterminacy thesis Quine questions the basic semantic concepts like, reference, meaning, propositions and rejects that our verbal behaviour can have any psychological explanation. As Hookway points out, it will be evident that it (the indeterminacy thesis) leaves intact very little of our familiar concept of mind and undermines most of the traditional aspirations of philosophy. We are left with an impoverished, highly naturalistic vocabulary for describing and explaining human practices, including the search for knowledge. [29]

Overwhelmed by this attack philosophers have tried to disprove it on various grounds. This has given rise to a huge literature, trying to show where Quine might have gone wrong. Our main concern, as has been mentioned in the introduction, is with the notion of propositions - that which two synonymous declarative sentences (either they be of the same language or of different languages) have in common, which is commonly known as meaning and which our translation tries to preserve. By casting doubt on determinate translation Quine casts doubt on a determinate meaning or a determinate meaning fact.

In order to see what are the debatable aspects of Quine's position, it may be worthwhile to start the discussion by considering some of the objections raised by Evans in his paper 'Identity and Predication' (1985). Evans starts by pointing out the difference between a translation manual and a theory of meaning. A translational manual is nothing but a mapping from expressions to expressions. So it tells us that.

'Snow is the English translation of the German Schnee'

The main purpose of providing a translation manual is to help us in arriving at, for each sentence of the language under study, a quoted sentence of another language having the same meaning. The translation manual has a limited capacity. It tells us which pairs of expressions have the same meaning, but not what their meaning is. For many philosophers a theory of meaning,

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on the other hand, aspires to offer more than this. For them, it should explain the meanings of expressions by showing how they relate to the world. So, a theory of meaning, for each expression of the language under study, would provide a statement of what it means, a statement like the following.

'Schnee' in German means snow.

The most important difference between a theory of meaning and a translational manual is that the former is an explanatory theory (explaining how the meaning of a sentence depends upon the semantic properties of its parts) while the latter is not. Being explanatory in nature, 'it is hoped that the construction of a theory of this sort, which will do justice to the complexity of natural language, will provide revealing insights into the underlying logical structure of our language and into our ontlogical commitments.[30] The demand that a theory of meaning provides a good explanation of semantic competence will rule out those theories which entail that aliens are talking of rabbit stages or undetached rabbit parts.

According to Evans, Quine's arguments can be regarded as philosophically important only if they point towards an indeterminacy in the theory of meaning and he thinks that it does not do so. According to Hookway[31], Evans relies upon two claims in criticising Quine's arguments. The first, which we have already mentioned, is that constructing a theory of meaning is a more deeper and fundamental enquiry, and that translation manual should be answerable to the kind of facts uncovered by theories of meaning. Secondly, in constructing a theory of meaning we should choose theories that are 'natural' on the grounds that they provide better explanation of verbal behaviour. And the theory which provides a better explanation is true as the explanatory power is the indication of truth.

What for Evans is a natural theory of meaning? - In the first place, being a theory of meaning, it points towards a system of dispositions which provides psychological explanation of linguistic behaviour. A natural theory hypothesises a single dispositional state underlying all the uses of a particular term while the more ad hoc theory hypothesises varied dispositional states underlying all the uses of the terms. Therefore, if that is correct, we can

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choose between the two theories by noting which provides the best explanation of the subject's linguistic behaviour and which fits best into all other things we know about his psychology.[32]

The reason why Quine's argument does not follow this line may be that he does not think that a translation manual or a theory of meaning should give a satisfactory explanation of the speaker's verbal behaviour. It is sufficient that it describes their verbal dispositions. But, if a translation manual leads us to regard that 'gavagai' refers to undetached rabbit parts and not to rabbits, then we have to say that they are perceptually sensitive to undetached rabbit parts and not to rabbits, they want an undetached rabbit part rather than rabbit for a pet, and ascribe to the agent a whole lot of other very curious psychology. In choosing a translation manual we should be guided by a network of considerations - our understanding of human perceptual capacities, the nature of human desire, psychology of reason and deliberation as well as sociological and anthropological information. Quine seems to ignore them altogether.

The reason why Quine does not accept Evan's point that cognitive psychology and semantic theory have explanatory autonomy can be traced back to his adherence to physicalism. Adherence to physicalism underlies both the argument from above as well as the argument from below. There are several strands to Quine's physicalism. Physical facts are all the facts and all explanations are physical explanations. Physics is the paradigm of scientific inquiry. Science other than physics does not provide autonomous explanation, or studies distinctive feature of reality. Being a realist about physical theory Quine accepts that there are physical facts of the matter about which physical statements are true. Quine, in this respect is very close to the traditional behaviourists. As Hookway remarks[33], Quine's position can be viewed as a combination of two claims : 1. the metaphysical assumption of the traditional behaviourism is unassailable, and 2. the behaviouristic outlook cannot do justice to the kind of discourse about meaning and the mind which are familiar from ordinary language and the work of cognitive psychologists. So cognitive psychology should be banished and ordinary language should be replaced by a suitable regimented form of discourse for purposes of scientific

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understanding.

One cannot but feel acute uneasiness to this Quinean position. It seems that Quine has a very narrow vision of philosophy. Quine may have been aware of this fact and has made initial attempts to explain our ordinary practices of using concepts like belief or necessity. But he is always hampered by his working within the physicalist framework. What he misses may be constitutive of a significant part of human experience. Why should we conclude from the fact that all changes involve physical changes that physical facts exhaust all the facts?

If, again, as the argument from above requires, under-determination of physical theory is compatible with realism about physical theory, why can't we say that under-determination of translation theory is compatible with realism about them ? Why can't we say that there is, a fact of the matter about which either of a pair of rival translation schemes is correct? If we say that the intrusion of pragmatic considerations in deciding between two rival translation schemes is sufficient for the conclusion that there is, in general, no fact of the matter, why isn't the parallel intrusion of pragmatic considerations in deciding between two rival physical theories enough to ensure that there is no fact of the matter in this case either? Quine's answer may be that though a translation theory is parallel, it is additional. But the fact remains that it is parallel. The logical possibility of alternative interpretations of meaning cannot possibly feature in an attack on the concept of meaning in the way Quine thinks it does. As Blackburn points out.

> ... if the logical possibility of choice about meaning in the face of evidence were taken to discredit that concept, then the logical possibility of choice about almost anything in the face of evidence would discredit virtually all concepts. In particular there would be an exact parallelism with the concepts of physical science, where most philosophers, but especially Quine, believes that there is no logically conclusive evidence for the truth of theories containing them.[34]

Quine might say that we do not need semantic concepts as much as we need scientific concepts. But this kind of pragmatism itself seems to be too narrow.

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The task of a correct physical theory is to seek a correct description of what are taken to be facts behind the appearance of things. In a similar way, one can say that a correct theory of translation wants to describe and explain facts about linguistic behaviour. And a linguistic behaviour involves much more than what Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation takes it to involve. To quote Blackburn once again,

> It is difficult to imagine a more valuable intellectual goal than removal of the fear that there is no fact of the matter which explains and interprets the human signs which are such an important component of everyone's experience.[35]

It is the meaning facts or the propositions which help us in understanding linguistic as well as psychological practises of human beings. The impoverished Quinean notion of physicalist/behaviourist philosophy seems to fail in this respect.

NOTES

In writing this paper I was immensely benefited from the discussions I had with Professor Bob Hale and Professor Crispin Wright. This has been revised during the first three months of my ICPR fellowship.

1. See Simion Blackburn (1975), The Identity of Proposition, in his (ed) *Meaning, Reference and Necessity*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
2. W.V. Quine (1970a) *Philosophy of Logic*, Prentic-Hall, Englewood cliffs, NJ,p.3
3. W.V. Quine (1960), *Word and Object*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., p.208
4. W.V. Quine (1969), *Ontological Relativity and other Essays*, Columbia University Press, New York, pp.26-7.
5. *Ibid, p.28*
6. *Ibid.p.27*
7. A. translation manual being a function which maps expressions of one language onto expressions of another language, is said to be adequate, if the sentences which are the arguments and values of that function are semantically equivalent.

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8. See C. Hookway (1988), *Quine : Language, Experience and Reality*, Polity Press, Cambridge, pp.128-9.

9. *Ibid*, p.128

10. The thesis does not say that there may be a uniquely correct translation, but that we fail to get at it because our evidence is inadequate to settle the matter. Quine's scepticism runs deeper than this - what he says is that there is no such fact of the matter - whether adequate or inadequate - to settle the issue.

11. W.V. Quine (1970b), On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation, *The Journal of Philosophy*, p.183

12. This argument is encapsulated in the under-determination of physical theory.

13. Quine (1970b), p.179

14. A note about stimulus meaning and observation sentences. Stimulus meaning (either affirmative or negative) of a sentence S for a given speaker is the class of stimulations which would prompt assent to or dissent from S. Two sentences for a given speaker are stimulus synonymous when they are assented to in just the same circumstances for a given speaker. Observation sentences are a subset of the set of occasion sentences. An occasion sentence (like, it is snowing), as opposed to standing sentence (like, Snow is white, or 2+2 =4), is assented to in some occasion and not in others. An occasion sentence is an observation sentence if all speakers assent to it in response to the same stimulation. Quine's suggestion is that the stimulus meaning of an observation sentence does full justice to its meaning. (Quine (1960), p...31-4)

15. Now a note on analytical hypothesis. Unlike observation sentences, most of a person's utterances cannot be correlated with publicly observable situations. But in case of radical translation, where no translation is available the translator needs to go beyond observation sentences. The strategy he follows is to dissect the unconstrued sentences into smaller parts and then hypothetically correlate them to words and phrases of his native tongue. These are called analytical hypotheses. By means of these analytical hypotheses we construe analogies between those sentences that have been successfully translated and

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those which have not. As Quine says (See Quine (1960), p.70), the method of analytical hypotheses is a way of catapulting oneself into jungle language by the momentum of the home language. It is a way of grafting exotic shoots onto the old familiar bush ... In this subtle way the linguist superimposes his home language and conceptual scheme upon the foreign language in almost every act of translation, and it is here that translational indeterminacy becomes philosophically interesting.

16. Quine (1970 b). p.178

17. *Ibid*, P. 179. A small note on the last two lines in this quotation may be made here. It seems to be one thing to say that two different theories might be empirically equivalent and another thing to say that two empirically equivalent theories might be logically incompatible. Quine seems to be making a further point here.

18. Quine (1970b), p.180

19. When a theory is said to have empirical slack it is methodologically underdetermined by observation, that is observation by itself is insufficient for fixing, in any unique way, the theorietical sentences of a theory.

20. Quine (1970b), p.180

21. *Ibid p. 180*-1

22. R.F. Gibson (1982), *The Philosophy of W.V. Quine*, The University of Florida Press, Tampa, Florida, p.93

23. Quine (1970 b) p.182

24. *Ibid, p.72*

25. See Hookway (1988), pp.139 -45

26. Quine has no hesitation in using concepts which are properly extensional in logic and philosophy of language.

27. Scientific study of mind and language, for Quine, is purely extensional as well, remaining faithful to the Watsonian behaviourist approach to mind.

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28. Hookway (1988), p.142
29. *Ibid*
30. *Ibid*, p.153
31. *Ibid*
32. *Ibid,* p.157
33. *Ibid,* p.160
34. Blackburn (1975), p.198
35. *Ibid, p.197*

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TRUTH AS CONCEIVED IN YOGĀCĀRA AND MĀDHYAMIKA

K. SRINIVAS

I

Truth is something that concern everyone in one's day-today affairs; yet people are puzzled when asked the question: What is truth? Is it something indefinable? If not, what, then, is truth? Is it an attribute or a substantive or a quality or a property? Several questions are asked about truth. Philosophers, both in the East and West, interpreted truth in various ways. As ordinary men leading mundane life, we are more concerned with everyday truth. It is generally believed that objects, properties and events are neither true nor false. They are mere facts of existence. Only our perceptual judgements about those facts are termed either true or false. In this sense truth or falsity can be attributed only to those judgements about our cognitions or perceptions of objects, properties, and events. Then, in a manner of speaking, we are treating truth or falsity as a property attributed to our judgements. But, what kind of property is it? Is it a natural property? Of course, it is not. Can we call it a property by convention? If it is a property by convention, then it is taken for granted that what is truth or falsity is based on our agreement and disagreement in our opinions. Another important factor to be noticed here is that truth cannot survive without its opposite non-truth (falsity). It is an epistemic precondition that a judgement/proposition is either true or false. Our claims to knowledge of various aspects of reality are true provided our claims are not disputed by subsequent claims. Thus discussions about truth somehow lead us to the discussions about knowledge. In a way, truth and

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No. 4
October 2000

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knowledge are inseparable, for the latter involves the former. Not only that, whenever we speak of knowledge we speak of the various conditions of knowledge such as: the knowing self or mind (the knower), the known, and the source. Against this backdrop, let us make an attempt to examine the theories of truth advocated by two prominent idealist schools of Buddhism, namely, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika.

II

The profoundness of any theory of truth depends on the way in which it explains the nature of error. Thus the problem of error becomes an important component of the theory of truth. The theory of error advocated by Yogācāra is known as Ātmakhyāti. According to this school, there is no external reality as such. What is ultimately real is consciousness (mind). Ontologically this school "adheres neither to the doctrine that all things exist, nor to the doctrine that nothing exists because it asserts that ideations do exist."[1] Hence, there are no objects independent of the perceiving mind. The so called external objects are unreal as they are our own mental projections. In order to uphold and substantiate the Doctrine of Dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), the Yogācāra hods that consciousness is an ever changing stream. Therefore, whatever exists can exist only as an idea in the mind. The independent existence of external objects cannot be established by any logical means. The reason stated is that consciousness and its content (object) are simultaneous, hence identical. In other words, no object can ever be perceived apart from consciousness.

Yogācāra advances many arguments[2] against the view that external objects have independent existence. As a matter of fact, these are the arguments directed against the two major realist schools of Buddhism, namely, Sautrāntika, and Vaibhāṣika. One of the arguments is that for an object to be independent must be either indivisible, partless, and atomic, or divisible and complex. Either way there is a problem. If an object is indivisible, then it is imperceptible since minute atoms cannot be perceived. If the object is complex, then the entire object *cannot* be perceived at a time. Thus, either way the view that

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external objects exist independent of consciousness cannot be justified on logical grounds. Diññāga in his *Ālambana-parikṣā* writes: "It starts with the declaration that it is neither an atom nor an aggregate of atoms, it is nothing but an idea without a corresponding external reality".[8] The logic advanced by Yogācāra is not all that illuminating. It may be admitted that an object being indivisible cannot be perceived. But its imperceptible nature does not bar its existence independent of consciousness. Similarly, a complex object, though it cannot be perceived in its entirety, can exist independent of consciousness. We admit perception as a source of knowledge. But when it fails to reveal the nature of things or objects, it does not in any way mean that their ontological independence is questioned. It only proves the point that perception is not a legitimate source of knowledge.

It is also viewed by Yogācāra that the belief in the independent existence of objects or external world can be disproved by making use of the ontology of momentariness. Since objects are not substances, but durationless point-instants, it is difficult to explain how a momentary object can be the cause of consciousness. If it were treated as a cause, then there must be a time gap between the arising of the object and our consciousness of it. But such a time gap appears to be an absurdity for the following reasons. (I) The object as point-instant is durationless, therefore, it cannot be causally efficacious. (2) Both the object and consciousness are experienced by us at a time. Based on these two reasons it can be argued that the external object cannot be the cause of consciousness. In fact, "The object of cognition is the object internally cognized by introspection and appearing to us as though it were external. The ultimate reality is thus the 'idea' of consciousness."[4] This point can be further illustrated with a suitable example. Dharmakīrti argues that we often make a distinction between the awareness of the colour blue and colour blue itself. But this distinction is illogical because the colour blue cannot be perceived except in awareness of something blue. Therefore, the awareness of the colour blue and the colour blue are identical. But this identity does not prevent us from making a distinction between the consciousness and the content of consciousness, though the latter is inseparable from the former. This view is further substantiated by Yogācāra

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with an example of dreaming. When we dream we assume that the objects of dream are real and have objective existence outside our dream. It is only when our dream is disturbed we come to realise that they are mere dream objects. Just as our dream objects do not have any independent existence apart from the dream, the objects of our consciousness too do not have any independence existence apart from the consciousness.[5]

The dream analogy stated by Yogācāra does not really substantiate its point that there are no objects outside realm of consciousness. The question of perception of any object arises only when there is an object to be perceived. The awareness of colour blue is different from colour blue. Unless there is colour blue, the question of its awareness does not arise. This is the argument advanced by Moore against idealists in general. Also, the objects experienced by us during the state of dream are the outcome of our normal experience which are buried in subconsciousness. Thus the dream experiences have their base in our day-to-day experiences.

The point that Yogācāra tries to establish is that the ultimate reality is of the nature of consciousness (vijñāna). The existence of external reality outside consciousness is a myth. The supposed external objects are nothing but the ideas in the mind. Thus the external reality is both epistemologically and ontologically dependent on consciousness. This position of Yogācāra is often compared with that of Berkeley. As a matter of chronological importance we would say that Berkeley's position is similar to that of Yogācāra. Once it is established that consciousness is the only reality, Yogācāra distinguishes between the various levels of consciousness. However, there is one seed-consciousness (Ālaya-vijañāna) which is basic to all other levels of consciousness. This seed-consciousness has an independent existence. All conscious activities arise out of its potentiality. The nature of this seed-consciousness is that it is self-determining and self-revealing. It is this consciousness that is responsible for the existence of any object which is believed to exist independent of consciousness by an ignorant person. This is where the error lies. The nature of this seed consciousness cannot be explained, for it is beyond all differentiations and distinctions. The relation

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between this seed-consciousness and ordinary consciousness can only be explained through similies. The following illustration is found in *Lankāvatāra-sūtra:*

> Consciousness consisting of the skhandhas (five groups), dhātus (elements of being), and āyatanas (sense fields), which are without a self or anything of the nature of a self, arises from ignorance, karma, and craving, and it functions through being attached to grasping at things by means of the eye and all the organs, and makes the presentations of its store-mind appear as bodies and vessles, which are manifestations of its own mind (the store-consciusness).[6]

Since the ultimate reality is of the nature of consciousness, the question of its being either one or many does not arise. Our experience of many distinctions in our day-to-day life is nothing but the manifestation of seed-consciousness as touch, mental activity, feeling, perception, and choice. It is due to our ignorance we differentiate and accord independent status to the activities proceeding from the seed-consciousness from that consciousness. This makes us believe that there is reality external to the seed -consciousness. According to Vasubandhu: "The various consciousnesses are but transformation. That which discriminates and that which is discriminated are, because of this, both unreal. For this reason, everything is mind only."[7]

Some serious objections can be raised against this position of Yogācāra. First of all, can there be internal objects without external objects? The word "internal" has meaning only in relation to the word "external". They are polar concepts. Each word derives its meaning only from its opposite. Secondly, if the ultimate reality is of the nature of consciousness and external objects are identical with that consciousness, then why is it that we cannot perceive the objects that we want to perceive? Why cannot we the appearance, change, and disappearance of the object of our perception? Well Yogācāra makes an attempt to answer the second question by appealing to the law of Karma. To quote the remarks of Diñnāga in this context : It is not the eyeball that represents the organ, but the respective sensuous faculty. In assuming a subconscious store of consciousness instead of an external world and a

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Biotic Force (Karma) instead of the physical sense-organs, we will be able to account for the process of cognition. There will be no contradiction." The consciousness, according to Diññaga, is a stream of ideas and states that contain *kārmic* impressions within themselves. These kārmic impressions are the result of our past experience. They are latent in the stream of consciousness. They rise to the surface only under appropriate circumstances. Just as our memory is made up of countless number of things which we recall and remember at certain times and places, there are myriads of impressions that lie deep in our consciousness. Only some rise to the surface under certain circumstances and appear as internal and external objects. It is in this sense the consciousness is referred to as seed-consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna). However, the question that arises is : What is the source of these impressions? Well, consciousness is the only repository of the impressions, but not the source. Not only that, in the absence of a continuous self the series (vijñānas) cannot be witnessed. This position of Yogācāra ends up in solipsism, for there is nothing external to perceiving mind or consciousness. Yogācāra's comparison of the object of normal experience with those of dream to show that the former are as unreal as the latter abolishes the distinction between truth and illusion. This argument of Yogācāra is not all that convincing, because it is not the case with the objects of normal experience. Above all, we infer the falsity of dreams by comparing them with our waking experience. If there is no distinction between dream experience and the waking state, then by what other criterion can we ever distinguish one from the other.[9]

III

Unlike Yogācāra, Mādhyamika avoids all kinds of extremes. The theory of error advocated by this school is known as *asat-khyāti*. The followers of Mādhyamika believe that both external reality and consciousness are only relatively real, for there is no ultimate reality in the conceptual realm. The *Mūlamādhyamikakārikā* of Nāgārjuna, who is regarded as the chief architect of Mādhyamika philosophy, brings out the central doctrines of Mādhyamika. Nāgārjuna asks the questions, what is knowledge? and how is it produced? The ingenuity of Nāgārjuna is revealed in his answers to these questions.

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Knowledge, if at all it is expressible, is propositional, and propositions are made up of concepts and percepts. In other words, concepts and percepts are nothing but names and forms.[10] Consequently, the reality that philosophers talk about in their discussions on knowledge is only the reality of names and forms, but not reality *per se*. In their quest for knowledge of reality philosophers often mistake the reality that they construct out of names and forms for the reality as such. This is where the error lies. They fail to see the distinction between illusion and reality. The reality constructed out of the knowledge of names and forms is only illusory. If one tries to capture the reality through names and forms, then he is making a vain attempt. Mādhyamika tries to illustrates this point with its own arguments.

In fact, the polar concept argument advanced by the modern western philosophers to disprove scepticism is introduced by Mādhyamika school long ago to analyse the nature of thought and knowledge. According to Mādhyamika, the polar nature of our concepts gives rise to thought process. Every concept acquires its meaning only from its opposite. The dependence of one concept on the other makes our thought, language, and knowledge possible. Now the question arises: Whether there is a unique way in which concepts can be put together in order to produce knowledge? Mādhyamika's answer to this question is negative. The knowledge generated out of certain concepts by bringing them together is dependent upon many factors. The chief among them is the presupposition of a given thinker. Any attempt to demonstrate the presuppositions of any given system of knowledge is bound to be circular, for any demonstration has to employ the same concepts and categories determined by the presuppositions themselves. Thus, it involves the fallacy of begging the question. Therefore, there is no view of reality that is absolutely true. All the views about the reality are relative to each other. The so called perspectivism adocated by the modern western thinkers like Quine is anticipated much earlier by Nāgārjuna. Views, being conceptual constructions of names and forms, cannot point to the reality. Every view is a mere opinion. A dialectic of views can only provide an insight into the nature of reality. The error occurs when one mistakes a view of reality for the reality itself.[11] The true philosophy, for Mādhyamika, is the dialectical consciousness

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of the limitations of our constructions of reality out of name and form.

The method of dialectic employed by Mādhyamika aims at showing the self-contradictory nature of consciousness. However, Mādhyamika does not employ its own standpoint to show the contradictory nature of the concepts used by the other systems, for it does not have a standpoint of its own. According to Nāgārjuna, adhering to a particular view of reality is the cause of conflict and suffering. Even relativity is not regarded as truth. As he puts it: "but if people begin to cling to this very concept of 'relativity', they must be called irreclaimble."[12] Chandrakīrti, who wrote a commentary of Nāgārjuna's aphorisms, holds that one who believes that relativity as itself absolute is in a way clinging to non-clinging. To quote his words in this context : It is as if somebody said, I have nothing to sell you, and would receive the answer, all right, just sell me this - your absence of goods for sale."[13] The truth of the reality is that it is Sunya. In other words, the reality is void and empty in the sense that it cannot be brought under any conceptual framework. It is absurd to talk about the reality as true or false. It is simply *is*. Nagarjuna simply refers to the reality as Emptiness. This does not mean that reality is non-existent or illusory. Nāgārjuna says: The teachings of Buddha are based on two truths, the mundane and ultimate. those who do not know the distinction between these two truths do not understand the profound teachings of the Buddha.[14] The phenomenal or mundane truths are grasped through names and forms, but ultimate truth can only be realised. The world of names and forms is governed by the doctrine of dependent origination. Therefore, every truth generated by any conceptual system is only relative, and dependent on other truths and systems. Thus, from the phenomenal point of view reality is only relative an relativity is only real. The Phenomenal truths are only conventional. They are lower truths (*saṁvṛtti-satya*). the absolute truth is supra-mundane, unconditional. It is beyond percepts and concepts, therefore, ineffable. It is the higher truth (*pāramārthika-satya*). the absolute truth is grasped in prajña, the direct intuitive insight. It is not instinct, and cannot be identified with any biotic force. It is supra-rational.[15] Thus, the Śūnya of Mādhyamika is beyond the four categories of intellect (*catuṣkoṭi-vinirmukha*). In other words, the reality transcends existence, non-existence, both and neither.

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IV

To conclude : Both Yogācāra and Mādhyamika refute the realist position on truth. The former claims that reality is of the nature of consciousness (mind) and the latter views reality as Śūnya. The position of Yogācāra is untenable for the following reasons. First of all, consciousness is always directed towards something or the other. If there are no objects external to it, then it is not directed towards anything. It is something unusual and uncommon to say that consciousness is directed towards itself. In that case, the same consciousness has to split into both subject and object. Not only that, the content of consciousness is consciousness only. Secondly, how can there be consciousness without a knowing subject that supports the relative nature of the phenomenal world. However, this relative conception It? In the absence of a continuous self, the activities of consciousness as a continuous stream are not witnessed by anyone. Thus, the crude subjectivisim of Yogācāra is an absurdity. Its position utimately boils down to solipsism which defies any meaningful discussion on anything. Although the position taken by Mādhyamika is more logical than that of Yogācāra, yet it is not free from certain contradictions. In the case of Mādhyamika, it recognised the relative nature of the phenomenal world. However this relative conception of the world is possible only when there is a reality which is absolute in itself. If Śūnya is regarded as void and devoid of everything, then the question arises: Is it devoid of existence (*sat*) too? If it were the case, then there is no reality to be termed as absolute. In the absence of any absolute reality, the question of relative reality does not arise. If the reality is positive (bhāva), then it is no Śūnya. There is another problem. If the world of events is only relative, then there cannot be any criterion of truth at all. This assumption is based on the dilemma that either all knowledge is treated as false or all knowledge is treated as true. Of course, the Mādhyamika recognises epistemology as a study of knowledge, but it does not entertain metaphysics of any sort as there is nothing to discuss about the ultimate reality. What is obvious in the analysis of the above mentioned theories of truth is that truth is somehow identified with the reality of some sort. According to Yogācāra, consciousness is the only reality. Therefore, it alone can be treated as true. For Mādhyamika, *Śūnya*, being the ultimate reality, is the truth. But if it is asked whether truth

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represents anything, the answer is it represents Śūnya (Emptiness). In other words, truth represents nothingness in Mādhyamika.

NOTES

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PAUL RICOEUR'S HERMENEUTICS OF THE TEXT

A. Joseph Dorairaj

The hermeneutical journey from Schleiermacher to Ricoeur reaches a milestone in Ricoeur, whose hermeneutics of the text is, in part, a synthesis of the earlier theories of hermeneutics, especially those of Heidegger and Gadamer, and, in part, a genuine offspring of the eclectic mind of Ricoeur. The appeal of Ricoeur's project lies in its inter-disciplinary approach. "In Ricoeur's hands", remarks Lewis S. Mudge, "interpretation is always confronted with the perspective of 'counter-disciplines': psychology, psychoanalysis, sociology, anthropology, linguistics, the history of philosophy ..."[1]

How does Ricoeur gloss the term "hermeneutics"? In "The Task of Hermeneutics," he propounds the view that "hermeneutics is the theory of the operation of understanding of texts"[2] In almost identical terms, he observes, in *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation*, that "by hermeneutics we shall always understand the theory of the rules that preside over an exegesis, that is, over the interpretation of a particular text, or of any group of signs that may be viewed as a text"[3], and, in his "Preface to Bultmann," he specifies that "hermeneutics is the very deciphering of life in the mirror of the text."[4]

In Ricoeur's project, text-interpretation turns out to be the paradigm for inerpretation in general, and hence his focus on the hermeneutics of the text. In "Philosophical Hermeneutics and Theology," he points out that his objective is to develop a "hermeneutics based on the problematics of the text".[5] Explicating the concept of a text, in "What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding" Ricoeur notes that "a text is any discourse fixed by writing."[6]

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In *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning*, he asserts that "discourse is the event of language"[7] and points out that "*if all discourse is actualized as an event, all discourse is understood as meaning.*"[8] In "The Model of the Text : Meaningful Action considered as a Text"[9] he discusses the hermeneutics of the event and of discourse with regard to spoken and written forms. Firstly, discourse, which exists as a Fleeting event in the instance of discourse, is fixed by writing, thereby leading to a dialectic tension between discourse as event and meaning. Secondly, discourse, which is self-referential in the instance of spoken discourse and is marked by an immediacy and a shared environment, becomes autonomous and public in writing. As Ricoeur puts it "the text's career escapes the finite horizon of its author".[10] Thirdly, discourse's actual reference to a world is realized differently in "event" and in "meaning". While the former is underlined by a shared environment between the interlocutors, the latter is characterized by liberation from the narrowness of the dialogical situation for meaning "frees its reference from the limits of ostensive reference"[11]. Fourthly, the auditors in discourse vanish in the transition from speaking to writing "an unknown invisible reader has become the unprivileged addressee of the discourse."[12] Here it has to be noted that "meaning" surpasses and transcends the "event".

The transition from speaking to writing is underlined by distanciation to alienation (*Verfremdung*), which has wide ramifications with regard to text-interpretation, and Ricoeur remarks that "the text ... is the paradigm of the distanciation in all communication."[13] In the movement from speech to writing, he points out that what is fixed in writing is "not the event of speaking, but the 'said' of speaking (the propositional content) where we understand by the said the intentional exteriorization constitutive of the aim of discourse..."[14]. In the transition from speaking to writing, is there any spillover of meaning? In other words, can the "meaning" pole retrieve the "event" pole completely?

The movement from speech to writing, according to Ricoeur, engineers a three-fold distanciation. The triple distanciation introduced by writing are: "(1) distanciation from the author; (2) from the situation of discourse; (3) from the original audience."[15] It has to be noted against this backdrop that semantic autonomy is inbuilt in the text, and Ricoeur propounds the view that the text

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"produces a double eclipse of the reader and the writer," i.e. "the reader is absent from the act of writing, the writer is absent from the act of reading (death of the author')"[16].

In the context of alienation or distanciation engendered by the transition from speech to writing, the three-fold semantic autonomy of the text with regard to the authorial intention, the original situation of discourse and the original recipients needs to be elaborated upon. In "The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation, "Ricoeur declares,

> The essence of a work of ... a literacy work, or a work in general, is to transcend its psycho-sociological conditions of production and be open to an unlimited series of readings, themselves situated within different sociocultural contexts. In short, it belongs to a text to decontextualize itself as much from a sociological point of view as from a psychological one, and to be able to recontextualize itself in new contexts.[17]

Secondly, as a result depsychologization and decontextualization, the text is open to virtually 'any' reader and to polysemous readings. "A written text," notes Ricoeur in *Interpretation Theory*, "is addressed to an unknown reader and potentially to whoever knows how to read" and adds that "this universalization of the audience" which calls for a plurality of interpretations is "the dialectical counterpart of the semantic autonomy of the text.[18]

In Ricoeurian hermeneutics, alienating distanciation is not looked upon negatively in a historicist manner as that which needs to be overcome or bridged. On the contrary, distanciation turns out to be the very condition of interpretation because it paves the way for semantic autonomy. Therefore, distanciation is no more alienating but "productive... according to which the predicament of cultural distance would be transformed into an epistemological instrument."[19]

Ricoeur carefully avoids the dangers of adopting a rigid and extreme stance with regard to the fallacy of the authorial intention, and its obverse, the fallacy of the absolute text. He points out in *Interpretation Theory* that "de-psychologizing of interpretation does not imply that the notion of authorial meaning has lost all significance." Approaching the issue from the other end,

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he comes up with "the fallacy of the absolute text: the fallacy of hypostasizing the text as an authorless entitity."[20] Similar to Hirsch's procedures of validation of interpretation in *Validity in Interpretation*, Ricoeur presents guidelines to arbitrate and adjudicate between multiple readings. He writes that "it is always possible to argue for or against interpretations, to arbitrate between them. An interpretation must not only be probable, but more probably than another interpretation."[21] This had promoted Gillespie to write that "Ricoeur seems to give back what he has taken away by his advocacy of semantic autonomy."[22] Thus Ricoeur skillfully avoids the extreme stance of the intentional fallacy and the fallacy of the absolute text."

To Ricoeur, understanding, explanation and appropriation comprise a triad. While Dilthey arrogated explanation to the natural sciences, and understanding to the human sciences, Ricoeur brings about a rapprochement between *Erklaren* and *Verstehen*. While Dilthey got trapped in an 'either-or' situation between explanation and understanding, Ricoeur fused the two and highlighted the dialectical relationship between them. While explanation is more concerned with the semiological system, understanding, on the other hand, focuses on the semantic system, and unless there is a grafting of the semantic pole onto the semiotic pole, interpretation will be incomplete. Ricoeur in "The Model of the Text" declares that "understanding is entirely mediated by the whole of explanatory procedures which precede it and accompany it"[23] and concludes the essay by remarking that" ultimately, the correlation between explanation and understanding, between understanding and explanation is the 'hermeneutic circle."[24]

By trying to reconcile "explanation," the epistemological pole, with "understanding," the ontological pole, Ricoeur attempts to weave together a hermeneutic fabric with the epistemological strands of Dilthey and the ontological strands of Heidegger and Gadamer. He develops this dialectic in two movements. From understanding to explanation, and secondly from explanation to comprehension wherein appropriation plays a crucial role. While the understanding pole is related to guessing, the explanation pole is linked to validation, and the back and forth movement (hermeneutic circle) between guessing and validation results in an interpretation which is "more probable

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than another interpretation."[25]

The third element in the triad is existential appropriation, and without appropriation, declares Ricoeur, the understanding process is incomplete. Appropriation not only completes the triad but "culminates in the self-interpretation of a subject who henceforth understands himself better, understands himself differently or simply begins to understand himself."[26]

Highlighting the dialectical relationship between distanciation and appropriation, he points out in *Interpretation Theory*, that "distanciation meant above all estrangement, and appropriation was intended as the 'remedy, which could 'rescue' cultural heirtages of the past from the alienation of discourse."[27] Significantly, the positive spin-off of the concept of appropriation is that it renders contemporary the meaning of the text for the reader. Hence Ricoeur's statement "above all, the characterization of interpretation as appropriation is meant to underline the 'present'character of interpretation."[28]

Appropriation or assimilation, the ultimate stage in the hermeneutic process, furthers self-understanding by mediating between the text and the self. Morny Joy in "Rhetoric and Hermenutics" comments that "for Ricoeur, any increase in textual understanding will also invite a concomitant growth in self-understanding."[29] From the Ricoeurian standpoint any interpretive activity is intimately related to self-understanding so that text-interpretation as well as other kinds of interpretation turn out to be a means, a detour to the whole issue of self-understanding. Hence Ricoeur remarks that "to make one's own' what was previously 'foreign' remains the ultimate aim of all hermeneutics."[30] Joy concludes that "as promoted to Ricoeur, hermeneutics is a philosophy of self-understanding with far-reaching implications."[31]

NOTES

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IS THEISM CENTRAL TO NYĀYA?

JOHN VATTANKY

In some quarters there seems to be a totally unfounded opinion that the role of *Īsvara*, God, in the Nyāya system is practically non-existent or at best peripheral and minimal. Is this true? First of all let us clarify what it means for a reality to be central in a philosophical system. One obvious but rather extrinsic criterion is the number of important works produced by the representative masters of the system on the topic. Another and perhaps a more important sense in which a reality can be central to a philosophical system is that without accepting this reality the whole philosophical system does not make any sense. Or in other words, the dynamism and the principles of the arguments of the system naturally lead to the acceptance of the reality in question.

I argue that in both these senses the reality of *Īsvara*, God, is central to the *Nyāya* system. First of all, in the course of the development of the *Nyāya* system outstanding authors of the school have produced philosophical arguments or works either as part of larger treatises or as independent monographs on the subject of God. Thus already in the *Nyāya Sūtras* of Gautama we find three aphorisms (4.1.19,20 and 21) which deal directly with God. These *sūtras* are the following:

(Sūtra 4.1.19): *Īsvarah Kāraṇam purusakaramāphalyadarśanāt.* God is the cause because we find fruitlessness in the action of men. 20) *na, puruśakarmābhāve phalāniśpatteḥ.* It is not so because so fruit appears without the actions of men. 21) tatkarītatvād ahetuḥ. This reasoning is not correct since it (the actions of men) is influenced by him (God).

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I have given an elaborate commentary on these *sūtras* in my work *Gaṇgeśa's Philosophy of God.*[1] It is not necessary to repeat all that I have developed in this commentary. Suffice to point out here that the early commentators like Vātsyāyana Pakśilasvāmin and Uddyotakara consider these *sūtras* as proposing the view that God is the cause of the world and there is no rational justification to reject the opinion of these classical interpreters. It may be noted also that Uddyotakara not only comments on these three *Sūtras* but at the end of his commentary on the third of these theistic *sūtras* adds a relatively long section on *Īsvaraprakriyā.* In concluding this part Uddyotakara gives an inference to establish the existence of God with *Kāryatva,* being an effect, as the reason. This has remained in its various formulations by different Nyāya authors the central argument for establishing the existence of God.

Vācaspati gives decisive logical interpretations to these *sūtras* and rejects the arguments advanced by the Buddhists against the existence of God. I have also shown in my work that Vācaspati's contribution is seminal in the most important respect of showing the limitations and ultimately the untenability of the logical positions of the Buddhists especially of Dharmakīrti.

Udyana also treats the existence of God in his *Ātmatattvaviveka, Nyāyakusumañjali and Kiraṇāvalī. Nyāyakusumañjali* is entirely devoted to establish the reality of God. It is probably *the* first authoritative systematic and independent work as different from the *sutras* and their commentaries, to establish with rigorous arguments the main doctrines of the Nyāya system and as the culmination of this philosophical enterprise. In the fifth and final chapter of this work Udyana elaborates various proofs *for the existence of God. Naturally the most significant proof is the inference with kāryatva,* being an effect, as the *hetu,* the reason. Whatever may be the meagerness of Nyāya literature on the existence of God prior to Udayana the situation is radically changed after his work *Nyāyakusumāñjali,* for it is a voluminous and central work in the development of Nyāya system.[2]

Leaving less known Nyāya authors who have contributed to the doctrine of God like *Śaśadhara* and others I come to the great Gaṇgeśa in whose

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magisterial work *Tattvacintāmani* there is a very significant section, *Īśvarānumānam*, establishing the existence of God. Perhaps the towering personality of Udayana and his magnificent work, *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, overshadowed the Īśvarānumānam of Gaṅegeśa and so earlier scholars like Jacobi argued that everything that could be said about God in the Nyāya tradition has already been stated by Udayana in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, but in the light of the studies undertaken in recent times[3], it is no more possible to hold such an opinion. In fact a detailed and careful study of the text of Gangeśa's *Īśvarānumānam* shows the considerable originality of the author not only in the organisation of the matter in the Nyāya tradition but also in the development of the arguments especially in as far as their logical rigour is concerned. In fact the whole work of *Gaṅgeśa's Īśvarānumānam* is a logical and epistemological defence of the basic *Nyāya* inference, *kṣityankurādikaṃ sakartṛkam kāryatvāat*, the earth and so on have an agent because they have the characteristic of being an effect, the standard Nyāya inference to establish the existence of God. The defence of this inference is carried out by Gangeśa's with such philosophical depth and logical acumen that his *Īśvaraānumānam* can easily be ranked as one of the finest philosophical text in any tradition, Indian or Western. But to appreciate the philosophical significance of this statement one should have carefully analysed each sentence and phrase and reflected over from for long.That is the only way to have even an inkling of the philosophical depth and logical acumen of Gangeśa.

We can therefore conclude that although the literature on God in the early Nyāya confines itself to the three theistic *sūtras* and the *commentaries* on them, still the contributions of Uddyotakara and Vācaspati are so significant from the point of view of logic and epistemology that in no way can one assert that the idea of god plays only a minimal role in early Nyāya .

With the advent of Udayana and Gangeśa the whole philosophical scene changes and substantial independent works like the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* and *Īśvarānumānam (Tattvacintāmaṇi)* establish god as the philosophical and logical culmination of the Nyāya system. In doing so these authors display philosophical and logical skills of the highest order and naturally they use precisely defined technical terms. Just to assert that these refinements are

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mere subtleties and dismiss them as Nyāya pharapharnelia would be just non-sense. It would be like the statements of A.B.Keith who dismissed Navyanyāya as a 'vast mass of perverted ingenuity'.[4]

Now we try to explore the intrinsic nature of some of the basic principles of Nyāya system which ineluctably point to god as the culmination of philosophical and epistemological enterprise. In Nyāya studies in general and in Navyanyāya studies in particular, it is very easy for one to miss the wood for the trees. There are so many different topics in Navyanyāya that one can easily get lost in particulars, though of course a detailed and exact knowledge of the individual topics is a prerequisite for an appreciation of Navyanyāya as a whole. What then is the basic concern of Navyanyāya? Its overriding concern is in its concern to study with unparalleled rigour and exactitude the nature, dimensions and conditions of human knowledge; and, as we know, the philosophical problem *par excellence* is the problem of knowledge. With rare insight Navyanyāya examines the problems connected with human knowledge and sets forth in detail the exact conditions in which valid knowledge is possible. It should be borne in mind that in and through the analysis of human knowledge Navyanyāya mediates also a self-understanding of human beings which deserves close examination and probably even unqualified appreciation. Thus its definition of *vyāpti,* invariable concomitance, is not a sterile definition of the concept but an exploration of a profound aspect of human knowledge itself and it may plausibly be argued that its true significance comes out in the *Īśvaravāda.*

In order to make the problem still clearer let us pose the following question; we know that the logical proof for the existence of God is developed by Vācaspati Miśra, Udyana and Gangeśa's against the logical and philosophical arguments of their opponents, especially the Buddhists. What is however most intriguing is that none of these authors nor even later commentators on Gangeśa's work like Jayadeva, Praglobha or Rucidatta ask the question why is it that according to Nyāya logic it is possible to establish the existence of God? On the other hand neither Dharmakīrti nor any of his followers like Jñānaśrīmitra or Ratnakīrti raise the question why in the Buddhist logical system it is not possible to establish the existence of God? It is also to be

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noted that none of the modern scholars who studied these texts raise this question, much less answer it. The question has also escaped the attention of general philosophers who know broadly that the Buddhist tradition does not believe in god, whereas Nyāya is theistic, at least as far as the great works of Vācaspati Miśra, Udayana and Gaṇgeśa are concerned. But they never ask the question what is the reason for this difference?

An adequate answer for this question lies naturally in the concept of knowledge in the different systems and hence in the possibilities and limitations of their logic. Therefore it could be asserted without much hesitation that the Nyāya proof for the existence of God presupposes a theory of knowledge according to which it is possible to raise the question of God. The Buddhists of Dharmakīrti School propose a theory of knowledge according to which it is radically impossible not only to prove the existence of god but even to conceive an idea of him. Thus the Nyāya system has as horizon a theory of knowledge which renders possible the proofs for the existence of god. That is why it could be validly asserted that in the Nyāya theory of knowledge the Absolute becomes the horizon of all knowledge and therefore also of all human activities. This aspect of the Nyāya theory of knowledge in all its details is not developed explicitly in Nyāya treatises but implied in them. But of course it does not mean that such an interpretation is purely subjective. On the contrary an interpretation of this kind is based on the very foundation of the system itself.

In order to explain this it is necessary to refer to some of the very basic theories of Nyāya epistemology. Intimately connected with it is the fundamental Nyāya theory about what is usually known as invariable concomitance or vyāpti. In simple terms invariable concomitance is the invariable relationship of the reason with that which is to be established by the syllogism. Thus when you establish fire by means of smoke you presuppose an invariable relation of smoke with fire. But the concept is not as simple as that. In fact a large part of Nyāya discussions on the theory of knowledge and inference in general is all about this concept of invariable concomitance. Further this concept is of primary importance in all the major systems of classical Indian thought. In fact prolonged and persistent controversies ranged

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among the different schools on this point precisely because they sought to justify their different ontological positions on the basis of this aspect of the theory of knowledge. The controversy was acute between the Buddhists especially of the Dharmakīrti school and the Naiyāyikas. And the point of difference between these two schools is that in Nyāya it is possible from what we have known to assert also what we have not known, whereas the Buddhists tend to deny this. But this of course is an over-simplified statement.

In slightly more technical terms, the Buddhist position would be the following; we know a thing whose existence we have not directly perceived only if that thing belongs to the class of things which could be the object of direct experience. And the Naiyāyikas on the contrary hold that we can, on the basis of experience of the class of things about which we have direct knowledge, assert the existence of a thing even if that thing does not strictly belong to the class of things that could be perceived. This in fact in simplified terms is the crux of the problem in the Buddhist and Nyāya theories of knowledge and of invariable concomitance. Consequently the arguments regarding the existence of God became the centre of heated controversies. Nyāya holds that it is possible for us to know the unknown from what we have known. It also means that this unknown need not necessarily belong to the class of things which are already known,but according to the Buddhist system as represented in the school of Dharmakīrti it is necessary that this unknown thing should belong to the class of things that are already known. Otherwise we cannot make any affirmation whatever about this unknown thing.

From what has been said it follows that the epistemological presupposition of Nyāya theory of inference involves by implication first of all the capacity of human intelligence to rise above what is of immediate experience. We could further draw the important conclusion that this Nyāya theory implies that human beings cannot think excpet in the context of an Absolute. No theory of knowledge is possible without implying at the same time the existence of an Absolute and the inherent capacity of human intellect somehow to grasp this Absolute. And such an explanation of the basis of Nyāya theory of knowledge particularly with reference of the concept of

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invariable concomitance is quite legitimate. An interpretation of this kind is based on sound philosophical and philological analysis of the texts concerneds. This implies therefore that the Nyāya theory of knowledge can be explained and validated only against the backgroud of the basic and inherent capacity of the human intellect to rise above the mere phenomena which are directly perceived by it.

This is also the basic reason why it is asserted that the God of the Naiyāyikas is a transcendent one. The dynamism of knowledge that is implicity affirmed in the Nyāya theory of inference cannot simply stop at an anthropomorphic God who is immanent to the system itself.[6] If the God of the Naiyāyikas is just one of the categories admitted by the system then there would not be much point in elaborating the theory of inference which tries to establish object beyond sense experience. In fact as we have explained the dynamic nature of the Nyāya theory of knowledge and inference can fully be understood only in the context of the infinite capacity of the human intellect to reach out to the ultimate.

It is quite possible that some one may disagree with the above interpretation of the Nyāys theory of knowledge and inference on the one hand, and of the Buddhist theory of knowledge and inference on the other, and with the conclusions drawn from such interpretations. But then it is incumbent on the one who disagrees to propose another plausible answer to the question which was raised: why is it that according to the Nyāya logic it is possible to establish the existence of God? On the other hand why is it that in the Buddhist logical system of Dharmakīrti it is not possible to establish the existence of God? The classical authors and their commentators do not give any explicit answer to this question. We have to reflect long on their texts themselves and their implications. I have given one interpretation based on which a plausible answer to this question is given. It is for other scholars either to accept my answer or to challenge it with adequate reasons.

I should have concluded this note here. However a further line of thought also haunts me. My inpression about why certain persons still think that theism is not central to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is because of their overriding 4.

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desire to judge what is purely philosophical in the philosophical traditions of India by the standards of modern Anglo-saxon philosophy which of course by and large has no place for God. Perhaps they think that by doing so and rejecting certain central concepts of Indian philosophical tradition as peripheral to it they can show that Indian philosophy is not real philosophy in the western sense of the word. This is just a futile and meaningless attempt revealing perhaps more the psychology of those persons rather than the true nature of philosophy. Indian philosophical tradition has such exquisitely rich achievements that it can just stand on its own. We need not try to judge it by other standards of philosophy elsewhere. This does not mean that we should not be open to the developments of philosophy in other places. Certainly we will have dialogue with them and develop our own traditions. In fact earnest dialogue was an inherent characteristic of classical Indian Philosophy. However what Mahatma Gandhi said in another broader context is equally applicable in the context of philosophy too: 'I keep my windows open but I refuse to be swept off my feet.'

NOTES

1. Cfr. Vattanky, J. *Gaṅgeśa's Philosophy of God*-Analysis, Text, Translation and Interpretation of Īśvaravāda section of *Gaṅgeśaś' Tattvacintāmani* with a study on the development of *Nyāya Theism*, Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras, 1984, pp.4-11. As an introduction to the translation and interpretation of *Gaṅgeśa's Īśvaravāda* I have also given an extended treatment on the contribution of various subsequent *Naiyāyikas* to the problem of God. The arguments of these Naiyāyikas were developed against the Buddhist philosophers who brought in a variety of objections against the existence of God. (cfr.*ibid*.pp.1-150)

   I have also treated the same subject matter in a different work entitled *The Development of Nyāya Theism*, Intercultural Publications, New Delhi,1993.

2. Interested readers may refer to the translations and interpretations of *Ātmatattvaviveka* and *Nyāyakusumāñjli* by the distinguished scholar, N.S. Dravid, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1995 and 1996 respectively.

3. Cfr. Vattanky's works mentioned in the earlier foot note.

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Keith, A.B. *Indian Logic and Atomism*, Munshiram Manoharla, New Delhi, 1977, p.35.

5. Cfr. Vattanky J., *Gangeśa's Philosophy of God*, pp.155ff.

6. Of course this interpretation is not fully in the line with the usual idea of God in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system according to which in the beginning of creation, God produces movement in the atoms according to the various adṛṣṭas of souls. The *adṛṣṭa* itself is insentient and therefore God is needed to activate it. In such an interpretation of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika idea* of God he is not a transcendent reality but he is one of the categories within the system, but does not stand above it. My point here is that although this is the traditional interpretation of god in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system, still the theory of knowledge in general and of inference in particular by its inherent dynamism demands the existence of a transcendent God.

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NĀGĀRJUNA'S CRITICISM OF THE CONCPET OF SUBSTANCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ŚŪNYATĀ

G. VEDAPARAYANA

anirodhamanutpadamanucchedamaśāśvataṃ/
anekārthamanānārthamanāgamamanirgamaṃ//
yah praītttyasamutpādam prapañcopasamam śivaṃ/
deśayāmāsa sambuddhastaṃ vande vadatāṃ varaṃ//

The concept of substance is one of the dominant themes of philosophical enquiry. Many thinkers of the East and the West have given it a profound significance. The concept looms large in their explanations of the reality, the lifeworld. But the Mādhyamikas are the trenchant critics of substantialism *per se* and as it figures in Asian philosophy, in particular. They have thoroughly deconstructed, through their logic of *śūnya*, the substantialistic model of grasping the reality in terms of the extreme views (*dṛṣṭis*) and firmly established the *śūnyatā* nature of the reality, which is missing in the uncritical or the semi-critical substantialistic ontologies. The Śūnyavādins, indeed, have pioneered a thorough going critical phase and an irreversible non-substantialistic turn in Asian thought. They have laid a solid foundation for *śūnyatā* as a paradigm *par excellence* of the non-substantialistic philosophical understanding.

This paper, in five parts, is an attempt at the exposition of Nāgārjuna's criticism of the concept of substance and its implications for *Śūnyatā*. Part one of the paper presents in brief the concept of substance in the Upaniṣads, the Early Buddhism and Nyāya-Vaiśesika. Part two constitutes a short account of the nature and structure of the śūnya dialectic. Third one deals in details

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 4
October 2000

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with Nāgārjuna's criticism of the concept of substance. Fourth part brings out in detail the implications of the criticism for śūnyatā - the relational and conditional origination, the mutual dependence and the ultimate quiescence - of the existence as a whole. In the last part, it is concluded that the concept of substance is a mere mental construction; no substantial entity, either physical, mental or both at once, exists in actuality; the idea of substance does not correspond with the reality as such. Whereas *śūnyatā* is the reality as such whatever is in correspondence with śūnyatā is in correspondence with the thusness (*tathatā*) of the reality. *Śūnyatā* is not a concept or a thesis but the truth (*tattva*) to be realized directly. Clinging to it as an extreme view or as a reified concept is disastrous.

Concept of Substance

Substance, fundamentally, has been defined as a self-caused (*causa sui*), an independent and a permanent being. It is indeterminate, unconditional or absolute. It has a self-nature (*svabhāva*), a self-identity (mamā), a self-hood (*ātimya*) and an individuality (ahaṁkāra). Substance has been viewed as the substratum or the locus of the ever changing attributes. Remaining numerically one and essentially the same admist diversity is its distinctive mark. The existence of the substance is necessary and does not involve a self-contradiction as the non-existent square-circle does.

The concept of substance looms large in Asian Philosophy. Primarily the concept figures in the Upaniṣadic doctrine of the *Ātman* or the *Brahman*. According to it, substance is the Soul or the Self which is uncreated, immutable, undivided and eternal; it is self-luminous, omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent. It is the pure Subject, the Knower, the ultimate Witness which never becomes an object of knowledge. To put it succinctly, the substance is a homogenous mass of constant consciousness and is devoid of all worldly attributes (Gambhīrānanda:191). Substance as the *Ātman* plays a pivotal role in the Orthodox and idealistic systems of Asian Philosophy, like the *Sāṅkhya*, the Advaita etc. The concept is predominant even in the realistic schools like the Early Buddhism and the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika*. The Early Buddhists like the Abhidharmikas, also known as the Sarvastivādins, deny the

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soul-substance but admit the substantiality of the elements (*dharmas*) of existence comprising the five *skandhas*, the twelve *ayatanas* and the eighteen *dhatus*[1]. These elements are claimed to be discrete, specific bits of realities existing in their own right, in the form of seeds. They are neither created nor can they be destroyed. They are in this sense *ātman*, self-being (Ramanan:57). Basing on the self-being of the elements the Sarvastivadins argue that all things including those in the past and in the future exist without ever ceasing to be (Bapat:93-94). The momentariness (*kṣanatva*) or the transiency (*anityatva*) of the elements is their function only it is their efficiency to renew themselves without essential change. The flux of life or the concatenation of the elements does not affect their reality (Murti:73,75). The elements constitute the personality devoid of the soul-substance (*pudgalaśūnyatā*). when the elements are decomposed no substance or soul of any kind remains (Grimm:132). Thus the Early Buddhists are only semi-critical of the concept of substance. They do not rule out the concept in toto as the Mādhyamikas do. They have retained it in the form of the elements.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the substance is *dravya*, the first of the seven categories to which the entire Universe is reduced. The substances are nine in number : earth (*pṛthivi*) water (*āp*), fire (*tejas*), air (*vāyu*), ether (*ākasa*), time (*kāla*), space (*dik*), self (*ātman*) and mind (*manas*). Of them the first four are the physical elements. They are atomic and have their specific qualities - earth has smell, water taste, fire colour, air touch. Ether is not atomic, it is imperceptible and all pervading like time and space.Soul is a spiritual substance it is eternal, allpervading and the locus of consciousness.Mind is also a physical, an atomic substance but partless, inperceptible and eternal. Like the souls, the minds are many. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas regard all these substances as objective realities (Sarma:178) having a being of their own.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas distinguishes between simple and compound substances. The simple substances are the atoms (*paramāṇus*) which are eternal, indivisible, imperceptible and ultimately real. They are of four kinds - of the earth, water, fire and air. Each atom has a particularity (*viśeṣa*) of its own and differs from others in quality as well as in quantity. As Murti puts it,

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The atoms are self-existent and immutable entities, veritable selfs as it were (Coward:143). The compound substances are the material objects (*avayavins*) composed of the atoms. They are impermanent, subject to origin, stability and destruction, and breakable into their atoms (Matilala:274-75). Yet they are called substances since each compound substance is by itself a 'whole' (avayavin) which is distinct from the atoms, the parts of which it is composed. The wholes have their own, specific and inalienable natures (*svabhāvas*) they have their own identity and significance in and out of their relation with other things (Coward:141).

Mādhyamīka Dialectic

The *Śūnyavādins* are the uncompromising critics of the concept of substance and the ontologies founded on it. They contend that the true nature of the reality is non-substantial; the entities and events of experience do not have a self-nature (*svabhāva*) and a constant being; nothing is independent and self-abiding, nowhere, internally or externally, is there an entity which is static, fixed and existing in its own right. The phenomena, physical, mental or both at once, are empty (*śūnya*) of self-nature and independent being. They exist in relational origination and mutual dependence; everything arises in the matrix or relational causes and conditions (*pratityasamutpāda*). The reality is all inclusive, undivided and quiescent in its ultimacy.

Substantialism militates against the *śūnyatā*, the thusness of the reality. It fails to comprehend the reality in the matrix of mutual relatedness and quiescence. It conceives the reality in terms of the extremes of eternalism (*śaśvatavāda*) and annihilationism (uchedavāda). The substantialists - the naturalists, the realists, the pluralists, the absolutists, the monists and the radical relativists - try to entify the reality by viewing it in terms of the either/ or logic of 'is', 'is-not' both is and is-not' or 'neither is not is-not'. They avoid the middle path of perceiving the reality outside the conceptual framework of the extreme views (dṛṣṭis).

Nāgārjuna deconstructs substantialism through his trenchant dialectic or logic of *śūnya* (Inada:23). The logic demonstrates the inconsistencies and

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ultimate falsehood of the concept of substance and the extreme views thereof by analyzing them to their logical necessity and on their own presuppositions. The *modus operandi* of the analysis is that it frames a thesis, claimed to be exclusively true, against the thesis itself by deducing absurd conclusions which the thesis entails. By the absurdity of the conclusions, the absurdity of the initial thesis, the falsity of the ground is revealed (Ramanan:152). The logic executes the criticism of an extreme view (*dṛṣṭis*) by formulating it in the form of four possible logical positions (catuṣkoṭika) in which the view can manifest. The four positions (*Koṭis*) are : is, is-not, both is and is-not and neither is nor is not. These positions, in other words, are expressed as (A) existence (*asti,bhāva, sat*), non-existence (*nāsti, abhāva, asat*), both existence and non-existence *astinasti, bhāvaabhava, satasat* and neither exstence nor non existence (*naivaāsti, na ca nasti*) (B) self (*sva*), other (*para*), both self and other (*ubhaya*) and neither self nor other (*anubhaya*) identical (*tat*), different (*anyat*), both (ubhaya) and neither-nor (*anubhaya*) and (C) self (sva), other (*para*), both (*ubhaya*) and chance or devoid of reason (*āhetuka*) (Ramanan: 155).

Nāgārjuna examines the four extremes thoroughly and establishes that they are neither true nor independent. The extremes are inherently inconsistent and mutually dependent. Being self-contradictory and relapsing into each other,the first two primary extremes, namely, 'is' and 'is-not' cause confusion and conflict. Being a mechanical combination of the two, the third one cannot explain the reality at all since its mutually exclusive alternatives nullify each other and the forth one unable to comprehend the truth of reality resorts to irrationalism, scepticism and agnosticism. Being the species of attachment to permanency and impermanency, these extremes deny the truth of the reality which Nāgārjuna reveals by their deconstruction. He dismantles the four-cornered conspectus without establishing a thesis of his own, for the truth is beyond all theses. The śūnya-logic of deduction *ad absurdum* (prasaṅgavākya)[3] reduces a position to ultimate absurdity without advancing a counter position. Its sole aim is to discover the truth by releasing the mind from the fetters of the extreme views. Truth is precisely freedom from the four cornered perspective of the reality. (*na san nāsan na sadasan na*

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cāpyanubhayātmakam / catuṣkoṭi vinirmuktam tattvam mādhyamaka viduh/\. The Mādhyamikas thus have laid a firm foundation for a critical phase and a non-substantialistic turn pioneered by the Buddha in Asian Philosophy. This fact will be more evident in the actual criticisim of the concept of substance and in the implications of the criticism for *śūnyatā* which are discussed in the following sections of this paper.

Criticism of the Concept of Substance :

Nāgārjuan criticizes the concept of substance as an abiding entity or a bifurcated self (*ātma*) by applying to it the four cornered logic. He formulates the existence or the origination of the substantial-self in the four possible views and reduces them to absurdity. The self-substance, if at all exists, it should exist in virtue of being either (1) self-caused, (2) other-caused, (3) both self and other caused or (4) neither self nor other caused i.e, non-causal.

Nāgārjuna's criticism of the first extreme view (*dṛṣṭi or koṭi*) that the self-substance creates itself is as follows. Let us put forward the arguments (*prasaṅgavākyas*) one by one. the arguments overlap because of the complexity of the problem and the analysis thereof.

The substance cannot be said to create itself, for the idea of self-causation entails, on the one hand the absurdity that the substance exists before its creation. But the creation of an already existent entity? Self-creation is fallacious, for it begs the question (petitio principii) by simply assuming the existence of the thing in question. On the other land, the idea of self production also implies that the existent entity in question does not yet exist and has yet to create itself, but how can a non-existent entity which has not arisen create itself (MK. VII.13). The substance therefore cannot create itself either as a created or as an uncreated entity. Both the ideas are wrong.

The idea of self-creation entails the contradiction that the substance is both existent and non-existent at a time. It means that the substance possesses, two mutually exclusive qualities as its nature at the same time. But it is not logically possible for a really existent entity to have two contradictory natures

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at a time. a thing is either existent or non-existent but cannot to both. (MK VII.30 Second verse only).

Self-creation means that a thing produces itself redundantly, *ad infinitum* (MK.VII.19. first verse only) and without ever perishing; but redundant production is only a self-duplication; it is not a causation in the strict sense which warrants the production of something new;production *de novo* is possible only when the cause, the existing entity which is supposed to be substantial, ceases to be. But the substantial entity is such that it is permanent; it has a self-nature (*svabhāva*) the non-existence of which is not possible. Indeed, the cessation of a really existent being does not follow. (MK VII.30.First verse only).

Nāgārjuna argues that the substance cannot create itself, for all creation is possible only in relational origination (*pratityasamutpāda*); there is no production without causes and conditions; that which is created necessarily possesses the character of being made or manipulated. But the nature of the substance is such that it has a self-nature which precludes mutual correspondence with something other than irself; it cannot have the character of being manipulated (MK.XV.1). The substantial reality ceases to be so when it has a mutual correspondence and the character of being made (MK.VX.2)

Fundamentally, the very existence of the substantial entity is in question, let alone its self creation. The substance is defined as an entity which possesses self-identity (*mamā*), self-hood (*ātma*) and individuality (*ahaṃkāra*) as its basic characteristics. But the substance, indeed, cannot have these characteristics, for they are in their basic nature relational and quiescence (MK.XVIII. 2); they cannot have the character of being independent and permanent. And the absence of separated and constant self-hood, self-identity etc., implies the absence of the substance as a bifurcated and an unchanging entity. Therefore, the substance if at all it exists, it has to exist as a relational and conditional entity, like any other entity. But a relational and conditional entity cannot be equated with the substance under examination. and (self) creation of a non-existent entity does not arise.

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Self-production is not justfiable on another ground. The idea entails the existence of two entities-the producing and the produced; and the relation between them would be either identity or difference. But no production is possible when the producing (substance) and the produced (*substance*) are identical to each other (MK.XX 19). So also self-production is untenable when the cause-substance and the effect-substance are totally different from each other. There can never be any relation, let alone the causal relation, between two different entities. The cause and the effect cease to be so in case there is difference between them; the cause would be a non-causal cause (MK.XX.20).

Self-origination is untenable also because there is no entity with the character of an effectuating cause. The very idea of an effectuating cause is not permissible (MK.1.7) for no entity of human experience is said to arise from an independent being; production by an independent being is the only proof for an effectuating cause with a producing nature; but there is no such production; all production is in mutual relationship.

The idea of self-creation does not sustain when the nature of the created-substance is analysed. The nature of the so-called created entity should be either complete or incomplete within itself. And it is not possible to say that what is produced would be a self-complete being, for a self-complete being can not be produced at all either by itself or by anything other than itself (MK. XX. 21). A produced self-complete entity is a contradiction in terms. On the other hand, it cannot also be said that the entity produced would be an incomplete being, for an incomplete being is no being, it is not any thing; it is as good as being not produced, and so non-existent. Moreover, production of an incomplete being is no production at all. An incomplete production, like an incomplete being, ceases to be a production.

Self-production is a fiction in yet another sense. Susbtance by definition, is a self complete being, a plenum, full of its self-nature (*svabhāva*). But the self-nature is such that it disaffirms the relational and causal conditions (*niḥsvabhāva*) in virtue of which anything may be said to arise. So the substance with self-nature cannot arise again (MK.XXIV. 22). On the other

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hand the idea of self-creation also renders the substance an incomplete being; for it is only an incomplete being which needs to be created again in order to make itself complete; but an incomplete being cannot create itself or another. Creation necessitates a cause, an entity which is self-complete; an incomplete cause cannot have a producing nature. The substance therefore cannot be said to create itself either as being a complete being or as an incomplete being. Thus goes Nāgārjuna's protean analysis of the view that the substance creates itself. The examination shows that the idea self creation is not justifiable under any circumstances. The idea is self-contradictory and so illogical. substance therefore cannot be said to exist as a self-created entity.

The second view that the substance is created by something other than itself is untenable too; it involves inconsistencies and fails to establish the existence of the substance. Nāgārjuna's logical demonstration of the non-substantiality of the view is as follows.

The substance cannot be said to be created by the other, for, fundamentally, the substantial entity, is independent and absolute, it so exists that it does not require, for its being, anything other then itself. The substance which is dependent on or caused by the other ceases to be a substance.

Creation of the substance by the other is not possible because the very existence of the other is in question. How can there be the other? Is it self-created or other-created? It cannot be self-created, for the impossibility of self-creation has been demonstrated; nor can it be other-created for the other is non-existent; the non-existent-other cannot create itself; nor can it be created by the existence, just as the existence can neither create itself nor be created itself nor be created by the non-existence (MK.XXI.12).

The existence of the other is not possible for another reason also. The existence of the other would be possible only when the existence of the self were possible. For, what is the self for one the same would be the other for another person. But the existence of the self is not justifiable; nothing exists as a self-substance; everything exists in mutual correspondence with others. This has been mentioned before. And from the non-existence of the self the non-existence of the other follows (MK. I.3)

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The Other cannot be anything other than the other-nature or the varying nature (*parābhāva*) of the self-nature (*svabhāva*) (MK, XV.3) (of the self). The primal nature of the self is such that it can never become an extended nature; it can never give rise to a varying nature for the other to arise. The other-nature cannot arise either in the presence or in the absence of a primal nature (MK.XV.9).

The creation by the other is not justifiable, for, the other, if at all it exists, it should be as another substance which is a self-complete being and how can a self-complete being be the cause of another being? A being of completeness cannot have any relation with anything so that it can produce anything. The other cannot produce the self because the other as another self-being cannot have any relation with the self. They exist as being totally different from each other. And there can be no causality whatsoever between two totally unrelated things. Just as total identity, total difference militates against production *per se*. All origination is relational and mutually dependent. This has been demonstrated earlier.

And finally creation by the other is not tenable, for it involves the absurdity that anything can produce anything. It ignores the invariable relation between the cause and the effect. It implies that mere otherness is sufficient for causality, in which case even the stone can be said to sprout for the stone is as much the other to the sprout as the seed is to the sprout. The idea of other cause implies the aburdity that existence arises from non-existence, something out of nothing (*ex nihilo*), for it presuopposes production of the self without first establishing the existence of the other. The idea thereby involves the anomaly that everything arises from everything or nothing, (MK. VII.19 Second verse only), in which case the orderly world of experience would be reduced to chaos and confusion.

Nāgārjuna thus deconstructs the view that the substance is created by something other than itself. He dismantles the concept of other - creation by exposing its inconsistencies and the implausibility of the very existence of the other. From the non-existence of the other and other-creation, the non-existence of the self-substance follows.

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The third view that the substance is created both by itself and the other is not justifiable when the existence of the substance as the self-being and as the other-being has been established in the refutation of the first and the second theses. The third position is illogical, for how can anything be caused at time by two mutually exclusive things which can never meet? Or, how can there be a thing which possesses as its nature at a time two self-contradictory natures viz., the self-nature and the other nature. If a thing were to possess these two different characteristics at two different times, then the thing in question would cease to be one; there would be two different things. Or, if the two natures were alike held to be absolutely and wholly true of one and the same thing, then each nature would cancel the other and with the cancellation of the two natures the very thing in question would be cancelled; it would cease to be. Moreover, on the one hand, being a mere syncretic form of the first two extremes, the third one is a natural heir to all their inconsistencies. On the other hand, being a disjuntive proposition with mutually exclusive alternatives which nuillify each other, this position cannot explain anything 'and there is nothing further that remains as the true description of the thing'. (Ramanan: 157); it suffers from the utter impossibility of the description of existence or creation. So Nāgārjuna declares that the origination of the substantial entity is not justifiable even by the third view of both being and non-being (MK. VII.20), self and other creation.

And the fourth extreme that the substance is caused neither by itself nor by the other is untenable because it implies that the events and entities are not caused but happen to be by mere accident (*āhetuka*). It ascribes randomness to the systematic world. The position thus is representative of the irrationalist who fails to see the cosmic nature of the world of experience. The fourth position may also be taken as the position of the agnostic who denies the possibility of all thought, knowledge and description about the world. But the agnostic position is not consistent with itself, for it, indeed, presupposes a certain amount of the knowledge of the world in the making of the statment that no description, thought and knowledge of the world is possible. In making this statement the agnostic is thinking and describing the world in a certain way. The position of agnostic seems to be no better than

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fool's talk (Ramanan: 158). This extreme is also representative of the sceptic position that no definite knowledge and description of the reality is possible. The position is not self-consistent too, for if everything is held to be uncertain this position would also be uncertain. The sceptic position cannot be an exception to itself. The sceptic cannot hold for sure the position that he or she does not hold any definite postion. This position may eventually lead to eel wriggling - quibbling, sophistry and evasion (Ramanan : 158).

Thus Nāgārjuna examines the four extrme views about the existence of the substance and reduces them to absurdity by bringing to light the dead-ends they meet and the contradictions they entail. He establishes the fact that the substance cannot arise or exist in any of the four ways. No entity can ever arise either from itself, from another, from both or from either (from the lack of causes) (MK. I.1), says Nāgārjuna. With the refutation of the origination of the substance in all the four possible ways, the very existence of the substantial entity is refuted. The substance cannot exist in any way other than the four ways that are examined.

The existence of the substance is unjustifiable even as the substratum of the attributes. If the substance is the substratum then where do the attributes inhere? Do they inhere in a substratum which is qualified, unqualified, both or neither? Firstly they cannot be said to inhere in a qualified one, for then it would mean that the substratum is already possiessive of the attributes the inherence of which is in question. Secondly the attributes cannot inhere in an unqualified substratum, for an unqualified substratum is not any thing (Ramanan : 207). An attributeless entity is no entity. Thirdly it is illogical to say that the attributes inhere in the substratum which is both qualified and unqualified at the same time. And the fourth view is untenable for the reasons considered above.

The non-substantiality of the substratum is justifiable by examining the relation between the substratum and the attributes. The relation between them would be either identity, difference, both or neither. In case of identity, the substratum would be one with the attributes which are ever changing; it would be subject to origination, duration and cessation, and no more be self-

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abiding; a transitory substance is no substance. and in case of difference, again, the substratum would not be any thing, for being totally separate from the attributes, the substratum would be imperceptible and inconceivable. And the untenability of the third and the fourth views need not be repeated. Thus the substance as the substratum is unfindable in all the four ways. The substratum or the self is neither qualified, unqualified, both, nor neither, it is neither identical, different, both, nor neither .

Substance as an independent being, the exclusive concepts and the extreme views related to it are false. They are non-substantial and do not have an essential truth. On ultimate analysis they are proved to be relational and mutually dependent. Substance and qualities, identity and difference are relational; one cannot exist or be meaningful without the other.

The idea of substance manifests in different ways in the substantialistic philosophies. It appears in the form of the elements of existence, the *skandhas*, the *dhatus*, and the *ayatanas*. It also figures in the form of the categories, like space, time, motion, rest, action, agent, cause, effect, including suffering and liberation. The criticism expounded above is applicable to all these forms of the substance. When the four cornered logic of *śūnya* is applied, they will be reduced to absurdity.

Implications for Śūnyatā

The criticism of the concept of substance has profound implications for *Śūnyatā* - the non-substantial nature of the reality. The criticism reveals that the reality - physical, mental or both at once - is relational and conditional. Entities, events and concepts are devoid of self-nature (*svabhāvaśūnya*), empty of essential or self-being (*anātma*); they are non-permanent (anitya) and arise in virtue of mutual dependence (*pratityasamutpāda*).

It is wrong to view the reality in the substantialistic terms of the mutually exclusive views (*dṛṣṭis*) of either being or non-being, self-nature or extended nature, existence or non-existence, (MK.XV›7) constancy or disruption, (MK. XV.11)finite or infinite, (MK. XXV. 22) identity or difference, permanence, impermanence, both or neither. (MK. XXV. 23)

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Śūnyatā refers not only to the determinate truth (*saṁvṛti satya*) -the relational, the co-arising and the all-inclusive nature - of the reality. It also refers to the indeterminate, the undivided (advaya) and the absolute truth (*pāramārthika satya*) of the reality which is quiescence (*śātaṁ*). Quiescence is the supreme excellence, the wonderful peace, perfection and bliss which the reality is in its ultimacy. Quiescence is the thusness or the thatness (*tattva*) of the reality. Nāgārjuna expresses it in terms of the eight 'noes' or negations as non-extinction (*anirodham*), non-origination (*anutpādam*), non-destruction (*anucchedam*), non-permanence (*aśāśvatam*), non-identity (*anekartham*), non-differentiation (*anānārtham*) non-coming into being (*anāgamam*) and non going out of being (*anirgamam*)[4], Nāgārjuna furhter describes the quiescence as non-conditionally related (*aparaprathyayaṃ*), non-conceptualized by conceptual play (*prapañcairaprapañcitaṃ*) and non-discriminative (*nirvikalpam*) (MK. XVIII. 9)

Thus non-substantiality or śūnyatā refers to the two truths - the empirical and the transcendental. the relative and the absolute or the relational and the non-relational. The two truths are not totally different from each other. The determinate truth is not separate from the indetermiante truth, but only the determinate form of the indeterminate itself, the divided truth, is only the division with undivided. But there can never be absolute determination or division of the indeterminate and the undivided. The determinate truth is only the appearance of the indeterminate truth (Ramanan : 252) Śūnyatā as the indeterminate truth is the ground of śūnyatā as the determiante truth. The former is nirvāṅa and the latter is saṁsāra. They are not essentially different from each other (MK. XXV. 19). There is not the slightest difference between the two. The realm (the limits) of *nirvāṇa* is the realm of *saṃsāra* (MK. XXV.20) . *Nirvāṇa* cannot be realized by avoiding the realm of *saṃsāra*. Nor can it be expressed without relying on the relative truth of *saṃsāra* (MK. XXIV.10) Those who fail to understand the subtle distinction between the two truths fail to understand the profound significance of the Buddha's teachings (MK. XXIV.9).

As a skilful means of avoiding the extreme views, *śānyatā* is itself the middle way (*madhyamapratipad*). Firmly established in śūnyatā the farer on

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the middle path comprehends the reality as it obtains, the relative as relative, the absolute as absolute. The farer grasps the determinate truth in terms of mutually dependent concepts and views; the farer uses the concepts and views as contingent and convenient designations in respect of the relative truth, but avoids all conceptualization or ideation in respect of the absolute truth (*prapañcaśūnya*).

Substantialistic outlook is due to the elements of attachements or defilements which condition the mind to view the reality in terms of the extremes of permanence (śāśvatavāda) and impermanence (*ucchedavāda*) which are the source of division, discrimination, intolerance, conflict and suffering. The elements of attachment are of two kinds: the physical taintings (kleśāvaraṇas) and the mental tainting *(jñeyāvaraṇas*). Śūnyatā destroys the elements of attachment by destroying the self-nature (svabhāva) of the reality as a whole including the elements of defilements.

The mind which is *śūnyatā* is in *mokṣa* and is never touched by sorrow, for the whole structure of conceptual play (*prapañca*) is banished in it (MK. XVIII.5) Ignorance and suffering are not due to *saṃsāra*, the *śūnyatā* as relational origination (*pratityasamutpāda*). Nor, of course, is it due to *nirvāṇa*, the *śūnyatā* which is non-relational and quiescence. Suffering, indeed is due to the creation of the fictitious, the dream world of substantialistic mental conformation or essentialistic thought construction. Nāgārajuna likens the substatialistic conceptual world to an imaginary city in the sky (MK.VII.34) which is totally unrelated to s*aṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* which belong to the realm of the uncreated. The wise never indulge in conceptual diffusion or substantialistic entification of the reality. They are always choicelessly aware of the immortal teachings (*śāsanāṃṛtaṃ*) of comprehending the undivided truth (*advayadharma*) in accordance with the middle way of non-identity (*anekātham*), non-differentiation (*anānārthṃ*), non-interruption (*aanucchedam*) and non-continuity (*aśāśvatam*) (MK. XVIII. 11).

Conclusions

The concept of substance is a mere mental construction; there is no such thing as a substantial or a self-abiding entity anywhere. Everything exists

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in relational and conditional origination. Nothing exists devoid of mutual dependence. The so-called substance belongs to the relam of the 'created' and it is unfindable in actual reality which is non-substantial or '*śūnyatā*'. *Śūnyatā* refers not only to the determinate truth (*saṃvṛti satya*) - the *Śūnyatā* is neither created nor uncreated but a beginningless and an endless interdependence and quiescence of the undivided reality. The concept of substance does not correspond with śūnyatā in any way. Where the one is there the other is not.

Śūnyatā is not a concept but an actuality to be directly realized by relinquishing all the views and the concepts. conceptualizing the *śūnyatā*, which is in truth non-conceptualizable and beyond all views is highly disastrous. It is as dangerous and ruinous as a badly seized snake or a wrongly executed incantation (MK. XXIV.11). It destroys the unwise, the people of low insight who reduce it to a concept. As *Nāgārajuna* puts it, those who cling to *śūnyatā* as an idea are incorrigible (MK. XIII.8). They are the victims of irremediable sorrow.

Nāgārjuan therefore controverts all attempts at grasping *śūnyatā* as an ontological category. He says that the term *'śūnyata'*, like any other term, is used as a provisional name or as a thought construction (*prajñāptirūpādāya*) (MK. XXIV.18) for the provisional understanding (*prajñāptyārtham*) of the thusness of all existence without entifying. it is the middle way of understanding the truth.

Śūnyatā is an much *śūnya* as *svabhāva* is. In other words,non-substanbitality is as much empty of substantiality as substantiality is. Just as clinging to substantiality is denied through the emptiness of substantiality, (*niḥsvabhāva or svabhāvaśūnya*), Nāgārjuna denies clinging to non-substantiality through his teaching of the emptiness of non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāvaśūnya*). Nāgārjuna has taught not only emptiness but also the emptiness of emptiness (*śūnyatāśūnyātā*). Thus *śūnyatā* may be called a paradigm *par excellence* for understanding and expressing the relational origination and quiescence of the whole of existence which is both immanent and transcendent at the same time. Śūnyatā is the basis of all existence. Anything true is possible only in

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virtue of being in correspondence with *śūnyatā* (MK. XXIV. 14). Non-substantiality at its determinate and indeterminate levels cannot adequately be expressed in words and more so in terms of positivity which have a natural tendency to substantialize the true nature of the reality. Nāgārjuna has therefore sought to express it in negative terms. and 'śūnyatā' is the best possible term to express the truth in the best possible way, that is, without substantializing.

NOTES

1. The *skandhas* are the five groups, viz., form (*rūpa*), sensation (*vedana*), perception (*sanjña*), mental conformations (saṃskāras) and consciousness (*vijñān*). the *ayatanas* are the six internal organs of sense and their corresponding objects, viz., the eye and forms, the ear and sounds, the nose and odours, the tongue and flavours, the touch and tangibles and the mind and ideas. The *dhatus* include the twleve *ayatanas* and the six types of consciousness, viz., the eye-consciousness, the ear-consciousness etc.

2. Nāgārjuna's dialectic is not the same as the Western dialectic. It is different, for instance, from the Greek *eristic*, a sophisticated disputation which is an end in itslef. It is also different from the Hegelian and the Marxian dialectics which are idealistic and materialistic, respectively. The Mādhyamika dialectic is soteriological in nature and its aim is the Insight which transcends reason and reveals the truth.

3. Besides Nāgārjuna, the *Prāsaṇgika* Mādhyamika is represented by Buddhapahita, Candrakirti, Aryadeva and Rahulabhadra. There is a rival group, namely, the Svātantrika Mādhyamika which advances a counter position in refuting a position. this school is represented by Bhāvaviveka.

4. These eight 'noes' constitute the first two lines of the very first verse of Nāgāarjuna's MK in which he offers salutations to the Buddha who taught the doctrine of relational origination (*pratityasamutapāda*) and blissful (*śivas*) cessation of all phenomenal thought constructions (*prapañcopaśamaṃ*).

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ABBREVIATION

MK. Mūlamādhyamakakārikā

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" DUTIES TO ONESELF" - A REFLECTION

DEBIKA SAHA

Moral values are not separable from cultures. That means, moral values and norms are interdependent. So moral assessment of human actions has to include both consequences concerning the particular objects of action and those concerning the wider social and cultural environment. The practice of selling one's organ for money is now a trend in our society. Those cases are referred here where people are forced to take such types of decision under circumstantial conditions. The question is, can this act be considered moral? In *Lectures on Ethics*, Kant states that we have duties towards our own bodies and any deviation in performing these duties gives rise to an argument that certain trends in our society are wrong. This paper will present Kantian views on this issue. It is divided into two sections. Kant's notion of duty to oneself will be discussed in the first section. And the second section will highlight the arguments that Kant adduces against selling of bodily parts.

I

The concept of duty is associated with morality. So, what is morality? It is an accepted fact that the concept of morality arises only because we are living in a society with varied interests. We can be happy or suffer, languish or flourish, whereas rocks and trees cannot. These interests form part of the dynamic ongoing process and constitutes an integral feature of our life-process. As human beings, we have unlimited desires and demands. But these desires and demands are curbed by certain codes of conduct. One way of defining morality is that it is a device designed to counteract the natural

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 4
October 2000

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tendency of human beings to selfishness, the tendency to be moved more by their own needs than by those of others.[1]

According to Kant duties to oneself fall within the purview of 'essential morality' and this should be treated first. He feels quite disappointed by the attitude of philosophers that no one has framed a proper concept of self-regarding duty. He remarks, 'Just as an innkeeper gives a thought to his own hunger when his customers have finished eating, so a man gives a thought to himself at the long last for fear that he might forget himself altogether'.[2]

While explaining his position, Kant makes it clear that duty to oneself is not be confused with prudence. In *Lectures on Ethics* he says, 'In fact, the principle of self-regarding duties is a very different one, which has no connection with our well-being of earthly happiness'.[3] On the contrary, 'Not favour but self-esteem should be the principle of our duties towards ourselves. This means that our actions must be in keeping with the worth of man'.[4]

The above view of Kant is echoed and clarified in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, where in he argues that the content of our duty is determined by the categorical imperative. In its second formulation it shows that we should always act so as to treat humanity, whether in our person or that or another, as an end and never as a means only.[5] It is because human beings should be treated in a certain way, that we have obligations to ourselves qua human beings. Kant emphasizes the preservation of human worth, and he depends on a notion of certain acts as intrinsically degrading. If we indulge in such acts we lose our worth.

In *Lectures of Ethics* he remarks that man is free to dispose of his condition but not of his person.'... he himself is an end and not a means; all else in the world is of value only as a means, but man is a person and not a thing and therefore not a means.[6]

Here a question may arise what this 'duties to oneself' mean? If a person says that he has duties towards his body, it might naturally be thought that he sees himself, as a moral agent distinct from his body, thus taking a dualist view.

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But in *Lectures on Ethics*, Kant clearly mentions, that he deals with an idea of the completeness of the whole person, a concept of the person as necessarily embodied. In the Lecture on, 'Duties towards the Body in regard to life', he says, 'Our life is entirely conditioned by our body, so that we cannot conceive of a life not mediated by the body and we cannot make use of our freedom except through the body'[7]

II

Let us now consider what Kant says about duties towards the body and their implications in the context of selling bodily parts.

It is a common practice now to sell bodily parts for money. Here only cases are taken into consideration where people have no other way but to take such drastic steps. In private columns of newspapers, often advertisements of kidney-transplantations are offered in exchange for money. What are the arguments of Kant against the selling of bodily parts?

In *Lectures on Ethics*, 'Kant says,' a human being is not entitled to sell his limbs for money, even if he were offered ten thousand thalers for a single finger'[8] The argument that he offers here is as follows, 'If he was so entitled, he could sell all his limbs'.[9] He adds further, we can dispose of things which have no freedom but not of a being which has free will'.[10] According to Kant, to sell oneself, even a part of oneself, is wrong, because we are beings which have free will and beings of this sort are not to be sold. The main objection that Kant offers here is, by selling oneself one makes it impossible to exercise freedom in future. Though it can be questioned here whether selling of a finger does lead to such a consequence. Kant Elaborates :

'A man who sells himself makes of himself a thing and, as he has jettisoned his person it is open to anyone to deal with him as he pleases'[11]

Kant seems here to invoke a notion of what is intrinsically degrading to human being. The main point that he offers is that, human beings, having free will, are simply not the sorts of things that should be bought and sold

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and if one offers any part of oneself for sale, then one makes oneself an object for other people's pleasure.

He has another argument for the impossibility of selling one's body. He says, 'Man cannot dispose over himself because he is not a thing, he is not his own property; to say that he is, would be self contradictory, for in so far as he is a person, he is a subject in whom the ownership of things can be vested, and if he were his own property, he would be a thing over which he could have ownership. But a person cannot be a property and so cannot be a thing, which can be owned, for it is impossible to be a person and a thing, the proprietor and the property. Accordingly, a man is not at his own disposal. He is not entitled to sell a limb, not even his teeth'[12]

But the above view that 'a man is not at his own disposal', itself contradicts what he says elsewhere. According to him, in some circumstances we do have rights of disposal over our own bodies. Kant says in the Lecture, 'Suicide'.

'We may treat our body as we please provided our motives are those of self preservation. If, for instance, his foot is a hindrance to life, a man might have it amputated. To preserve his person he has the right of disposal over his body'[13]

But if a person can have his foot amputated to save his life, why not sell his kidney to meet the economic crisis that he faces urgently? It is also from the motives of self-preservation that he feels the need to sell a part of himself.

One of the undesirable consequences of selling our bodily parts is, here bodies of persons are taken as resources. This action contributes to the fact of everything being for sale, everything having a price. The seller of bodily parts encourages the purchaser to think that everything is within one's reach for a price. Kant's remark that the seller makes himself an object in the purchaser's eye exprs ses this insight.

But this action of the seller should not be judged alone. We have to

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see the social condition in which these sorts of situation arise. As we said in the very beginning, the action and consequences of any individual should be judged within the social and cultural environment. For, it is not rich people who sell their organs. It is people who find themselves in situations where there's no way out but to opt for sale of an organ. (Excluding those business oriented people who make this kidney - transplantation as a mode of their business) It is the economic necessity which forces people into this type of action and thus, the question whether individuals are free to make a choice, does not here arise at all. We have to unearth the social condition which led a person to commit such an action. We have to examine the infrastructure and the economic resources of our society. In other words, the essence must be explored, without relying upon appearance, otherwise truth will never come out.

Thus, if selling of organs are undesirable from a moral point of view, it is not enough to suggest that they are undesirable, we have to create also that environment where people can perform desirable acts.

NOTES

1. J.L. Mackie, *Ethics* : Inventing right and wrong, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1977, Chap-5.
2. I. Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, trans. Louis Infield. Harper & Row, New York, 1963, P.117.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*, P.124
5. I. Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, trans, J.J. Paton as The Moral Law, Hutchinson, London, 1948, P. 91
6. I. Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, P.120
7. *Ibid.*, P. 147-148
8. *Ibid.* p.124
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid*

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11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*, p.165

13. *Ibid.*, p.149

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QUINE ON ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENT

GOPAL KRISHNA SINHA

Of many problems that are concerned with philosophy, the ontological problem is associated with that part of metaphysical problem under which the question, what there is? is taken into account. As regards this question both in Indian and Western tradition in ancient and medieval times philosophers were busied with the explication of ontological problem. Owing to the predominance of religious world-view in those days philosophers had tended to embark on this problem on the basis of speculative metaphysics and religious concepts. Although twentieth century philosophers have revived their predecessors' ideas about the ontological problem in terms of logical analysis and modern logic, but no philosopher seems to have been able to provide satisfactory solution to this problem. It is W.V.O. Quine who has tried to solve this problem in a new fashion.

Quine's approach to ontological problem is observed with his notion of quantification and of identity.[1] According to Quine's notion of quantification, 'to be is to be the value of variables', and his notion of identity provides that 'there is no entity without identity'. The former notion provides a test of 'what a given remark or doctrine, ours or someone else's, says there is', and thus introduces Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. The latter notion brings out the fact that only those entities should be admissible for which adequate criteria of identity can be provided, and thus introduces Quine's standards of ontological admissibility. In this paper I shall concentrate only on what Quine has said about ontological commitment.

Quine puts his criterion of ontological commitment on the line of

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 4
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Plato's doctrine of ontology. When Plato talked of ontology, he admitted of the existence of non-being as well as of being. Plato expressed his views on the existence of non-being like this: Non-being must in some sense be, otherwise what is it that there is not?

Apparently, since we consider, according to Plato, something as 'non-being' so 'non-being' must necessarily be. Historically, Plato's doctrine of ontology what Quine calls Plato's beard[3], has proved tough.

Like Plato, through formulating criterion of ontological commitment Quine tries to expose that we affirm that something exists in some sense or other. He means to say that when we do make assertion that something exists in some sense or other, it leads us to ontological commitment. This opinion of Quine about ontological commitment makes it clear that to say that we are committed to an ontology is nothing but just our way of saying that we affirm that something or other exists. Even the thinking of denial of being leads to the existence of being in some sense or the other.

Quine goes on to say that when one is just involved in ontological commitment, he is to use an existential quantifier. In other words, when one wants to say that something exists, he is to use an existential quantifier and then the objects which we consider to exist will be all and only those that are values of the variables which are bound by such existential quantifier, what logicians call bound variables.

What Quine is concerned to prove is that ontological commitment must be carried by bound variables, and even to prove that all general and singular terms or names that we commonly use like 'Descartes' are really abbreviations for descriptions. He means to say that all general and singular terms which are commonly regarded as names can be converted into descriptions, and then analyse out the descriptions in the way which Russell[4] has suggested in his theory of so-called singular descriptions or definite descriptions. In doing so, the meaning of general or singular terms or names remains unchanged. For example, 'Descartes' can be converted without the alteration of meaning into 'the father of modern Western philosophy'. In this

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example, we use name meaningfully by supplying a definite description such a way in which there are no bound variables.

Here it is important to note that what bound variables carry ontological commitment disappears after translation and analysis. When one transforms all general or singular terms or names into definite description, one uses an ordinary predicate true of the individual denoted by a name. Quine further adds that if one faces some difficulty in finding a predicate true of the individual denoted by name, in that case he should construct artificial predicates as 'Descartes' can be replaced by 'the x which Descartises' or' (ix) (fx)'.

Again we can eliminate definite description in favour of quantifies, variables & identity. This is written as follows:

E : (ix) (fx) = $(\exists x)$ (y) (fy $\equiv$ x = y) i.e, the f exists, means 'there is exactly one f (Descartes exists). Similarly, the x which is f is also g = 'there is exactly one f which is also g'. In symbolic way, this will be written as follows:

g [(ix) (fx)] = $(\exists x)$[(y) (fy $\equiv$ x = y). gx]

The above description makes it clear that sentence containing names (as Descartes was the father of modern Western philosophy) can be converted into sentences containing description (The x which Descratises was the father of modern Western philosophy) and then into sentence containing only quantifiers and variables. Quine thus comes to hold that whatever we say with help of names can be said in a language which shuns names together[5] and as such, names are immaterial to ontological commitment.

Now, what about fictional entities such as 'Pegasus', Unicorns' etc. In Quine's theory of ontological commitment. According to Quine, even such terms, which are commonly regarded as names can be converted into descriptions, and then analyse out the descriptions in the way, suggested by Russell in his theory of descriptions. For instance 'Pegasus' can be rephrased into a description as the 'winged horse that was captured by Bellerophon' Putting such a phrase in place of Pegasus, we can go ahead to analyze the

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statement 'Pegasus is 'or' Pegasus is not' clearly on the analogy of Russell's analysis of 'the author of Walverly is' 'and the author of Waverly is not' or 'the present king of France is' and 'the present king of France is not'. If basic notions such as Pegasus have no possibility of pat translation into descriptive phases, then we can still adopt artificial device and transform Pegasus into 'the thing that is - Pegasus', or into 'the thing that Pegasizes'. If we interpret the alleged name 'Pegasus in terms of Pegasizing as a description under Russell's theory of descriptions, then the old notion that Pegasus can not be said not to be without presupposing that in some sense Pegasus is has been disposed of.

What Quine assumes is that we should accept a certain kind of entity to be existing. If an entity does not exist, we should not have any talk about that entity. Apparently, if Pegasus were not, we should not have any talking about Pegasus. Therefore, it would be nonsense to say that Pegasus is not. Quine expresses his view as follows:

'When we say of Pegasus that there is no such thing, we are saying, more precisely, that Pegasus does not have the special attribute of actuality.[6]

Thus the thinking of denial of even fictional entities leads to the existence of fictional entities in some sense or the other, and is as logically admissible as what Wyman,[7] a logician, has said that Parthenon is not red. Here we see that Quine is really in agreement with Plato in the sense that Quine admits that there are existence of both being and non-being. As he says,

'In either case we are saying something about an entity whose being is unquestioned'.[8]

The point here to be noted is that Quine gives the importance of bound variables to the ontological issues, it is not names but bound variables, which carry ontological commitment. He himself says,

'The only way in which we can involve ourselves in ontological commitments (is) by our use of bound variabes'.[9]

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On this view, we are committed to ontology of abstract entities. Even he tries to show that how we could use seeming names or descriptive phrases meaningfully without supposing that these are entities allegedly named. The solution of ontological problems, according to Quine, consists in the elimination of description.

Here we see that like British empiricists (e.g. Berkeley and Hume), Quine, a scientific empiricist denies the reality of Universals on the ground of the bound variables, and asserts that when we say that 'some dogs are white', we mean that 'there are something that are dogs and also are white'; and, 'in order that this statement be true, the thing over which the bound variable' 'something' ranges must include some white dogs, but need not include doghood or whiteness. They (doghood and whiteness), being regarded as dependent objects, can never be the value of a propositional function. If a 'Universal' be not considered as a dependent object, it would have to be represented by a propositional function whose values would themselves be universal which is not possible; and therefore, Universals do not exist. Thus Quine, like Ayer, Plato, Aristotle, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas etc., believes in the reality of particulars.

Since Quine's theory of ontological commitment is based on the identification of particulars, ontological issues may be solved only on the surface of sensedata. Here we may say that what Quine means to say that ontological problems may be solved only on what we perceive is something else, called sense data. If it be so, a question may arise :, is it always the case that when we assert that Øa, we imply that there is an x such that Øx? Quine's answer to this question is that in asserting Øa we do not always imply that there is an x such that Øx. In this connection, he takes an example of a disease: from the statement that appendicitis is dreaded, it need not follow that there exists something which is dreaded.[10] But he might want to say that when it is said that the assertion of Øa carries with it some ontological commitment, it does not entail that there is anything that satisfies Ø, but does entail that there is something that satisfies Ψ, a predicate of different order from Ø. For an example, if I say that David did see the ghost of his father, I

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do not necessarily imply that there was anything that was both a ghost and what David saw. There was no ghost for David to see. In fact, he did see something, an illusion, a hallucination or a sense datum, the appearance of a ghost, which is sensed. Here at all event, something happened, meaning thereby that we are affirming a fact of some sort; and such 'facts' are described by means of choosing a conceptual scheme because it determines one's ontology. Here we have two conceptual schemes: Phenomenalistic one and physicalistic one. If we use, according to Quine, the phenomenalistic scheme, we shall regard the conceptual scheme of physical object as 'a convenient myth'. What Quine implies is that the truth-claim of language belonging to ontological statements depends on the truth-value of language of phenomenalistic statements. If this view be accepted, then statements about physical objects could be converted without changing of meaning into the statements about sense data. But Quine says that there is no likehood that each sentence about physical objects can actually be translated, however deviously and complexly, into the phenomenalistic language.'[11]

What he wants to say is that physical objects are nothing but 'postulated entities. 'Here a question arises, if physical objects be treated as merely 'postulated entities', how can it be decided that something is a postulated entity? Under what criterion we still refuse to say that physical objects exist? Quine himself does not have any solution to this problem.

It is A.J. Ayer who offers a solution to the above problem by saying that since physical objects do not satisfy the basic predicate, they do not exist. What criterion he has to solve the above problem is expressed as follows:

'Let us say that a predicate Ø is reducible to a set of predicates, K, if it is not logically possible that anything should be experienced which exemplifies or manifests Ø unless something exemplifies one or more members of K, but it is logically possible that something should be experienced which exemplifies or manifests a member of K even though nothing exemplifies Ø'. Here a member of predicates K will be regarded as a basic predicate. Let us say then

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that a predicate is basic with respect to a given language if the language contains no predicates, or set of predicates, to which it is reducible. Then we may construe the statement that certain objects are postulated entities as a statement that certain predicates, namely those that ostensibly apply to the objects in question, are not basic.'[13] Thus according to Ayer, 'only that which satisfies the basic predicates will be admitted to exist.'

Quine thus claims that knowledge of what exists come from sense-data; and since he claims of all knowledge to be generated by sense-data, his theory of ontological commitment leads to skeptical solipsism. More precisely, in construing physical objects in terms of sense data Quine tries to show that what we know is not only legitimate but also empirically consistent. In this sense, his position in epistemology is a form of empiricism.

After all, Quine has also made a very important methodological claim on the ground that ontological commitment is analytical rather than speculative. Interestingly, what he believes in the being of fictional entities is similar to what Wyman calls 'unactualized possibles.'[14]

What Quine seems to arrive at when he is dealing with the problem of ontology, is that we must take predicates as applying to something; and again, to say that we use predicates that are regarded as being capable of affirming the existence of anything by which the predicate is satisfied.

In this connection, P.T. Geach[14] remarks that Quine's talking of object existing with the help of predicate being taken as applying to something is not convincing because predicates stand also for properties. If to say that a predicate applies to something is to say that objects exist, then it would not be incorrect to say that objects exist is to say that properties are instantiated. We can also say that properties are instantiated instead of saying that objects exists. Geach considers exists' as a second-level predicate.[16] Quine opposes this on the ground that what a predicate stands for something is necessarily not to imply that there are properties, as opposed to what instantiates them. On the contrary, if we say that properly is instantiated instead of saying that objects exist, then it would be said that some other property is instantiated,

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namely, some property which this property instantiates. This brings out the fact that if a property Ø is instantiated it certainly does not follow that there is any thing that it instantiates. It seems to be clear that whenever we say that predicates apply to something if says simply that they had meaning. In the case of negative existential statements a predicate is actually asserted to be taken as applying to nothing. Quine contends that predicative expressions are meaningfully used.

Ayer, in the course of criticising Quine, also points out that if we talk of a predicate being taken as applying to something, we meet with the difficulty that all predicates that we use are not regarded as being capable of applying to anything. A formalist who does not admit number into ontology may accept that the expression 'being a prime number between 7 and 13 'has meaning but does not allow that there is something to which it applies. Then, how are we to distinguish between those predicates that are to be taken as applying to something and those that are not (excepting negative existential statements)? Quine gives answer to this question but not satisfactory one.

Despite being these difficulties in Quine's philosophy of ontological commitment, there are ten characteristics thereof. Firstly, he has given an importance of bound variables to the ontological issues because a picture of existence is constructed largely symbolic in that he admits the value of variables, variables of quantification and usage of just those entities encompassed by our use of 'everything', 'nothing', 'something' etc.

Secondly, from the fact that a sign that is demonstrative or pronoun in its nature has meaning, it does not follow either that there is anything that it stand for, or that there is anything that it denotes. This does not apply only to words like 'green', which are commonly regarded standing for properties, but also to words like 'pegasus' which are regarded as names. What Quine tries to prove is that after we interrupt the noun 'Pegasus' in terms of Pegasizing as a description under Russell's theory of description, the old notion that pegasus can not be said not to be without presupposing that in some sense Pegasus is has been disposed of.

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Thirdly, we can use both general and singular terms meaningfully without thereby committing ourselves to the existence of anything whatever. That to say, one can use both general and singular terms to make statements significant 'which are such that it does not follow from them, that anything exists.'

Fourthly, there is difference between meaning and naming even in the case of a singular term, which is genuinely a name of an object. In this connection, we can take Frege's example of the morning star and the evening star which shows that two expressions denote the same object but can not be regarded as having the same meaning, that is, they are not synonymous.

Fifthly, 'logically, a name is what refers to an object is purely existent. Now, in strict logical sense, what is purely existent is given in our experience. Obviously, names stand for sense data. Words like 'Pegasus', 'Unicorns' which we also take as names are known to exist through sense data.

Sixthly, the names to which Quine's method on the basis of Russell's theory of description directly applies are complex phrases or names. Such phrases are not analysed independently but only as the fragments of the whole sentence in which they occur.

Seventhly, from the fact that names and descriptive phrases should be distinguished, ordinarily, we think that descriptive phrases are for their objects in the same way as names. But this general conception has some difficulties. If 'Pegasus' which is used also as name is considered as standing for the 'winged horse', and the 'winged horse'which is a descriptive phrase is considered as standing from the name 'Pegasus', then an absurd knowledge would be found that 'Pegasus is Pegasus.' Therefore, names and descriptive phrases must be distinguished. Like Russell, Quine holds that the letter does not stand for an object but stands for certain characteristics, which we think apply to an object.

Eighthly, what Quine is concerned to prove is that when we are committed to an ontology by our use of bound variables it is simply admitting

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abstract entities into our ontology. In this sense when we say that Pegasus is or that there are centaurs, we are admitting abstract entities into ontology or realms of being. In short, to say that one is committed to an ontology by our use of bound variables is indeed, his way of saying just that one affirms that there are abstract entities. Thus he accepts a language of mathematics containing variables of higher levels in formulating his logistic conception of ontological commitment.

Ninthly, Quine's account of ontological commitment, however, differs from Locke's theory of ontological commitment. Locke held that ontological commitment which is metaphysical in its nature is involved in the mind's taking cognizance of physical objects through certain qualities which depend upon the former but are the product of the latter. Quine, on the other hand, does not believe in the mind or body as physical objects or substances, which make contact with each other through sense data.

Tenthly, though his philosophy of ontological commitment lies in the tradition of Greek philosophy his method is different from that of Greek philosophy. Plato's method was largely metaphysical and introspective but Quine's method is scientific-oriented. It may be also added that Plato has made use of metaphysical knowledge in formulating his philosophy of ontological commitment, whereas Quine, having formulated theory of ontological commitment, has supplied scientific knowledge.

To conclude, we shall make two observations in the light of Quine's assertions. First, what we believe in the reality of particulars is based on sense data; and secondly; what we are affirming as a fact of some sort it may be described by choosing our conceptual schemes. As regards his first assertion, we may say that system of ontology would, for him, have to be consistent with the life of sense-experience, what is also called sense data, because knowledge of what exists comes from sense data. In this sense, his theory of ontological commitment is essentially existential. I think that the cornerstone of his ontology is his sharp distinction between essence and existence. Essence that is always universal and is free of time does not possess conversion or

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changeability. Existence, on the other hand, that is particular and temporal possesses conversion and changeability.

As regards the second assertion, we may point out that the questions about ontology can be interpreted as questions about the choice of conceptual schemes, and since the adoption of an ontology is nothing but simply a matter of choosing a conceptual scheme, his (Quine's) ontology, it seems to me, is running under the line of pragmatic trend. According to me, throughout his theory of ontological commitment, he maintains the importance of logic therein. He asserts that there is no pre-logical understanding of ontological commitment. For this reason ontology and logic is said to be so much so related to each other that ontology without logic is empty and logic without ontology is blind.

Anyway, the great ancient discussion on ontology or realms of being has flared up anew in the philosophy of Quine. It is Quine who has developed Russellean view on ontological commitment in new order. Quine's approach to his criterion of ontological commitment is so much impressive and convincing that R. Carnap[17] also admits of the use of bound variables as referring to a certain kind of entities 'which is the aspect of our linguistic usage involving us in ontological commitments.' Quine seems to share with Heidegger[18] in the sense that he, like Headgear, identifies all philosophy with ontology and remarks in this connection that ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical disciplines among others.

NOTES

1. W.V. Quine 'Notes on Existence and Necessity', *The Journal of Philosophy*, 40, 1943 Reprinted in *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language*, ed. Leonard Linsky, the University of Illinois, London 1952.
2. W.V. Quine, 'On What There Is' *Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. II,No 5, 1948. Reprinted in *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language*, ed. Leonard Linsky, op.cit. P-189.
3. *Ibid.*,
4. See B. Russell, 'Descriptions', *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, Chap. XVI, Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1920. Reprinted in *Classics of Analytic Philosophy*,

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ed., Robert R. Ammerman, McGraw - Hill Book Co., 1965; and in *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language, op.cit.*

5. W.V. Quine, 'On What There Is', op. cit P-200; and also his article, 'Designation and Existence', *The Journal of Philosophy*, 36, 1936, p-36. Reprinted in *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, ed. Feigl and Sellars.

6. W.V. Quine, 'On What There Is', *op.cit*, P-190

7. *Ibid.*,

8. *Ibid.*,

9. W.V. Quine, 'Designation and Existence', op. cit. PP-31-32.

10. *Ibid.*

11. W.V. Quine, 'On What There Is', *op. Cit.* PP-204-205

12. A.J.Ayer, *Philosophical Essays*, Macmillan and Co. Ltd., New York, 1965

13. *Ibid*, P-222

14. W.V. Quine, 'On What There Is', *op.cit.* PP-190-199.

15. Vide P.T. Geach, 'On What There Is, *Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* Vol. XXV,

16. *Ibid.*, PP-130-132.

17. R. Carnap, Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology, *Revue Internationale de philosophie*, 11, 1950. Reprinted in *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language, op.cit.*

18. Vide, M. Heidegger, *Being and Time.*, tr. By John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York, 1962,

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PERCEPTION, INTUITION AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD : SCIENTICIZING AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY

MADUABUCHI DUKOR

I

The aim of this inquiry is not to re-echo the disputation between perennialism and constructivism over the epistemology of mysticism. It is rather to argue that African philosophy provides a good example of perennialism or epistemological mysticism. The perennialists like William James, Evelyn Underhill, Joseph Morechal, William Johnston, James Pratt, Mircea Eliade and W.T. Stace maintain that mystical experiences represent an immediate direct contact with an absolute principle. According to this school of thought,

> "The core experience which is 'pure consciousness event' is the same but when it is made explicit it appears to be divergent, since it is interpreted according to the language and belief of traditions'[1].

On the other hand, the constructivists paradigm would argue that 'all experiences, whether religious, artistic, or mystical, are in fact shaped and mediated by the terms, categories, beliefs and language'[2]. This seems to have an antecedent in Immanuel Kant who says that there is no direct, unmediated knowledge of the reality - all knowledge and human experiences are structured by human categories and forms of sensibilities.

In between these and similar claims, we shall examine the status of African epistemological conceptions of perception, intuition and the external world that P. The two concepts represent different focal whiffs in epistemology. While intuition, as a method of knowing, is popular among rationalists and

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 4
October 2000

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mystics, the concept of perception represents the philosophy of the empirical school. The aim of this paper is to examine the epistemological content and validity of these concepts and as the multi-cultural aspects of epistemology. We shall therefore argue that both concepts have played separate and complementary roles in philosophy and science of cultures. Precisely, it is an examination of the unique and separate roles of Perception and Intuition in knowledge that P and as well as argument for their complementary roles in Western and African Philosophies.

The questions, what is Perception and what is Intuition?, are methodologically imperative. Perception is defined as the apprehension of the world through the sense, or the general exercise of it, or particular cases of its exercise, and also what is perceived.[3] On the other hand, intuition is a direct apprehension of truth, which is not the direct result of reasoning or sense-perception. It has been viewed as 'a direct relation between the mind and some object analogous to what common sense thinks is the relation between us and something we see unambiguously in a clear light'.[4]

In science, Psychokinessis, clairvoyance, crystal gazing, dream prophecy, telepathy and revelation, the process of perception is argued to be always a constant matrix. Therefore, perception arguably takes many forms and meaning.[5] The point at issue is, is it cognitive or epistemological? The cognitive areas where perception takes place have philosophical and scientific problems concerning relations to sensory experience on the one hand, and to intellectual notions like belief, judgement, and inference on the other. While the former is the epistemological problem in science and empiricism, the latter is the scientific problem in the Para-Psychology, Metaphysics, Clairvoyance, African medicine and witchcraft. Similarly, notions like belief, judgement and inference are dominant themes in African epistemology. That is why the empiricist (scientists) and the idealists (rationalists) are trying to discover what constitute the external world, P.

The point at issue is that perception has hindered the certainty of knowledge that P. Very often our Perception tells us lies - what we conclude

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that perception tells us is not always the case. For instance according to B. Russel the penny viewed from one side looks elliptical and the candle seen out of focus looks double. It means that we are often under illusion and that what we directly perceive or are aware of (often called sense data) sometimes or always differ from what is out there in the external world. It means that we perceive objects by interpreting or inferring from these sense-data. The problem of Perception or scepticism about it becomes more complex when it is admitted that we even perceive when we dream or hallucinate. However, our grave concern is a scientific one which demands a more serious concern about perception through the senses the supramental and supranatural. If we conduct our epistemological enquiry from 'pure experience' it is going to be difficult to get beyond it. The African hold firmly the belief in the conceptual space and time or the idea of three dimensional space being interposed on this earth. This seems to clear hurdles in confining perception to pure physical experience. Similarly, Sri Aurobindo in his account of Physical Transformation has this to say -

'Since the beginning of civilization, man has developed the levels of mind and life, developing his mental faculties such as the sciences, and, the life energy faculties such as the arts'.[5]

This statement is an eloquent testimony of psychisation, spiritualisation, supramentalisation and psychical process in perception, intuition and the knowledge that P. Although this has been highly disputed by the apostle of objectivity and physical sciences, the modus operandi and target of the exponents of the three dimensional world has been to show that the two worlds overlap and that the supramental is the reference point of reality as an African case study will show.

II

Lockean and African epistemologies have interesting parallels and divergences. John Locke's epistemology tries to solve the problem of Perception with his doctrine of primary and secondary qualities. The primary qualities

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are those qualities inseparable from the body, for instance, solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest and number while the secondary qualities are colour, sound, smell and so on. He says that secondary qualities are only in the percipient. It means therefore that without the eye there would be no colours, without the ear, no sounds and so on. The African would however posit the spiritual and the physical qualities whereby the spiritual perception is the gift of the seers and the wisemen who see beyond the physical. However this notion of perception lack the scientific sophistication of Locke's. Berkeley objected to Lockean Dualism by pointing out that the primary and secondary qualities are the percipient. However, Lockean Dualism dominated practical physical until the rise of quantum theory. It proved successful as a source of many important discoveries e.g. the theory that the physical world consist only of matter in motion was the basis of the accepted theories of sound, heat, light and electricity. It seems therefore that while the African and Locke were dualistic, Berkeley is monistic as far as the problem of perception is concerned.

Empiricism is the doctrine that all our knowledge (excluding logic and mathematics) is derived from experience. Locke sustained this doctrine against Plato, Descartes and the scholastics who believe in innate ideas or principles. He says,

> 'Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without only idea; how come it be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in the one word, from experience in that all knowledge is founded and from that it ultimately derives itself'.[6]

According to Locke, our ideas are derived from two sources (a) sensation; and (b) perception of the operation of our mind, which may be called internal sense, and since we can only think by means of ideas, and all ideas come from experience, it is evident that none of our knowledge can antedate experience. This empiricist tradition recognises the existence of the external world in terms of the world of experience.

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Kant would argue for this position and of course, he held the view that no mystic experience or metaphysical insight can have any justification since man is not equipped with higher faculties of knowledge. But William James is of the view that

> mystical experience should be accepted as authoritative for an individual, although not for the observer, even if the mystical experience does suggest other modes of knowledge and truth. It should be so because mystical experience, like ordinary perception, involves 'face to face presentation of what seems immediately to exist' and provides evidence no less than that given by the senses'.[7]

Empiricism and idealism have problem of showing how we can have knowledge of other things than oneself and the operation of our own mind. According to Locke 'Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas.'[8] And

> From this it would seem to follow immediately that we cannot know of the existence of other people, or of the physical world, for these, if they exist, are not merely ideas in any mind. Each one of us, accordingly, must so far knowledge is concerned, be shut up in himself, cut off from all contact with te outer world'.[9]

At another point he postulated three kinds of knowledge of real existence. He said that ourknowledge is intuitive, our knowledge is demonstrative, and our knowledge of things present to sense is sensitive.[10] The African would treat objects of intuitive knowledge, demonstrative knowledge and sensitive knowledge as real. Locke assumes that certain mental occurrences, called sensations, have causes outside themselves and that these causes resemble the sensations which are there effects. Bu the fact that sensation have causes and still more the belief that they resemble their cause, could be maintained on grounds wholly independent of experience. This argument, of course, presupposes external world. This is consistent with the principle of empiricism. David Hume got rid of it by dropping the assumption that sensations have external causes. But his maxim, 'no idea without an antecedent impression' which he inherited from Locke, is only plausible so long as we think of impressions as having outside causes.

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III

While the African would hold on the idea of causation, Hume would object to it. For David Hume, there are two kinds of perceptions - impressions and ideas. Impressions are those perceptions that have more force and violence. While ideas are faint images in thinking and reasoning. Ideas at least, when simple are like impressions, but fainter. 'Every simple idea has a simple impressions, which resembles it: and every simple impression, correspond to any idea.'[12] Our simple ideas in their first appearance, he said, are derived from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them and which they exactly represent. Complex ideas, on the other hand, need not resemble impressions. We can imagine a winged horse without having ever seen one, but the constituents of this complex idea are all derived from experience. For example, a man born blind has no ideas of colour. Among ideas those that retain a considerable degree of vivacity of the original impressions belong to memory and others to imagination. Yet Humean ideas presuppose external world or world of independent objects. Simple impressions and those that belong to memory are signals of independent world. But that of imagination is only solipsistic.

Sri Aurobindo argues that it is nonsense to speak that what is unknown by the mind is unknowable and that mystic experience remains ineffable -

> 'Reality is such that it is not exhausted by more objective externalities which our mind and senses can grasp. There are different orders of reality of which the objectivity and physical is only one poise. There are other poises of the reality, which are given to our subjective experience. Just because this realm of spiritual reality is beyond the grasp of normal experience, it should not be regarded as illusive imagination'.[13]

But David Hume would argue that there is no impression of self and therefore no idea of self. He says, 'For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at anytime without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.'[14]

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This raises a problem with knowledge of the self. Hume can be interpreted to mean that there are glimpses of the knowledge of the external world but not knowledge of the self. But Russell argues that no man perceives his own brain, yet, in an important sense, he has an 'idea' of it. He is also concerned with uncertain, or probable knowledge like knowledge as to the future and as to unobserved portion of the past and present not including direct observation, logic and, mathematics. For him there are seven kinds of philosophical relations - resemblance, identity, relations of time and space, proportion in quantity or number, degrees in any quantity, contrariety and causation. Those that depend only on the ideas are resemblance, contrarity, degrees in quality and proportions in quantity or number while those that can be changed without any change of idea are spatio-temporal and causal relations. The first kind of relations give certain knowledge about the external world while our knowledge concerning other is only probable. Algebra and Arithmetic in sciences give certain knowledge about the external world. Geometry is not so certain because we cannot be sure of the truth of its axioms. Perhaps it belongs to another category of truth. Sri Aurobindo draws a distinction between true truth of things and practical truth of things. He contends that the former kind of knowledge is knowledge by identity which is different from sense knowledge and ratiocination. The knowledge of identity is the highest mystic experience which is attained at the supramental consciousness.'[15]

The business of philosophical enterprises borders much on formalization of thoughts as is the case with and similar to things like perception and its congruence with reality. Hume and Russell's idea may not be truer than that of the African, no matter how spiritually densed it may be. Resemblance, identity, relation of time and space, proportion in quantity or number, degrees in quantity or number, degrees in quantity, contrariety and causation are amenable to and inferable from African philosophy. But these categories are enmeshed in the substratum of Polymonotheism and Theistic Panpsychism. Similarly, Professor Sogolo has argued that -

> 'every culture operates its even perception of objects and its own conception of reality. There exist in each a divide between the world of

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> common sense, that is, between the reality based on our direct perception and experience though the human senses and the 'reality', beyond that which is based on our systematic construction of what is based on our systematic construction of what we perceive'[16]

once the dualism is accepted, it is tempting to believe that only direct perception truly reflects reality on the assumption that variations be not in human sensual perception of objects but in their interpretation. This, according to Sogolo, leads to the view that reality is a universal notion but culture independent as well as that it is culture bound in terms of interpretation, that is, that every culture has its own explanatory model of its perspective experience.

In identity and spatio-temporal relations the mind goes beyond what is immediately present to the senses. Spatiotemporal relations can be perceived and can form parts of impressions. Causation alone enables us to infer some thing or occurrence. Implicit here is the knowledge of the external world through causation. But Hume believes not in such thing as an impression of causal relation. According to him,

> We have no other notion of cause and effect, but that to certain objects, which have been always conjoined together ... We cannot penetrate into the reason of the conjuntion'.[17]

But in Cartesian philosophy as well as that of the scholastics, the connection of cause and effect tend to have no room for the existence of the external world since everything we perceive is only at the level of impression unlike the African philosophy whose cause and effect relationship tend to underpin the external world and the real or physical world.

To be precise, Theistic panpsychism underpin the external world and the real or physical world. It is on the same theoretical form that in the Hermetic, the ancient Egyptian sought to know the reality through intuitive and mystical means. According to Mimansakas and Vedantins,

> 'knowledge is intrinsically valid. It is 'self-revelation', whether it is sense-knowledge or intellection, intuition, or revelation, each has a

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claim to knowledge.'[18]

In African (Ghana) causal theory, the following proverbs provide evidence in the belief in an effective cause. The Akan saying on cause and effect goes like this : Biribi ankoka mpopao, enye krade' meaning if nothing touches the dry palm branch, it does not make a noise'.[19] Again, 'Birebire amna, amone mama' or if Birebire had not come there would have been no calamity or if the initiating event had not occurred the consequence would not have resulted'.[20] The African had reasons for every occurrence in terms of 'how' and 'why'.

IV

George Berkeley and the African are transcendental idealists but while Berkeley denies matter the African affirms it. George Berkeley argues that the reality of sensible things consist in being perceived and that we do not perceive material things but only colours, sounds and so on, and that these are 'mental' or in the mind and that what-ever is immediately perceived is an idea and that any idea exist out of the mind.

> 'it if were held that thought and perception consist of a relation between subject and object, it would be possible to identify the mind with the subject and to maintain that there is nothing 'in' the mind, but only objects 'before' it.[21]

One can argue that Berkeley's theory of perception does not actually establish the existence of external world. His subsequent denial of matter is equally unAfrican and substantiates this interpretation. But his concept of ideas could mean to represent the external world in similar manner for which the spiritual realm of the African could represent the world the P. Sri Aurobindo holds that -

> 'There are different orders of reality of which the objective and physical is only one order. It is convincing because it is given to our senses. We seem to remain unconvinced about the subjective and supra physical because mind has no direct access to it except through fragmentary signs and data and inference which can be erroneous. The subjective events

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are as real as any other physical events.'[22]

Berkeley does not tell us what he means by perception. He rejects the theory that perception is a relation between a subject and a percept. However, according to Russell, one difference between perceived and unperceived events is that the former, but not the later, can be remembered. Recollection is one of the effects, which are peculiar to the phenomena that we naturally call mental. These effects are connected with habit. A burnt child fears the fires, a burnt poker does not. In physicalist language, we can say that an occurrence is 'perceived' if it has effect of certain kinds: Habit and memory when described in physicalist terms are not wholly absent in dead matter. The difference, in this respect, between living and dead matter, is only one of degree. Therefore to say that event is 'perceived' is to say that it has effect of certain kinds, and there is no reason, either logical or empirical, for supposing that all events have effects of these kinds. For the African, the reality of sensible things does mot consist only in being perceived. Since every object has a spiritual essence, it exists both in the spiritual realm and physical realm. Sri Aurobindo would support this view arguing that just as scientific inquiry passes beyond that of the physical senses and enters the domain of the infinite and infinitesimal about which the senses can say nothing and test nothing. So also spiritual search passes beyond the domain of scientific or rational inquiry and it is impossible by the aids of the ordinary positive reason to test the data of spiritual experience and decide whether those things exist or not or what is their law and nature'.[23]

According to Bertrand Russell the theory of knowledge would require that we start our inquiry about perception from whatever knowledge is the ground for our belief in science. Percepts are propositions or event we know without inference or what can be called dated particular events. Then the question, can we, from our own percepts, infer any other event? There are four possible positions according to Russell, of which the first three are forms of idealism. Firstly, any event is logically capable of standing alone and therefore a group of events affords demonstrative proof of the existence of other events. If we confine inference to deduction, then the known world is

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confined to those events (in our own biography) that we perceive. Secondly, the view ordinarily understood as solipsism allows some inference from my percepts and those in my biography. Thirdly, there is the view that it is possible to make inferences to other events analogous to those in our own experience, and that, therefore we have a right to believe that these are, for instance, colours seen by other people but not by ourselves, toothaches felt by other people and so on. And lastly, there is the view of the common sense and traditional physics, according to which there are, in addition to my own experience and other people's also events which no one experience, for example, the furniture of my bedroom when I am asleep and it is pitch dark. The African whether an Igbo, Yorba, Akan or Zulu has a wholisitc view of an object or the universe in the sense that everything has spiritual and physical component. This is the African amalgam of idealism and empiricism.

According to Russell, Perception involves the sense and is the basis for beliefs, and that illusion does occur. He says that a single account does not hold for different modes of perception such as seeing, hearing, etc. Do we perceive physical objects or infer their existence or do we treat them as logical constructions (phenomenalism)? The African is not 'scientific enough' to be bothered by this and similar questions. The clarification of issues raised in this question in African way would be in defense of African science. However,

> 'There is a prima-facie conflict between Russell's empiricist task of grounding all knowledge claims in sense-data and his realist view of the independently existing physical world of chairs, tables, trees etc. and the scientific world of atoms, molecules and so on ... It is to resolve this dilemma of empiricism and realism and to bridge the gap between perception and physical objects that Russell introduces constructionism'.[24]

In African metaphysics and epistemology there is no conflict because of the panpsychic dimensions of objects and matter in general.

From our study there are unconscious and subliminal perceptions. Locke, Hume and Berkeley talked about the features of the object we perceive. It is argued that these features like colour, shape, nature, etc. have causal

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properties. If the object we perceive plays a causal role, does it cause our having an experience or our perceiving the object? And does this role enter the analysis of what we mean by saying we perceive the object, so that to say we perceive something is to say, among other things, that it causes us to do something? Or is it merely that our perceptions of it, or our accompanying experiences, are always in fact caused partly by it.

There are theories, apart from causal ones that try to explain perception and its object. The representative theories say either that what we perceive is not the object but something else (sense data) representing it. Realist theories say that whatever it is that is perceived exists independently of being perceived. Naive realism is the view attributed to the plain man that we not only perceive ordinary objects but perceive them as they are, by a direct relation without sense data interpretation.

In African metaphysics and epistemology spirits are philosophical categories. Locke, Berkeley, Ayer and Ryle may not agree with this African point of view. African seers generally agree that -

> (1) Another world, three-dimensional space is interposed on this world; (2) Man and lower animals have a physical body and a spirit as well; (3) when we die our spirits separate and go to a hill or forest in the neighborhood; (4) the other three-dimensional world is as firm to those living there as our three-dimensional world is to us. Superior spirits can materialise and even kill human beings in our world; (5) There are flaws or cracks in the layer between the physical beings in our world'.[25]

These African philosophical theories go to show that we can legitimately make inference from our sense data and this is best explained by the representative theory that what we perceive is not the object but something else (sense data) representing it. However, and again in African way, the problem of inference can be solved with the theory that -

> 'pragmatic inter subjectivity, veridical objectivity and overall coherence are important criteria for warrant of mystic belief'. Coherence is argued for because 'no contradiction could be true and some warrant accrues to the logical entailment of well-founded beliefs'.[26]

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But for William James, the mystic experiences are only subjective feelings and hence lack veridicality except that the mystics are the authority of their own experience. It is important to examine key terms in perception.

Perceptual means things as they appear to the perceiver. Perceptual consciousness is the total conscious experience of the perceiver qua perceiver. Perceptual objects are whatever it is one perceives, be it sense-data, physical objects, or whatever, considered as having just those characteristics they are perceived as having. The perceptible field is the total of a person's perceptual objects at a given moment, not necessarily distinguished as separate objects. Percept is similar to perceptual object. It sometimes refers to sense-data or content or perceptual consciousness. The African distinguish that which is perceived by the senses (phenomena) and the 'thing-in-itself, the inner nature or force of the thing, (noumena) [27]. As a realist, he believes in percepts and perceptual consciousness in relation to objects. As an idealist and transcendentalist, he believes in the external world of noumena.

V

Intuition is an immediate, non-discursive, non-symbolic peneration into the nature of the object. What we are said to intuite may be objects not accessible to the senses like numbers, universals, god or truths. Intuition is free from environmental influence. Intuition of truths may take the form of knowledge which we cannot account for, simply because we are unconscious of the reasons which led to it. We have this kind of intuition in African metaphysics, epistemology and ethics.

People do know things by intuition, and the word 'intuition' is explicitly used to rule out the possibility of a rationale. Intuitions may come more easily in some circumstances than in others; there may in some cases be causally necessary conditions for them. The idea of intuition is captured in D.H. Lawrence's story, The Rocking-horse Winner, where the boy in the story consistently got the winner of a horse race right simply by riding a rocking-horse. In such a case we are likely to say 'It is clear that he knows although

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heaven knows how'.[28]

The remark 'heaven knows how' may suggest that we do think that the person has some kind of rationale for his beliefs about what that rationale is.

Are people who knows things by intuition sure of what they know? The Africans may have the right to be sure, but only because they are sure about the things that they claim to know, and not for any other reason. It may be that African people who know things do in some sense have the right to be sure and this might therefore be a necessary condition of knowledge. But this not sufficient. African people may have the right to be sure of something if they believe it on the best authority, yet what they think they know may turn out to be false and is not for that reason knowledge.

On the other hand, one pivotal belief in African philosophy is the belief in innate ideas. Therefore African philosophy takes side with rationalism instead of empiricism. Because of African belief in innate ideas there is a lot of emphasis on intuitive knowledge. According to H.K. Minkus, it is a common knowledge that Europeans think in syllogisms, the Bantu think in what the European traditions calls sorties. Many misunderstandings would be avoided if only one did not expect Bantu or Akan or Igbo discourses to follow the rigid syllogistic forms. This is because sorites is a rigorous and logical reasoning also. The Fanti philosophy believes in innate ideas. Thus there is a saying according to Munkus 'Obu nnkyers abofra Nyame (no one teaches a child about GOD). Among the Africans generally a child does not acquire knowledge of GOD from experience or teaching. He is born with that knowledge. The Fanti also believes that certain individuals are born with certain abilities, abilities which are not acquired from, though, developed through experience.

It is on this basis that some herbalists are said to possess their knowledge of the use of herbs not from experience but innately. Some of the special abilities are also supposed to be acquired through extra-sensory perception. Akomfor (seers), Eninsifo (healers) and Abayifo (witches) are widely believed to possess the faculty of extra-sensory perception. The Igbo

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call seers and healers 'Nwadibia' and witches 'Amuosu' and they are all believed to have extrasensory perception.. As necessary conditions of knowledge, the notion of having the right to be sure is on firmer ground than that of the justified true belief. Plato and Aristotle think of such awareness - the direct intuition of an object - as the paradigm of knowledge. The content of any such awareness could be expressed only in terms of what the subject knows about the object and what relevant facts he knows.

VI

Russel distinguishes first between 'knowledge that' and 'knowledge of' and within the latter he distinguished between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. What is known by acquaintance is supposed to be direct, immediate, certain and incorrigible, and according to Russel all other knowledge, which is not knowledge by acquaintance do not include physical object, and can be known by description. In African epistemology and metaphysics the 'knowledge that' has to do with the knowledge of the external world and the 'knowledge of' has do with direct perception of objects and things of the physical.

Plato believed that there is nothing worthy to be called knowledge that is derived from the senses, and that the only real knowledge has to do with concepts for instance '2+2=4' is genuine knowledge and not a statement 'snow is white'. On the contrary *Theaetetus*, observes 'it seems to me that one who knows something is perceiving the thing that he knows, and, so far as I can see at present, knowledge is nothing but perception'.[29] However African thoughts are found in Protagoras, Heraclitus and some other ancient Greek philosophers. Protagoras says that 'man is the measure of all things'[30] meaning that any given thing is to me such as it appears to me, and is to you such as it appears to you. The African Igbo or Akan would agree with this. Critically speaking, it is urged that Protagoras ought equally to have admitted pigs and baboons are measurers of all things, since they also are percipients. Questions are raised as to the validity of perception in dreams and in madness. The Igbo believe that a mad perceives what is revealed to him in the external

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world but would disagree with Heraclitus that everything is in a flux. Critics say that this has awkrd consequences for instance we cannot as a result say this is white for if it was white when we began speaking it would have ceased to be white before we end our sentences. This means we cannot be right in saying we are seeing a thing for seeing is perpetually changing into not seeing.

On Protagorean position that man is the measure of all things i.e. that each man is the measure of all things, we need to distinguish between percepts and inferences. Each man is confined to his own percepts; what he knows of the percepts of others he knows by inference from his own percepts in hearing and reading. The percepts of dreamers and madmen, as percepts, are just as good as those of others; the only objection to them is that, as their context is unusual they are apt to give rise to fallacious inferences. Russell argues that inferences are personal and private. What I am to believe I must believe; because of some reason that appeals to me. The Portagorean position, rightly interpreted does not involve the view that I never make mistakes, but only that the existence of my mistakes must appear to me if any inference that I happen to draw is just as good as any other, than that intellectual anarchy that Plato deduces from Protagoras does infact follow. On this point, therefore, which is an independent one, Plato seems to be in the right. But the empiricist could say that perceptions are the test of correctness of inference in empirical material.

Plato argues against the identification of knowledge with perception by pointing out that some of our knowledge is not connected with any sense-organ. We can know, for instance, that sounds and colours are unlike, though no organ of sense can perceive both, there is no special organ for 'existence and non-existence, likeness and unlikeness, sameness and differences, and also unity and number is general.'[31] It means that we cannot know things through the senses, since through the senses alone we cannot know that things exist. Therefore knowledge consist in reflection, not in impressions, and perception is not knowledge, because it has no part in apprehending truth. However, for the Igbo people of Africa, knowledge consists in both reflection and perception.

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Russell says a percept is not knowledge, but merely something that happens and that belongs equally to the world of physics and to the world of psychology. On likeness and unlikeness, he says that two shades of colour, both of which come in seeing, are similar or dissimilar as the case may be. It is something, which one should not accept as a 'percept', but as a judgement of perception. For him perception is a relation between a percipient and an object.

> 'I see a table' here means that 'I' and 'Table' are logical constructions. The percept is just an occurrence, and neither true nor false. The percept as filled out words, is a judgement, and capable of truth or falsehood'[32].

Therefore the proposition 'knowledge is perception' must be interpreted as meaning 'knowledge is judgement of perception.

Here Russell is explicity committed to the realist view that physical objects exist independently of our perception and the representational one that physical objects are caused by our sense data. Yet as an empiricist, Russell amitted that he could not prove that physical objects exist independent of perception.[33] Sajahan Miah has identified some problems connected with Russelâs idea of logical constructions, sense-data and sensibilia, which I believe are problems that can easily be shoved aside for utility reasons by the analytical framework of Theistic Panpsychism. He argues that since verification of the external world consist in the occurrence of sense data and the empirical verification includes the possibility of actual perception, there would be a problem since in actual construction, Russell has included unsensed sensibilia and the constructed object is bound to remain unverifiable. Also Russell is guilty of a 'speculative leap' in his assertion of the existence of the sensibilia because sense-data are all that we are directly acquiainted with in any perceptual expereience. There is again the problem of the inferred sense-data of other people. Inferring other people's sense-data assumes that there are other people's bodies 'But from strict logical and epistemological point of view, Russell is no more justified in inferring other people's sense-data than in inferring other people's bodies.[34] Critics observed that if other people's sense-data have to be inferred via other people's minds then why worry

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about having to infer physical objects? The physical object is not empirically verifiable, no neither is other mind. Therefore he has no more right logically to infer other minds than he has to infer physical objects.[35] With his notions of construction and sensibilia, Russell anticipated a reconstruction of African epistemology and metaphysics for scientific reasons. His notions are at best forms of idealism amenable to African 'idealist pragmatism'.

In Igbo thought, 'knowledge as judgements of perception' is an exercise in three-dimensional spaces. There are three-dimensional spaces, all of which are priorities, and none of, which can be considered the only means by which we perceive things. In African philosophy, the number of conceivable logically possible worlds is infinite.

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WALKING ON THE PATHS OF MARX'S *CAPITAL*

MARZBAN JAL

The twenty-first century shall wake with a resounding question : What to do with Hegel? Recall the Hegelian dictum: truth lies neither in being *(Sein)* nor nothing *(Nichts)* but in becoming *(Werden)*.

Yet the pathway to *becoming* is not a single, simple, universally determined monistic path. It is a pathway with many sides. As Marx notes, each path is double bound - where the rational and mystical continuously intermingle with one another.[1] Reading *Capital*, one finds four paths distinctively outlined: (1) the path of everydayness, (2) the natural path, (3) the alien path, and (4) the historical path. *Capital* inquires into the nature of these pathways. Principally it states the difference between the historical and alien pathway.

Two distinct discourses emerge with the archaeological foundation of these four paths : (1) alienation (the philosophy of Marxism) and (2) history (the science of Marxism). Whilst historical materialism as the science of Marxism involves the empirical examination of societies, their economies, political systems and cultures; Marxist philosophy studies the discursive genealogies of estrangement.

The aim of this paper is to present Marx's *Capital* as the study of genealogy of estrangement wherein the conditions for the discovery of the sites of non-alienated history are explored. This *non-alienation* or *de-reification* is crucially important as it involves the study of the history of philosophy in which the question of freedom and socialism emerge.

It thus examines the lines of demarcation that Marx draws between the

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVII No 4
October 2000

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estranged and emancipatory modes of production. To think this difference is the project of *Capital*. Secondly the paper researches the ways whereby alien paths dominate over the historical ones. In this way one finds out how the alien pathways become the *epistemic structures in dominance*.

In this essay I am using the original German text *Das Kapital* in order to lay stress on the philosophic terms used by Marx and to distinguish them from the English translations (Moore-Aveling, Ben Fowkes and David Fernbach) which are *determined in the last resort* by Anglo-American instrumental rationality that relives the estrangement which they are supposed to critique. They cannot ask : what is the precise nature of Marx's *Capital* in which the sublation *(Aufhebung)* of alienation is possible? But this is not restricted to the instrumental translations. Economism, teleologism and fatalism are three elements foreign to Marx, yet crucial aspects of Marxism. How is this possible? How is the suturing of opposites (necessity/freedom, objective laws/human essence) possible within the Marxist problematic? How does one find the nodal points in which one can free oneself from the instrumental and estranged interpretation of Marx's classics?

On the other hand the German terms used by Marx: *umgekehrt, umstülpen* (both implying an "inversion"), *geworden form* ("form of becoming") etc. signify a dialogical relation to German classical philosophy in general and Hegel in particular where philosophy means essentially a logic of becoming where becoming heralds the pathway to human freedom.

This paper is divided into three parts :

(a) Part I *Reading Philosophy* deals with the method used by Marx to read philosophical systems within the genre of the genealogy of estrangement.

(b) Part II *Revolutionary Pathways* deals with the way the genealogy of estrangement analyses effect produced by alienation. We call this "production effects" whereby estranged and idealist signifying discourses are produced. This section deconstructs the terms inversion (*umstülpen*) and *Kehre* (bend) whereby Marx is able to clear out the

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overgrowth of alien things in order to visualize history as a process of radical emancipation. Here the structure of the alien thing is revealed with the various possible discourses produced by it.

(c) Part III *Time and Phantasmagoria: Futurism and the Holocaust of Reified Time* dissolves the estrangement inherent in the Marxist problematic. It introduces the notions of time and phantasmagoria in *Capital.* Secondly it relates the category of determinism incorrectly inscribed in Marx's works with the notion of reified time. It presents reified time as a "production effect" of the alien thing.

The paper concludes with the possibility of an archaeology of a theory of time in Marx whereby Marx distinguishes the *reified time zone* of the alien thing from *historical time* that presents Marx's *theory of futurism.*

Thirdly this section relates the philosophy of *Capital* (genealogy of estrangement) with the science of historical materialism that studies the transformation of societies. Here I relate the concept of "determination" (*Bestimmung*) with formation (*Gestaltung*) and form of appearance (*Erscheingusform*), whereby the deconstruction of the genetic structure of the alien thing presents the disembodied development of hitherto history. Within the rupture of this disembodied - estranged history, Marx inscribed his philosophy of futurism.

In the philosophy of futurism, alienated humanity, which had hitherto, chosen repressive pathway where only dead labour and animated objects lived, breaks out from the nightmare of domination and servitude into the morning of freedom.

I

Reading Philosophy

Louis Althusser had remarked that Marx involves a different practice of philosophy.[2] Consequently one does not read the history of philosophy anymore in the sense of seeking "external realities" or "inner experiences", or

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of bracketing the world to get the ideal essence, or whether intuition, reason or experience give true knowledge, or whether philosophy gives primacy to matter or to consciousness. A different practice of philosophy no longer reads these question in terms of an *endogamous textuallity* with its *immanent meaning - worlds*. On the contrary we need to read this life-world as idealised signification of the genealogy of estrangement.

Marx calls this method the *Aufhebung* (Sublation) and *Verwirklichung* (realisation) of philosophy.[3] what is required is not a response to idealist signification but the archaeological uncovering which lays bare the mode of production of the idealised sign systems. It is thus the *Kehre*, the turn or bend, in which the earlier practice of philosophy can be read. Marx calls this the *umstülpen*, the *overturning* in which the mystical shells are peeled off from historical discourses.[4] In case the act of the umstülpen is not discovered the earlier practice of alienated philosophies would recurr again. And it is this *recurrence of alienated discourses* that would haunt post-Marx Marxism. Not only philosophical inquiry, but political economy and the social sciences would be estranged recurrences. The historical mutation that would qualify the epistemic possibilities of socialist discourses would not be found.

Historical time is constituted by the act of *umstülpen*. It is an upheaval in which reified time is discovered. To discover reified time the genealogy of estrangement proceeds into the analytic of reification (*Verdinglichung*) in *Das Kapital*. It studies how reification produces the discourse of "things" - value, exchange - value, forms of value, labour-power, capital, wage-labour, surplus-value. It consequently analyses how reified time operate in a double way :

(1) *The time of things* (that controls the human life-world) dominated by the idealist signifier (M^1), in the M-C-M^1 circuit, where M=money, C= Commodity incorporating means of production and labour power, and M^1 = surplus-value or value produced over and above the original investment), and

(2) *Circular time*, where M^1 as the idealist signifier recurrs again and again. In the psycho-analytical register this eternal recurrence signifies neurosis,[5] whilst in the post-Marx-Marxism of Luka'cs circular time

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signifies the reification of consciousness.[6] Principally circular time signifies the eternal recurrence of the capitalist mode of production, *Capital's* epistemic mechanism analyses how thingified and circular time zone opens the world of disembodied time - a time zone that not only is independent of the subject but which causes dread and terror to the human life-world.

From the conjuncture of reified - disembodied time zone, analysis turns towards the conditions of the possibilities of historical time. Historical time actively interpellates reified time. Genealogy analyses Marx's doctrine of necessity (*Notwendingkeit)* in *Capital*, in the framework of laws "working with brazen necessity" and "asserting tendencies",[7] and the logic of the "necessity of successive determinate orders" (Notwendingkeit bestimmter Ordnungen) of social formations in which each order passes over.[8]

To clarify the difference between reified and historical time, *Capital* becomes the Sketchbook that states the difference in the concepts of "becoming" (*Werden*) and "sublation" (*Aughebung*) in Hegel and Marx, wherein lies the introduction of the notion of the tyranny of "fetished necessity". Fetishised necessity is inscribed in the genealogy of the alien thing. The point is to relate the doctrine of necessity with the logic of appearance and essence of the alien thing and study how formless substance (abstract labour as the substance of value) creates a phantasmagorically delusory phenomenal form (exchange-value) (See following model). Abstract time now becomes the groundwork of this formless substance which work as the essence of the phantasmagoric appearance (forms of value). The leitmotif is to understand how this phantasmagoric alien object projects the history of idealised significations.

Only from the deconstruction of this alien object does emancipatory history emerge. This paper is a study in the emergence of emancipatory histories.

II

Revolutionary Pathways

There are two basic sites discovered in the reading of *Capital*. The

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first deals with the epistemic revolution that Marx heralds. The second deals with the reading of Hegel in which Marx develops his methodology of exploring the pathways of alienation.

I begin with the first page of *Das Kapital* in which Marx studies the alien thing. He asks: how does one take a detour (*Umweg*) into the thing-in-self? Two paths are sighted - the immediate (umittelbar) or the direct path and the detour (*Umweg*). Now Marx thinks that it is imperative to take this detour. The alien thing can be understood only when this detour is taken. Since Marx understands history dominated by the narratives of alienation and as the means of production of the alien thing lie in the detour, the detour into the alien paths begins.

In the detour Marx analyses how the *alien thing produces effects.* Thus analysis moves into the *dominant production effects* of the alien thing. These dominant effects are reification, value and ideology. This triple binding of reification, value and ideology becomes the site that organises the dominant discourses of class societies. They are alien paths on which history has hitherto walked on. It is walking on these alien paths of reification, value and ideology that the young Marx of 1839-1844 discovered two practitioners of the alienation effect: Hegel and Feuerbach. For Hegel philosophical discourse is inscribed in a semiotics of the "Idea". Philosophy has to be dialectical, and phenomenology in order to read this estranged semiotics. This Hegelian dialectical phenomenology analyses the experience of self-consciousness from the embryonic state of pure being to Absolute knowledge, where the precise details of historical experience are outlined.

On the other hand Feuerbach claims that the Hegelian thesis of estrangement is written in a dialectical imagined text in which the epistemic structures of subject-predicate are inverted. The Feuernbachian method is henceforth stated as the invertive method (*Umkehrungsmethode*) that outlines a critique of onto-theological reason. In this critique, the actual historical experiences outlined by Hegel are said to be distorted images of the human condition. Humanity is predicated on this dialectical imagery. One has merely to invert the inversion to get a crystal clear view of reality.

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Now for Marx, both the Hegelian thesis of a reified onto-theological historicism and the Feuerbachian analysis of the human condition are taken very seriously. Thus reified history (Hegel) and the invertive method (Feuerbach) become two philosophical sites with whom Marx initiates a dialogical discourse. Contemporariness is wrapped up in this *reified inversion.* That is why it is extremely important to point out that the logic of *inversion* is not a metaphorical act (Althusser's position)[9] but an epistemic mechanism that poses the question of the nature of Marx's problematic. As pointed in the beginning, the *Kehre* is the bend in the paths of alienation where Marx conceives of the possibilities of emancipatory histories. In the alien paths the philosopher ceases to walk and loses hope. In the loss of hope the world stands in its head.... sketched by Marx as an *auf den Kopf stellen* or an *auf den Kopf gestellt.*[10] whilst in 1843-4 the young Marx announces to the world that this alien resignation of philosophy is overcome in the "brook of fire" (i.e. Feuerbach literally spelt out), by 1845-6 when historical materialism first make its appearance in the world, the method is the *umsturzen* method - the method that *overthrows* the real basis of the reified games.

And in *Capital* we have the *umstülpen* method that reads both Hegel and capital accumulation as the desiring machines of the reified games.

In both the texts of *umsürzen - umstülpen* Marx makes it clear that Feurbach himself cannot take the invertive method seriously. For in walking on the manifold estranged paths, two distinct and different roadways appeared before Feuerbach: (1) materialism and (2) history. Feuerbach consequently took only one of them. Thus Marx says that when "Feuerbach is a materialist he does not deal with history, and as far as he considers history he is not a materialist. With him materialism and history diverge completely..."[11]

Thus Marx claims that Feurbach stops at this crossroad, turning into a transcendent humanist and ending his philosophical endeavors with the *Future of Philosophy* and the *Essence of Christianity*. Humanism cannot walk ahead of this crossroad. On both paths, history and materialism, only anti-humanism exists — class exploitation, human greed, war of nations and the will to destroy. And it is crossing of this junction that Marx deems extremely

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necessary,

This is the nodal point where the natures of discourses in Marx have to be explicated. Whilst in 1843-45, Marx works on the questions of philosophy, in 1845-46 the materialist conception of history appears with *The German Ideology,* 1847 onwards to the 1850's political discourses and the struggle for socialism become the dominant discourses. 1857 witnesses the writing of the rough sketch of political economy *Grundrisse* and in the 1860" *Capital* is sketched out. With *Capital* three fundamental categories appear, "use-value', "value" and "exchange-value". And strangely Marx seems to say that the crossroads, which Feuerbach halted, could be surpassed with the help of political economy. Thus three travellers are found in the pathway of alienation: English political economy, German classical philosophy and French Socialism. It is with these fellow travellers that the sorcerer and his apprentice - the two partners in the pathway of alienation - can be dealt with.

The sorcerer and the apprentice are epistemologically speaking the subject and object in the dialectics of alienation. The human subject is the labouring subject. In labouring, the subject mediates itself in the world. In this labour of mediation the subject becomes a being-in-the-world. The subject is thus an objective (gegenstandliche) subject that objectifies itself in the world by creating objects.[12] however when the detachment of object takes place from his subject, we have a disjunctive subject-object. The subject is no longer *in the world.* There is a two fold *other world* created:

(1) a duplicate (verdoppeln) onto-theological world, which functions

(2) independent (unàbhangig) of human will and intelligence.[13]

This onto-theological autonomous world is consequently personified. Reification is the personification of this autonomous world. In the *Theories of Surplus-Value* Part I, Marx calls this reification an "inversion" which signifies the "personification of the thing and materialisation (*Versachlichung*) of the person."[14]

Thus the human subject that tried to enslave its own created object is now enslaved by that object. It is this bend (*Kehre)* that Marx visualises very

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clearly in the paths of estrangement. Thus it is important to stress that the problematic of alienation is the method that Marx works with, from 1843 critique of Hegel to *Capital*. The *umstülpen* method in *Capital* clears the overgrowth of estranged practices in the pathways. Yet Marx insists on being very careful in treading on these reified paths. For reification signifies unreal "things" to have been granted life and where the human life world is consequently de-personified. The dominant discourses - economic, political, philosophical, etc. - are reified discourses, which have been granted the strange and uncanny life of their own. They have thus their own independent will, power and consciousness.

And these reified things work independently of human will. That is why the *inversions* that Marxs talks of - *Umkher, Usturzen, umstulpen* - are not metaphors, but precise epistemic zones where he works out his philosophical and scientific modes of production.

How then are those personified things to be dealt with? Remember the young Marx : "My will does not possess, it is possessed",[15] and in this demonic state of possession Marx announces the opening of *Capital* with the structure of alienation duly grasped. It is use-value, value and exchange-value that comprise the structure of alienation.

It is here that two interventions are deemed necessary. Firstly structural linguistics' concepts of "referent", "signifier" and "signified", and secondly Lacan's concepts of "real", "imaginary" and "symbolic". The study of *Capital* shall have to analyse the interaction between these two interventions with Marx's use-value, value and exchange value. It is with these categories that the battle cry against alienation is announced. For when the crossroads of history and materialism seemed to be unbridgeable roads both leading to different destinations, Marx clears the pathways for a historical materialist genealogy of emancipatory histories.

To clear the pathway Marx writes two texts :

(1) Theory of the object, where the object is differentiated as *Gegenstand*, *Sache* and *Ding*, [16] (2) archaeology of estrangement in which the

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model of the alien thing hidden in the archives of the reified time zone is explored. This is how the alienated thing first expresses itself:

The alien thing's immanent structural mechanism

- (C) Exchange-value which is the phenomenal form or form of appearance (Ercheinungsform) of value.
- (B) (I) Socially necessary Labour time (as The magnitude of value)
  - (ii) Abstract Labour (which is in the substance of value).
  - (iii) The substance-magnitude of the alien thing we call *abstract time*.
- (A) *Value*, which is the essence (*Wesen*) of the alien thing.

This model Marx calls the *micrology of alienation* expressed in its cell form.[17] It is extremely important to understand the cell form of alienation. For in this cell form the genetic structure of estrangement is investigated. Marx's important claim is that this genetic structure produces effects. What then are the production effects of the micrology of alienation with special reference to the differences in the concepts of reified and historical time?

III

Time and Phantasmagoria : Futurism and the Holocaust of Reified Time

Reified Time and phantasmagoric appearance are sites (B) and (C) in the model of the alien thing explicated above. The prominent effect produced by the sutured zone of the phantasmagoria of abstract time is the doctrine of necessity. The doctrine of necessity claims that historical order operates in a determinate, definite way and that the contingent events are merely predicated on these ironlaws. Hence it follows that history does not act from freedom of will.

Consequently the deterministic order of history has to be the master

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text for all scientific and philosophical studies. This master text of necessity is unable to differentiate the alien order from the de-alienated order of things. Thus the concealed alien thing that is now producing the effects of iron necessities is not understood as the mode of production of estranged history.

This displaced vision merely erases the theological God of Spinoza to inscribe the Marxist conception of history. Thus: "Thing could not have been produced by God (or history - my insertion, M.J.) in any other way or order than that in which they were produced."[18] Spinoza continues: All things have followed of necessity from the given nature of God, and they were determined for existence and action in a certain way by the necessity of the divine nature."[19] History now starts playing the role of onto-theology. Yet the history-onto-theological nexus is an important feature of contemporary life that cannot simply be wished away. Or to recall the historical materialist method, the onto-theological text is not merely inscribed at the level of the superstructure. This *transcendent - psychotic* opening of the deterministic ideal world is an important aspect of social being itself.

It is an effect produced by the alien thing. Thus the historical materialist treatise of necessity is inscribed in the alien thing. We call it a "fetishised necessity". We have now to analyse the relation between reified time, phantasmagoric appearance and fetishised necessity.

We also have to distinguish "fetishised necessity" from "revolutionary necessity". Whilst fetishised necessity marches in the marches of pre-determined teleology of the alien thing, revolutionary necessity intervenes in the alien process. It locates a historical conjuncture which is involved in a double production: of communist consciousness and the alteration of people (*Vernaderung der Menschen*) which is necessary (*nötig*), and where the overthrowing class (*sturzende Klasse*) intervenes in the discourses of the ruling class who insist on playing the sorcerer's apprentice to the alien thing.[20] This site of the necessary (notig) is grounded in human needs (*Bedurfnisses*). The site of human needs is different from the teleology of alien time. It recalls the *umstülpen* from *Capital* and thus records a time for upheavals. Historical time now makes its first appearance.

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In an earlier paper on the study of the human essence (*das emnschlichen Wesen*) I distinguished discourses appearing in pure from and the *chaotic form*.[21] The preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* is an example of the discourse in pure form. This model is thus outlined:

Ideological superstructure

↑

Forces of Production ----------> Relations of Production

This pure form will analyse both estranged and de-alienated histories. There are three split sites:

(1) productive forces,

(2) relations of production, and

(3) Superstructure

The productive forces - relations of production combine is the (alienated) body — presented as the dominant mode of production, whilst the ideological superstructure is the (reified) mind where people become (un) conscious. This (un) conscious mind is the subordinated mode of production. One could also call it the *enslaved mode*.

In this pure presentation of alienation, the body splits creating a conflict between production forces (means of production, technologies and labour power) and relations of production (class structure of society which defines the economic ownership of productive forces). Thus the arms and legs (productive forces) of alienated civilisation clashes with the anatomy of the body (relations of production). Now this clash causes disorders within the anatomical structure and brings the arms and legs of history to a halt. They have become "fetters" instead of "forms of development".[22] This disorderline reflects a historically defined superstructural consciousness. To bring the body back on its feet the anatomy is transformed. This transformation in the anatomical relations of production brings the body back onto its feet.

In this dichotomous and fracture clashes alienated society evolves.

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Estranged time thus moves forth. The datability of hitherto hsitory is constituted within this body-mind sclerosis. Thus Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production are epochs in the (alienated) progress of history.

The datability and assigning of time is constituted within the dialectical struggle between forces and relations of production. The scientific problematic of historical materialism is constituted with this pure model of productive forces, relations of production and super structural interactive zones. Thus at each historical datable structures and events, the productive forces *transcend* the relations of production. The relations of production can no longer hold their own productive forces. In this state, the relations of production itself split where warring classes attempt to take hold of the productive forces. The *historical transcendence* is based on a determined dialectical and historical logic. Determined historical logic locates historical societies. There are three main *transformative zones*, which are important in the *datability of historical societies*: (1) origin of class societies, (2) transformation of feudalism into capitalism, and (3) transformation of capitalism into socialism.

The logic of the historical transcendence in each of the transformative zones in presented thus: In the first zone, i.e. origin of class societies, productive forces transcend use, exchange comes into being which becomes the site of emergence of class societies. In the second zone, the productive forces transcend feudal cartels based on semi-use, semi-exchange, exchange-value in general in the form of capital accumulation comes into being. And in the third zone, productive forces are socialised, relations of production too have to be socialised. The struggle for socialism begins.

One must remember that this is the pure model of historical materialism in which the datability of historical epochs is presented. The pure model is presented in the "most typical form", "free from disturbing influence".[23] On the other hand actual histories do not function purely on the determined site. Actual histories combine the levels of determintion and un-dertemination. To study actual histories the pure model has to be developed. This epistemic development combines the levels of estranged and historical time zones. How

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does this combination of two different time zones take place?

In order to understand this combination we recall the model of the alien thing and the production effects (reification, value, ideology) hitherto produced. Next we introduce another model that the young Marx sighted in 1844:



(1) *Existence*

(Estranged world of capital and wage-labour)

(II) *Essence* (Reified relations of production which produces the idealised M-C-M^1 circuit)

(III) *Human Essence* (*Das menschliche Wesen*) which is the liberative sight of humanity's labouring in the world of naturalism and humanism.

Humanity's being-the World

Site I existence comprises everytime time, site II essence, reified time, and site III the human essence is composed of historical time.

This is where Marx's futurism emerges. Marx's futurism is not a pre-determined, "*ideal* to which reality (will) have to adjust itself". On the other hand it is the real movement (*Wrikliche Bewegung*) which abolishes (*aufgebt*) the present state of things".[24] Thus analysis will have to turn towards the present state (*jetzigen zustand*).

At this conjunctural site the difference is drawn between the metaphysics of estranged presence (in which the doctrine of necessity is inscribed) and Marx's futurism defined as the uprising (*Aufhebung*) against the estranged present. Here Aufhebung which implies "to rise up" (which preserves and abolishes) in the Hegelian text becomes an uprising in Marxism. *Aufhebung* as uprising is contrasted to fetishised and reified necessity — a necessity that is independent of the subject and consequently which lies in estranged "things". In this manner the doctrine of iron necessity and the falsely transcripted inevitable (*unvermeidlich*) are deconstructed in the text of the alien thing.

Consequently Marx is able to draw a rigorous line of demarcation

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between the following two sites of progress and development (*Entwicklichung*):

(1) development of the alien thing, Here we have the movement of categories in *Capital*, from the dialectical sclerosis of use-value and value to the question of the accumulation of capital and the theorem of the falling rate of profit, and

(2) Critique of the alien thing where the *desiring subject* rebels against the accumulation of capital.

At this rebellious site of the desiring subject, the genealogy of estrangement is able to relate Marx's category of determination (*Bestimmung*) with formation (*Gestaltung*) and form of appearance (*Erscheingsform*). When Marx talks of a *bestimmte* he means a mode in which definition is possible. Determination (*bestimmung*) is consequently understood as that which defines (*bestimmt*). The determination definition genre is not to be confused with the logic of determinism. However once discourses fall prey to the model of the alien thing they take the formation (*Gestaltung*) of a phantasmagoric form of appearance in which determinism and teleology of onto-theology are rewritten. Erase the alien thing and philosophy is emancipated from the hegemony of the phantasmagoria.

In this erasure one is able to combine a historical materialist possibility of emancipatory histories and the genealogy of estrangement such that the holocaust of reified time is transcended in the terrain of a radical futurism. *Capital* is the name of this radical futurism.

NOTES

(1) Karl Marx, 'Nachwort zur Zweiten Auflage', *Das Kapital, Kritik der Politischen Okonomie*, Erster Band (Berlin : Dietz Verlag, 1962), pp 27-8. *Capital : A Critique of Political Economy* Vol I, trans, Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (Moscow : Progress Publishe, 1983), p.29

(2) Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Monthly Review Press, 1971).

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(3) Karl Marx, 'Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung', in *Die Fruhschriften* (Stuttgart: Alfred)

(4) Karl Marx, 'Nachwort zur Zweiten Auflage', p. 27

(5) Sigmund Freud, 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle', trans. James Stretchy, in *on Metapsychology. The Theory of Psycho-analysis* (London : Penguin, 1987) pp. 286, 288-90, 292-3, 304, 'Neurosis and Psychosis', and 'The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis', in *On Psychopathology* (London : Penguin, 1993).

(6) George Lukacs, *History and Class Consciousness* trans. Rodney Livingstone (London : Merlin Press, 1983).

(7) Karl Marx, 'Vorwort Zur ersten Auflage', *Das Kapital,* Erster Band, p.12 'Preface to the first German Edition', *Capital*, Vol.I, p.19. the Moore-Aveling translation uses two incorrectly transcribed terms, "iron necessity" and "inevitable results", Marx on the contrary uses the terms, *eherner Notwendigkeit* which is "brazen necessity" and *durchsetzenden Tendenzen* is "asserting tendencies". The word "inveitable" (*unvermeidliche*) is not there in the passage. To talk of a text dominated by "inevitable results" is to write an onto-teleological text.

(8) Karl Marx, 'Nachwort zur Zweiten Auflage', *Das Kapital*, Erster Band, pp 25-7

(9) Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Allen Lane, 1969), pp 89-90.

(10) Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, *The German Ideology* (Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1976), pp 41, 101-2, Karl Marx, 'Nachwort zur Zweiten Auflage', p.27

(11) Karl Marx and Fredrick Engles, *op. Cit.*, p.47

(12) Karl Marx, 'Thesis on Feuerbach', in Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels *Selected Works* (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1975), p.38, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1982), pp. 95-9, 136-8.

(13) Karl Marx, 'Thesis on Feuerbach', p.29, 'Nachwort zur Zweiten Auflage', p.26.

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(14) Karl Marx, *Theories of Surplus - Value*, Part I (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1975), p.390

(15) Karl Marx,'Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State' in *Karl Marx Early Writings*, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (New York: Vintage, 1975) p.169

(16) Karl Marx, *Das Kapital*, Erster Band, p.49, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, pp.95,135

(17) Karl Marx, Preface to first German Edition', *Capital* Vol I. p 19.

(18) Baruch Spioza, *Ethics,* trans. Andrew Boyle (London : Everyman, 1993), p.27

(19) *Ibid*

(20) Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, *op. Cit.*, p.60

(21) Murzban Jal, 'The Question of the Human Essence in the works of Karl Marx', in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, XXV (3), July 1998.

(22) Karl Marx, 'Preface', *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. S.W. Ryazanskaya (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1977), p.21

(23) Karl Marx, 'Preface to the first German Edition',p.19

(24) Karl Marx and Fredrick Engles, *op.cit.*, p.57

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BOOK REVIEW - I

Misra, Rajnish Kumar : *Buddhist Theory of Meaning and Literary Analysis;* D.K. Print-World, (P) Ltd.; New Delhi; 1999; PP xx + 202; Hard-bound; Rs.380/-

The book under review is apparently a result of collaborative research undertaken by a group of sixteen students of the Jawaharlal Nehru University from the Department of Linguistics, with a common interest in understanding rich ancient Indian past, especially available in well-known texts (pp xii-xiii). It attempts to present a systematic study of the thoughts of celebrated Buddhist philosophers in particular and of Indian philosophical traditions in general with reference to the theory of meaning. In doing this, emphasis is on interpreting the Buddhist conceptions of sign, *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, *Apohā*, *Niṣedha* (negation), *Dharma* etc. and their interconnections in the light of world-word relationship. It strives to indicate its applicability in the field of linguistic analysis to such a literary poetical work as Wordsworth's 'Tintern Abbey' and thereby bring out its contemporary relevance.

Very often one notices that when researches are conducted in the field of ancient Indian systems of thinking, inquiries pay less attention to inter-school and intra-school controversies. Analysis of a theory is given thinking as if it is homogeneous right form its inception and as if there is no difference between what predecessors advocate and what their successors present. This creates an impression that right form its start the theory remained uniform in a stereotype way, without any major conceptual change. Conceptual change, further, needs to be understood in the sense of growth and development or degeneration and decay. The present work, though it mostly seems to rely on secondary sources, fortunately pays attention to the aspects of controversy

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among adherents of various trends of Indian philosophical thought. It also brings in elements of conceptual growth and development with reference to Buddhist theory of meaning. And for this it certainly deserves credit. It, however, seems to ignore degnerative and distortive aspect of the conceptual change with regard to it and the contribution which various controversies made in that direction.

In the present book Buddhist theory of meaning is outlined in the light of its treatment at the hands of Dinngāga, Dharmakīrti, Sāntarakṣita and Ratnakīrti with special reference to Apoha as a method of linguistic analysis. On the background of the of the non-Buddhist traditions like Grammar (*Vyākaraṇa*), *Nyāya* and *Mimāṁsā*, the relation between word and world in Buddhist thought is dealt with. The work also inquires into the views of the four major sub-schools of Buddhism and their metaphysical standpoints. And at the end it probes into the present relevance of the Buddhist theory of meaning.

The book consists of four chapters. The first discusses Indian theories of meaning along with their metaphysical stands, viz. The *Mimāṁsā*, tradition upheld by Kumarila and Prabhakara (pp. 37-41), the *Nyāya* (pp.41-43), Jaina (pp.43-46) and Grammarians like Bhatṛhari (pp.27-36). On this background, in the second chapter, an attempt is made to sketch Buddhist conception of reality in general and the relation between cognition and expression in particular. The intra-school debate among Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas, Yogācārins (Vijñanavāda) and the Mādhyamikas (Śunyavāda) with regard to the nature of reality and nature of cognition is elaborated. And further on this background, the method of negation (Niśedha) is critically examined to acknowledge the growth and development of the concept of linguistic sign on the one hand and Apohā on the other. With this focus, in the third chapter an attempt is made to bring out the continuity of Buddhist thought, especially in the philosophy of Diṅnāga as presented in his *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa-vārtika*, *Tattva-samgraha* of Śāntarakṣita and *Apohasiddhiī* of Ratnakīriti as outlined in the secondary works on which the study mostly relies. As observed earlier, the last chapter deals with

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contemporary relevance of the Buddhist theory of meaning with reference to Wordsworth's poem. The work on the whole is well-conceived and brings out some important aspects of the philosophical and linguistic richness of the thought of the Buddhist tradition, without introducing any major distortion.

However, there are some shortcomings. An inquiry into philosophical thought cannot be properly conducted within the framework of linguistic studies alone. It seems to do injustice to basic metaphysical and logical considerations at stake, since they are often taken too simplistically. The present work seems to sideline or marginalise metaphysical, logical and methodological aspects of the Buddhist theory of meaning. Further, it also seems to ignore degenerative and distortive aspect of the Buddhist theory of Apohā, introduced especially at the hands and at the behest of adversaries of the Buddhist theory. An impression appears to have been created that Ratnakīrti's conception of negation (*Niśedha*), Exclusion (*Apohā*) and the theory of meaning is the most clear and final development of it. However, the facts seem to indicate something different. Similarly, it is held that although Māhāyana tradition is founded by Nāgārjuna, it is Diṇnāga who is to be credited for introduction of the concept of negation (Niṣedha), if not of *Apohā* as well. This, perhaps, is not a justifiable claim. For, as is well known, it is Nagarjuna who for the first time emphasised and used the method of negation (*Niṣedha*), both in the form of *Prasajya-pratiṣedha* and *Paryudasa.* And later on, while interpreting them a schism is created in the followers of Nāgārjuna, especially Bhavya on the one hand and Buddhapālita or Chandrakīrti on the other, which also later on created a deep impact on Buddhist tradition in general. This is so especially because Śāntarakṣita is influenced by Bhavya and in the present work this fact appears to have been almost neglected.

Further, even though Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrit have continuity of thought, their conceptions of lanugage and conventional reality (*Saṁvṛtti sat*) is not the same. Nor the ways in which *saṁvṛtti sat* (conventional reality) and *Paramārtha sat* (ultimate reality) are related remain the same. Moreover, *saṁvṛtti sat* (p.95) does not mean vikalpa (doubtful and uncertain) or ficticious cognition necessarily, though it is our construction of images,

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concepts, ideas, notions etc. But so too the difference between Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti (p.92) with regard to the definition of Pratyakṣa is very basic. Through introduction of an element of non-illusoriness (Abhrāntatva) in the definition of Pratyakṣa, Dharmakīrti emphatically concentrates on veridical perception in contrast to any perception at the hands of Diṅnāga. The distinction is very crucial both metaphysically as well as epistemologically. But this aspect seems to have been completely ignored in the present work. There are certain avoidable repetitions e.g. exposition of the thoughts of *Vijñānāvāda* on pp. 74-75 is again repeated on pp. 146-47 or on p. 66 in the foot-notes *Nyaya-bindu* is said to be a work of Diṅnāga, which is obviously wrong as it is of Dharmakīrti and not of Diṅnāga. Similarly on p.70 *Vijñāptimātratā* doctrine is said to have been advocated by Diṅnaga and Dharmakīrti, which is absolutely incorrect, because that doctrine was upheld by Sthiramati, Asanga and Vasubandhu. And Dharmakīrit, on the contrary, criticises it and has written a separate treatise entitled *Santānāntarasidhi* as a criticism of it. Further, on p.106 Diṅnāga's and Bhartṛhari's views regarding language and meaning are stated to be the same, which seems to be contrary to the fact that Diṅnāga criticises Bhartṛhari.

In spite of such flaws which could have been avoided, the author has rendered good service in exposing and bringing out for concerned scholars some important aspects of Buddhist theory of language and meaning. The work is appended with an extensive glossary, useful bibliography and an index, which are of great help to researchers. It is indeed a good example of collaborative research and deserves to be studied by the scholars of history of Indian philosophical ideas.

M.R. CHINCHORE

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BOOK REVIEW - II

Prasad, Rajendra : ***Varṇadharma, Niṣkāma Karma and Practical Morality : A Critical Essay on Applied Ethics***, D.K. Printworld (P) Ltd., New Delhi, in association with Dept. of Speical Assistance in Philosophy, Utkal University, Bhubaneshwar, 1999, pp. xii + 292, Price Rs. 300/-

Prof. Rajendra Prasad is a well-known thinker who has spent major part of his career in philosophising on morality as manifested in Indian Society, traditional and modern. The present volume, which contains a series of his lectures delivered at Utkal University in Oct-Nov.1998, makes a valuable contribution to the analysis of Indian moral thought in a meaningful but non-conventional manner. It is thought-provking and would prove to be of seminal influence in shaping the future moral thinking of younger generations. Any moral philosophy, as it filters down into everyday practices of life where human relationships are concerned, has to be critical and cannot for long take for granted the ancient ideas to rest itself on. It has to be an on-going dialectic extending invitation to the future to have an ever-fresh but critical vision of the past. The book is therefore most welcome especially when the Indian Society and its philosophers are passing through a phase of intellectual renaissance during the post-independence period. In this mission of renaissance one has to bear in mind that, to quote Sartre, "you cannot with impunity form generations of men by imbibing them with successful but false ideas." Prasad does the job of self-searching and of forthrightly placing before us his reflections admirably well. His conceptual analysis sifts realities from appearances and truths from falsehoods with discerning scholarship of sources which he has studied carefully. It was necessary to do this because one cannot solve moral dilemmas in one's own life without reaching a rational solution by considering what is morally best in the given circumstances. One

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can get guidance from moral theories provided they are logically coherent enough to function as normative theories.

The Book is divided in three parts. The First contains five lectures mainly dealing with some basics of Indian normative ethics. It deals mainly with the concepts of Varṇadharma, Niṣkāma Karma, Jeevanmukti, Suṣupti and the Identity of the real with value. The second part deals with Ethics in practice, and contains four lectures on Secularism, General Dharma, Professional Ethics and Business Ethics-limits of applied ethics. The third part of the Book comprises only one lecture on the 'Background Conceptual Framework'. The book contains bibliography of Prasad's own writings but does not contain any general bibliography as such. The footnotes and the references given profusely in the book should be enough to indicate the works on which the author has relied for his own views and comments. There is no index to the book.

I

The concept of Varṇadharma is perhaps the single most pivotal concept in Indian Ethics which has affected the social structure of Hindu society in the most unjust and unfair way over hundreds of years. What is worse, it still continues to affect adversely life of this people in the process of reforming its consciousness and ethos and providing spiritual foundations of equality and justice. Prasad, in his bold analysis tries to show on logical grounds that varṇāshram cannot be both natural and obligatory. Prasad's main complaint that none of the prominent philosophers of ancient times as also thinkers like Tilak and Aurobindo in modern times has questioned the dogmatic account of the origin of four varnas is quite legitimate. While āśramwise duties were assigned to those who belonged to upper classes of the society, śudras had only one āśrama - the lifelong āśrama of service to upper classes, which is not even remotely comparable to any one of the four āśramas enjoyed by the upper classes. In India, moral philosophy has never been an autonomous discipline like the one that we have in the West

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especially after the rise of humanism and the Kantian call for the autonomy of morals. Prasad is therefore dart right when he says that "although many modern philosophers, Indian as well as non-Indian, have discussed this theory, they do not seem to have high-lighted those aspects of it which need to be highlighted in a *philosophical* treatment of it. (p.11) Such a treatment, Prasad believes and rightly so, will dispell the illusion which has held captive many a scholar that the theory of *varṇāshramdharma* 'almost paradigmatic of an ethical theory or of a general theory of human values.' Breaking the hold of such illusions is indeed the task of philosophical analysis and Prasad, I must admire, does it painstakingly. The most important point which he makes is that although we grant for the sake of argument that, according to *Bhagwatgita*, duty is nature-born (*svabhāvajāta*), the nature-bornness cannot be the duty-making property of an action. 'Swabhāvajāta' cannot function as a criterion for separating actions that are obligatory from those that are non-obligatory. It is obvious, as Prasad himself hints at one place, that if duty is defined as nature-born it would amount to a natualistic fallacy. He drives the same point home by showing that 'svabhāvajāta', though a necessary condition, can never be a sufficient condition of any action being duty or obligatory. Prasad comments finely on the notion of *swadharma* as well. He notes that howsoever we may try to understand its superiority, the basic question as to why the natural be made the determiner of *dharmatā* remains unanswered. The Indian tradition surely does not deny the possibility of human nature getting morally corrupt. If that is so, it surely leeds to an open question argument. One cannot but notice here Moore's influence on Prasad's line of thinking. Prasad further shows that argument from natural necessitation won't help, as it would amount to denying agent his freedom. This is a kind of determinism and fatalism that would render all moral reasoning, argument and even rhetoric, if any, unnecessary. Prasad pushes his threadbare analysis to expose the utilitarian or consequentialistic character of morality built around the concept of varṇadharma and swadharma. He points out specifically that "calling any swadharma or varṇadharma a categorical imperative would be unfair to the spirit of the general classical Indian theory of values." (p.20) These reflections might upset all those who look upon *Bhagvatgitā* as a

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Kartavyaśāstra.

Prasad carries his analysis a bit further to the observation that "it is a logically interesting fact.... That the very concept of *svabhāvaja varṇadharma* rules out the possibility of its being categorical." (p.24)" Duties cannot be the effect of one's own nature because they are not the effects of anything." (p.25) If any external agency, whether divine or earthly (like society or state) makes assignment of duties, they cannot be categorical. A duty, if it is to be categorical, must have its ground or reason in itself and not in any external agency. He pertinently draws attention to the prevalence of considerations other than moral in the treatment meted out to lower classes. Prasad is outspoken and gets indignant at moral insensitivity showed by the leaders of ancient Hindu society. Last but not least, Prasad points out how the theory of varṇadharmata, though intended to be a normative ethical theory, fails to satisfy the criterion of consistent application to all cases that are relevant to it and of inviting consequences that are morally optimistic.

In the second chapter, Prasad examines thoroughly the concept of niṣkāmatā or nishkama karma around, which is built on another basic normative structure of classical Indian Ethics. Again it's the arguments of Krishna in *Bhagvatgitā* that receive Prasad's logical and therapeutic treatment, free from what he calls *ṛṣi* bias. For him, and very rightly, it is the arguments that matter the most; not who it is that has put them forth. Outlining formally in clear terms the arguments of Arjuna in the given situation on the battlefield Prasad has shown how Krishna's counter argument does not have enough probative force to prove that its conclusion is true, nor does it have anything to show that conclusion of Arjuna's argument, is false. What is instrumental in procuring Arjuna's willingness to fight is not Krishna's water-tight logic but his use of exhortative language and personal influence. In order to show this Prasad asks his readers first to get rid of ṛṣi bias, which is his name for the fallacy of *argumentum ad verecundiam*, and which could be and, usually, is a great hindrance to creative philosophising. Secondly, he asks them to look at *Bhagvatgitā* as a human work. For anyone who is interested in philosophical argumentation, this surely would be the correct approach to any work, which

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claims to expound a certain philosophy of life. Arjuna's arguments, which are certainly moral, are then presented, in all four in number. It should be noted that the situation in which Arjuna finds himself is dilemmatic which no overly general argument can resolve. The assumptions of such an overly general argument presented by Krishna, are (I) the thesis that caturvarṇa or caturvarga are created by God and (ii) the thesis that the entire living world is governed by the Law of Karma. Both these theses stand exposed to bear the consequence, severally or collectively, that moral reasoning becomes a worthless exercise in the life of an individual. It is rather surprising that Indian community, by and large, has resigned itself to fatalistic consequence of both these theses. Prasad further presents ingenuously analysis of intentionality of human actions and leads us to the most important point that if the niṣkāma theory of Indian Ethics" allows us to have only desires for actions and recommends abnegation of desires for their results, we cannot, in point of logic, do that." (p.63)Prasad's treatment of that famous stanza of *Bhagvatgitā* (II.47) viz., *Karmaṇyevādhikāraste mā phaleṣu* ... etc. which is oft-quoted in the lay as well as academic circles as presenting the central thesis of Niṣkāma Karmayoga is noteworthy. Because of its mandatory character, one may wonder whether the said stanza contains any argument as such. But even granting that it contained an argument, towing Prasad's line of reasoning, one is easily convinced to see that the premisses of the argument are as a matter of fact indeed false. They are overgeneralizations and hence make the argument unsound. The argument is also not innocent because if we really believe that we have absolutely no control over the consequences of an action we would turn out to be stark pesimists. (p.64) In fact, as Prasad points out, the great and insuperable difficulty that exists in reading out the intentions of at least some human actions renders the whole theory implausible and untenable. Cases are not wanting where the contentions of self-lessness are a sham or pretnese. Again in the context of the doctrine of *Puruṣārthas*, selflessness or naiṣkāmyatā of agent's actions would be a matter of self-conceit. Prasad does well in showing that ultimately "justification for the prescription of leading one's life in a *niṣkāma* manner for doing whatever he does desirelessly has to be teleological or consequential." (p.67)

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The third chapter examines the ideal of *Jivanmukti*, yet another landmark in the Indian moral philosophy. It is usually thought to be salvation or self-realization attainable by an individual while he is alive. It is, so to say, a life of devotion and dedication to doing desirelessly whatever he does. It is thus supposed to be a moral ideal not beyond the reach of any human being. Prasad wants to examine if such a conception is normatively flawless and conceptually non-vacuous. He opens his discussion with a caution not to allow any *ṛṣi* bias to stand in the way of fair philosophic inquiry, offers some clarifications about his use of certain key-terms and proceeds to examine chiefly two important claims made in behalf of Jivanmukta. Firstly, jivanmukta is necessarily free from the liability to be reborn and secondly, he is a morally prefect individual. As against the first claim, Prasad argues that the claim is simply false for the simple reason that "this feature cannot be predicated by anyone of anyone including himself and that concept of jivanmukta or of being jivanmukta is uninstantiable or inapplicable to any individual. He reasonably argues to show how the concept of suffering, its inextericable bond with body and hence soul's struggle to seek emancipation from suffering provide the context of significance for the concept of jivanmukta. The context is certainly embedded in the theory of birth-cycle and the theory of Karma, which are two sides of the same coin. The concept of jivanmukta receives its significance provided one accepts that everyone who is a jeeva is a boned individual, the bond consists in its possession of a body which is the sole cause of suffering. Only then there is a point in getting rid of the body once for all to avoid the liability of getting reborn. Prasad very rightly points out that "*mumukṣā* is not just the desire to get rid of suffering or even all sufferings one has or can possibly have ... it is the desire for *mokṣa* which is release from bondage - from the cycle of birth-death-rebirth running according to the provisions of the law of karma." (p.73) The concept of *jivanmukta* is thus overloaded with so many metaphysical intricacies that for a common man the ideal of jivanmukta would indeed be a meaningless ideal, and if meaningless, it would cease to have any normative force in his day-to-day normal life. A common man looks at sufferings, whether his own or of others, in the most natural way, and at least some sufferings, he is able to see

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as not quite unnecessary and not bad. It is certain that philosopher's way of looking at suffering vastly differs from ordinary man's way of looking at suffering. Naturally, expressions connected with the phenomenon of suffering in life that are meaningful and intelligible become semantically intransperant when used by philosophers. Needless to say that *'mumukṣā'* is one such word. Commenting upong Indian philosophers way, he points out that for them (a) suffering is necessarily linked with life and (b) complete freedom form suffering is necessarily a feature of *mokṣa*. He frankly complains that this interpretation is reflected in academic circles so dominantly that questioning it will not get an unbiased reception. (p.76)

And yet, Prasad questions it on grounds of logic. Firstly, the link between suffering and living is non-symmetrical. It is not logical but only empirical. Secondly, complete freedom from suffering cannot be ensured because of the poor epistemic credentials of belief in the cycle of birth-death-rebirth etc. with which the notion of moral perfection is uncritically associated by Indian philosophers. Prasad believes and hopes that generation of new budding philosophers of India will be able to see as a result of critical inquiry that' x is nonliable to be reborn' cannot be an empirical claim and that it cannot be also claimed to have a special status because it is a statement from '*sruti*'. Towards the end of the chapter, Prasad presents elaborately his reflections on the open-texture character of genuine morality. Concept of moral perfection is an open concept. Morality can never be a closed and predetermined phenomenon. (p.97) Prasad carefully argues for the concept of morality without its being linked with the notion of *jeevanmukta*. Morality is an earthly phenomenon and among its ideals, jivanmukti cannot have any place. "Morality is ... independent of *jivanmukti*. (p.101)

In the fourth chapter, Prasad manages to expose the last refuge of the concept of jivanmukti as a moral ideal and to shred it to pieces. In the earlier chapter, Prasad had argued that the concept of *jivanmukti* is uninstantiable, that it is impossible to say of any individual as being non-liable to be reborn. Moreover since morality is logically independent of *jivanmukti*, a *jivanmukta* need not be necessarily a morally perfect individual. But since Advaita

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Vedantins have claimed that the state of *jivanmukti* is exemplified at least partially by the experience of deep or dreamless sleep, Prasad's argument developed in the first three chapters would remain incomplete. He has therefore to take Advaitin's argument from 'suṣupti' rather seriously and to show that his (Advaitin's) claim that '*suṣupti*' is an empirical analogue of Self-realization-ideal of individual's moral life-long endeavour is inappropriate. Although Prasad's argument is presented in the contextual setting of moral phenomenon in humn life, it raises in my view, an hornet's nest for an Advaita metaphysician. First, he formulates Advaitin's argument for the reality of Witness Self or Consciousness very systematically and then examines its premises critically one by one. It is not necessary to restate the whole argument or again his criticism of its premises. His purpose is to show that the argument of the Advaitin is highly vulanerable. I shall, however, pass only two comments. One: Premise No.1 - '*Susupti* is a phenomenal (or empirical) reality' does not seem to differ vastly from Premise no.4 " '*Susupti* is an experience'. Two: it is the fifth premise viz.,'An experience implies consciousness' that is the crux of the issue which needs fuller examination. I shall not expand on these comments for the fear of unwanted diversion. All that I shall say is that Prasad's argument against Advaitins is a real challenge. Readers should go through it and form their reactions. Towards end of the Chapter, Prasad hints at an important implication of Advaitic position that the highest reality is also the highest value. (P.120)

In the fifth and the final chapter of part I, therefore Prasad proceeds to examine this identity of reality and value. He does this in the context of Aŭrobindo's philosophical reflexions. Aurobindo is an Idealist of a high reputation and respected in a very wide circle of academicians and intellectuals whose philosophy shows identity of the real and the value *par excellence*. Examples of thinkers who have effected such and identification in their systems are available in legion both in the East and in the West. Theologians who think of God as omniscient and omnipotent have also thought of Him as benevolent and ultimate governor of human destiny. This identification is in need of explanation if one has to explain true nature of our moral life. Prasad

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thinks that there is some confusion involved in effecting such an identification Irrespective of the metaphysical claims which philosophers make with regard to the nature of ultimate reality, the doctrine of '*mokṣa*' which is regarded by them as the highest *puruṣārtha* is certainly in the need of logical explanation as to why 'self' which is ultimate reality is also an ultimate value. Prasad's complaint is that none of the Indian philosophers seems to have addressed this issue. This is basically the question of autonomy of morals. In the West also, this issue has been on the anvil since David Hume and Kant should be regarded as an apostle of moral autonomy. In the 20th century Moore however gave a theoretical boost to this issue on meta-ethical plane in his *Principia Ethica* (1903). Prasad is obviously launching a similar kind of Investigation in respect of a nearly unanimous view of Indian philosophers that which is ultimately real is also that which constitutes ultimate value for human life.

Prasad first criticizes Aurobindo's idea of dynamising philosophy with religion, which is considered by some even now as a fundamental principle of the ancient wisdom. The followers of Aurobindo however forget that the chasm between fact and value, between 'is' and 'ought' and between real and ideal is unbridgeable. The recent discussions on 'naturalistic fallacy and 'non-inferentiability of 'ought' from 'is' are pointer to the difficulties involved in bridging the gap between the real and the ideal. Prasad comments that "Aurobindo seems to think that if something is a basic truth of all existence, then it is obvious that it ought to be made a guiding principle of our existence. But the logical consequence of calling any 'p' a basic truth of all existence is that we cannot speak of making it a guiding principle of our existence." (p.125). The whole discussion of this point is incisive and full of insights for all those who are interested in logical nature of our moral discourse and of moral life which reflects it. Prasad does want us to undertake such an exercise to overcome 'prides' and prejudices' about the moral dimension of human life. The objection to this kind of exercise very often stems from undue or misplaced pride for the wisdom of the East. His view is that we must get over it for a fair and reasonable philosophical

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debate. Prasad, out rightly rejects the instrumentalty of mystic experience as being unauthentic and thoroughly unreliable. To know the Divine is, for Aurobindo, to become Divine. Such knowledge is possible only in the mystical way. For common people, this cannot be a normative ideal. Prasad's conclusion is obvious: "If there is a logical gap between being real and being a value, faith or even mystic experience cannot bridge it. Only logic can and if logic cannot, it cannot be bridged." (p.134) **(To be continued)**

S.V. BOKIL

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

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